• Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · IPR2022-00981 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 8–11, 13, 17, and 19 were held unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandMixed

    “8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and remanded “for consideration of the patentability of those claims.” Id. at 14. We understand both the reversal and vacature are with respect to Ground 1 of alleged unpatentability, not Ground 2, because the Federal Circuit’s decision did not discuss anything relating to Ground 2. Paper 43. The parties agreed. Paper 44. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing or evidence. In a telephone conference call, both parties expressed agreement with the Board (1) that “there is no issue regarding collateral estoppel or issue preclusion with respect to dependent claims 8– 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and (2) that the remand proceeding would not involve the Board revisiting any matter or issue concerning alleged obviousness of claims 1, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, and 19 over Ground 2.4 Papers 43, 44. The parties also agreed that the remand proceeding would only involve the Board reviewing the alleged obviousness of dependent claims 8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 as obvious over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton. Id. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. On the record before us, which is the same as the record before us at the time we issued the first final written decision (Paper 34), we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8– 11, 13, 17, and 19, but not claim 15, of the ’936 patent are unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton.” slip op. at 3

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “5. Petitioner’s Request to Discredit Dr. Cooklev’s Declaration Petitioner makes several arguments discrediting Dr. Cooklev’s declaration (Ex. 2031) and asserts that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. Reply 13–14. We have already considered and rejected this request in the Final Written Decision issued on November 7, 2023. Paper 34, 21–23. Our reasoning need not be reiterated here. Petitioner does not persuade us that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration testimony should be accorded little to no weight.” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petition’s definition of level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, accepts Dr. Kotzin’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2031 ¶ 24. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22) and is consistent with the level reflected in the ’936 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “only when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A prior art reference constitutes analogous art if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a reference is analogous art. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,472,936 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,472,936
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7–18 were not shown unpatentable because Ribarits does not disclose a mouthpiece disposed on the pivotal mount.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). While CamelBak offers “a similar, though slightly different level,” it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 27. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is 2 JP 2002-211613A, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 WO 2004/063042 A2, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 4 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 5 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1008, “Hughes”). reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’250 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We will not bite. CamelBak’s original assertion—that the plain and ordinary meaning of the constituent parts of “mouth” and “piece” is “a piece (or part) that goes in the mouth”—underscores the fallacy of CamelBak’s additional physical contact requirement. PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). Indeed, in support of that earlier assertion, CamelBak pointed to the very dictionary definition that we relied on at institution in construing “mouthpiece” as a part that either “goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” See id. at 31 (citing Ex. 2005 (emphasis added)). Even the original testimony of CamelBak’s own expert confirms that one skilled in the art “would understand that the term ‘mouthpiece’ is commonly known in the art as a part designed for a user’s mouth,” without any requirement for physical contact with the mouth. Ex. 2016 ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 2005) (emphasis added)). And nothing in the Specification limits that common understanding. Although, indisputably, the Specification contemplates an embodiment where the user physically contacts the mouthpiece with their teeth (i.e., a bite-actuated mouthpiece), it also contemplates an embodiment where the user simply inserts the bottle in their mouth and commences fluid flow by squeezing it. See Ex. 1001, 10:9–13. That disclosure supports a meaning of “mouthpiece” that simply requires placement in the opening of the user’s mouth without necessarily incurring physical contact with some portion of the mouth, such as the teeth, tongue, or lips. Indeed, had CamelBak wished to premise the meaning of “mouthpiece” on some sort of physical contact with the mouth, it knew how to do so. For instance, the independent claims of CamelBak’s earlier ’255 patent, which is the subject of the related 1137 IPR, are limited in just such a manner, as they recite “wherein the resilient mouthpiece is adapted to resiliently compress responsive to compressive forces applied to the resilient mouthpiece by a user’s teeth.” Ex. 2023, at 20–25 (emphasis added). Thus, we reject CamelBak’s attempt to narrow our construction of “mouthpiece” to something other than “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” Neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence supports the narrower construction proposed by CamelBak.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In reply, Trove argues that CamelBak’s “novel” construction that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion about that same axis of rotation defined by the two joint as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount “are inconsistent with the claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning and find no support in the intrinsic and extrinsic record.” See Pet. Reply 16. But, because we find that, when properly construed, the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis” requires that the mouthpiece rotate about the same axis and in the same direction as the pivotal mount, we reject Trove’s argument as unavailing. And, although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in counter-clockwise rotation about a “Second Pivot Axis” when Nakajima’s lid 4 is opened (id. at 20–22), that rotation is about a different axis—one defined by Nakajima’s protrusions 24 rather than the claimed “pivotal axis” defined by Nakajima’s hinge shafts 19—and in a different manner—an upward and counterclockwise path rather than the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” defined by Nakajima’s lid 4. Finally, in an alternative theory, Trove and its expert use “image- manipulation tools” in an attempt to show that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in some initial “clockwise-rotation” with Nakajima’s lid as it is opened. See Pet. Reply 18–24. We reject that theory as entirely conjectural and unsupported by the evidence.” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We disagree. As discussed above, the proper construction of “for pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” requires that the mouthpiece mirror the rotational movement of the pivotal mount, i.e., rotate about the same axis as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount. See supra § II.B.3. But Nakajima’s mouthpiece does neither, and, thus, does not exhibit the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis for . . . the pivotal mount axis,” as properly construed.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,851,250 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,851,250
• Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2022-01002 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1–9 and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Paulraj and Heath under § 103.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “determining no challenged claim had been proved unpatentable by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Apple Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”). Paper 41. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 43, 44. On January 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, on the basis that the Board erred by not considering certain alternative arguments presented in the Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 29), which were properly responsive to claim construction proposed in the Patent Owner Response and adopted by the Board.1 Paper 45. In its Reply, Petitioner alternatively argued that even under the Patent Owner’s claim construction relating to “the plurality of antennas,” the same prior art references nonetheless still rendered obvious the challenged claims. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing, despite having been given an opportunity to make and explain such a request. Paper 51. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Having considered all of the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Reply, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 and 12–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,191,083 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’083 patent”) are unpatentable. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner additionally states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not in its Response address the level of ordinary skill. Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Cooklev, testifies that he “will apply the same definition of the level of skill of a POSITA [as Petitioner].” Ex. 2004 ¶ 19. Based on the evidence of record, we determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems. This is consistent with Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, with the exception of Petitioner’s open-ended reference to “at least” two years of experience, because that would improperly encompass a level of experience only possessed by an expert. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is also the same as what we determined in the Final Written decision issued on November 30, 2023. Paper 41, 6. C. slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends: “The plain meaning of the claims requires that the same ‘plurality of antennas’ be used for transmitting and receiving the plurality of signal streams.” PO Resp. 5, 9–12. Citing Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, Patent Owner contends that the ’083 patent’s Specification describes embodiments that use the same antennas for both transmitting and receiving data streams. PO Resp. 7–9 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 34–35). In the Final Written Decision, we determined: Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas— one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims. Paper 41, 13 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit agreed with our claim construction. Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., slip op. 24-1419 (January 13, 2026) (2026 WL 91021) (Paper 45, 2–4). We continue to apply the same construction here that we adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “legally sufficient motivation for modifying Paulraj, but only attempted to show that the modification “could” have been made by one of ordinary skill in the art which is not enough for a showing of obviousness. Sur-reply 8–9. We disagree with Patent Owner. Establishing that certain technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the challenged patent constitutes sufficient motivation to make a modification in accordance with what was well-known in the art to one of ordinary skill, absent factors not present here. Indeed, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. That would be the situation where a technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art, unless there is actual difficulty in making the application. The “improvement” here, although not articulated by Petitioner, is inherent with the technique, not requiring use of separate antennas for transmitting and receiving, i.e., eliminating the need for additional parts. Further, it is not necessary to show that a modification is the “best option,” because any “suitable option” would suffice. See Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, Patent Owner does not assert that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had difficulty modifying Paulraj to use some of the same antennas both for transmitting and for receiving. Nor does Patent Owner dispute that it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the same antenna(s) for both transmitting and for receiving. We further note the following description in the Specification of the ’083 patent: “The typical CT/MD [cellular telephone/mobile device] has one transmitter and one receiver (T/R), with one antenna.” Ex. 1001, 1:47–48. That statement is fully consistent with Petitioner’s assertion that it was well-known to use the same antenna for transmitting and for receiving. For the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner sufficiently has shown that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Paulraj such that some of the same antennas would be used both for transmitting and for receiving, according to limitations 1[b], 1[d], and 1[e].” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,191,083 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,191,083
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01405 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–20 over Torii, claims 1–3, 9, 11–13, and 19 over Ide, and claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20 over Gambino with Conn, with Ding for claims 10 and 20.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “of the substrate is based on Dr. Thompson’s testimony. In his first declaration, Dr. Thompson relies on Conn’s paragraphs 31 and 35 to support the annotated version of Figure 2 in the Petition. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84. As discussed above, paragraphs 31 and 35 do not disclose that the anchor vias 14 are located in the corner of the substrate. The second annotated Figure 2 shown in Petitioner’s Reply does not appear in either of Dr. Thompson’s declarations (See Ex. 1003, Ex. 1034). It appears to be mere attorney argument not evidence. Dr. Thompson testified in his deposition that the second annotated version is based on his interpretation of Conn. Ex. 2009, 45:2–46:9. Because Dr. Thompson’s testimony is not adequately supported by the disclosure of Conn, we find that his testimony on the point of whether Conn discloses anchor vias located in the corner of the substrate is entitled to little, if any, weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Therefore, because Petitioner has the burden of proof, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Conn discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 27

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “J. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibits 2007 and 2008. MTE, 1. Petitioner argues that the Exhibits are in violation of FRE 401, 402, 403, and 901. Id. We do not rely on either Exhibit 2007 or 2008 in this Decision. Consequently, we deny Petitioner’s MTE as moot.” slip op. at 72

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the differences between the parties’ proposed levels of skill in the art are immaterial for the purposes of this Decision. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’826 patent and the prior art. Further, our determination in this case would not be affected if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1 uses the term “comprising” which is open-ended and normally does not exclude additional, unrecited elements. See Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This is in contrast to the phrase “consisting of.” See Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (there is an “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.”). The use of comprising in claim 1, thus, weighs against a construction limiting claim 1 to direct contact between the backside metal layer and the bottom surface of the semiconductor substrate. Additionally, we note that claim 1 does not recite that the backside metal layer is “directly on” or “formed on” the bottom surface or similar language that would suggest “direct contact” may be required. For these reasons, we determine that the language of claim 1 does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 9,245,826 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,245,826
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures, II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00124 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10–14, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the Neufeld grounds; the Board found the IPMI and Lawrence grounds insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “[O]ne or more factors may predominate.” Id. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner proposes for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’140 patent. Dec. on Inst. 7–8. Namely, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelors’ degree in electrical or computer engineering or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience in the field of computer and/or” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), following the standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340–41, 51,343 (Oct. 11, 2018). In applying such standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). in claim 1 means “said managed network device.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction for this term as it appears to be consistent with the Specification’s use of “element” as referring to networked devices, and with the overall claim. See generally Ex. 1002.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “First, Petitioner argues that “an out of band access connection means” is a means-plus-function term with the recited function being “connecting said one or more network services or remote users with said secure management access controller for management of said network device.” Id. at 10. Petitioner argues that the function’s corresponding structure is “one or more of the following networks: a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) (2:45–57, 3:2–4, 12:37-61), an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) (2:45–57), a cellular network (6:14–21, 7:60–62, 12:37–61), an Ethernet network (12:37–61), a wireless network, and/or a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) (12:37–61, 15:55–60), where the one or more networks use one or more of the following protocols: [Simple Network Management Protocol (“SNMP”)], TFTP, FTP, DNS, SysLog, Telnet, SSH, HTTP, HTTPs, point to point IP, and/or XML (8:30–38).” Id. Second, Petitioner argues that “virtual management interface connection means” is a means-plus-function term with the following recited with said secure management access controller’; (ii) ‘provides logical separation of management data from user data,’ and (iii) ‘utilizes user interfaces of said managed network element for connecting said one or more network services or remote users with said secure management access controller.’” Id. at 10–11. Petitioner argues that the functions’ corresponding structure is a VPN. Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1002, 6:22–44, 6:63– 7:5, 12:5–21).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Lastly, we determine that we do not need to construe any other terms to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,325,140 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,325,140
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures, II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00109 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6–9, 12, and 14–17 are unpatentable as obvious over grounds involving Neufeld; the Board found the grounds involving IPMI and Huckins insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner proposes for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’016 patent. Dec. on Inst. 8–9. Namely, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelors’ degree in electrical or computer engineering or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience in the field of computer and/or network design and security or other relevant industry experience,” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56)). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s definition, nor provide its own. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’016 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that we do not need to construe any term to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In addition, we find not credible Dr. Mishra’s deposition testimony that Neufeld teaches only out-of-band communication, and it is not possible for a remote management command to come to remote management controller 116 via network N and through NIC 110. See Ex. 1043,22 43:5– 44:6, 49:9–50:7; PO Sur-reply 4–5. This testimony is inconsistent with Neufeld’s express teachings, which we discuss above. Compare Ex. 1043, 43:5–44:6, 49:9–50:7, with Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 11–12, 15, 34–35, 43, Figs. 1–2.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1068−69 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that “the Board focused on what a skilled artisan would have been able to do, rather than what a skilled artisan would have been motivated to do at the time of the invention”). Petitioner’s arguments focus on that the modified version of IPMI could have been made, rather than that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings to make the proffered combination. For example, Petitioner argues that the modified IPMI version is “one way to implement a side-band connection.” Pet. 62. This argues that the modified IPMI version could have been made. Petitioner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the combined modifications because “IPMI’s LAN Controller already has the necessary logic and hardware to send packets to [the] managed server via the PCI bus as shown in unmodified version of Fig. 12-1.” Pet. Reply 23; see also id. at 24 (arguing that “implementing the I2C sideband interface taught by IPMI using a PCI-I2C controller/bridge is a simple and logical solution on the PCI bus”). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not explain why this would be a motivation to add Huckins’s “PCI-I2C Bus Controller/Bridge” to IPMI’s teachings. E.g., PO Resp. 60; PO Sur-reply 20. And, we find persuasive Dr. Mishra’s testimony that “[r]equiring a LAN controller to offload management data onto the PCI bus only to route it back internally via the I/O Controller Hub introduces unnecessary design complexity, reduces system performance, and consumes additional bandwidth and power, all without technical justification.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 148; see also id. ¶¶ 145–146 (testifying to the modified combination’s operation). We also find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner’s criticisms of the modified version of Figure 12-1 “do not defeat the Petition’s showing of obviousness because ‘[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is the best option, only that it be a suitable option.’” Pet. Reply 26 (citing Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799– 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). But Petitioner does not address why the modified version of IPMI is suitable. Nor does Petitioner persuasively counter Dr. Mishra’s testimony as to why one of skill in the art would not have made the proposed combination. See Pet. Reply 24–26; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 145–148. In addition, in our view, Petitioner’s modification of IPMI to add Huckins’s “PCI-I2C Bus Controller/Bridge” is driven by impermissible hindsight and the desire to locate a distinct, second bus (the PCI bus) as required by the claims. Petitioner’s arguments to this end rely impermissibly on the ’016 patent itself as a roadmap. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am.-Maize Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.”’)); Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”). slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 8,474,016 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,474,016
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2024-01137 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 9–23 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the asserted combinations failed to teach the claimed mouthpiece movement or bite-actuated compression.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). While CamelBak offers a “slightly different” level of skill in the art, it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the 2 JP 2002-211613, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 US 6,070,767, issued June 6, 2000 (Ex. 1005, “Gardner”). 4 WO 2004/063042, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 5 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 6 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Hughes”). Board’s decision on the patentability of the ’255 patent.” PO Resp. 14–15. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’255 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “not move in a circular path that maintains a constant radius about the axis of rotation defined by McDonough’s axle 30, but instead engages in up-and-down translational motion (red arrows) relative to axle 30. Thus, we understand CamelBak’s arguments during reexamination to have distinguished the purely rotational (i.e., circular) motion of the claimed mouthpiece from a mouthpiece that moves with a translational component relative to the pivotal axis. In sum, this reexamination history shows that, by distinguishing over the translational motion of McDonough’s mouthpiece, CamelBak limited the claimed mouthpiece to one that (1) maintains a circular path of constant radius about the pivotal mount’s axis of rotation, and (2) does not include a path that has a translational component relative to the pivotal axis. See Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco Partnership, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 & 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Any explanation, elaboration, or qualification presented by the inventor during patent examination is relevant, for the role of claim construction is to capture the scope of the actual invention that is disclosed, described, and patented.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]hrough statements made during prosecution or reexamination an applicant for a patent or a patent owner, as the case may be, may commit to a particular meaning for a patent term, which meaning is then binding in litigation.”) (emphasis added); see also Univ. of Massachusetts v. L’Oreal S.A., 36 F.4th 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The prosecution history, in particular, may be critical in interpreting disputed claim terms, and even where prosecution history statements do not rise to the level of unmistakable disavowal, they do inform the claim construction.”) (internal quotations omitted).” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Those detailed descriptions demonstrate that “adapted to,” as recited in claims 1 and 20, means that the resilient mouthpiece is specifically designed and configured to dispense fluid as a result of a user biting the mouthpiece, rather than merely being “capable of” being compressed. See Giannelli, 739 F.3d at 1379–80. Indeed, as disclosed, a distinct benefit of the resilient mouthpiece being bite-actuated “is that a user may position the drink bottle (and mouthpiece) to a desired drinking orientation, and even a partially or completely inverted orientation, without drink fluid being dispensed from the mouthpiece” until the user bites upon the mouthpiece to commence fluid flow through self-sealing valve to the user. Id. at 10:9–19. Thus, the intrinsic evidence, i.e., the specification and figures of the ’255 patent, confirm that the phrase “adapted to” means “designed or configured to” and is not satisfied by mere hypothetical capability. That is, as claimed, the resilient mouthpiece is designed or configured to compress based on actual forces applied by a user’s teeth, as opposed to merely being capable of compression based on the inherent nature of the mouthpiece’s material. C. Obviousness” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in up-and-down movement relative to the pivot axis identified in Trove’s annotated figures, we disagree that Nakajima’s mouthpiece is “pivotal about an axis defined by the pair of lateral projections as [they] rotate within the pair of sockets,” as required by claim 1. As discussed above, the proper construction of this claim limitation requires that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion in a circular path of constant radius about the pivotal axis defined by the pair of lateral projections. See supra § II.B.1. Nakajima, on the other hand, discloses that its mouthpiece moves with translational motion, i.e., up-and-down movement, relative to the pivotal axis defined by lateral projections 19 of Nakajima’s lid 4—“[T]he mouthpiece moves up and down in conjunction with the opening and closing of the lid.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 3 (emphasis added); see also id., Abstract (“[T]he mouthpiece 2 moves up and down in conjunction with the opening and closing of the lid 4.”). Indeed, although Trove relies exclusively on Nakajima’s disclosure of up-and-down movement for the mouthpiece, Trove never explains how such up-and-down movement equates to rotational motion required by the disputed limitation of claim 1. Nor can it.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,676,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,676,255
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00858 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–7 and 16–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 102 or § 103 because the cited references failed to disclose the claimed closure retention mechanism.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. “closure retention mechanism” Trove proposes that “closure retention mechanism” should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Pet. 18–19; Pet. Reply 1. CamelBak agrees. See PO Resp. 8. Indeed, subsequent to our institution decision, the district court in the parallel action held that the “closure retention mechanism” is a means-plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Ex. 2010, at 5–6. We see no reason to depart from that holding and adopt the district court’s reasoning in that regard as our own. See id. at 6–8.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with CamelBak that the plain language of the claim imposes a temporal condition on when the closure is received by the closure retention mechanism, namely, only after it is removed from the drink spout. In other words, the closure cannot be in engagement with, i.e., “received by,” the closure retention mechanism while it remains on the drink spout. This interpretation is consistent with the specification, which repeatedly states that spaced-apart tabs 56 “engage” the closure when it is removed from the spout and moved to the stowed position. Ex. 1001, 8:58–60 (“tabs 56 . . . are configured to selectively engage and retain, or otherwise grip, the closure in the stowed position”); 9:32–39 (“when the closure is positioned between and/or otherwise in engagement with the tabs, the tabs engage the closure across the maximum width, such as with the tabs resiliently deflecting, bending, or compressing to accommodate the greater width of the closure”); 11:36–39 (“the closure retention mechanism 54 may be configured to engage . . . the closure to operatively retain the closure in its stowed configuration.”); 13:26–31 (“When the closure is operatively positioned within the closed perimeter of the handle into its stowed position . . . such closure is compressed slightly.”) (emphases added). Moreover, the specification describes this engagement as occurring by means of a “friction-fit” or “snap-fit” arrangement (id. at 8:50–52, 14:33– 36), which confirms that the closure is not permanently engaged with the tabs, but rather moved into engagement with the tabs, i.e., “received by the closure retention mechanism” per the plain language of the claim. Thus, the intrinsic evidence—the claim language and the specification—supports a construction that imposes a temporal condition on the recited function of the claimed “closure retention mechanism” such that it receives the closure only after the closure has been removed from the drink spout, meaning the closure is not engaged with the closure retention mechanism before it is selectively removed from the drink spout.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. “retain the closure in a stowed position” CamelBak contends that this limitation should be construed to mean “to hold or keep the closure in a position removed from the drink spout.” PO Resp. 13–14; PO Sur-Reply 4. Although Trove contends that CamelBak’s construction “impermissibly rewrites” the claim language, Trove nonetheless “does not disagree that it encompasses ‘hold or keep the Indeed, the claim language itself already contemplates just such a construction by expressly reciting that the closure retention mechanism “selectively retain[s] the closure in a stowed position relative to the handle when the closure is selectively removed from the drink spout.” Ex. 1001, 18:63–66 (emphasis added). As such, we determine that further construction of this limitation is not necessary to resolve the present dispute.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had— an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products . . . [and that] [m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–30). 2 US 9,272,822 B2, issued Mar. 1, 2016 (Ex. 1004, “Samartgis”). 3 EP 2 177 447 A1, published Apr. 21, 2010 (Ex. 1011, “Gorskey”). 4 US 2006/0006578 A1, published Jan. 12, 2006 (Ex. 1012, “Johnson”). 5 US 7,753,240 B2, issued July 13, 2010 (Ex. 1005, “Leoncavallo”). 6 US D586,184 S, issued Feb. 10, 2009 (Ex. 1006, “Miller”). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. See PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 61–68). Because CamelBak simply paraphrases Trove’s slightly more detailed definition of the level of skill in the art, we adopt Trove’s definition, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’252 patent.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 8,905,252 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,905,252
• Google LLC v. Dialect, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00752 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 12–17, and 19–23 are unpatentable; claims 8–11, 18, and 24–27 were not shown unpatentable, because Coffman’s domain-agent disclosure was deficient for the latter claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “recites one or more processors programmed with instructions to “synchronize the first context stack with a second context stack . . . such that the context information of the first context stack is updated based on related context information of the second context stack.” Ex. 1001, 38:43–45, 38:50–54. This language focuses on synchronizing the two context stacks by updating the context information of the first stack based on related context information of the second stack. See id. The only potential textual support in claim 1 for Patent Owner’s position that the claim requires duplicating the order of the context entries in the two stacks are the terms “synchronize” and “context stack.” See id. We discern nothing in the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms that would require duplicating the order of context entries in the two stacks as part of the claimed synchronizing.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See PO Resp.; Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 28–31. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s unopposed formulation of ordinary skill generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’652 patent and the asserted prior art. Therefore, we apply that formulation here.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We have also considered the expert testimony. Patent Owner’s expert Mr. Occhiogrosso opines that synchronizing context stacks must include duplicating the order of entries in the stacks. See Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 36–41, 50, 67–74. However, the only documentary evidence cited to support this opinion is the ’652 patent specification disclosures we have addressed above. See id. ¶¶ 39, 70, 72 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:10–12, 20:19–22). Thus, Mr. Occhiogrosso’s extrinsic testimony on this point is overly conclusory, and we accordingly give it little weight here. Moreover, although extrinsic evidence such as expert witness testimony “can shed useful light on the relevant art,” it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1318 (“We have viewed extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the patent . . . in determining how to read claim terms.”); Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Given the clarity of the intrinsic evidence, resort to extrinsic evidence is unnecessary” so “to the extent the Board relied on extrinsic evidence to alter the meaning of ‘fixed’ that is clear from the intrinsic evidence, that was error.”).” slip op. at 29

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedNew argument consideredMixed

    “Mr. Schmandt’s initial Declaration (Exhibit 1002) entirely fail to address how Coffman’s processor(s) might be programmed to “identify” one or more conversationally-aware applications per claim 8. As a result, the additional argument in the Petitioner Reply concerning this claim requirement is untimely and should not be considered. See PO Sur-reply 4, 13; e.g., Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[T]he expedited nature of IPRs bring with it an obligation for petitioners to make their case in their petition” and “the Board is not permitted to entertain ‘[s]hifting arguments’ but must, instead, reject any ‘entirely new theory of prima facie obviousness absent from the petition,’ if the petitioner attempts to inject such a theory into the proceeding post-petition.” (citations omitted)); Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Here, [the petitioner] did not make out its obviousness case in its petition” and “[a]fter [the patent owner] pointed out the flaws of [the petitioner’s] position, [the petitioner’s] ensuing arguments to the Board and to us effectively abandoned its petition in favor of a new argument” thereby “amount[ing] to an entirely new theory of prima facie obviousness” which “is foreclosed by statute, our precedent, and Board guidelines.”). Nonetheless, in order to provide a complete record for federal court review if sought by Petitioner, we will go on to consider the substantive merit of the arguments in the Petitioner Reply. We conclude those arguments and Mr. Schmandt’s supporting testimony (Exhibit 1017) do not satisfy Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence, for the following reasons.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 8,849,652 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,849,652
• Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01348 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 2, 3, 5–15, 17, and 19–21 not shown unpatentable over Spitballs and Peev because the evidence did not establish an obvious reason to use the SAP ammunition in Peev’s airsoft gun.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “After the Petition was filed, Patent Owner disclaimed independent claim 1 and dependent claim 4 of the ’282 patent. Prelim. Resp. 26; Ex. 2013. Accordingly, we need not reach Petitioner’s challenges to claims 1 and 4. E.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e). Thus, the remaining challenged claims are claims 2, 3, 5–15, 17, and 19–21.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “that were proposed in the ITC proceeding as “similar” and noting the ITC ALJ’s determination that “all of the proposals are appropriate,” Petitioner does not argue for the application of any particular level of skill in the art in this proceeding. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1015, 8). We too find the definitions advanced in the ITC proceeding similar. Indeed, any differences between the definitions do not rise to a level that would affect our analysis of whether the Petition and associated evidence are sufficiently persuasive for purposes of institution. In our view, the foregoing level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Patent Owner in the ITC proceeding best fits the legal requirements. Accordingly, we adopt and apply that level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis of the merits.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties’ arguments and evidence do not raise any issues that necessitate an express claim construction in order to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we need not and do not expressly construe any claim language. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “success in an airsoft gun such as Peev, including rubber, cork, foam, and soft plastics, such as SAPs.” Ex. 1016 ¶ 78; Pet. 37. For multiple reasons, this testimony fails to support Petitioner’s suggestion that using SAP ammunition in Peev’s airsoft gun was among a finite number of identified, predictable solutions. For example, because Mr. Delman does not support this testimony with objective supporting evidence, it is not entitled to persuasive weight in Petitioner’s favor. Ex. 1016 ¶ 78; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Additionally, even if Mr. Delman substantiated his view that an ordinarily skilled artisan “could have considered” SAPs as airsoft ammunition, that would not persuade us that SAPs were identified, predictable solutions for airsoft ammunition.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,371,282 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,371,282

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.