- PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-01011 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim and no basis for discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and evidence set forth by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’924 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’924 patent on all of the grounds of unpatentability set forth therein.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Although the parties appear to agree that this factor is neutral, we note that a district court denial of a motion to stay without prejudice, accompanied by an indication that the district court would consider a renewed motion, “suggests the district court may be willing to avoid duplicative efforts and await the PTAB’s final resolution of the patentability issues raised in the petition before proceeding with the parallel litigation.” Fintiv at 6–7. “This fact has usually weighed against exercising authority to deny institution.” Id. (also noting that factors 2 and 3 are relevant to how much weight to give to the court’s willingness to reconsider a stay); see also T-Mobile, Paper 16 at 12 (noting that a stay was unlikely in that case given the proximity of the trial date to the entry of the institution decision). In view of the forgoing, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution.” slip op. at 39
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a Master’s degree in materials science, chemistry, chemical engineering, a field relevant to polymer science and engineering, or the equivalent, and at least three years of experience in nanomaterials, electrochemistry, batteries, or polymer related activities” and that “[a]dditional work experience can compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 11). For purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “does not dispute the Petition’s definition of [the] level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record, we preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner contends that all claim terms should be interpreted “in accordance with their ordinary and customary meaning.” Prelim. Resp. 2. Upon review of the record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,968,924 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-01006 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–8 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Ohata–Kavan obviousness challenge and no basis for discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and evidence set forth by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’909 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’909 patent on all of the grounds of unpatentability set forth therein.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, the law on overlapping ranges in obviousness challenges is clear. See In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A prima facie case of obviousness typically exists when the ranges of a claimed composition overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art.”). Here, Petitioner directs us to evidence of an overlapping range, which is not meaningfully disputed by Patent Owner. As to Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the lower end of the claimed range of aspect ratios and Ohata’s warning about aspect ratios below 100, we note that Ohata states that its carbon nanotubes “preferably have an aspect ratio . . . of not less than 100,” and expressly includes examples with an aspect ratio of 50. Ex. 1004 ¶ 20 (emphasis added), Table 2 (Examples 12 and 14). Patent Owner also criticizes Petitioner for relying on oxidizing Ohata’s nanotubes in view of Kavan (discussed in more detail below). Prelim. Resp. 6. According to Patent Owner, oxidation is known to shorten the length of nanotubes, which would impact the aspect ratio of the nanotubes in the proposed combination. Prelim. Resp. 6. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that oxidizing Ohata’s nanotubes will reduce the aspect ratio below 100, and argues that “Petitioner has not explained why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would ignore Ohata’s warning nor has Petitioner provided evidence that the resulting combination will perform as Petitioner alleges.” Prelim. Resp. 7; see also Prelim. Resp. 8 (arguing Petitioner has not explained why a person of ordinary skill in the art would try to retain Ohata’s aspect ratio and expect success when Ohata is altered in view of Kavan). Even giving Patent Owner’s arguments their full weight, there is no evidence on the present record as to how much the aspect ratio of Ohata’s nanotubes would be reduced as a result of oxidation. Rather, based on the present record, namely, the broad range of aspect ratios disclosed in Ohata (preferably 100–1000), it seems reasonably likely that the aspect ratio of at least some of the oxidized nanotubes in the proposed composition would remain within the range disclosed in Ohata and overlap the claimed range, as Petitioner asserts. Nevertheless, the parties may address during trial the expected level of carbon nanotube shortening in the proposed combination of Ohata and Kavan.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner is presenting a teaching away argument, these statements do not rise to the level of criticizing, discrediting, or discouraging investigation into the claimed invention. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Indeed, in addition to its statement regarding oxidation not being necessary for anchoring to TiO2, Kavan also states that oxidation of carbon nanotubes “was sometimes mentioned to improve anchoring of TiO2.” Ex. 1005, 2. Moreover, the full statement from Kavan regarding storage capacity reads: “The Li-storage capacity of TiO2 is not enhanced in the composite, but the rate of electrochemical charge transfer is higher due to nanotube networking.” Ex. 1005, 9. Thus, in its entirety, this statement supports Petitioner’s argument that there are advantages to using oxidized nanotubes, and, in turn, provides a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used oxidized nanotubes. Moreover, the evidence Petitioner presents regarding the use of oxidized nanotubes in combination with TiO2, coupled with Ohata’s statement that the electrode active material to be used can vary depending on the battery type (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–27), undermines Patent Owner’s criticism that Petitioner’s arguments are circular.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Although the parties appear to agree that this factor is neutral, we note that a district court denial of a motion to stay without prejudice, accompanied by an indication that the district court would consider a renewed motion, “suggests the district court may be willing to avoid duplicative efforts and await the PTAB’s final resolution of the patentability issues raised in the petition before proceeding with the parallel litigation.” Fintiv at 6–7. “This fact has usually weighed against exercising authority to deny institution.” Id. (also noting that factors 2 and 3 are relevant to how much weight to give to the court’s willingness to reconsider a stay); see also T-Mobile, Paper 16 at 12 (noting that a stay was unlikely in that case given the proximity of the trial date to the entry of the institution decision). In view of the forgoing, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution.” slip op. at 37
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,808,909 - Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Austria AGInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00975 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design.” Pet. 1. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. On the present record, Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 1–78. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’481 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“On the present record, neither party proposes any claim terms for construction. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 1–78. As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“‘run[ning] generally parallel to the lateral extent of a semiconductor material or semiconductor carrier’” and that “[t]he ’481 patent . . . describes a device that ‘has a lateral drift path.’” Pet. 24 (quoting Ex. 1001, 3:14–18, 4:37–38). Patent Owner directs us to a statement in the prosecution history that “[a] lateral transistor is a transistor in which current flows across ‘in the direction parallel to’ the device surface,” as opposed to “a vertical transistor,” in which “[c]urrent ‘flows in the direction normal to’ the device surface.” Prelim. Resp. 8 (quoting Ex. 1002, 33–34). Thus, the parties generally agree that a lateral transistor is a transistor in which current flows in a direction parallel to the surface of the transistor. Petitioner argues that Nega teaches or suggests a transistor in which current flows parallel to the surface because Nega’s source, gate, and drain electrodes “are spread laterally in a lateral drift path, instead of vertically stacked.” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 2). Patent Owner argues to the contrary that the placement of source, gate, and drain electrodes in the same lateral plane, rather than in a vertical stack, does not necessarily indicate that the current flow within the transistor is parallel to the surface. Prelim. Resp. 47–48 (citing Ex. 2002, 7–8, Figs. 1.7a, 1.7c). According to Patent Owner, transistors with electrodes in the same horizontal plane can have either lateral or vertical current flow. Id. Thus, Patent Owner argues, the lateral placement of the source, gate, and drain electrodes in Nega does not mean that Nega teaches or suggests a lateral transistor. On the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Nega teaches a transistor in which current flows in a direction parallel to the surface, rather than in a direction normal to the surface. Transistors with current flow in either direction can have electrodes located on a common horizontal plane, with the direction of the current flow depending on the configuration of doped semiconductor regions located below the electrodes. Ex. 2002, Figs. 1.7a, 1.7c. Because Petitioner relies on the location of Nega’s electrodes, rather than on any particular configuration of doped semiconductor regions in Nega, Petitioner does not show sufficiently that Nega teaches a lateral transistor.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,899,481 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01056 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
CommScope did not prove claims 1–3, 9–14, and 16–18 unpatentable; the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds failed on the barrier tape’s conductive material extending to the lateral edges.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and a minimum of 3-4 years of industry experience in connection with designing, manufacturing, and testing of twisted-pair data cables,” and an “individual with a master’s degree in electrical engineering would require less industry experience (e.g., 1-2 years).” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 12). Prior to institution, Patent Owner’s declarant asserted that a POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and a minimum of 3-4 years of industry experience in the telecommunications industry and disagreed that industry experience specifically with respect to twisted-pair data cables was necessary to qualify as having ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (cited at Prelim. Resp. 22 n.6). Patent Owner stated, however, that any differences between the parties’ proposed definitions “are insubstantial and do not impact the analysis of the issues presented.” Prelim. Resp. 22 n.6. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal of a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) as someone that “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and a minimum of 3-4 years of industry experience in connection with designing, manufacturing, and testing of twisted-pair data cables,” and an “individual with a master’s degree in electrical engineering would require less industry experience (e.g., 1-2 years).” Inst. Dec. 7–8. During the trial, neither party disputed our definition of a POSITA nor argued that the outcome of this case would differ based upon our adoption of any particular definition of a POSITA. See generally Reply; PO Resp. 12 n.4 (agreeing the POSITA definition does not impact analysis of issues presented). Upon review of the full record, we see no reason to modify, and we thus maintain, the definition of a POSITA applied in our Decision on Institution.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Mr. Cornelison’s testimony that a POSITA would understand that the tape shown in Figure 13C “has three layers aligned along the side edges” is not credible. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶ 138. Mr. Cornelison’s testimony that Figure 13C is only “intended to identify and illustrate the three different layers of the multi-layer tape,” not to show the relative positions of the layers relative to each other (id. ¶ 137), is belied by his own testimony, in which he states that Figure 13C shows “metallic layer 133 extends to the front edges of dielectric layers 135 and 137 (id. ¶ 136). Additionally, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Cornelison provide persuasive evidence to support the contention that it would take “much more time and be more complex to make all three layers” in Figure 13C offset from each other or that it would be more costly to make than using the customary slitting processes. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 138. Although Mr. Cornelison provides evidence as to how the slitting process can be used to manufacture barrier tape, he does not provide any evidence to support his contention that the proposed slitting processes is in fact less expensive or complex than other methods. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 138. Indeed, Mr. Cornelison does not address the particular methods disclosed in Glew to manufacture the disclosed multi-layer tapes nor persuasively explain why these disclosed methods would be more costly or complex as compared to the “slitting” process. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 199–201 (stating the multi-layer tapes can be manufactured in a “variety of ways” including bonding the various layers using adhesive or other bonding agents,” mechanically affixing or bonding the layers, needlepunching, thermal bonding, ultrasonic welding, or calendar bonding). We determine that this portion of Mr. Cornelison’s testimony is conclusory and unsupported and is entitled to little weight. Accordingly, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Glew discloses conductive material that extends to the lateral edges of the dielectric material as required by claims 1 and 18. As such, Petitioner has not shown a by a preponderance of the evidence that Glew anticipates independent claims 1 or 18 or the challenged claims that depend therefrom.” slip op. at 42
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Thus, although the Specification does not use the term “lateral edge,” the Specification and figures of the ’030 patent make clear, that in the embodiments having a conductive layer that extends to the edges of the dielectric layers of the tape, the referred to “edge” is the edge of the “long side” of the tape that extends in the longitudinal direction. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:49–51 (stating in some embodiments conductive layer 302 may not extend to the edge of tape 110), 8:1–25 (stating, inter alia, pairs 102 could electrically couple to the corresponding edge 306 resulting in increased ANEXT), 8:41–46, 10:30–36 (stating that the tape edge lies over a pair of conducts and the pair generates more ANEXT). Our construction of term “lateral edge” is supported by Roberts, which also refers to the edges of the long side of the tape extending in the longitudinal direction as the “lateral edges.” See, e.g., Ex. 1009, 2:20–24 (“a shield made from a plurality of tapes helically disposed, the lateral edges of which overlap adjacently lying tapes”), 2:42–46 (“a shield composed of a plurality of …, the lateral edges of which overlap adjacently disposed tapes”), 4:27–33 (“the plastic-coated metal foil shield (15) [FIG. 2] has lateral edges that overlap,” “the lateral edges of the shield overlapping one another”), 4:34–40 (“The lateral edges of the helically disposed tapes [of FIG. 3] overlap adjacently lying tapes.”), 5:65-75 (“the shield (15) [of FIG. 10] is made up of a plurality of tapes, the lateral edges of which overlap adjacently disposed like tapes”), Figs. 2, 3, 10. We credit Dr. Eldering’s testimony that these disclosures of Roberts shows that a POSITA would understand that a tape’s “lateral edges” are the edges running along the sides of the tape parallel to the longitudinal direction. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 64–65; see also Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 415 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (considering whether the proposed claim construction is “consistent with the prior art’s usage of that term”).” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“contentions set forth in its Petition are insufficient to show that Cook discloses a barrier tape having a conductive material contained between two layers of dielectric material where the conductive material extends to each lateral edge of the two layers of the dielectric material, as required by claims 1 and 18, and further that the conductive material be continuous as required by claim 1. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner relies on multiple disparate embodiments of Cook for each of these limitations without sufficiently articulating how a single embodiment satisfies the requirements of claim 1 or 18 or articulating how the disparate embodiments may be combined to arrive at claim 1 or 18. See, e.g., PO Resp. 18–25; Pet. 18–21; see also NetMoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating in order to establish anticipation, “it is not enough that the prior art reference . . . include multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention” and that the “reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,991,030 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,991,030 - Intel Corporation v. Besang Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00991 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1 and 13–17 not unpatentable, finding the asserted obviousness grounds deficient in claim limitations or motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties proposed definitions differ in that Petitioner would permit a degree in “materials science” and require three years, as opposed to two years, of relevant experience. Compare Pet. 9 with PO Resp. 14. On this record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition, as it is more consistent with the prior art of record and the disclosures of the ’702 patent. We note, however, that neither party contends that the outcome of this case depends on the slight differences in the proposed definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1996) (“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.”). Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the intrinsic record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’702 patent does not support a construction of “stackable add-on layer” that encompasses memory cells formed by sequential deposition on a substrate without being formed and then added to a separately formed substrate. Pet. 11–12. First, the plain language of the claim does not require merely a “layer” having a plurality of vertically oriented semiconductor memory cells, but rather “a stackable add-on layer” having a plurality of vertically oriented semiconductor memory cells; that plurality is bonded to the dielectric layer. Ex. 1001, 12:29–32. A construction that gives meaning to all words of the claim is preferred. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, we do not understand a “stackable add-on layer” to include memory cells that are formed by sequential deposition on or above a substrate without being added to a separately formed substrate. It is undisputed, and indeed it is Petitioner’s assertion, that Lee’s memory devices are formed by sequential deposition. Pet. 16, 29 n.11, 51 (“In Lee, each level 3104 is deposited on the underlying level of array 3101.”). Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that Lee discloses every limitation of independent claim 13 under our claim construction. Thus, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 13 would have been obvious in view of Lee. 3. Analysis: Claims 14–17 Claims 14–17 each depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 13. Petitioner’s arguments with respect to these claims do not remedy the deficiencies noted above with respect to claim 13. Pet. 31–41. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 14–17 would have been obvious over Lee.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Aspar would improve Lee, would solve a problem in Lee, and that Petitioner is proposing to use Aspar in a way that is not disclosed in the reference. PO Resp. 49–50 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 153–162); Tr. 57:24–58:12; Pet. 61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (asking whether a technique “would improve similar devices in the same way”), 420 (asking whether there was a known problem in the art), 421 (asking whether one of ordinary skill in the art had reason to “pursue the known options”); Intel, 61 F.4th at 1381 (explaining that obviousness may be demonstrated by showing that there was a known problem in the art (“cache coherency in multiprocessor systems”) and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that that the prior art solution to this problem (“global segmented secondary cache”) would improve the system of another prior art reference). Petitioner does not persuasively show that there was any known problem in the art with respect to Lee or its monolithic method of constructing memory arrays. Nor does Petitioner provide persuasive argument or evidence that Aspar’s wafer bonding would improve Lee’s memory device.10 For example, Petitioner states in a conclusory fashion that Aspar would address the known problem of “fabricating 3D structures,” but does not explain what those problems were or why Lee fails to solve them. Pet. 61. Dr. Sechen’s testimony merely parrots the Petition, providing no further analysis or explanation of what problem might exist in Lee when fabricating its 3D structures. Ex. 1003 ¶ 212. The Petition notes that Aspar transfers “thin layers of very good thickness homogeneity and with a high crystalline quality,” but the Petition never asserts that Lee’s direct deposition method fails to provide these same or similar qualities. Pet. 60–61.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 7,378,702 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,378,702 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitutedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00948 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 7–10, 12, 13, and 19 on all asserted grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Hanisch-Dunagan combinations with added references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Hanisch in view of Dunagan and Hayashi, Meador, or Shin. 5. Claims 2, 3, and 7–10 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’097 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, materials science/engineering, or a related field, and three to five years of experience in design and implementation of battery recycling processes.” Pet. 15–16. Patent Owner argues to the contrary that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have [had] at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, materials science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithium-ion batteries.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On the present record, neither party argues that the result would be any different should we adopt a different definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’097 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “[t]he ’097 Patent expressly defines ‘drying’ to mean ‘the removal of at least one solvent in the conducting salt.’” Pet. 16 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:23–25). Petitioner also argues that “[a]ll other terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning under Philips and do not need further construction for the purposes of this Petition.” Id. Patent Owner argues that “[n]o claim terms require express construction to determine that the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability of any claim and, thus, deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time.6 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“On the present record, we do not find the relationship between URT and Petitioner to be significant to the degree that raises concerns under Valve and General Plastic. In Valve, two factors affected the determination that there was a significant relationship between the two petitioners at issue: “Valve and HTC were co-defendants in the District Court litigation,” and “the petitions . . . challenge[d] the same claims of the [challenged] patent.” IPR2019-00062, Paper 11, 10. Here, one of these factors is absent, and the other is not entirely present. URT and Petitioner are not co-defendants in the related infringement lawsuit, which accuses only Petitioner. Ex. 2014, 1. As for the claims challenged in the two petitions, Patent Owner is correct that all claims challenged in the present proceeding are also challenged in IPR2024-00887, but the reverse is not true. The petition in IPR2024-00887 challenges claims 15–17 of the ’097 patent, none of which is challenged here. Compare Pet. 3, with IPR2024-00887, Paper 2, 4–5. Thus, there is a significant difference between the present situation and that in Valve.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,050,097 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00887 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 7–10, 12, 13, and 15–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 12 is anticipated by LithoRec.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with 1 In the Introduction and section headings of the Petition, Petitioner identifies claims 1–3, 7–9, 12, 13, and 15–19 as the challenged claims. Pet. i–ii. In the substantive content of the Petition, however, Petitioner includes claim 10 as a challenged claim as well. Id. at 34–35. respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, materials science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry [experience] in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries.” Pet. 14. On the present record, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 19. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’097 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[n]o claim construction is needed,” because “[t]he claims are unpatentable under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 15. That said, Petitioner directs us to alleged definitions of several terms in the specification or prosecution history of the ’097 patent. Id. at 15–17. Patent Owner argues that “[c]laim construction is not required to deny the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 26. Based on the present record, we agree with both parties that we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time.6 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“In order to anticipate a claimed invention, a prior art reference must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In addition, “[a]n anticipatory reference need only enable subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at issue, nothing more.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,050,097 - Micron Technology, Inc. / Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. et al. v. Besang Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00900 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 13–17 were not shown unpatentable: Lee-based grounds fail on the stackable add-on layer limitation, and Watanabe-based grounds fail on nonvolatile memory, enablement, or motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“meaning in the art. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that, absent an accepted meaning in the art, “we construe a claim term only as broadly as provided for by the patent itself”). Thus, we must attempt to discern the meaning of this term from the claim language itself and from the remainder of the intrinsic record. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.”). Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the intrinsic record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’702 patent does not support a construction of “stackable add-on layer” that encompasses memory cells formed by sequential deposition on a substrate without being formed and then added to a separately formed substrate.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, we construe “stackable add-on layer” to not include memory cells that are formed by sequential deposition on or above a substrate without being added to a separately formed substrate. It is undisputed, and indeed it is Petitioner’s assertion, that Lee’s memory devices are formed by sequential deposition. See Pet. 52 (asserting that in Lee “the layers of the array are directly deposited on the layers of each underlying level, and the array is deposited on the interlayer insulating layer formed over a substrate”); see also id. at 70 (“Lee discloses forming vertical memory devices through layer-by-layer sequential deposition on the substrate . . . .”). Therefore, Petitioner does not show that Lee discloses every limitation of independent claim 13 under our claim construction. Thus, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 13 would have been obvious in view of Lee. 3. Claims 14 and 15 Claims 14 and 15 depend from claim 13. Ex. 1001, 12:35–42. Petitioner’s arguments for these claims do not remedy the deficiencies noted above with respect to independent claim 13. Pet. 54–59. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 14 and 15 would have been obvious in view of Lee alone. E. Claims 16 and 17 over Lee and Endoh Petitioner contends the subject matter of claims 16 and 17 would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Lee and Endoh. Pet. 59–69. Petitioner’s arguments with respect to these claims, however, do not remedy the deficiencies noted above with respect to Lee and its monolithic, sequentially deposited memory array. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 16 and 17 would have been obvious over Lee and Endoh.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“combined Lee and Watanabe to achieve improved integration density. Pet. 71. Petitioner concedes, however, that the benefits of Lee’s design related to 3-D integration and improved integration density would be obtained if Lee’s memory structures are formed using either Lee’s monolithic construction method or Watanabe’s alternative stacking method. Pet. Reply 13–14 (citing Ex. 1041 ¶ 34). Thus, we are not persuaded that improved integration density provides a sufficient rationale for Petitioner’s combination of Lee’s memory device and Watanabe’s stacking method. Petitioner argues that Watanabe’s stacking method “improves the accuracy of the wiring” because the wiring is made “for each planar member.” Pet. 72 (citing Ex. 1005, 6:1–3). Watanabe also states that its disclosed methods provide “a low interconnection wire resistance.” Ex. 1005, 6:20–23. Petitioner does not, however, explain sufficiently how Watanabe’s stacking method would improve Lee’s device. For example, Petitioner does not address whether the alleged wiring benefit already existed in Lee’s monolithic array or explain how this benefit would also apply to Lee’s particular memory array, which differs in construction and elements from Watanabe’s device. This diminishes Petitioner’s benefits-based motivation to combine arguments. In general, a petitioner need not demonstrate that a particular alternate method would improve a prior art device in order to show a motivation to combine. Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023); see Pet. Reply 20 (citing Intel). But here, Petitioner affirmatively invokes improvement of Lee’s device as a reason for the combination, and we must evaluate Petitioner’s contention. Moreover, any relative lack of improvement or benefits must be weighed against any problems the alternative method would introduce. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795–96 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (noting that simultaneous advantages and disadvantages to a proposed combination must be analyzed to determine whether the disadvantages “outweighed any reason to combine”). Here, as discussed above in more detail with respect to the ground based on Watanabe, the evidence shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have expected Watanabe’s bonding temperature of 900– 1000° C to damage the electronic devices in an underlying substrate. Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 75–76; Ex. 2028, 123:13–124:7; Ex. 2027, 715. The expected damage to Lee’s device, when balanced against the limited evidence of a benefit to the combination,7 outweighs the reason to combine Lee and Watanabe set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 13 would have been obvious over Lee and Watanabe. 2. Analysis – Claims 14 and 15 Claims 14 and 15 both depend directly from independent claim 13. Ex. 1001, 12:35–42. Petitioner’s arguments with respect to claims 14 and 15 do not remedy the deficiencies noted above with respect to independent claim 13. Pet. 73. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims would have been obvious over Lee and Watanabe.” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther
“We credit the testimony of Dr. Przybylski that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Watanabe’s stacked structure would be severely impacted if bonded at a temperature above 900° C, as disclosed in Watanabe. Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 76–77. Dr. Przybylski’s opinion is supported by Dr. Lee’s testimony (Ex. 2028, 123:13–124:7, 125:6–126:7), as well as Watanabe (Ex. 1005, 6:6–14) and Batude (Ex. 2027, 715). As further discussed below, we find that Petitioner has not rebutted Patent Owner’s showing of nonenablement, and Patent Owner has carried its burden to demonstrate that Watanabe was not enabled for bonding temperatures of 900–1000° C, as of the 2004 filing date of the ’702 patent.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 7,378,702 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,378,702 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00679 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 28, 38, 39, 41–43, 53, 56–59, 61–63, and 65–68 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 28 was obvious over Krantz and Herrmann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of relevant experience in networking and network security, and related fields.” Pet. 4. Petitioner also asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and at least three years of experience in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. On the present record, neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’484 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“Based on the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that the recited “reconfiguring the communication port” at least encompasses changing the association between the input port and output port of the access point. This is supported by the specification of the ’484 patent, which states: “Access Control 320 is configured to send commands to Switch Logic 317 in order to reconfigure members of Ports 305A-305G. This reconfiguration includes modifying the association of members of Ports 305A-305G with different members of VLANs 310A-310D.” Ex. 1501, 9:21–25; see also id. at 8:16–21 (similar disclosure with respect to “configuring and reconfiguring”). Notwithstanding, based on the present record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “reconfiguring the communication port” is limited to changing the connection between the input port and the output port of the access point. Instead, the ’484 patent makes clear that reconfiguration is merely “typically,” not necessarily, of this type. Ex. 1501, 3:20–25. For this reason, we need not and do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction at this juncture.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Based on the present record, we find Petitioner’s rationale sufficient for institution. Petitioner points to Krantz’s alleged goals of security and automation. Pet. 19. Petitioner (id.) and Dr. Houh (Ex. 1503 ¶ 64) both cite paragraph 19 of Krantz, which states that “[i]f credentials do not authorize full access . . . the server can respond by sending a notification . . . includ[ing] conditions (e.g., signup, renewal etc.) a user must satisfy to become authorized for []full access to resources.” Ex. 1505 ¶ 19. We are persuaded preliminarily that an ordinarily skilled artisan considering Krantz’s teachings of such conditions for full access would have had reason to apply Herrmann’s technique for checking a client’s antivirus security policy in the manner suggested by Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 1503 ¶ 64; Ex. 1506 ¶ 68. Krantz’s express teaching of conditions for a client to fully access a network (Ex. 1505 ¶ 19) also undermines Patent Owner’s argument about impermissible hindsight and Patent Owner’s suggestion that Krantz is limited to user authentication. Finally, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently, for purposes of instituting review, that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have expected success in making the combination because it would only require software modifications to Krantz’s system. See, e.g., Ex. 1503 ¶ 64.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,523,484 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00675 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 11–13, 15–19, and 23–25 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success at least on obviousness over Krantz and Herrmann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“e) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Krantz and Herrmann. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review with respect to all grounds asserted in the Petition. 5. Claims 2–6, 11–13, 15–19, and 23–25 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’484 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 22
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“III. PARALLEL PETITIONS As noted above, Petitioner challenges the ’484 patent both in this proceeding and in IPR2024-00679. Petitioner argues that we should institute review in both proceedings because “the analysis of all 33 challenged claims . . . of the 484 Patent could not reasonably fit within the word limit for a single petition.” Paper 4, 2. Petitioner notes further that “addressing different sets of independent claims in each petition was most efficient given the differences between independent claim 1 (Petition 1 - IPR2024-00675) and independent claims 28, 41, 56, and 57 (Petition 2 - IPR2024-00679).” Id. Patent Owner does not argue that we should deny institution either in this proceeding or in IPR2024-00679 due to Petitioner’s having filed parallel petitions challenging the ’484 patent. Prelim. Resp. 1–44. Given Patent Owner’s acquiescence and Petitioner’s arguments, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution due to the parallel petitions.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. On the present record, neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’484 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that the recited “reconfigur[ing] the communication device” at least encompasses changing the association between the input port and output port of the access point. This is supported by the specification of the ’484 patent, which states: “Access Control 320 is configured to send commands to Switch Logic 317 in order to reconfigure members of Ports 305A-305G. This reconfiguration includes modifying the association of members of Ports 305A-305G with different members of VLANs 310A-310D.” Ex. 1501, 9:21–25; see also id. at 8:16–21 (similar disclosure with respect to “configuring and reconfiguring”). Notwithstanding, based on the present record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “reconfigur[ing] the communication device” is limited to changing the connection between the input port and the output port of the access point. Instead, the ’484 patent makes clear that reconfiguration is merely “typically,” not necessarily, of this type. Ex. 1501, 3:20–25. For this reason, we need not and do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction at this juncture. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any other claim terms.3 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,523,484
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.