• Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.Com, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · May 24, 2019 · IPR2016-01201 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact the finding that the challenged claims were not shown obvious over the asserted Chu and Chen combinations.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “At the outset, we note that in a request for rehearing we do not review the merits of the Final Written Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked in the Final Written Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “evidence that, in Chu ’684, users would dial according to the dialing conventions of their geographic area. Reh’g Opp’n 8 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Mangione-Smith, testified that “in Chu ’684, the users would dial PSTN ‘public numbers’ based on the location of the customer premises.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 66 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 2). Figure 2 of Chu ’684 supports Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony, in that Figure 2 of Chu ’684 illustrates customer premises 105 (which includes IP phones) as connected to a service provider central office 205. See Ex. 1006, Fig. 2; Reh’g Opp’n 9 (contrasting Petitioner’s assertion” slip op. at 4

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,542,815
• Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.Com, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · May 24, 2019 · IPR2016-01198 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact the finding that challenged claims of the ’005 and ’815 patents were not shown obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “At the outset, we note that in a request for rehearing we do not review the merits of the Final Written Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked in the Final Written Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “testimony by Dr. Mangione-Smith—when rejecting Petitioner’s view of the prior art and reason for the combination. See FWD 19 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 65–67); Reh’g Opp’n 6. Thus, when the panel concluded that Petitioner had not shown that Chu ’684’s method would apply to a number reformatted by the secondary references (see FWD 22–23), it relied on record evidence supporting its conclusion. We determine that the panel did not misapprehend the nature of the proposed combination; rather, based on the record, it resolved a factual dispute and concluded that Petitioner failed to show the proposed combination would operate as asserted.” slip op. at 5

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,179,005
• Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00331 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Beser and RFC 2401.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s contentions are not persuasive. Patent Owner fails to explain sufficiently why the notion of “performing an additional evaluation” constitutes an implicit part of the claimed intercept clause. Addressing similar arguments by Patent Owner, a Board panel made a similar determination in the ’237 FWD relied upon by Petitioner. ’237 FWD 11 (“the record show[s] that the additional functionality urged by Patent Owner should not be imported into the intercepting phrase”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Under this standard, absent any special definitions, claim terms or phrases are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For the purposes of this Decision, only the claim terms or clauses below need express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Dr. Tamassia’s testimony as to public accessibility of RFCs in general to be credible, especially given the independent support of RFC 2026 (Ex. 1036), the contents of which Patent Owner does not challenge.7 As part of routine discovery, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii), Patent Owner had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Tamassia, but does not point us to any discussion of this issue. Moreover, RFC 2401’s contents are consistent with the publication process described by RFC 2026 and Dr. Tamassia, including the inclusion of a date “November 1998” on the top right corner of the first page of the document. Ex. 1008, 1. In addition, this document—a request for suggestions and improvements for an Internet standards protocol, 7 As addressed below, Patent Owner objects and moves to dismiss a number of Exhibits based on hearsay and relevancy. See Paper 20 (Motion to Exclude). having no indication of being a mere draft or internal paper—is precisely the type of document whose very purpose is public disclosure, including on the Internet. Both of the magazine articles, Exhibits 1064 and 1065, further corroborate the indicia of availability on the face of RFC 2401, although they are not necessary to our finding of public accessibility. We do not rely on the testimony of Sandy Ginoza, Exhibits 1060 and 1063, which Patent Owner seeks to exclude as discussed further below.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not articulate a persuasive reason for giving Dr. Tamassia’s declaration, as a whole, little or no weight in our analysis. We agree with Petitioner that experts are not required to opine on every relevant factual and legal issue in order to be accorded substantial weight. The cases upon which Patent Owner relies do not show otherwise. For example, Patent Owner cites Schumer v. Laboratory Computer Systems, Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “[expert] testimony . . . ‘must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.’” PO Resp. 52–53. Patent Owner’s quotation, however, mischaracterizes Schumer by omitting introductory words necessary to the meaning of the quoted sentence. In its entirety, the quoted portion of Schumer states the following: Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference. The testimony is insufficient if it is merely conclusory. Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315–16. The Federal Circuit then adds that it is not the task of the courts to “attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a case of invalidity has been made out” and “if the testimony relates to prior invention and is from an interested party, as here, it must be corroborated.” Id. at 1316. So, instead of laying out a specific, required format for the content of all testimony regarding invalidity, as asserted by Patent Owner, this portion of Schumer confirms the unremarkable proposition that conclusory, overly general, confusing, and self-interested testimony should not be relied upon. Id.; see also Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“General and conclusory testimony, such as that provided by Dr. Kazmer in this case, does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity.”). Patent Owner does not show that the whole of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony suffers from any of these failings. Under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), the preponderance of the evidence standard governs in determining whether Petitioner establishes unpatentability. We exercise discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord the evidence presented, including expert opinions, based on the underlying facts supporting the opinion. We accord relevant portions of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony the appropriate weight based on that particular testimony and supporting evidence.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 8,504,696 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,504,696
• Coalition For Affordable Drugs Viii, LLC v. The Trustees Of The University Of PennsylvaniaNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01836 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the prior art did not establish a reasonable expectation of success using lomitapide in the claimed dosing regimen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “The reasonable expectation of success requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As to reasonable expectation of success, we agree with Patent Owner that the ordinary artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation of success of combining Pink Sheet with Chang to arrive at the claimed invention. To the extent that Petitioner relies on our Institution Decision, we note that decision was based on the evidence of record at that time. The evidence advanced by Patent Owner during trial, discussed herein, however, tips the scale in favor of a finding different from that set forth in our Institution Decision. slip op. at 36

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “As to Exhibit 1052, which is the Deposition Transcript of S. David Kimball, and which Patent Owner acknowledges that Petitioner cites in its Reply, Patent Owner argues that it timely objected to the exhibit as an improper duplicate of Exhibit 2304. Mot. Exclude 7. Petitioner responds that Exhibits 2304 and 1052 are the transcripts of Petitioner’s expert. Opp. Mot. Exclude 4. Although acknowledging that the party taking the deposition normally files the transcript, Petitioner asserts that its Reply cites to Ex. 1056, and Patent Owner does not cite to either exhibit. Id. Patent Owner replies that Exhibit 2304 also contains Dr. Kimball’s signed errata sheet and is, thus, the more complete of the two documents. Reply Mot. Exclude. 3. Patent Owner asserts that the citations in Petitioner’s Reply can be updated to reflect the correct exhibit number, if necessary. Id. Given the posture of this proceeding, that is, it is at final written decision, and as Patent Owner notes, the two documents are not exact duplicates, we decline to exclude Ex. 1056, but will allow both Exhibit 1056 and 2034 to remain in the record.” slip op. at 44

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsNot reached

    “the unrebutted evidence of commercial success further supports the patentability of the challenged claims. Looking at the entire record before us, we conclude that Petitioner has not meet its burden to establish unpatentability of challenged claims 1‒8 by a preponderance of the evidence over the combination of Pink Sheet and Chang. E. Motion to Amend As discussed above, because we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated the obviousness of the claims by a preponderance of the evidence, we need not reach the merits of Patent Owner’s contingent Motion to Amend (Paper 24). We, thus, dismiss the motion a moot.” slip op. at 44

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “biotechnology and medical device companies.” Id. The press release does not even mention Dr. Stein. Thus, there is nothing in the press release suggesting that the ordinary artisan in the cardiovascular/cardiac field, or interested in MTP inhibitors, should attend the presentation. We, therefore, decline to credit Dr. Mayersohn’s testimony that “[a]person of ordinary skill in the art interested in the development of MTP inhibitors could apparently have attended the meeting or accessed the presentation itself via webcast or on the PPD website shortly thereafter” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 25 (citing the PPD Press Release)), as there was nothing in the press release discussing MTP inhibitors. That finding informs our analysis of the factors set forth in Klopfenstein. Thus, although the ordinary artisan may have been able to copy the presentation, and although there may have been an expectation that the materials could be copied, Petitioner does not provide any evidence establishing that the target audience would have been an ordinary artisan in the relevant field.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 7,932,268 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,932,268
• Coalition For Affordable Drugs Viii, LLC v. The Trustees Of The University Of PennsylvaniaNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01835 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the prior art did not establish a reasonable expectation of success substituting lomitapide into Pink Sheet’s dosing protocol.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must establish facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Based on the record before us, we conclude that Petitioner has failed” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedDecided for patent owner

    “under 35 U.S.C. § 102 “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation not foundMixed

    “Although we find this issue to be very close, we find that the Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the ordinary artisan would have looked at other MTP inhibitors, such as lomitapide as taught by Chang, that could be used in the dosing protocol taught by Pink Sheet. Specifically, Pink Sheet teaches a dosing method with the MTP inhibitor, implitamide, wherein, as discussed above, the dosing schedule meets the dosing schedule required by claim 1. Ex. 1013. In addition, Pink Sheet discusses MTP inhibitors generally, and notes that they may have efficacy in situations where high-dose statins are ineffective or inadequate, such as homozygous and severe heterozygous familial hypercholesterolemia. Id. Pink Sheet also acknowledges that the toxicity seen with MTP inhibitors may have been due to the high doses used during the clinical trials. Id. Chang discusses the clinical efficacy of MTP inhibitors, including implitapide (BAY-13-9952) and lomitapide (BMS-201038). Ex. 1015, 566. Specifically, Chang discusses the clinical efficacy of CP-346086, and then notes that similar efficacy was reported for implitapide and lomitapide. Id. Given that implitapide and lomitapide are from the same class of therapeutics, that is, MTP inhibitors, and that they are known to have similar clinical efficacy, based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable basis as to why the ordinary artisan would have substituted lomitapide as taught by Chang for implitapide in the method of Pink Sheet.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Commercial successObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “Initially, we note that Petitioner does not contest that Juxtapid is a commercial success, and, thus, in view of the unrebutted evidence provided by Patent Owner, we find that Patent Owner has established that Juxtapid is a commercial success. As to Petitioner’s argument that the Juxtapid website does not suggest a forced titration, as set forth in our section on claim construction above, we decline to construe independent challenged claim 1 as requiring a forced titration. Moreover, as shown in the table below, the dosing schedule of independent claim 1 encompasses the dosing method that is given to doctors on the Juxtapid website (Ex. 2301, 1):” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,618,135 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,618,135
• Coalition For Affordable Drugs Vi LLC v. Celgene CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01092 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Powell, Mitchell, and Dishman.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “qualifications of an ordinary artisan, over the somewhat different qualifications proposed by Petitioner, would materially alter the obviousness inquiry. The prior art references asserted in the Petition are representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (absence of specific findings on “level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). To the extent that a more specific definition of the ordinary artisan is required, we hold that the definition encompasses pharmacists and other persons having experience restricting the distribution of teratogenic drugs. Specifically, we find that the prior art references, like the ’501 patent specification, focus on controlling the distribution of a drug. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:13–16 (describing “the distribution to patients of drugs, particularly teratogenic drugs, in ways wherein such distribution can be carefully monitored and controlled”); Ex. 1005, 901 (Powell, disclosing guidelines for restricting the distribution of thalidomide); Ex. 1006, 101 (Mitchell, describing a method for restricting the distribution of the teratogenic drug Accutane); Ex. 1007, 899 (Dishman, describing a national registry for restricting distribution of the psychoactive drug Clozaril). Consistent with the prior art, Dr. Fudin testifies that the types of problems encountered by a person of ordinary skill in the art included creating a restricted drug distribution program to prevent adverse side effects, such as teratogenic risks. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–55. The prior art demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have experience in controlling the distribution of a drug. We credit Dr. Fudin’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would encompass a pharmacist. Ex. 1002 ¶ 15. We also credit Dr. Frau’s testimony that an ordinary artisan would not be limited to pharmacists but also would encompass persons having at least two years of experience in risk management relating to pharmaceutical products, as pharmacists are not the only persons having restricted drug distribution experience and knowledge. Ex. 2059 ¶ 60. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would include pharmacists and persons having at least two years of experience in risk management relating to pharmaceutical products as pharmacists. Additionally, we determine that, even if we were to adopt verbatim Dr. Frau’s definition of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner has failed to present sufficient and credible evidence to persuade us that Patent Owner’s defined person of ordinary skill in the art would be led to a different outcome regarding the obviousness of the challenged claims. Specifically, Dr. DiPiro, testifying for Patent Owner, acknowledged that many” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “No claim term requires express construction for the purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). One issue of claim construction, however, requires some discussion. Patent Owner argues that the term “computer readable storage medium” in claim 1 should be read to require a “centralized” computer readable storage medium—namely “a centralized database that includes all registration information regarding the claimed prescribers, pharmacies, and patients.” Resp. 22, 35. We are not persuaded that the wording of the claim, or the disclosure of the ’501 patent specification, supports Patent Owner’s view.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “distribution of Accutane and Dishman’s method for controlling distribution of Clozaril—and apply those features to controlling the distribution of another potentially hazardous drug (thalidomide, which Powell discusses as requiring controlled distribution). Patent Owner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized or applied the teachings of Mitchell or Dishman to the problem identified in Powell lacks merit. Resp. 49–53. On that point, Patent Owner itself identifies in the Response an article, which explains that Patent Owner’s “plan [for thalidomide] is built on experience with restrictions on such other drugs with severe side effects as Accutane . . . and Clorazil.” Ex. 2063, 1136; see Resp. 6 (quoting Ex. 2063, 1135). Furthermore, both of Patent Owner’s witnesses acknowledged the relevance of the programs disclosed in Mitchell and Dishman to the problem at hand, namely, controlling distribution of thalidomide. Specifically, Dr. DiPiro testified that, “in some of the literature where isotretinoin [Accutane] and clozapine [Clorazil] systems were discussed,” even researchers employed by Patent Owner recognized “that the results from these systems could guide an individual in either direction, as a way to do it or as a way not to do it. So in that sense they are relevant.” Ex. 1066, 326:23–327:5. Dr. Frau similarly acknowledged that the clozapine program was a restricted distribution program (Ex. 1067, 112:7–15; 113:3–8) and, thus, addressed the very same problem that would have been focused upon by a person of ordinary skill in the art. We find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s assertions that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to consider the combined disclosures of Mitchell, Dishman and Powell—all of which pertain to controlling the distribution of a drug to a subpopulation of patients likely to suffer serious side effects. Resp. 31–32, 38–41 (arguing that various features of known methods for controlling distribution of Accutane and Clozaril, as disclosed or suggested by the combined prior art, would not have been applied to controlling distribution of thalidomide in the manner claimed). Patent Owner, in essence, argues that an ordinary artisan would understand each applied reference only for its express teachings and would not have applied those teachings beyond the specific uses disclosed in the particular prior art reference. However, “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. In that regard, we are persuaded that the invention of claim 1 represents the “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417. Claim 1 is directed to a combination of known steps (registering patients, prescribers, and pharmacies in a computer readable storage medium; identifying and counseling a subpopulation of patients whose access to a teratogenic drug should be restricted; and authorizing drug therapy only for non-pregnant patients) to accomplish a known purpose (prescribing drug only to non-pregnant patients) and achieve a predictable result (preventing fetal exposure to the drug). Pet. 36–41 (claim chart). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner approaches this dispute as if the ground set for trial was based on anticipation. Reply 14 (pointing out that Patent Owner’s Response “reads as if [the ground set for trial] was based on an anticipation”). For example, Patent Owner focuses on specific features not present in one applied reference, without meeting head on the question whether all the features would have been suggested by the combined disclosures of the prior art. See Resp. 25–29, 31–32, 36–37 (attacking disclosures of each applied reference in isolation). Patent Owner’s attack on the individual disclosures of Powell, Mitchell, and Dishman is ineffective to counter Petitioner’s evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of those prior” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “As an initial matter, we determine that Petitioner complies with our rules, and precedent of our reviewing court, by presenting Mann as objective support for Dr. Fudin’s opinion testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (opinion testimony that does not disclose underlying facts “is entitled to little or no weight”); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (lack of objective support for expert opinion “may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination”). We have considered, but find unpersuasive, Patent Owner’s counterview that the Board should disregard Mann because, according to Patent Owner, the reference is directed “to teratologists or reproductive toxicologists, not pharmacists or [] those focusing on risk management.” Resp. 44. Patent Owner’s position on that point is not persuasive in view of Patent Owner’s own prior reliance on information supplied by teratologists in connection with the controlled distribution of thalidomide. Reply 16–17 (citing Ex. 2094, 7, 130, 137). Taking account of the full record developed during trial, we credit Dr. Fudin’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the desirability of identifying a subpopulation of male patients in view of Mann. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–98. We are persuaded that Mann reveals the state of the art at the time of the invention, and supports Dr. Fudin’s testimony that an ordinary artisan would have 7 Passage of Chemicals into Human and Animal Semen: Mechanisms and Significance, Thaddeus Mann and Cecelia Lutwak-Mann, CRC Critical Reviews in Toxicology (1982) 11:1, 1–14 (Ex. 1018, “Mann”). understood the necessity of counseling males, capable of impregnating females, about the risks that attend fetal exposure to a teratogenic drug. Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–98 (citing Ex. 1018, 7–8) (Mann, suggesting that thalidomide was known to become “strongly adsorbed by spermatozoa” and adversely affect the pregnancy in female rabbits mated to males that were administered thalidomide prior to conception)). We have considered, but are not persuaded by, Patent Owner’s counterview that one would not have considered Mann’s discussion of rabbit sperm to apply to human sperm. Resp. 44–45. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner previously admitted that studies relating to rabbit sperm were relevant to evaluating the effects of thalidomide on human sperm. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 2064, 951). Dr. Fudin’s opinion—that it would have been “apparent that the sperm of male patients could be damaged by teratogenic drugs and consequently result in birth defects, if the male was to impregnate a female”—is supported by objective factual evidence, namely, Mann. Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 96) (citing Ex. 1018, 7–8)). We recognize that Powell’s Patient Information Sheet, under a heading relating to “side effects,” contains this statement: “No effects on male sperm are recognized.” Ex. 1005, 903; Resp. 45. That isolated statement in Powell, standing alone, does not defeat the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the sperm of male patients, treated with teratogenic drugs, could result in birth defects. Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 96) (citing Mann (Ex. 1018, 7–8)). Significantly, the statement in Powell is preceded by a discussion of the necessity of using “adequate contraception throughout the duration of thalidomide therapy.” Ex. 1005, 903. When read in the context of the surrounding disclosure, Powell suggests that no contraceptive “effects on male sperm are recognized” as a side effect of thalidomide therapy. Id.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 6,045,501 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,045,501
• ZTE USA, Inc. v. Saint Lawrence Communications LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Sep 14, 2016 · IPR2016-00705 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Ozawa did not show the required comparison of pitch prediction errors across signal paths, and the obviousness grounds did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). We have reviewed the Petition and supporting declaration of Dr. Johnson, and these materials do not contain adequate support for Petitioner’s assertion that Ozawa discloses the “a selector for comparing the pitch prediction errors calculated in said at least two signal paths” limitation of claim 1, or the “comparing the pitch prediction errors calculated in said at least two signal paths” limitation of claim 55. Petitioner asserts that “vector selector 22 selects one of the candidate code vectors and one of the gain code vectors that minimize the distortion [i.e., pitch prediction error].” Pet. 18. Petitioner, however, does not cite persuasive evidence that Ozawa discloses calculating the distortion of a pitch codevector in each of at least two signal paths, or that Ozawa’s vector selector 22 performs a comparison between distortions calculated in at least two signal paths. See Pet. 17–19, 37–40, 58. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Johnson, testifies that vector selector 22 performs one type of comparison “during mode 1, 2, or 3,” and a different type of comparison “during mode 0.” See Ex. 1036 ¶ 98 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:21–40). Dr. Johnson, however, does not offer persuasive testimony or evidence that Ozawa discloses a comparison between distortions (i.e., pitch prediction errors) that were calculated in two different modes (i.e., signal paths). See Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 96–101, 145–147. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has not made an adequate showing that Ozawa discloses the “a selector for comparing the pitch prediction errors calculated in said at least two signal paths” limitation of claim 1, or the “comparing the pitch prediction errors calculated in said at least two signal paths” limitation of claim 55. Accordingly, the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on its anticipation challenge to independent claims 1 and 55. For the same reasons, the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on its anticipation challenge to dependent claims 2, 5, 7, 8, 56, 59, and 62, all of which depend from either claim 1 or claim 55. 3.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “is . . . used for selecting a single path used for the computation of the codevector distortions” (i.e., the Petitioner-identified pitch prediction error).” Prelim. Resp. 27. “In other words, Ozawa does not calculate pitch prediction errors for subframes for each of the different modes [paths] and select the mode [path] with the lowest calculated pitch prediction error,” as required by independent claims 1 and 55. Id. (emphasis added). On this record, we find Patent Owner’s argument to be persuasive.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Obviousness of Claims 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, and 60 over Ozawa, G.729, and/or Ordentlich Claims 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, and 60, all depend from either claim 1 or claim 55, and Petitioner’s obviousness arguments regarding these claims all rely on Petitioner’s assertion that Ozawa discloses all limitations of claims 1 and 55. See Pet. 24, 27, 35, 41– 60. Petitioner does not argue that G.729 and Ordentlich individually or collectively cure the deficiencies discussed above in Petitioner’s argument with respect to claims 1 and 55. See id. Accordingly, the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on its obviousness challenges to dependent claims 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, and 60.” slip op. at 16

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,260,521
• Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC / Microsoft Corporation Inc. v. Adc Technology Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2016 · CBM2015-00026 · APJ Michael P Tierney · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 8–14 are unpatentable under §103 as obvious over the instituted prior-art combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “D. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Garry E. Kitchen, testifies that, based on his experience in the commercial software art, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related engineering discipline or equivalent experience or education. Declaration of Garry Kitchen, Ex. 1011 ¶ 33. Patent Owner does not dispute this recitation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art identified by Mr. Kitchen as it is consistent with the prior art of record. See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Petitioner provides specific constructions for each of the interference means appearing in the dependent claims. Pet. 22–24. Patent Owner disagrees that the dependent claims recitation of interference means requires “additional functional limitations piled on top of the disclosed structure.” PO Resp. 7. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that there is only one construction of interference means, namely that which Petitioner provided with respect to the interference means of claim 8. Petitioner disagrees with Patent Owner and contends that the four dependent claims themselves recite specific functions and must further limit the claim from which they depend. Reply 7. We determine that it is unnecessary to determine whether Patent Owner or Petitioner is correct as to the specific construction of the interference means recited in claims 11, 12, 13, and 14 as the claims are unpatentable under either construction. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Program, Data and Combination of Program and Data Claim 8 contains the recitation “the program, the data, and a combination of the program and data together.” Petitioner contends that the term should mean “the program and/or the data.” Pet. 28; Reply 9. Petitioner, however, contends that Patent Owner was silent as to the meaning of the term during ex parte reexamination. Pet. 29. Patent Owner generally contends that the claim recitation is definite and requires operations to be performed either on “a program, or on data, or on a combination of the program and data.” PO Resp. 8. We adopt Patent Owner’s construction (operations are performed either on “a program, or on data, or on a combination of the program and data”) as it is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term and appears to be substantially the same as Petitioner’s construction. Reply, 9–10, Ex. 1011, ¶ 54.” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “The obviousness-type double patenting rejection does not demonstrate that the earlier filed ’995 patent described the invention, with all its claimed limitations. First, the rejection was based on obviousness, not anticipation. See Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). (“One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.”). Second, the Examiner’s identification of “common subject matter” consists merely of that which appears in the preamble of challenged claim 8. Although the Examiner stated that there was no apparent reason why the present claims were not presented in the earlier application, Mr. Kitchen presents credible testimony that the clock means limitation “for keeping a predetermined time period after said executing means starts execution of the program or data processing,” did not appear in the earlier filed applications and written description support for it was added in the continuation-in-part ’784 application via new Figure 12. Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 46–47 and 49; compare Ex. 1001, Figures 1–14, with Ex. 1014, Figures 1–11. Based on the evidence of record, we credit Mr. Kitchen’s testimony as it is consistent with the evidence of record and hold that Petitioner has established that claims 8–14 are limited to the July 2, 1998, filing date of the ’784 application, which resulted in the issuance of the ’520 patent.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,193,520 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,193,520
• Daiichi Sankyo Company, Limited v. Alethia Biotherapeutics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 14, 2016 · IPR2015-00291 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–11, and 15–23 are unpatentable under § 102(a) over Hiruma because the claims lack priority to the Parent Application and Hiruma was not antedated.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “of antibodies having the desired function would have required undue experimentation. In view of the forgoing, we find that practicing the methods of the challenged claims at the time of the filing of the Parent Application would have required excessive experimentation, even if routine. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2010).” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by this reasoning. The challenged claims contain functional claim language concerning the biological properties of the recited antibody. The Federal Circuit, however, has on several occasions distinguished between claims not involving functional claim language and” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “3. Conclusion In view of the forgoing, we conclude that the claims of the ’181 patent are not entitled to the priority date of February 13, 2007. Hiruma is thus prior art to the ’181 patent and anticipates the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). D. Antedating Hiruma” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “presented in the Petition demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1−6, 8−11, and 15−23 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) over Hiruma. This is a final written decision of the Board under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that claims 1–6, 8–11, and 15–23 of the ’181 patent are unpatentable;” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,168,181 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,168,181
• Tiffany And Company v. Lazare Kaplan International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 13, 2016 · IPR2015-00024 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Fine Diamonds with the ILR Article and over Gresser with the ILR Article.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “motion, lasers, and optics.” Ex. 1003 (“Trumper Declaration”) ¶ 17. Patent Owner and its declarant, Dr. Bokor, adopted the level of ordinary skill in the art advanced by Dr. Trumper. PO Resp. 43–44 and n.4; Ex. 2005 (“Bokor Declaration”) ¶ 22. For purposes of this decision, we credit the testimony provided by the declarants for both parties and hold that one of skill in the art would possess at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical, electrical, manufacturing, or optical engineering, plus a few years of experience in the design and control of machines involving precision motion, lasers, and optics. This level of ordinary skill is reflected not only by the information presented by the parties, but also by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable under either of the proposed constructions of the “controlling” limitations. Accordingly, we determine that it is unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute over the term “controlling.” See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We provide below an analysis of the challenged claims under both constructions.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “patterning and ablations of diamonds with a UV laser source. Ex. 1009, 2. The ILR Article depicts a computer in Figure 2, and refers to the “[i]ntegration of a computer into the direct-write system.” Id. at 3. The ILR Article further discloses that “[v]ideo images generated by the viewing system can be digitized and processed to derive information used for” various “operations that make the laser tool easier and faster to use.” Id. We credit the testimony of Dr. Trumper that “the ILR Article makes clear that the computer digitizes and processes the optical images of a gemstone, and the automated feedback derived from the images is used for controlling the directing of the focused laser energy,” as it is consistent with the ILR Article’s disclosure of integrating a computer into the diamond ablation system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 56. Thus, despite the fact that the ILR Article does not expressly state that the computer is used to digitize and process the video images, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that integrating the computer into the direct write system would include using the computer (shown in Fig. 2) to digitize the video images generated by the viewing system and process them to conduct the various operations that make the laser tool easier to use. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 US 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Furthermore, as noted above, the ILR Article teaches that “[c]omputer control of work surfaces allows direct production of CAD-generated shapes” on diamond surfaces. Ex. 1009, 2. Petitioner contends, and Patent Owner does not contest, that the CAD/CAM programs correspond to the required “marking instructions.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1009, 2); Ex. 1003 ¶ 56 (Dr. Trumper stating “marking instructions (e.g., motion programming of the CAD/CAM program)”). Additionally, the ILR Article discloses that the “CAD/CAM interface . . . allows electronic control of processing speed, exposure parameters, and other features” of the laser tool that “simplifies set-up [and] accelerates process development.” Ex. 1009, 3. As Petitioner points out, the next sentence in the very same paragraph discusses digitizing and processing the video images. Reply 13. In view of this, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art, reviewing the ILR Article, would have understood the ILR Article to disclose or suggest using the computer to control and operate the laser tool to generate shapes based on a combination of two inputs, the CAD/CAM programs (i.e., “marking instructions”) and images fed back to the computer and digitized therein (i.e., electronic image information), which “simplif[y] set-up [and] accelerate[] process development” and “make the laser tool easier to use.”2 Ex. 1009, 3; Reply 13; Ex. 1003 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the ILR Article discloses or suggests that images are fed back to a processor and combined with marking instructions for, at the very least, setting up the laser inscription machine. Thus, although Patent Owner also argues that its proposed construction of the controlling limitations “distinguishes over systems that use gemstone images for setup—independent of ‘marking instructions’” (PO Resp. 29 (emphasis added)), the ILR Article discloses or suggests using images for set up in combination with marking instructions. Moreover, as Patent Owner points out, the Federal Circuit stated that the “controlling” limitations include “control based on . . . feedback derived from optical images of a gemstone, before or during the laser burn process.” Ex. 1006, 14 (emphasis added); PO Resp. 31–32. We note that Patent Owner argues that its proposed construction is consistent with the 2010 Federal Circuit opinion. PO Resp. 29–32. For all of the reasons discussed above, we determine that the ILR Article discloses or suggests the “controlling” limitations of claims 1 and 7. Petitioner has identified sufficiently where the additional limitations of claims 1 and 7 are present in Fine Diamonds and the ILR Article, and Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. We, therefore, conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Fine Diamonds and the ILR article disclose or suggest all elements of claims 1 and 7.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 6,476,351 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,476,351

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.