- Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00006 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sfarti and Foley because the combination teaches the claimed graphics pipeline, including a tessellation unit between transformation and lighting.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’534 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’534 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 7–8. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “rendering unit”, and “tessellating unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’534 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”). Patent Owner’s and Mr. Van Dyke’s apparent disagreement with this” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 10; Pet. 14– 15. As Patent Owner points out, the ’534 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude that the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor. Nonetheless, we agree with Petitioner’s position that the transform unit encompasses, at least in some embodiments, a different unit from the other three claimed units. This is suggested by the language of claim 10, which refers to each of the units separately. Claim 10 additionally refers to the tessellation unit being “coupled between the transform unit and the lighting unit,” demonstrating that at least those three units can be different units. Further, Figure 3 of the ’534 patent correspondingly illustrates four separate units 2, 9, 3, and 4 within GPU 7. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 3, 7:4–15. Thus, although the transform unit may perform functions other than the transforming function, the transform unit in at least some embodiments does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units. In summary, we construe “transform unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 10 and 15), or the function of transforming the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects (claim 12), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the ’534 patent specification. Further, the transform unit does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS RE42,534 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham - Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2022-01591 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sfarti and Foley because their combination teaches the claimed graphics pipeline, including a tessellation unit between transformation and lighting.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’534 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’534 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 7–8. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “rendering unit”, and “tessellating unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’534 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“preliminary construction in the Institution Decision, with two exceptions. First, it adds that the corresponding structure is a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor. See Inst. Dec. 10. We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the ’534 patent describes such pipeline hardware as being part of “[t]he present invention,” so we include it in our construction. Ex. 1001, 5:25–34. Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 10; Pet. 14– 15. As Patent Owner points out, the ’534 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude that the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor. Nonetheless, we agree with Petitioner’s position that the transform unit encompasses, at least in some embodiments, a different unit from the other three claimed units. This is suggested by the language of claim 10, which refers to each of the units separately. Claim 10 additionally refers to the tessellation unit being “coupled between the transform unit and the lighting unit,” demonstrating that at least those three units can be different units. Further, Figure 3 of the ’534 patent correspondingly illustrates four separate units 2, 9, 3, and 4 within GPU 7. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 3, 7:4–15. Thus, although the transform unit may perform functions other than the transforming function, the transform unit in at least some embodiments does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units. In summary, we construe “transform unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 10 and 15), or the function of transforming the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects (claim 12), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the ’534 patent specification. Further, the transform unit does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS RE42,534 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham - Maplebear Inc. D/B/A Instacart v. Consumeron, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2022-01357 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14–17, 21, 22, and 24–26 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Park, Kim, Hileman, Pugliese, and Mault.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“does not equate an “acquisition request” exclusively with a shopping or purchase request. See Ex. 3006, 10–11. Rather, the specification repeatedly uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:25–27 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:56–58 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121.”); id. at 2:24–28 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”) (emphases added). Consumeron’s argument that the specification “uses the word ‘or’ to refer to things that are synonymous to each other” is not persuasive. See PO Resp. 10; see also PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (essentially same). As noted above, the specification uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire.” Ex. 1001, 5:25–27, 7:56–58 (emphasis added); see also id at 2:24–28 (similar). By including the adverb “otherwise,” the specification makes clear that purchase and acquire are not used synonymously, but rather that acquiring is broader and encompasses other ways of obtaining a product. See Ex. 1039, 1 (“otherwise” means “in a different way or manner”). Indeed, the specification unequivocally describes instances where the delivery agent acquires a product without purchasing or shopping for it. For instance, the specification explains that the customer may “pre-purchase[]” goods such that the customer requests simply that the delivery agent “pick-up” of the goods: [T]he customer has the option of paying the retailer or seller directly, in which case the customer will only be billed for the pick-up and delivery services provided. . . . If pre-purchased by the customer, the delivery agent obtains a receipt showing proof of pre-payment by the customer. Id. at 8:15–23 (emphases added). Even more explicitly, the specification states that, “although discussed in the context of a customer who wishes to purchase a product, it should be understood that system 10 may be utilized to schedule both pick-ups and delivery of any type of goods, including free goods. Id. at 10:40–44 (emphasis added). Those disclosures collectively indicate that a delivery agent can fulfill an acquisition request without necessarily shopping for or purchasing goods. Consumeron attempts to distinguish those descriptions, urging that they refer to an “alternative” embodiment that “does not expand the meaning of the term ‘acquisition request’ beyond its ordinary meaning.” PO Sur- Reply 4. But that argument is premised on an incorrect assumption that the ordinary meaning is limited to purchasing or shopping. Here, nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that the term “acquisition request” excludes the specification’s embodiments where “pre-purchased” or “free” goods are only in need of “pick-up.” To the contrary, as noted above, the specification repeatedly states the delivery agent may “otherwise acquire” goods without purchasing them, thereby, indicating that the agent can fulfill an acquisition request without necessarily shopping for the goods on the customer’s behalf. See Ex. 1001, 5:25–27, 7:56–58.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We previously construed the term “acquisition request” in the related 865 IPR to encompass “not only a request for an agent to shop for and purchase goods for delivery to a customer, but also to encompass a request for a delivery agent to simply pick up and deliver goods that have been prepurchased by the customer.” See Ex. 3006, 9–11 (granting institution in conjunction with construing “acquisition request”). As noted above in Section I.A (“Related Matters”), the 865 IPR centers on the ’465 patent, whose lineage derives from the same application—the ’867 application—as the ’835 patent challenged here. Compare Ex. 1001, 1:7–15 (referencing Appl. No. 12/711,867), with Ex. 3005, code (63) (also referencing Appl. No. 12/711,867). Indeed, the ’835 and ’465 patents share essentially identical specifications and figures. Thus, based on the final record before us (as discussed below) and consistent with our prior construction in the related 865 IPR, we likewise determine here that Instacart’s construction of “acquisition request” is the more reasonable one. See SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Where multiple patents ‘derive from the same parent application and share many common terms, we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted patents.’” (quoting NTP, Inc., v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). More specifically, as we explained in the 865 IPR, the specification does not equate an “acquisition request” exclusively with a shopping or purchase request. See Ex. 3006, 10–11. Rather, the specification repeatedly uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:25–27 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:56–58 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121.”); id. at 2:24–28 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”) (emphases added).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Although the district court considered “intentional delay” in the course of construing the term “real time,” the district court does not appear to have accepted Consumeron’s narrower construction in that regard. More accurately, the district court stated it “sees no reason that a ‘real-time’ transmission of data could not both involve no inherent delay and permit a system that requires multiple ‘clicks’ to operate.” Ex. 1035, 24 (emphasis added). In addition, the district court quoted from a technical dictionary, which provided: The basic definition of real-time data is that it is data that is not kept or stored, but is passed along to the end user as quickly as it is gathered. It is important to note that real-time data does not mean that the data gets to the user instantly. There may be any number of bottlenecks related to the data collection infrastructure, the bandwidth between various parties, or even just the slowness of the end user’s computer. Real-time data does not promise data within a certain number of microseconds. It just means that the data is not designed to be kept back from its eventual use as it is collected. Id. at 25 (citing “Technopedia”). In other words, the district court contemplated that real-time data includes data that is transmitted as it is gathered despite some inherent delay in transmitting and accessing the data, such as bottlenecks in the infrastructure, slowness of the user’s computer, or “multiple clicks” by the user. With that in mind, we reject Consumeron’s attempt to alter our construction of “real-time” to exclude so-called “intentional delay.” Thus, consistent with the district court and our institution decision, we maintain that “real-time” transmission means “data that is passed along as it is gathered.”” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Instacart submits that one skilled in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of electronic commerce” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Consumeron responds that one skilled in the art would have been “someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like,” but that “industry experience can make up for a lack of technical training, and more education can make up for a lack of industry experience.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 17–20). 1 WO 01/11523 A1, published Feb. 15, 2001 (Ex. 1005) (“Park”). 2 Certified translation of KR2003-0085802, published Nov. 7, 2003 (Ex. 1006); corrected certified translation of Figure 2 (Ex. 1038); and original Korean language version (Ex. 1007) (collectively, “Kim”). 3 US 2003/0040944 A1, published Feb. 27, 2003 (Ex. 1009) (“Hileman”). 4 US 2002/0072974 A1, published June 13, 2002 (Ex. 1010) (“Pugliese”). 5 US 2002/0027164 A1, published Mar. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1016) (“Mault”). We discern no material difference between the levels of skill in the art espoused by the parties. Nor does Consumeron’s expert. See Ex. 2016 ¶ 20 (“Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA is not materially different from my definition.”). Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by Instacart.” slip op. at 6
Patent outcomesUS 10,628,835 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,628,835 - Maplebear Inc. D/B/A Instacart v. Consumeron, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2022-01356 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 13–17 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the grounds based on Park and Kim, with Hileman or Pugliese for specified dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We discern no material difference between the levels of skill in the art espoused by the parties. Nor does Consumeron’s expert. See Ex. 2016 ¶ 20 (“Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA is not materially different from my definition.”). Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by Instacart.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“More specifically, as we explained in the 865 IPR, the specification does not equate an “acquisition request” exclusively with a shopping or purchase request. See Ex. 3006, 10–11. Rather, the specification repeatedly uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:58–60 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:7–9 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121.”); id. at 2:9–12 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”) (emphases added).” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“course of construing “real time,” the district court does not appear to have accepted Consumeron’s narrower construction in that regard. More accurately, the district court stated it “sees no reason that a ‘real-time’ transmission of data could not both involve no inherent delay and permit a system that requires multiple ‘clicks’ to operate.” Ex. 1035, 24 (emphasis added). In addition, the district court quoted from a technical dictionary, which provided: The basic definition of real-time data is that it is data that is not kept or stored, but is passed along to the end user as quickly as it is gathered. It is important to note that real-time data does not mean that the data gets to the user instantly. There may be any number of bottlenecks related to the data collection infrastructure, the bandwidth between various parties, or even just the slowness of the end user’s computer. Real-time data does not promise data within a certain number of microseconds. It just means that the data is not designed to be kept back from its eventual use as it is collected. Id. at 25 (citing “Technopedia”). In other words, the district court contemplated that real-time data includes data that is transmitted as it is gathered despite some inherent delay in transmitting and accessing the data, such as bottlenecks in the infrastructure, slowness of the user’s computer, or “multiple clicks” by the user. With that in mind, we reject Consumeron’s attempt to alter our construction of “real-time” to exclude so-called “intentional delay.” Thus, consistent with the district court and our institution decision, we maintain that “real-time” transmission means “data that is passed along as it is gathered.” 3. “mobile delivery agent system” In our institution decision, we adopted a construction of “mobile delivery agent system” consistent with the way the term was construed in the Delaware action, namely, “a mobile system that includes at least a device to capture video or still images and a device set up to communicate with a remote server.” See Inst. Dec. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1034, 1; Ex. 1035, 13–17). Neither party disputes that construction. See PO Resp. 12 (adopting our construction); Pet. Reply 1–7 (disputing only the meaning of other claim terms). Thus, we maintain our construction as stated above.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Again, we disagree with Consumeron. As Instacart points out, Park’s system and method is not limited to one-hour delivery. See Pet. Reply 19. To the contrary, Park teaches that items can be “delivered within the hour or within a customer specified delivery window” exceeding an hour. Ex. 1005, Abstract (emphasis added), 20:9–12 (describing “processing orders for deferred delivery (i.e. those not required to be delivered in the next hour)” (emphasis added)); see also Ex. 1044 ¶ 29. Moreover, while Park places some emphasis on delivery time, it also explains that its goal is to promote customer satisfaction. See Ex. 1005, 30:16–18 (increasing “dispatch efficiency and customer satisfaction”), 34:5–7 (resequencing delivery “to ensure 100% customer satisfaction”). In that regard, the reason that Instacart articulates for combining Park and Kim dovetails with Park’s objective of improving customer satisfaction by ensuring the product to be delivered is acceptable to the customer. See Ex. 1044 ¶ 65 (“[A] POSITA would have understood that a customer ordering goods would care little if an unacceptable product was delivered quickly.”).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,244,594 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,244,594 - Maplebear Inc. D/B/A Instacart v. Consumeron, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2022-01358 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, and 21–28 are unpatentable as obvious over the four asserted combinations of Park and Kim, with Hileman, Mault, or Pugliese where specified.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner offers a similar description, asserting that a POSITA “is someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science or the like” and that either experience or training can make up for a lack of the other. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 17–20). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition is supported by the record (Ex. 1003 ¶ 24) and consistent with the disclosure in the ’067 patent and the references cited in the Petition. Patent Owner’s definition is “not materially different” from Petitioner’s definition. See Ex. 2016 ¶ 20 (Patent Owner’s declarant acknowledging such). Thus, our analysis and findings would be the same under either sides’ proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the institution decision, we agreed with and applied the same MDAS construction adopted by the district court in the Delaware litigation. Dec. 12–14. That is, a “mobile delivery agent system” is “a mobile system that includes at least a device to capture video or still images and a device set up to communicate with a remote server.” Ex. 1034, 1. To the extent there was any substantive disagreement with this preliminary construction, we invited the parties to present their alternative positions at trial. See Dec. 14. Neither party has done so. See Resp. 13 (applying same MDAS construction); Reply 1–5 (addressing other claim construction issues, but not raising any issue with the MDAS construction). Accordingly, we apply the same construction of “mobile delivery agent system” here. ii. “real-time” The term “real-time” is not recited in the independent claims, but does appear in some of the challenged dependent claims. See Ex. 1001, 10:8– 14:16 (claims 14 and 18). In the institution decision, we agreed with and applied the same construction adopted by the district court in the Delaware litigation. Dec. 14–15. That is, that “real-time” has its ordinary meaning, which is “data that is passed along as it is gathered.” Ex. 1034, 2. Neither party has proposed an alternative construction. See Resp. 13 (applying same “real-time” construction); Pet. 14 (asserting that “the terms of the Challenged Claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning”). Accordingly, we apply the same construction of “real-time” here.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, the Specification does not exclusively equate an “acquisition request” with a shopping or purchase request. See Resp. 10–12. Rather, the Specification repeatedly uses the phrasing “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:4–6 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:24–26 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121 and deliver the product.”); id. at 2:15–18 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”). Patent Owner’s argument that the Specification uses the “word ‘or’ to refer to things that are synonymous to each other” is not persuasive. See Resp. 10; Sur-reply 4 (citing Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingeniosh, LLC, IPR2022- 00202, Paper 29, 18–19 (PTAB May 19, 2023)). As noted above, the Specification uses the phrasing “purchase or otherwise acquire.” Ex. 1001, 5:4–6, 7:24–26 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2:15–18 (similar). By including the adverb “otherwise,” the Specification makes clear that purchase and acquire are not used synonymously, but rather that acquiring is broader and encompasses other ways of obtaining a product. See Ex. 1039, 1 (“otherwise” means “in a different way or manner”).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner has also articulated a sufficient rationale for combining these elements of Park and Kim. See Pet. 20–23 (citing exhibits). Kim identifies a problem with purchasing a product from a website, i.e., that the product delivered to the customer may not match the images or videos of that product on the website. Ex. 1006, 2. Kim teaches this problem can be overcome by having the delivery service provider operate a MDAS to transmit an image of the actual product in real time to the customer so that after receiving the image the customer can send instructions back to the delivery service provider confirming that is the product they delivered. Id. We credit Dr. Houh’s testimony that, based on these teachings, a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate those same steps into Park’s system and methodology to “enhance the reliability of the delivery,” “increase customer satisfaction,” and “save[] resources” by preventing the delivery of goods that, upon viewing, the customer might reject. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 51–56. Moreover, a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining these teachings because Park’s system was already configured to send live video and images to the customer’s computer. Ex. 1003 ¶ 57. Indeed, while Park primarily discusses transmission of video and images of the delivery process to the customer, it expressly teaches that its objective is to “allow customers to interactively view, in real-time, the progress of his order, from reception to compilation to delivery though the route taken by the delivery agent.” Ex. 1005, 4:26–32 (emphasis added). Incorporating Kim’s teachings regarding elements 1.5–1.7 would further this objective, allowing the customer to interactively view images of the actual products compiled for delivery and send instructions back to the delivery agent regarding those products prior to delivery. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 57 (explaining that the combination allows Park’s system to perform the same intended functionality “in a more reliable way”). Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that it would have been obvious to” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,115,067 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,115,067 - Maplebear Inc. D/B/A Instacart v. Consumeron, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2022-01359 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Park, Kim, and Williams; claims 11–13 are also unpatentable over those references with Hileman.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner offers a similar description, asserting that a POSITA “is someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science or the like” and that either experience or training can make up for a lack of the other. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 17–20). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition is supported by the record (Ex. 1003 ¶ 24) and consistent with the disclosure in the ’191 patent and the references cited in the Petition. Patent Owner’s definition is “not materially different” from Petitioner’s definition. See Ex. 2016 ¶ 20 (Dr. Mitzenmacher acknowledging such). Thus, our analysis and findings would be the same under either sides’ proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ii. “real-time” In the institution decision, we agreed with and applied the same construction adopted by the district court in the Delaware litigation. Dec. 14–15. That is, that “real-time” has its ordinary meaning, which in this context is “data that is passed along as it is gathered.” Ex. 1034, 2. Notably, this is the same construction Patent Owner advocated for in the Delaware litigation. See Ex. 1035, 4. Nevertheless, Patent Owner now seeks to add to that construction, urging that the district court “accepted” that the term “does not include any ‘intentional delay’ in the transmission.” Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1035, 22, 26); see also Sur-reply 16–17 (essentially same). Although the district court considered “intentional delay” in the course of construing “real time,” it did not include the additional language Patent Owner proposes in its construction. See Ex. 1035, 2. Moreover, the district court stated it “sees no reason that a ‘real-time’ transmission of data could not both involve no inherent delay and permit a system that requires multiple ‘clicks’ to operate.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added). In addition, the district court quoted from a technical dictionary, which provided: The basic definition of real-time data is that it is data that is not kept or stored, but is passed along to the end user as quickly as it is gathered. It is important to note that real-time data does not mean that the data gets to the user instantly. There may be any number of bottlenecks related to the data collection infrastructure, the bandwidth between various parties, or even just the slowness of the end user’s computer. Real-time data does not promise data within a certain number of microseconds. It just means that the data is not designed to be kept back from its eventual use as it is collected. Id. at 26 (citing “Technopedia”). In other words, the district court contemplated that real-time data” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, the Specification does not exclusively equate an “acquisition request” with a shopping or purchase request. See Resp. 10–12. Rather, the Specification repeatedly uses the phrasing “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:4–6 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:24–26 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121 and deliver the product.”); id. at 2:15–18 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”). Patent Owner’s argument that the Specification uses the “word ‘or’ to refer to things that are synonymous to each other” is not persuasive. See Resp. 10; Sur-reply 4 (citing Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingeniosh, LLC, IPR2022- 00202, Paper 29, 18–19 (PTAB May 19, 2023)). As noted above, the Specification uses the phrasing “purchase or otherwise acquire.” Ex. 1001, 5:4–6, 7:24–26 (emphasis added); see also id at 2:15–18 (similar). By including the adverb “otherwise,” the Specification makes clear that purchase and acquire are not used synonymously, but rather that acquiring is broader and encompasses other ways of obtaining a product. See Ex. 1039, 1 (“otherwise” means “in a different way or manner”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner has also articulated a sufficient rationale for combining these elements of Park and Kim. See Pet. 22–25 (citing exhibits). Kim identifies a problem with purchasing a product from a website, i.e., that the product delivered to the customer may not match the images or videos of that product on the website. Ex. 1006, 2. Kim teaches this problem can be overcome by having the delivery service provider operate a MDAS to transmit an image of the actual product in real time to the customer so that after receiving the image the customer can send instructions back to the delivery service provider confirming that is the product they delivered. Id. We credit Dr. Houh’s testimony that, based on these teachings, a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate those same steps into Park’s system and methodology to “enhance the reliability of the delivery,” “increase customer satisfaction,” and “save[] resources” by preventing the delivery of goods that, upon viewing, the customer might reject. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–67. Moreover, a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining these teachings because Park’s system was already configured to send live video and images to the customer’s computer. Ex. 1003 ¶ 69. Indeed, while Park primarily discusses transmission of video and images of the delivery process to the customer, it expressly teaches that its objective is to “allow customers to interactively view, in real-time, the progress of his order, from reception to compilation to delivery though the route taken by the delivery agent.” Ex. 1005, 4:26–32 (emphasis added). reach Petitioner’s backup argument that this “clause . . . is a non-limiting statement of intended purpose.” See Reply 15–17; Tr. 29:12–30:6 (Petitioner acknowledging this is a “backup position”). Incorporating Kim’s teachings regarding elements 1.3–1.5 would further this objective, allowing the customer to interactively view images of the actual products compiled for delivery and, if acceptable, send approval for the delivery agent to purchase and deliver those goods. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 68 (explaining that the combination allows Park’s system to perform the same intended functionality “in a more reliable way”).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,202,191 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,202,191 - Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00950 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–22 on all petitioned grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Markel – to accomplish Markel’s goal of a concealed electrode – is a reasonably sufficient basis or reason to combine the references. On this record, Petitioner demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to apply Nissilä’s electrode structure having a distinct exterior surface to the teachings of Markel because of the similarities in electrode structure and to achieve a stated goal of Markel. Nissilä’s electrode structure uses an external layer of “metal, electrically conductive plastic or a similar conductive material.” Ex. 1006, 5:32–37; Ex. 1003 ¶ 355 (“both references disclose an intermediate conductive material made of conductive plastic”). Petitioner has shown this structure could be adopted by Markel’s “hidden” electrode having a main body portion formed from conductive plastic and a person having ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to do so in order to achieve Markel’s stated goal of an electrode that is substantially concealed (or hidden) from a user. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 354. Even if a goal of Nissilä’s device is for the user to be aware of the electrodes to place them on their chest, as Patent Owner alleges, Petitioner shows that Markel’s concealment objective could be suitably achieved by use of Nissilä’s structure, even if Nissilä does not share a similar concealment objective. Id. ¶ 355 (“Markel’s hidden electrode is desirable because it increases aesthetics of the device while protecting the electrode from bumps or other damage.”). Based on the record before us, Petitioner has also shown sufficiently that a POSITA would be motivated to combine Markel and Nissilä to satisfy limitations [1.c.i], [1.c.ii], and [1.c.iii].” slip op. at 41
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ recitations are similar in scope. Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is somewhat broader in education. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with both the scope of the claimed invention and the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that our decision would be the same adopting either proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“With respect to the preamble “[a]n electronic device for detecting a user’s cardiac signal,” as recited in elements [1.pre] and [15.pre], Petitioner submits that the language provides antecedent basis that defines language in the claim body. For example, [1.pre] and [15.pre] each recite “a user’s cardiac signal,” which is referred back to later in the claim bodies as “the user’s cardiac signal” . . . The phrase “a user” in [1.pre] and [15.pre] is referred back to in the claim bodies as part of “the user’s skin’s contact” . . . As another example, [15.pre] recites “An electronic device,” which is referred back to later in the claim body as “the electronic device” . . . Consequently, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the language “An electronic device for detecting a user’s cardiac signal” in [1.pre] and [15.pre] is limiting and should receive its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77). We find Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the preamble of claims 1 and 15 persuasive. Petitioner has shown that the claim preamble, when read in the context of the entire claim, recites limitations of the claim, and is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,076,257 - Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00949 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 11–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kim anticipates or renders obvious at least claims 11, 14, 16, and 19.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Our Trial Practice Guide explains that, as is the case here, for parallel petitions challenging the same patent “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” CTPG 59. The CTPG also recognizes “that there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. The CTPG provides some exemplary reasons for multiple petitions, for instance “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. The CTPG further compels a petitioner filing multiple petitions to identify: (1) a ranking of the petitions in the order in which it wishes the Board to consider the merits, if the Board uses its explanation of the differences between the petitions, why the issues addressed by the differences are material, and why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Id. at 60. We focus our analysis on part (2) and “why the issues addressed by the differences are material, and why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions.” Id.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, at this stage in the proceeding, we expressly construe the claims only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner indicate that any claim terms require construction. See generally, Petition; Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision where no claim terms are in dispute we need not explicitly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’619 patent would have been a person with a working knowledge of physiological monitoring technologies, a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, and training or at least one to two years of related work experience with capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to physiological monitoring technologies. Pet. 8 (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not expressly address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’619 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,866,619 - Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00948 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kim anticipates or renders obvious at least claims 1, 5, 9, and 10.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Analysis Two things can be true—first, the Board’s word and page count can be necessary to limit Petitioner’s to a reasonable articulation and advancement of the challenges with respect to the claims of a particular patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24; see also CTPG II.A.3. (“parties should . . . focus on concise, well-organized, easy-to-follow arguments supported by readily identifiable evidence of record.”). Second, as recognized in the CTPG, a single petition, limited in this way, may at times be insufficient to convey all of the necessary information for the Board to correctly consider and evaluate the prior art and claims at issue. See CTPG 59 (“there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.”). With this in mind, and for the following reasons, we find Petitioner’s explanations and arguments for filing two petitions persuasive and, based on the facts and circumstances in this case, institute both parallel petitions.” slip op. at 23
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,866,619 - College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01042 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1, 21, 26, and 28 of the ’876 patent because the petitioner’s earlier Iowa declaratory judgment action triggered § 315(a)(1).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherDenied
“The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1). For these reasons, after considering the parties’ evidence and arguments, we determine that § 315(a)(1) bars institution of inter partes review for these proceedings.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Here, there is no evidence that Patent Owner filed a claim as a plaintiff against Petitioner in the Northern District of Iowa and that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim in opposition to or against such a claim. Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner should be precluded from arguing that the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim is also not persuasive. Pet. 7. Regardless of whether Patent Owner subsequently argued that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim (an argument made in the context of a motion of consolidation), subsequent arguments by Patent Owner would not retroactively transform the Iowa DJ action, which was filed before any claim was filed by Patent Owner against Petitioner in that jurisdiction, into a counterclaim. Thus, we find that Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent. The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,274,876
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.