• Praxair Technology, Inc. v. Entegris, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 29, 2018 · IPR2016-01845 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the four instituted combinations of Rendon, ATMI VAC or Trace, Gupta, and, for claims 3, 5, 8, and 10, Tempel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that the probative weight of Dr. Sinha’s testimony is diminished based solely on Patent Owner’s arguments alleging Dr. Sinha is biased and has a substantial interest in the outcome of these proceedings. To assess the probative value of an expert opinion, we must consider the following factors: (1) the interest of the expert in the outcome of the case; (2) the presence or absence of factual evidence supporting the expert’s opinion, and (3) the strength of any opposing evidence. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294– 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985).15 Although “the opinion testimony of a party having a direct interest in the pending [proceeding] is less persuasive than opinion testimony by a disinterested party, it cannot be disregarded for that reason alone and may be relied upon when sufficiently [persuasive].” Id.” slip op. at 69

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “6. Constitutionality of Inter Partes Review Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be rejected because the proceeding violates Patent Owner’s constitutional rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See PO Resp. 47. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Autlman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898)). Patent Owner acknowledges that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Oil States Energy Servcs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, No. 16-712, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017) to consider the constitutionality of inter partes reviews. SeePO Resp. 47. Patent Owner seeks to preserve this issue pending the outcome in Oil States. See id. At this time, no court has found inter partes review unconstitutional, and we are bound by Federal Circuit precedent. See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016). The matter is before the U.S. Supreme Court, and Patent Owner’s arguments on this basis are premature.” slip op. at 70

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “February 26, 2010 (the earliest priority date for the ’134 Patent) “had at least a bachelor’s of science degree in chemistry, physics, chemical engineering, or materials science engineering with at least two years’ experience in ion implantation.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 79). Petitioner contends that a person of skill in the art “would have had knowledge of ion implantation considerations, including considerations affecting the effectiveness of ion generation and longevity of ion implantation equipment, and be familiar with gas handling related to ion implantation.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 79). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 8. Moreover, Patent Owner agrees that a person of skill in the art “would have had knowledge of ion implantation considerations, including considerations affecting the effectiveness of ion generation and longevity of ion implantation equipment, and be familiar with gas handling related to ion implantation.” Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 49–51). We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 8,237,134 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,237,134
• Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01895 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 13–21, and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Johnson, Mason/EIA-709.1/Shuey/C12.18, and anticipated by Johnson.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 2002 ¶ 76. Patent Owner asserts using its lower level of skill in the art “would diminish the motivation of a POSITA would have for combining references identified in the instituted grounds.” Id. at ¶ 82. We disagree that an understanding of how to design and build a wireless, multi-hop communications systems is a leap in knowledge that would create a motivation to combine that would not be there under Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of skill. See Ex. 1027 ¶¶ 9–11. Thus, we do not discern a difference between the two proposed levels of skill that affects the analysis in this IPR. However, for clarity we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill, which is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Here, the intrinsic evidence does not support limiting the challenged claims to sending “original” messages. Thus, sending sensed data acquired from another device is within the ambit of the challenged claims. In fact, dependent claims 2, 11, 15, 17, 21 specifically recite a sensor and/or actuator which suggests that the independent claims can be broader and may not require a remote device “including” a sensor and/or actuator. Additionally, the court in the related Amazon litigation did not construe “remote devices” to require actuators. Id. at 16, 74. For the reasons above, the broadest reasonable construction of the remote device terms does not require a sensor and/or actuator. Based on the 4 Sipco, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2-08-cv-00359 (E.D. Tex.) (“the related Amazon litigation”). 8 record before us, it is unnecessary to expressly construe the remote device terms further.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on Petitioner’s citations to specific prior art disclosures and supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that it also would have been obvious to modify the teachings of Mason, with EIA-709.1’s teachings, to include an address that varies in size. Pet. 50. For example, Petitioner contends: A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to use the scalable destination address of EIA-709.1 in Mason’s system. The ‘492 patent uses scalable addresses in order to accommodate systems of different sizes and complexity. Ex. 1001 at 9:59-61. The scalable addresses of EIA-709.1 would also accommodate systems of different sizes and complexity in a more flexible manner. Mason expresses a desire to implement a large scale AMR system. Mason at 1:46-48, 5:25-57. Mason also recognizes the importance of uniquely identifying a large number of destination meters. Mason at 10:43-56. Using the scalable addresses of EIA-709.1 in Mason’s system would allow a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to effectively identify message destinations in networks with increasing sizes and complexity. Kinney, ¶¶116-117. Moreover, Mason explicitly discloses that the LonTalk protocol can be used with its system. Mason at 17:4-9. The LonTalk protocol ultimately was adopted as EIA-709.1. Exs. 1022, 1023, 1024. Indeed, the LonTalk protocol specification includes the same scalable addresses disclosed in EIA-709.1. Ex. 1020 at 14-16. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would thus be motivated to combine Mason and EIA-709.1, with a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Kinney, ¶118.” slip op. at 44

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “configured to detect a condition and output a signal to the controller,” as recited in claim 15. In that regard, Petitioner contends each meter 12 of Mason includes a metering board for performing the metering function. Pet. 44; Ex. 1006, 5:59–63. Each meter also includes a set of analog transducers. Id.; Ex. 1006, 5:59–64. Thus, according to Petitioner a person of ordinary skill in the art “would appreciate that a sensor is a type of transducer, and that Mason’s transducers are sensors. Mason’s metering board and/or analog transducers correspond to the claimed ‘sensor.’” We agree and credit Petitioner’s declarant’s supporting testimony. Pet. 44; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101. Petitioner also asserts the metering board and/or analog transducers are operable to detect a condition related to, for example, electricity, gas, or water, and output meter information corresponding to the condition to the meter’s controller. Pet. 44; Ex. 1006, 5:32–41, 9:56–65, 15:37–47, 49–53; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101. c. Claims 17 Petitioner persuades us that Mason teaches “at least one actuator configured to implement an action corresponding to the command code,” as recited in claim 17. In that regard, Petitioner contends Mason discloses that each meter 12 includes a disconnect switch drive circuit. Pet. 45; Ex. 1006, 5:59–64. Thus, according to Petitioner a person of ordinary skill in the art 48 “would appreciate that a disconnect drive circuit implements an action, such as a disconnect function, in response to receiving a command to do so using the C12.18 protocol. This operation corresponds to the claimed actuator configured to implement an action corresponding to the command code.” Pet. 45; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101. We agree and credit Petitioner’s declarant’s supporting testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶ 101.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 7,697,492 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,697,492
• Freebit As v. Bose CorporationRehearing denied
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2018 · IPR2017-01309 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Freebit’s rehearing request and left in place the denial of institution on claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–11, and 13 based on the deficient obviousness showing and Tan antedating.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. (Emphasis added.) See Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of 1 IPR2017-01307 Inst. Dec. 34 (“As we noted above, although Patent Owner mentions both March 26, 200[9] (Prelim. Resp. 8), and May 26, 2009 (id. at 1, 10), as the date of actual reduction to practice, it is clear from Mr. Annunziato’s testimony and supporting evidence, that actual reduction to practice occurred by May 26, 2009. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 9, 11; see id., Ex. A, 2.”). 2 We note that Petitioner presented substantially identical arguments regarding Patent Owner’s antedating of Tan in its Request for Rehearing filed in IPR2017-01307 and IPR2017-01308. See, e.g., IPR2017-01308, Paper 11. Our reasons for denying rehearing here regarding the antedating of Tan are substantially the same as the reasons presented in IPR2017-01307 and IPR2017-01308. discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “testimony that there was a known, retention problem with in-ear earpieces as of the earliest priority date for challenged claims of the ’853 patent. See Inst. Dec. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 149). Nor did we question that Howes discusses that problem and teaches a possible solution to that problem. See id. at 11–13. The failure in Petitioner’s argument and Petitioner’s declarant’s testimony was to draw the necessary link between the known problem and Howes’s possible solution and the teachings of Sapiejewski. In order to link this problem and its possible solution to the teachings of Sapiejewski, Petitioner relies on Dr. Staab’s testimony. Id. at 14. It is this testimony that we find unsupported and conclusory.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundTeaching away not found

    “testimony that there was a known, retention problem with in-ear earpieces as of the earliest priority date for challenged claims of the ’853 patent. See Inst. Dec. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 149). Nor did we question that Howes discusses that problem and teaches a possible solution to that problem. See id. at 11–13. The failure in Petitioner’s argument and Petitioner’s declarant’s testimony was to draw the necessary link between the known problem and Howes’s possible solution and the teachings of Sapiejewski. In order to link this problem and its possible solution to the teachings of Sapiejewski, Petitioner relies on Dr. Staab’s testimony. Id. at 14. It is this testimony that we find unsupported and conclusory.” slip op. at 6

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Initially, we note that Petitioner did not raise these arguments anywhere in its Petition or its authorized Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Not only did Petitioner fail to raise the issue of “Peeler diligence,” but Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing does not include a single citation to its Petition or to its Reply on this point. Thus, Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing fails to identify the place where each matter that allegedly was overlooked or misapprehended was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity for the requestor to present new arguments or evidence. It goes without saying that we could not have overlooked or misapprehended arguments that Petitioner did not make, and it is not an abuse of discretion not to consider such arguments.” slip op. at 10

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,036,853
• Freebit As v. Bose CorporationRehearing denied
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2018 · IPR2017-01307 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Freebit’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–4, 6–9, 13, and 17 because the obviousness challenge lacked a supported reason to combine and Tan was antedated.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. (Emphasis added.) See Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of 1 Inst. Dec. 34 (“As we noted above, although Patent Owner mentions both March 26, 200[9] (Prelim. Resp. 8), and May 26, 2009 (id. at 1, 10), as the date of actual reduction to practice, it is clear from Mr. Annunziato’s testimony and supporting evidence, that actual reduction to practice occurred by May 26, 2009. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 9, 11; see id., Ex. A, 2.”). 2 We note that Petitioner presented substantially identical arguments regarding Patent Owner’s antedating of Tan in its Request for Rehearing filed in IPR2017-01308 and in IPR2017-01309. See, e.g., IPR2017-01308, Paper 11. Our reasons for denying rehearing here regarding the antedating of Tan are substantially the same as the reasons presented in IPR2017-01308 and IPR2017-01309. discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “testimony that there was a known, retention problem with in-ear earpieces as of the earliest priority date for challenged claims of the ’253 patent. See Inst. Dec. 41 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 149). Nor did we question that Howes discusses that problem and teaches a possible solution to that problem. See id. at 37–39. The failure in Petitioner’s argument and Petitioner’s declarant’s testimony was to draw the necessary link between the known problem and Howes’s possible solution and the teachings of Sapiejewski. In order to link this problem and its possible solution to the teachings of Sapiejewski, Petitioner relies on Dr. Staab’s testimony. Id. at 41. It is this testimony that we find unsupported and conclusory.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

    “neither Petitioner nor its declarant explains why a general need to secure an earpiece in an ear would lead to adding a positioning and retaining structure in the context of Sapiejewski’s teachings, when that function allegedly already is provided by the Sapiejewski device, besides seeking the benefits described in the ’253 patent – a reason tainted by hindsight. Inst. Dec. 45–46 (citations omitted). Consequently, we considered fully Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Staab’s testimony, including any supporting evidence, in view of Sapiejewski’s disclosure. Based on this consideration, we agreed with Patent Owner that “Petitioner relies on a far too general reason to combine the references and engages in impermissible hindsight as to the particular combination of the teachings of Sapiejewski and Howes.” Id. at 45.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “suppression or concealment may be overcome with evidence that the reason for the delay was to perfect the invention.” 843 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see Inst. Dec. 33. Nevertheless, the delay could not be excused (1) if “the delay is caused by working on refinements and improvements which are not reflected in the final patent application,” or (2) if “the activities which caused the delay go to commercialization of the invention.” Lutzker, 843 F.2d at 1367. In its Reply, Petitioner focused on the length of the delay between the actual reduction to practice and the filing of a patent application. Reply 3–4. Petitioner, however, made only cursory and conclusory reference to Patent Owner’s activities3 between the actual reduction to practice and the filing of a patent application. See Reply 4 (“Moreover, Mr. Annunziato’s testimony (¶ 6) that his team put in hundreds (if not thousands) of hours trying out and testing different designs for ear interfaces is not credible.”). Petitioner now argues that “all the alleged work carried out by [Patent Owner] to complete the [printed circuit board] is irrelevant to the suppression/concealment issue because it was not reflected in the final patent application, and rather, was relevant simply for commercialization.” Reh’g Req. 12. We continue to disagree.” slip op. at 10

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,311,253
• Emerson Electric Co. v. IP Co., LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2018 · IPR2016-01602 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious over the stated combinations of Burchfiel, Schwartz, and Heart, with Online Encyclopedia for claims 2, 5, and 11.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties differ on the level of ordinary skill applicable to this case. Petitioner contends the person of ordinary skill “would have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and 2-3 years of experience in the development and design, or technical marketing, of radio communications and computer network systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Almeroth, responds: “a person of ordinary skill in the art for the patent-in-suit would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent and experience with, or exposure to, computer networks and routing. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately two years of professional experience with computer networking, routing, and wireless networks.” Almeroth II Decl. ¶ 74. Dr. Almeroth takes issue with Petitioner’s definition “since it does not specifically list Computer Science as a possible degree.” Id. at ¶ 78. We adopt Patent Owner’s slightly more inclusive definition. As the definitions do not differ substantially, however, under either we would reach the same result. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “transmission paths from a particular client to the server. Pet. Reply 5–6. Petitioner responds that Patent Owner’s dictionary definition relates to “a physical map, not a structure for organizing data in mathematics or computer science.” Id. at 6. We agree with Petitioner that this particular definition of “map” is not pertinent to the subject matter of the ’516 patent, and therefore give Patent Owner’s argument based on this definition little weight. See id. If anything, the dictionary entry cited by Patent Owner supports Petitioner’s view that the construction of “map” should not be limited to multiple paths from one client. Thus, the second definition of “map” in the dictionary entry is not limited to multiple elements: “The correspondence of one or more elements in one set to one or more elements in the same set or another set.” Ex. 2001, 827 (“map,” definition 2; emphasis added). We deem this second definition, identified as pertaining to mathematics (“Math.”), to be more pertinent to the technology of the ’516 patent than that chosen by Petitioner. Nor are we persuaded by Patent Owner’s other argument, based on the reference in the ’516 patent claims to plural “paths.” PO Resp. 11–12. As Petitioner points out, claims 1 and 13 recite “changing the transmission path [singular] from the client to the gateway so that the path to the gateway is chosen.” Pet. Reply 6. We are, therefore, not persuaded by the arguments presented that the construction of this term in our Institution Decision requires modification. We therefore construe the term “map” as containing the paths or links to a node in the network, including a single path.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededOther

    “We agree with Petitioner that this term needs no express construction. However, we determine that it is necessary to address Patent Owner’s proposed construction, as it is central to its defense to Petitioner’s challenge. Patent Owner’s construction of this term is related to its proffered construction of “map of data packet transmission paths,” discussed supra. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he claim language itself . . . requires the server to change the selection of a transmission path including an identification of an entire path from the client to the server.” PO Resp. 13 (emphasis added). We disagree with this interpretation. The claim uses the word “chosen,” not “select.” We agree with Petitioner that this is a significant difference, in that “chosen” does not necessarily imply a selection among alternative paths. Pet. Reply 7. Further support for this conclusion is found in our discussion of “map of data packet transmission paths,” supra. There, we conclude that “map” should not be limited to multiple paths from a client. See supra. In the same way, the claim language should not be construed as requiring choosing from a selection of alternative paths. Patent Owner points to a decision in which another panel of the Board, in IPR2015-01901, construed the word “select” in a “related patent.” PO Resp. 13–14. We are not persuaded by that decision that we are misconstruing the claims at issue here, which do not use the word “select.” In the context of the ’516 patent claims, we do not regard “chosen” as having the same meaning as “select.”” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has demonstrated that Burchfiel’s connectivity matrix meets this claim limitation. Pet. 35–35; 54. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments in rebuttal. First, addressing the “plurality of descriptions” argument, we have construed the term “map” as not limited to storing multiple paths from one client to the server. Thus, Patent Owner’s argument calling for a “plurality of descriptions” of a path from a client to the server is contrary to our construction. Moreover, we are not persuaded that a map must contain the “entire path.” We have construed “map” as containing the paths or links to a node in the network, including a single path. See infra. Thus, the “entire path” argument fails for this reason alone. We find, however, that even under Patent Owner’s construction of map as requiring a “description of the entire path,” Burchfiel would meet this limitation. Ex. 1005, 246. Burchfiel teaches a map containing both the path from the station to the server and from the server to the station. According to Burchfiel, a connection table provides a map of path information: Once a station has labelled all PRU’s and established connections to them, the information for maintaining these connections is entered into the station’s connection table. This contains the status information described above for handling the connection protocol. Ex. 1005, 247 (emphasis added). As Petitioner points out, Burchfiel specifically describes these connections as “bidirectional.” Pet. Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1005, 246 (“Since most expected uses of the PRN will require bidirectional communication, the PRN connection is bi-directional.”)). Petitioner provides persuasive expert testimony to the effect that “it would have been obvious to recompute the route in both directions, to the extent not disclosed by Burchfiel, based on Burchfiel’s disclosure that, e.g., the ‘PRN connection is [a] bidirectional’ ‘data transmission path.” Geier II Decl. ¶ 69. We find that at the very least, therefore, Burchfiel’s reference to “bi-directional” connections suggests such a computation. “Even if a reference’s teachings are insufficient to find anticipation, that same reference’s teachings may be used to find obviousness.” CRFD Research, Inc. v. Matal, 876 F.3d 1330, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We find based on the foregoing that Burchfiel’s disclosure would teach or suggest to a person of ordinary skill that the connection table stores bidirectional path information.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 6,249,516 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,249,516
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2017 · IPR2017-00649 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution on claims 1–30 because Petitioner did not show that the Board overlooked or misapprehended its obviousness arguments.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The Decision Denying Institution considered Petitioner’s argument regarding combining Bonella’s power reduction technique and Bonella’s power loss algorithm as it was presented in the Petition. Thus, Petitioner has not established the proposition that the Board overlooked or misapprehended some evidence in the record. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. Thus, we are not persuaded by this argument.” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot reached

    “disclosed the specific feature alleged to be obvious. Req. Reh’g 12. We disagree. The Decision Denying Institution found that Long and Ashmore did not provide motivation for the specific combination advanced by Petitioner, stating “Petitioner does not point to a motivation to adjust the frequency of the memory banks specifically, simply a general motivation to reduce battery power during power loss.” Inst. Dec. 13. Thus, the Decision Denying Institution stated “we are not persuaded Ashmore [or Long] supports that contention that running at the frequency associated with Power Level 4 during a power loss would have been obvious.” Id. 13–14. “[T]o establish obviousness based on a combination of the elements disclosed in the prior art, there must be some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the applicant.” In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citation omitted)(emphasis added)). “A determination of obviousness cannot be reached where the record lacks ‘explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’” Hyundai Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, Case IPR2016-01476, slip op. at 32 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2017) (Paper 12) (quoting Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Decision Denying Institution properly followed this precedent in requiring a specific motivation to make the combination alleged by Petitioner to meet the claimed combination.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “CONCLUSION The Request for Rehearing does not demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters raised in the Petition declining to institute review of claims 1–30.” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,301,833
• Composite Materials Technology, Inc. v. Greatbatch, Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2017 · IPR2017-01441 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the fact that two references relate to the same general subject matter is not, by itself, sufficient to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to modify one reference in view of the other; it demonstrates at most that the two references are in the same field of endeavor. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Nor is an alleged admission that Fife and Stephenson are prior art to the ’075 patent sufficient to explain why these two references would be combined in a manner necessary to arrive at the claimed invention. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 389, 418–19 (2007) (“[I]nventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.”). In support of the Petition, Mr. Frost generally reiterates Petitioner’s arguments, stating: “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of Fife and Stephenson since both Fife and Stephenson relate to methods for producing tantalum electrolytic capacitors, and both Fife and Stephenson constitute admitted prior art mentioned specifically in the ’075 Patent.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 32. Mr. Frost does not explain, however, why either of these factors would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to use Stephenson’s higher formation voltages in Fife. Thus, this testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (expert testimony regarding motivation to combine is insufficient if it is “generic and bears no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements” and “fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does”); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that “[l]ack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations” may “render the testimony of little probative value”). As Petitioner provides insufficient rationale to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the disclosures of Fife and Stephenson in a manner necessary to achieve the claimed invention, it has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over those references. And, because challenged claims 2–11 and 13–18 each depend from claim 1, and because the deficiencies in Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding claim 1 are not remedied by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding claims 2–11 and 13–18, Petitioner has likewise not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of those claims would have been obvious over Fife and Stephenson.6” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In support of the Petition, Mr. Frost generally reiterates Petitioner’s arguments, stating: “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of Fife and Stephenson since both Fife and Stephenson relate to methods for producing tantalum electrolytic capacitors, and both Fife and Stephenson constitute admitted prior art mentioned specifically in the ’075 Patent.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 32. Mr. Frost does not explain, however, why either of these factors would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to use Stephenson’s higher formation voltages in Fife. Thus, this testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (expert testimony regarding motivation to combine is insufficient if it is “generic and bears no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements” and “fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does”); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that “[l]ack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations” may “render the testimony of little probative value”).” slip op. at 8

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,312,075
• Sony Mobile Communications Inc. v. SSH Communications Security OyjRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01869 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 3–8, 10–12, 14–18, 20–23, 25, and 27–29 unpatentable over Shuen and RFC1234, and claim 19 unpatentable over Bellovin.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successDecided for petitioner

    “mapping for the network address translation” under the Board’s construction of that phrase, i.e., “a property associated with the mapping in which the mapping expires after it has not been used in the translation of a packet for a period of time associated with the mapping,” the Petition cites the following language from Shuen:” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Disclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “from various documents into a host document . . . by citing such material in a manner that makes clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein.” Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citations omitted). “To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.” Id. (citations omitted). Whether and to what extent material has been incorporated by reference into a host document is a question of law. Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Notably, Patent Owner did not raise this argument (i.e., that Shuen’s “time to live” does not satisfy the recited “time out . . .” under the Board’s construction) in its Patent Owner Response. Patent Owner asserts, however, it “noted this deficiency of Petitioner’s proofs in the January 18, 2017 hearing” and “[t]his deficiency of Shuen was first raised in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response.” Req. Reh’g. 4. However, our rules do not allow Patent Owner to incorporate arguments by reference from its Preliminary Response (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference form one document into another document”)), and our Scheduling Order provides that any arguments and evidence not contained in the Patent Owner Response will be “deemed waived” (Paper 9, 3). Petitioner asserted at the oral hearing that the argument was new and, as such, Petitioner did not have a reasonable ability to respond to the argument. Tr. 43:8–14. We determine Patent Owner has waived its argument that Shuen does not disclose the “has not been used” portion of our construction of the phrase “time out of the mapping for the network address translation.”” slip op. at 3

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,544,079
• Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Eagle View Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00591 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 6, 9, 12-14, 16, 19, 22, and 23 are unpatentable as anticipated by Avrahami; claims 10, 15, and 25 were not shown obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. Avrahami describes its algorithm as providing “for semi-automatic 3D spatial polygon extraction from a pair of colored aerial images with a known external model solution.” Ex. 1004, 43 (emphasis added). Avrahami touts that one of the advantages of its system is that “the operator can identify at a glance which buildings can be mapped by this method so as to combine it with traditional manual extraction or other semi-automatic method.” Id. at 48 (emphasis added). Further to this point, Figure 1 shows a side-by-side comparison of the images in the pair. See id. at Fig. 1 (displaying left and right polygons going through Avrahami’s iterative matching process). Further, we credit the testimony from Petitioner’s Expert, Mr. Schuch, that one skilled in the art would understand Avrahami’s images to be what “you see . . . on a computer screen” as “part of the production.” Ex. 2017, 69:20–21; see also id. at 71:2–4 (explaining that “[t]his is an actual production image”). Therefore, we find that Petitioner has proffered sufficient evidence that Avrahami discloses the disputed limitation.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s extensive evidence of nexus between its Render House and Twister products and the challenged claims. Patent Owner steps through each challenged claim on an element-by-element basis and directs us to images and specific passages from its Render House and Twister user guides that it argues embody the limitations of each challenged claim. PO. Resp. 50–58. Patent Owner also supports its assertion of nexus with testimony in the form of a Declaration from Dr. Chandrajit L. Bajaj that includes a claim chart detailing where each limitation of the challenged claim is found in its Twister and Render House products. Ex. 2010, 44–91.5 The Federal Circuit has held that “if the marketed product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them, then a nexus is presumed and the burden shifts to the party asserting obviousness to present evidence to rebut the presumed nexus.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Patent Owner has put forth sufficient evidence to show that its Twister and Render House products embody the elements of the challenged claims and thus, we look to Petitioner to rebut this presumed nexus and acknowledge that the presumption “cannot be rebutted with mere argument; evidence must be put” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Commercial successObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “with the purportedly unique characteristics of the claimed invention and that for which there is alleged commercial success.” Reply 23–24. Our reviewing court has held that for evidence of commercial success to be relevant, “the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010). As noted above, however, Patent Owner has provided extensive evidence that the Twister and Render House products are coextensive with claims 10, 15, and 25 and that the reports sold were created using the Twister and Render House products. Thus, we are persuaded that nexus exists between the challenged claims and the commercially successful products at issue. Petitioner also asserts that “Patent Owner has failed to make any showing as to market share, thus rendering their sales figures irrelevant and not adequately defined.” Reply 24. Patent Owner provided unrebutted evidence that “approximately 96 percent of the top 25 insurance carriers rely on [Eagle View Technologies 3D aerial roof measurement reports] in their claims departments.” Ex. 2020, 1; see also Ex. 2029, 8 (Verisk Analytics presentation noting that 24 of top 25 insurance companies and 30,000 contractors are Eagle View customers). In addition, Patent Owner’s evidence shows that its products are used by “about one-fifth of the roofing contractor market, according to an estimate by market researcher IbisWorld.” Ex. 2024. Patent Owner’s financial reports show both that it sold a significant number of roofing reports and that its sales grew significantly between 2009 and 2015. See PO Resp. 60–61. We find that this information, taken together with statement from others in the industry (see Ex. 2029) gives us a view of Patent Owner’s place in the relevant market and persuades us that Patent Owner’s Twister and Render House products experienced significant commercial success and wide-spread use in the industry.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseDecided for patent owner

    “iii. Industry Praise Praise from industry participants, especially competitors, is probative as to obviousness because such participants “are not likely to praise an obvious advance over the known art. Thus, if there is evidence of industry praise of the claimed invention in the record, it weighs in favor of the non-obviousness of the claimed invention.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner described Patent Owner’s products as “[u]sing aerial photography and patent-pending software [to] accurately calculate[] measurements for the roof’s ridges, rafters, valleys, slopes and more.” Ex. 2021, 1. Petitioner further noted that the “process saves contractors and roofers hours of time spent measuring and scoping a roof.” Id.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,209,152 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,209,152
• Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Eagle View Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00590 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 10, 11, 14, and 19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the asserted art lacked a required movable-marker limitation and objective indicia outweighed the obviousness evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not agree with Petitioner that Avrahami’s pointing to and identifying seed points, constitutes movement of a first visual marker. Rather, as Patent Owner explains, “prior to the user’s click, the seed point does not exist, and thus there is nothing to move.” See PO Resp. 18 (citing 2008 ¶ 56). Avrahami’s characterization of the already-placed seed point as the “initial 2D seed point” supports Patent Owner’s position. See Ex. 1003, 44. The user cannot move an object that does not yet exist, and Petitioner offers no support to suggest that Avrahami’s seed points somehow exist before the user places them by clicking. See Pet. 14; Reply 2–4. There is also no indication that after placing the seed point, the user can move its location. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 56. To the contrary, Avrahami describes the algorithm as “fully automatic” after the user places the seed point. Ex. 1003, 43.” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We note that in Reply, Petitioner makes an alternative argument that “placement of subsequent seed points after placement of a first seed point, as well as the addition of segmentations around such seed points, qualifies as ‘movement.’” Reply 3. We decline to reach this argument, however, because Petitioner raised it for the first time in its Reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) (requiring that a petition must identify “the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge and the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explaining that “[t]he Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Commercial successObjective indicia outweighedDecided for patent owner

  Patent outcomesUS 8,818,770 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,818,770

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.