- Petiq, Inc. v. Bayer Intellectual Property GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 23, 2022 · IPR2022-00304 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3 were obvious over Dorn and Reul or Dorn and Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to substitute Miglyol 840 from Reul into the solid preparations of Dorn. Petitioner argues that the similarities between Miglyol 840 and dipropylene glycol pelargonate, and dipropylene glycol pelargonate’s use in the art as a spreading agent, would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to have a reasonable expectation of success in substituting the spreading agent in Dorn with Miglyol 840. Pet. 31–32. However, as discussed by Patent Owner, Dorn’s discussion of dipropylene glycol pelargonate (and spreading oils generally) is in the context of adjuvants that may be used in liquid solutions for use as “pour-on and spot-on formulations.” See Prelim. Resp. 10–17, 20–23; Ex. 1004, 7:4– 7, 8:1–2. These pour-on formulations are different than Dorn’s solid preparations, which include shaped articles made of PVC. See Ex. 1004, 7:15–8:10 (discussing solutions for pour-on formulations), 9:9–22:31 (discussing solid preparations). While Dorn also discusses the use of adjuvants that can be used with its solid preparations, this discussion mentions preservatives, antioxidants, colorants, lubricants, and glidants, but does not include the use of spreading agents.5 Ex. 1004, 9:18–22. Thus, Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have swapped out the dipropylene glycol pelargonate from” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“its use as a release-promoting substance or spreading agent. See, e.g., Pet. 31, 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 157; Ex. 1006, 1:44–50, 2:63–3:37). Petitioner does not show that Miglyol 840 is being used as a plasticizer in Reul such that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use it in the compositions of Dorn in the amounts specified by Dorn for plasticizers. We credit the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Jacobs, that a “uniformly accepted definition of plasticizer” is “a substance or material incorporated in a material … to increase its flexibility, workability, or distensibility.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 12 (citing Ex. 2012, 173). In contrast, Reul states that its release-promoting substances (including Miglyol® 840) “either do not affect the mechanical properties of the silicon rubber at all or only to an insignificant extent.” Ex. 1006, 2:38–40. We further credit the testimony of Dr. Jacobs that Reul’s “release-promoting substances … do not function as a plasticizer in silicone rubber, at least under the ‘universally accepted definition’ of a ‘plasticizer’ discussed above.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 39 (further testifying that “Reul does not mention any ‘plasticizer’ in general, and does not teach or suggest that caprylic/capric acid-1,2-propanediol diester or Miglyol® 840 functions as a plasticizer in silicone rubber.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“from Reul in the solid PVC compositions of Dorn, Petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to show that these references teach the presence of Miglyol 840 at the recited weight limitation of “about 5% to about 17.5% by weight of the solid moulded body.” As discussed above, Petitioner relies on Dorn’s disclosure of spreading agents (such as dipropylene glycol pelargonate) in arguing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in substituting the Miglyol 840 in the compositions of Dorn. See Pet. 31–32. However, Dorn does not disclose any weight percentage for dipropylene glycol pelargonate or any of the disclosed spreading agents. Petitioner instead relies on Dorn’s disclosure of plasticizers in amounts of 10 to 50%, preferably approximately from 25% to 45% by weight, to supply this disclosure. Pet. 41–42. In order for this argument to be persuasive, Petitioner must show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in, substituting the plasticizers of Dorn with Miglyol 840 as disclosed in Reul. For the reasons explained below, we find that Petitioner has failed to do so.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,910,122 - Thorne Research, Inc. v. Trustees Of Dartmouth CollegeAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 31, 2022 · IPR2021-00268 · APJ John E Schneider · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 2 is unpatentable as anticipated by Stamler and, alternatively, obvious over Stamler.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“2. Anticipation2 “Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, every limitation of a claim must identically appear in a single prior art reference for it to anticipate the claim.” Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the 2 As noted above, the pre-AIA provisions of 35 U.S.C. apply to the ’086 patent. the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“Under § 120, a patent is entitled to the priority date of an earlier filed application if (1) the written description of the earlier filed application discloses the invention claimed in the later filed application sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 112; (2) the applications have at least one common inventor; (3) the later application is filed before the issuance or abandonment of the earlier filed application; and (4) the later application contains a reference to the earlier filed application. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also 35 U.S.C. § 120 . As discussed above and in our Decision to Institute, the ’086 patent meets this criterion. While we agree with Petitioner that the face of the ’086 patent does not include a citation of the ‘701 application, the specification does contain a clear claim of priority back to the ’701 application. Ex. 1001, col. 1. ll. 7–13; Ex. 1004 1.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the art offered by Patent Owner in the ’1795 IPR, which, as noted above, also involved the ’086 patent, should apply to this proceeding, namely “someone with a Ph.D. in biochemistry or similar field in the pharmaceutical sciences, with familiarity and experience with pharmacokinetics.” Pet. 33. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition and, indeed, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Amiji, used the same definition in his analysis. Ex. 2014 ¶ 21. For purposes of this Decision, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s description. We also note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and supports Petitioner’s definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We have considered the arguments presented by the parties, and find that our initial construction is proper for the reasons set forth in the ’1795 proceeding. Ex. 1018 12–14. We decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction that calls for an isolation step separate from the process used to manufacture synthetic NR.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,383,086 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,383,086 - PTAB · May 31, 2022 · IPR2022-00402 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the anticipation challenge and all asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Petitioner has shown that Pioneer Hi-Bred discloses examples of synthetic guide RNA and crRNA molecules having the recited modifications at their 3’ and 5’ ends. See Pet. 20–24 (referring to Table 8 of Ex. 1006). That disclosure undermines the Applicant’s arguments during prosecution that: (1) “a skilled person would not modify a CRISPR guide RNA or crRNA at the particularly claimed positions,” and (2) the reference to “‘securing or steadying the structure’ of RNA in [Zhang] relates to secondary structure” as opposed to “modifications at the claimed positions,” i.e. within five nucleotides from one or both of the ends. Ex. 1002, 783. Both of these arguments were credited by the Examiner as reasons for withdrawing the rejection over Zhang. Id. at 783–784. Thus, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the Examiner materially erred by not recognizing the relevance of Pioneer Hi-Bred’s disclosure and in particular the crRNA examples in Table 8.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“On the current record, we determine that the merits of Petitioner’s anticipation ground appear to be particularly strong for the independent claims and for those dependent claims where Petitioner’s arguments are similarly premised on the crRNA examples in Table 8 being anticipatory without any further modification. See infra § V.E (explaining that, on the current record, Petitioner has shown that Pioneer Hi-Bred Table 8 discloses presumptively-enabled examples that read on claims 1 and 12 as well as a number of the dependent claims). Accordingly, we find that this factor weighs strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution. G. Weighing of Fintiv Factors Considering the Fintiv factors as part of a holistic analysis of the factors discussed above, we are not persuaded that the interests of the efficiency and integrity of the system would be served by invoking our authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of a potentially meritorious Petition. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a).” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of its declarant, Dr. Furneaux, Petitioner contends that a POSA “as of December 3, 2014 (the earliest possible priority date of the ’001 Patent) would have had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related discipline.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 60). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Marshall, applies the same definition for his analysis. Ex. 2003 ¶ 85. At this stage in the proceeding, we find this description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we adopt the description of a POSA noted above.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither party identifies any claim term for construction. Pet. 17; Prelim. Resp. 35. We agree that no formal claim construction is necessary at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that it is only necessary to “construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,337,001 - PTAB · May 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00142 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–6 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Gil and claims 1–6 are obvious over the cited combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“When ‘about’ is used as part of a numeric range, the use of the word “‘about’” avoids a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter.” Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1368 (internal quotations omitted). When “about” is used to define the limit of a numerical range, the extension beyond the stated number depends on what “a person having ordinary skill in the art … would reasonably consider ‘about …’ to encompass.” Monsanto Tech. LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 878 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Furthermore, when determining how far beyond the claimed range the term “about” extends the claim, “[w]e must focus ... on the criticality of the [numerical limitation] to the invention.” Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Extrinsic evidence of meaning and usage in the art may be helpful in determining the criticality of the parameter.” Id. at 1326 (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66, F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). At this stage of the proceeding, and on this record, we find Petitioner’s reasoning that the claim term “about 0.025%” includes 0.03% to be more persuasive. As Petitioner points out, the Specification discloses a number of embodiments with concentration ranges of brimonidine that include both values. Furthermore, Patent Owner has not persuasively pointed to any disclosures of the ’742 patent that expressly support the criticality of 0.025% brimonidine as the upper end of the concentration range. Indeed, the passage pointed to in this respect by Patent Owner states: FIG. 6 depicts a graphical representation of a finding of the present invention that an increased rebound hyperemia begins at around 0.03% for brimonidine. It thus demonstrates that the net effectiveness of brimonidine as a decongestant is greatest between about 0.01% and about 0.03%; preferably, between about 0.012% and about 0.02%. Ex. 1001, col. 19, ll. 52–57. This passage does not expressly or implicitly disclose the criticality of “about 0.025%” as the upper limit of the effective range of brimonidine concentration. slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“2. “ocular condition” Petitioner argues that the ’742 patent defines “ocular condition” broadly and without limitation. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 12, ll. 14–49). Petitioner therefore urges us to construe “ocular condition” as including, without limitation eye redness, glaucoma (including open-angle glaucoma); elevated intraocular pressure, also known as ocular hypertension, postoperative reduction of subconjunctival hemorrhage and hyperemia after refractive surgery such as LASIK and radial keratotomy, subconjunctival hemorrhage and hyperemia prophylaxis prior to refractive surgery such as LASIK and radial keratotomy, and redness in the eye following LASIK or radial keratotomy. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, col. 12, ll. 14–49; Ex. 1002 ¶ 47). Patent Owner makes no argument with respect to construction of this claim term, other than to note that the phrase would be understood by a skilled artisan to have its ordinary meaning consistent with the Specification. Given the capacious disclosures of the Specification of the ’742 patent in this respect, we find Petitioner’s proposed construction to be reasonable. See Ex. 1001, col. 12, ll. 14–52. We consequently construe, for the purposes of this Decision, the claim term “ocular condition” as including, without limitation, “eye redness, glaucoma (including open-angle glaucoma); elevated intraocular pressure, also known as ocular hypertension, postoperative reduction of subconjunctival hemorrhage and hyperemia after refractive surgery such as LASIK and radial keratotomy, subconjunctival hemorrhage and hyperemia prophylaxis prior to refractive surgery such as LASIK and radial keratotomy, and redness in the eye following LASIK or radial keratotomy.” 3. Additional claim construction Reviewing the present record, the panel the panel concludes that no other claim term needs express construction for the purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have been a composite person (or team) that included a medical doctor and a pharmaceutical formulator. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26; Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that the medical doctor would have been an ophthalmologist with at least three to four years of experience in LASIK surgery, clinical trials, and U.S. FDA regulation of eye products, and had experience in the use of topical brimonidine, apraclonidine; and topical vasoconstrictors such as naphazoline and tetrahydrozoline. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26). Petitioner contends that the pharmaceutical formulator would have had a doctoral degree in pharmaceutics, or a related degree, and at least three to five years of experience developing eye drop formulations for clinical trial and regulatory approval. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not contest this definition in its Preliminary Response, stating it does not take a position at this time regarding the qualifications of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 29. Patent Owner further notes that Petitioner’s characterization of a person of ordinary skill in the art goes beyond that of ordinary skill. Id. We find Petitioner’s proposed characterization to be reasonable and consequently adopt Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundInstituted
“A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only when “every element and limitation of the claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). With respect to Petitioner’s argument that Gil inherently discloses the preambular limitation reciting a “method for reducing eye redness,” we agree that, although Gil teaches that “[o]cular responses characteristic of neurogenic inflammation, including redness and pupillary constriction, are also observed in rabbits following external stimuli,” Example 1 of Gil does not expressly teach that administration of 0.03% brimonidine reduces redness in the subject patients. See Ex. 1004, col. 5, ll. 38–40. Nevertheless, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Gil teaches only the reduction of ocular pain via administration of brimonidine in the claimed concentrations. Gil discloses that a person of skill in the art would understand that inflammation of the eye is accompanied by both redness and pain, and expressly discloses that its invention is directed to “the topical application of brimonidine for treating ocular pain and neurogenic inflammation.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 11–13. Gil also discloses that “neuropeptides enhance inflammatory reactions in the injured tissue, contributing to vasodilation, edema, and increased vascular permeability, this phenomenon is called ‘neurogenic inflammation.’” Id. at col. 1, ll. 40– 43. We find that a skilled artisan would understand that “neurogenic inflammation,” and particularly “vasodilation, edema, and increased vascular permeability” are proximal causes of eye redness. See id. at col. 5, ll. 38–40. Furthermore, and as Petitioner argues, the ’742 Specification also expressly teaches that administration of doses of brimonidine of 0.02– 0.033% resulted in redness reduction. See Ex. 1001, cols. 19–20, ll. 65–25. Although Gil is generally silent with respect to redness reduction, using pain as an indicator of neurogenic inflammation, the ’742 Specification demonstrates that application of 0.03% brimonidine would also necessarily reduce redness when administered to patients with an ocular condition. See also Ex. 1025. We therefore conclude that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim upon Ground 1.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,293,742 - Incyte Corporation v. Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 11, 2022 · PGR2021-00006 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–7 and 9–21 not shown unpatentable over either obviousness ground because Petitioner did not establish motivation to select Compound (I) from Silverman’s genus.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“It is not necessary for an expert’s experience or expertise to precisely match the art at issue. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, one offering expert testimony must at least have ordinary skill in the art to provide relevant and reliable testimony that is helpful to the factfinder. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools, Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf?MURL=). Dr. Patterson has a Ph.D. in Chemistry and over 30 years of experience in drug design, drug administration, evaluation of drug effectiveness, and participated in drug design for over 20 years. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4–10; Ex. 1008, 1–2. He is author or co-author on over eight peer-reviewed journal articles involving medicinal chemistry. Ex. 1007 ¶ 5. We find this level of skill to meet the qualifications for the level of skill in the art under the training and experience portion of the definition we have adopted for purposes of this opinion (see § II.B.), reproduced below: a Ph.D. in chemistry, pharmaceutical sciences, molecular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar background. A POSA would also have had at least several years of experience with drug design, drug development, clinical trials, or access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience. Likewise, a POSA would have had knowledge and experience in treating hair loss disorders, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We note that Dr. Patterson himself also proposes this definition. Id. ¶ 102. However, Dr. Patterson does not have “knowledge and experience in treating hair loss disorders” and did not opine that, in regards to his testimony, he had access to a person with that knowledge and experience, as is proposed in the definition. See generally, Ex. 1007. Accordingly, we find Dr. Patterson qualified to opine on the level of ordinary skill with regard to issues of drug design, evaluation of effectiveness, and drug administration, but we find he is not adequately qualified to opine on the level of ordinary skill with regard to issues of treating hair loss disorders.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proposes the same definition as Petitioner, but adds that the skilled artisan “would also have had experience in JAK inhibition, deuteration, and AA [alopecia areata] formulations, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience.” Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2059 ¶ 14). Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Ko critiques Petitioner’s proposed definition as “incomplete, because it lacks any requirement for experience, or access to individuals with experience, in JAK inhibition, deuteration, and AA formulations.” Ex. 2059 ¶ 16. However, neither Dr. Ko nor Patent Owner explains what difference this additional direct experience would have provided to an artisan with the skill level proposed by Petitioner, particularly when Petitioner’s definition includes “experience in treating hair loss disorders,” and for which the record contains evidence that existing JAK inhibitors such as ruxolitinib had been identified as causing reversal of hair loss caused by AA. Ex. 1003, 1043. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition as consistent with the level of skill apparent in the cited prior art. In any event, as Patent Owner does not explain why its alternative definition would have any bearing on the outcome of the present case, and as we discern no appreciable difference in the parties’ definitions, we note our findings and conclusions would be the same regardless of which definition were adopted. We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We construe claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Therefore, we construe the challenged claims under the framework set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under this framework, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”), at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id. Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We have considered Petitioner’s claim construction proposals (see Pet. 21–23), which are uncontested (see generally Resp., not addressing construction), and find that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of rendering this Decision.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artReference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Section 102(b)(1) provides two exceptions to § 102(a)(1) for disclosures made within one year of the effective filing date. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) provides that a disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) with respect to the claimed invention if: (A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 10,561,659 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,561,659 - Restem, LLC. v. Jadi Cell, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 20, 2022 · IPR2021-01535 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–15 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would show at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we authorize an inter partes review to be instituted as to the Challenged Claims of the ’176 patent on the grounds raised in the Petition. Our factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far (prior to Patent Owner’s Response). This is not a final decision as to patentability of claims for which inter partes review is instituted. Any final decision will be based on the record, as fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 19–24). Patent Owner does not comment on the characterization offered by Petitioner or offer one of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization as it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’176 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther
“Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner cites Ex. 1001 6:32–34, noting that the patent specification “expressly defines ‘isolated cell’ as ‘[referring] to a cell that has been isolated from the subepithelial layer of a mammalian umbilical cord.’” Id. As neither party references any prosecution history related to interpretation of this claim term, we look only to the claim itself and the specification as intrinsic evidence. DePuy Spine, 469 F.3d at 1014. Claim 1 recites “an isolated cell prepared by a process comprising . . . ” Ex. 1001 at 19:6. As Patent Owner notes, the patent specification states “the term ‘isolated cell’ refers to a cell that has been isolated from the subepithelial layer of a mammalian umbilical cord.” Id. at 6:32–34. The remainder of the citations Petitioner cites relate to additional steps for isolating the cell, or characteristics of the cell, such as the markers expressed or not expressed, but do not further elucidate the meaning of “an isolated cell” itself. Dr. Olsen’s testimony reiterates the content of these citations but does not add any additional information or explanation. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 67–68. Given the definition provided in the specification, we interpret “an isolated cell,” consistent with Patent Owner’s definition, to mean “one or more cells isolated from the subepithelial layer of a mammalian umbilical cord.”” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInstituted
“the Wharton’s Jelly, epithelium, etc.” and that, without evidence that the recited markers are expressed/not expressed as recited, there is no inherent disclosure. Prelim. Resp. 22, 25, 28–29 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶ 162). Patent Owner is correct that an ultimate finding of anticipation requires such confirmation, but, for purposes of institution, our standard is a reasonable likelihood. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Due to the breadth of claim 1, Majore’s method must produce only one cell having the recited limitations to anticipate. Petitioner’s expert testifies that production of such cells would be inherent by Majore. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 97 (“Majore’s protocol would produce a population of adherent cells that necessarily and inevitably comprise the cells of the subepithelial layer.”). And, although we recognize that the burden of persuasion does not rest on Patent Owner, Dr. Burger’s testimony, which focuses heavily on the differences in methodology between Majore and the ’176 patent disclosure and Petitioner’s alleged failure of proof, is not persuasive at this stage to overcome the evidence presented by Petitioner. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 137–163. Indeed, both Majore and the ’176 patent disclose umbilical cord tissue cut into sections and placed into environments fostering cell culture and replication. Ex. 1011 at 18, Ex. 1001 at 13:57–14:5. Both methods encourage and result in adherent cells growing on a plastic growth surface awash in culture media. Id. On this record, Petitioner has provided sufficient factual basis to establish a reasonable likelihood that Majore’s explant method of dissecting umbilical cord, culturing cells, and growing adherent cells would have produced (or did produce) at least one cell with the recited limitations. In this regard, we credit the testimony of Dr. Olsen that the isolated cells disclosed in Majore are MSCs cultured from umbilical cord tissues including the subepithelial layer, which have migrated to the periphery of the cut tissue and adhered to the tissue culture vessel. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 95–97. That Majore discloses genetic markers with similar expression/non-expression to the markers recited in claim 1 is further evidence that at least some cells were cultured from the subepithelial layer. Id. ¶ 99. Moreover, even if we gave weight to the process limitations construed as requested by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 13–20), the limitations are sufficiently broad as to read on Majore with the exception of the express/non-expressed markers. With regard to markers not examined by Majore, we credit Dr. Olson’s statement that “the cells obtained by Majore’s protocol necessarily and inevitably comprise the same cells produced by the process steps of claim 1[A] and 1[B]” and that the skilled artisan would have understood that the marker expression pattern would be identical for those cells. Id. ¶ 101.16 The evidence on this issue is subject to final determination on a more complete record developed through trial.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,803,176 - PTAB · Apr 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00089 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 12–14, 16–21, 23, and 24 based on the petition’s anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the argument and evidence presented in the papers, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of the claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 12–14, 16–21, 23, and 24 of the ’384 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had: a Masters or a Ph.D. degree in nutritional science, chemistry, biology, biochemistry, or a related discipline or an M.D. or doctor of optometry (“O.D.”), and a few years of practical experience in the nutritional supplement area, including an understanding of formulations that could be considered for promoting eye health, including preventing or treating eye disorders such as macular degeneration. Alternatively, such a person could have been a person with a Bachelor’s degree with a greater number of years of experience. The POSITA would have, or would have access to, general information regarding eye health and eye disorders, the convenience and needs of patients who suffer from eye disorders such as macular degeneration, and background information. And to the extent needed, the POSITA would have collaborated with others having ordinary skill in the areas pertinent to the subject matter of the ’384 Patent. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 16). Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not contest [Petitioner’s] definition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it appears to be consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we find the preamble to be limiting. “In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). On the other hand, a preamble is not limiting “where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.” Id. Although not dispositive, “dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.” See Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Group, LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Here, the preamble of claim 12 recites: “A nutrient formulation for oral ingestion for protecting a user’s eyes from the harmful effect of blue light, the formulation comprising:.” Ex. 1001, 37:13–15. The body of claim 12 recites “wherein the nutrient formulation is provided in the form selected from the group consisting of capsules, tablets, liquids, and powders for oral ingestion.” Ex. 1001, 37:22–24 (emphasis added). Because the first use of “nutrient formulation” is in the preamble, claim 12 relies on the preamble for antecedent basis for “the nutrient formulation.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, claim 22, which depends from claim 12, relies on the preamble of” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“2. Remaining Claim Terms Petitioner contends the term “substantially-free of meso-zeaxanthin stereoisomers” should have its plain and ordinary meaning, and a person of zeaxanthin that is present in the 3R-3R' stereoisomer form is “largely but not wholly free of meso-zeaxanthin stereoisomers.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 57, Ex. 1031, 3). Patent Owner does not offer a construction for this term. See generally Prelim. Resp. Petitioner also contends the term “mixed tocopherols” should be construed to mean “a mixture of tocopherols such as alpha-, beta-, gamma-, and delta-tocopherols.” Pet. 22–24 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 65–66). Patent Owner does not offer a construction for this term. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because there does not appear to be any dispute over the construction of these terms, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed constructions as consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,307,384 - PTAB · Apr 12, 2022 · IPR2021-01565 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable based on the petition’s asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Legal Standards “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes two highly similar and interrelated versions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The first comprises a multidisciplinary team consisting of at least (1) a person (“Engineer POSA”) with either (a) a bachelor’s or master’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering or a similar field, as well as two or more years of work experience with catheters or similar medical devices, or (b) a Ph.D. in mechanical or biomedical engineering, or in a similar field; working with (2) a person with an M.D. or analogous degree and five or more years of work experience in interventional cardiology, hemodynamics or a similar discipline (“Clinician POSA”). Pet. 24–25; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 97–98; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 54–55. In the second, Petitioner recasts the above team as a collection of skilled artisans in complementary fields, specifically, an Engineer POSA receiving assistance from, or equivalent to that provided by, a Clinician POSA; a Clinician POSA receiving assistance from, or equivalent to that provided by, an Engineer POSA; or a single person with the qualifications of both an Engineer POSA and a Clinician POSA. Pet. 25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 99; Ex. 1004 ¶ 56. However phrased, Petitioner’s proposed definition indicates a high level of skill in the relevant art.” slip op. at 25
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Consistent with this portion of the Specification, the parties agree that maintaining systemic pressure excludes “reducing pressure like prior treatments.” See Prelim. Resp. 13, 20 (quoting Pet. 26). But because the record does not make clear how broadly one of ordinary skill in the art would have defined hypotension—let alone the conditions under which hypotension activates the renin angiotensin aldosterone system—the parties are encouraged to address how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the range of pressure (if any)—and any permissible temporal variance—encompassed by the term “maintaining.”” slip op. at 30
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Considering the intrinsic record and the testimony of Dr. Garcia, Petitioner has the better argument on present record. For the purpose of institution, we provisionally construe “maintaining intravascular pressure,” as used in independent claims 1 and 13 to mean, “maintaining pressure within blood vessels or a blood vessel” and encompassing: 1) maintaining a systemic pressure that does not lead to hypotension; 2) maintaining an isolated region of reduced pressure between pairs of occlusion devices; and 3) maintaining a region of reduced pressure in the vicinity of an occlusion device. The parties are encouraged to submit additional argument and evidence as to the meaning of this term at trial. 2. “distal restrictor,” the catheter extends across a vein wall,” and “resistors” Patent Owner “does not take a position on the constructions of the remainder of [the terms addressed by Petitioner] for the purposes of this Preliminary Response because no issue that must be decided by the Board depends on them.” Prelim. Resp. 12. While we agree with Patent Owner that our Decision on Institution does not depend on a precise meaning of “distal restrictor,” “the catheter extends across a vein wall,” or “resistors.” Petitioner presents reasoned argument and evidence as to their meaning, which we find useful in understanding the claims as a whole, and Petitioner’s proposed definitions appear consistent with the intrinsic evidence of record. In the interest of clarity, we provisionally adopt Petitioner’s proposed definitions for these terms, and invite Patent Owner to address the meaning of any relevant claim term at trial.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,639,460 - Ricetec, Inc. v. BASF SEInstitutedPTAB · Mar 11, 2022 · PGR2021-00114 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 on all petition grounds, finding the claims more likely than not unpatentable over Hinga and related art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . ., if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner states a person of ordinary skill in the art must have one to two years of postdoctoral research experience and Patent Owner’s definition requires at least five years of research experience, Patent Owner’s definition does not indicate a specific time for that research (i.e., it could include research during a doctoral program). On this record, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Moreover, we find on this record that Dr. Shaner and Dr. Burgos are both qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as both are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art, based on either party’s definition. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 5–15; Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 5–17.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner states that it “agrees that the claim terms of the ’346 Patent should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Prelim Resp. 20. We interpret Patent Owner’s statement to mean that it agrees with Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “endogenous non-transfected mutant” and “effective amount.” Because Petitioner’s construction of “endogenous non-transfected mutant” is consistent with the ’346 patent’s express construction of the term, that construction in this proceeding.” slip op. at 7
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Instituted
“limitation of each of the challenged claims is not adequately supported by the Mankin Application. Although the Mankin Application does generally describe herbicidal compositions that “comprise an herbicidal effective amount” of at least one ACCase herbicide (Ex. 2034 ¶ 233), that generic disclosure is not sufficient written description support for the specific effective amount recited in the claims. Indeed, we agree with Petitioner that the Mankin Application does not disclose any effective amounts of quizalofop within the claimed range, let alone one that causes less than 10% injury. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 90, 91. 94; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 128, 237 (Table 1), 248, Fig. 17.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,096,346 - Ricetec, Inc. v. BASF SEInstitutedPTAB · Mar 11, 2022 · PGR2021-00113 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 because Petitioner showed it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable over Hinga or Hinga2013.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . ., if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the “effective amount” limitation of each of the challenged claims is not adequately supported by the Mankin Application. Although the Mankin Application does generally describe herbicidal compositions that “comprise an herbicidal effective amount” of at least one ACCase herbicide (Ex. 2034 ¶ 233), that generic disclosure is not sufficient written description support for the specific effective amounts recited in the claims. Indeed, we agree with Petitioner that the Mankin Application does not disclose any effective amounts of any of the recited herbicides within the claimed ranges, let alone one that causes less than 10% injury. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 90, 91. 94; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 128, 237 (Table 1), 248, Fig. 17. description is satisfied because the Mankin Application’s disclosure of an herbicide tolerance study for a DIM herbicide would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to the specific effective amounts of the FOP herbicides recited in the claims. Prelim. Resp. 72–73. Nor are we persuaded that there is adequate written description support because a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to ascertain the effective amounts for each herbicide based on the knowledge in the art. Id. at 73. That is not the test for written description. “It is not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement of § 112 that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the art, would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, “[e]ach application in the chain must describe the claimed features.” Id.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable
“We note that Petitioner does not appear to consider the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art in evaluating the amount of guidance needed to enable the claimed invention. As our reviewing court states, “[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Although the ’345 patent does not provide a specific working example of the G2096S mutation, we are not persuaded on this record that that necessarily weighs heavily in favor of undue experimentation given the prior knowledge in the art that that mutation confers herbicide tolerance to rice plants and the deposit of the G2096S mutation seed, as taught by Hinga and Hinga2013. Ex. 1003 ¶ 21; Ex. 1004 ¶ 54.” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Analysis Anticipation requires that “each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.’” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, to anticipate, a prior art reference must “disclose[] within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 31
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,096,345
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.