- CSPC Megalith Biopharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Lepu Biopharma Co. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00685 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Wei and Liu, and over Leanna, Wei, and Liu.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“appears to be generally consistent with the level of skill presented in the cited prior art. See generally, e.g., Exs. 1005–1008; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, as at institution, we reject the portion of Petitioner’s proposed definition that includes having “access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience,” as not reflecting the individual level of skill of a given skilled artisan. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted); but see Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labys., S.A., 930 F.3d 1325, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (no clear error in determination that “a person of ordinary skill . . . ‘would be on a team with an engineer or scientist . . . .’”). Consequently, we find the person of ordinary skill in the art was a person who had a Ph.D. in immunology, molecular biology, cellular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar experience, and had at least five years of experience with antibodies and antibody engineering.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits that no term of the Challenged Claims requires construction to resolve the challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 32. We did not construe any terms in our Institution Decision. See DI 6–7. Patent Owner presents no express positions on claim construction. See generally Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, no terms of the challenged claims require construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. D. slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“2 G. Wei et al., US 2015/0071923 Al, pub. March 12, 2015. Ex. 1005 (“Wei”). 3 J. Liu, CN 103772504 A, pub. May 7, 2014. Ex. 1007. The Liu reference is published in Simplified Chinese and Petitioner filed a certified English translation, to which we refer herein. See Ex. 1008 (“Liu”). Patent Owner does not contest the accuracy of the translation. See generally Resp. 4 M.R. Leanna & C.L. Becker, WO 2014/152199 A1, pub. Sept. 25, 2014. Ex. 1006 (“Leanna”). 5 Based on our review of each deposition transcript in view of the record as a whole, although each witness appears competent, we are left with the impression that Dr. Bournazos’s testimony is somewhat more credible than Dr. Atanackovic’s. This conclusion is based, inter alia, on each witness’s ability to recall the relevant record and respond to questions on evidentiary and technical issues.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We find that combining Liu’s BA03 antibody with Wei’s ADC platform would have been desirable, predictable, and routine for the ordinarily skilled artisan based on the facts that: (1) cetuximab was a wellknown and well-studied, U.S. regulatory approved, anti-EGFR antibody that would have served as a starting point for new cancer therapies; (2) humanization of therapeutic antibodies is generally desired (and “[e]very antibody can be humanized” and it is advantageous according to Patent Owner’s counsel); (3) BA03 was a well-known humanized version of cetuximab that had several known advantages over cetuximab in addition to lower immunogenicity from humanization; and (4) Wei taught a similar cetuximab-derived antibody, and a humanized cetuximab-derived antibody, each provided in an ADC with a well-known and validated off-the-shelf linker-drug platform, i.e., vc-MMAE, that exhibited a strong anti-tumor response. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:57–2:32, 2:50–3:1, 5:6–53, 18:3–33, 19:26– 29; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 14, 38, 42–43, 45–53, 56–73, 84–92, 109–117, 178–189, 202–271; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9–10, 229–232, 434, 437, 476, 491–506, 664–675, 685, 688, 715, 732, 1103, 1092–1141; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 3–6, 60, 74, 141–160; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 7–8, 38, 50, 57 (confirming our understandings regarding the claimed antibody and linker-drug payload); Ex. 2023, 173, 300; see also Resp. 1, 5–6, 23 (Patent Owner made the “choice” to use the prior-art-known BA03 antibody, and known-candidate cytotoxic payload MMAE); Hr’g Tr. 34:20–23, 36:6–38:20, 47:16–50:16 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s argument). When Liu’s BA03 antibody is provided in an ADC with a vc- MMAE or a Mc-vcPAB-MMAE platform (and used as cancer therapy as the references instruct) the invention of the challenged claims is achieved.” slip op. at 52
Patent outcomesUS 10,792,370 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,792,370 - Gettattle, Inc. v. Afterwords, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00677 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable as anticipated by Douglas and Ganesh; the revised contingent motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“record before us, we conclude that Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that each challenged claim of the ’811 patent is anticipated by Douglas and by Ganesh. Accordingly, we find that claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’811 patent are unpatentable. Moreover, we find that Patent Owner’s Revised Contingent Motion to Amend adds new matter in every proposed substitute claim, and, therefore, the motion is denied.” slip op. at 80
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Because the RMTA does not meet the foundational statutory and regulatory requirements, we decline to reach Petitioner’s arguments as to the asserted unpatentability of the proposed substitute claims. C. CONCLUSION ON REVISED MOTION TO AMEND Because the RMTA does not meet foundational statutory and regulatory requirements for a motion to amend, it is denied.” slip op. at 80
Patent outcomesUS 10,430,811 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,430,811 - Evenflo Company, Inc. v. Baby Jogger II, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01122 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Liao or Liao and Cheng; Rolicki is not prior art, and the challenge over Offord ’341 and Offord ’797 fails.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Baby Jogger does not dispute Evenflo’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is that a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter, “one skilled in the art”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (e.g., mechanical engineering or industrial design) and at least two years of product design experience and/or industry experience with juvenile products” and that “[m]ore education can replace product design experience, and vice versa.” Pet 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 31–33); PO Resp. generally. We apply that definition here, as it accords with the problems addressed in the prior art and the specification of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“At the outset, we note that the claim language requires only that “the first seat and the second seat” be arranged in an inline descending configuration, not that the seat’s mounting points or other physical connections be so arranged. Ex. 1010, 17:31–33. Baby Jogger improperly reads “seats” out of the claim and substitutes the seat’s “mounting points” on the frame. A proper reading of the claim language focuses on what happens when both seats are connected to the frame, not where they are so connected. In other words, “when connected to the frame” simply emphasizes that both seats must be connected to the frame to form the inline descending configuration, as opposed to the single stroller embodiment of Figure 1, where there cannot be an inline descending configuration because only one seat is connected to the frame and the other seat is removed, i.e., not connected to the frame. That reading is supported by the specification of the ’682 patent,” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“We find that testimony persuasive, for it shows what one skilled in the art would have recognized the 2008 Provisional as necessarily disclosing. The relevant inquiry is whether the disclosure of the prior application “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the inventor was in possession of the invention.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). “While a prior application need not contain precisely the same words as are found in the asserted claims, . . . the prior application must indicate to a person skilled in the art that the inventor was ‘in possession’ of the invention as later claimed.” Id. In other words, “to satisfy the written description requirement, ‘the missing descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original] application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure.’”7 Id. (quoting Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). “This requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element.” Id. at 1306–07. Moreover, a drawing may supply written description for the arrangement it depicts even though the text describes that arrangement in different terms. See Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1319–23 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Instead, Evenflo’s argument rests on isolating the statement—“A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]”—from the remainder of the passage in which that statement appears in order to arrive at a reason to incorporate the reversibility teaching of Offord ’797. However, when that statement is read in the context of the full passage in which it appears, nowhere does that passage suggest reversibility as the reason for referencing Offord ’797. More accurately, it suggests a different reason that relates to a curved lug 108 by which sub-frame 100 rests on the stroller’s main frame 4 to carry the weight of the stroller’s two occupants— When the interface components 100 are attached to the frame assembly 4 they form a sub-frame of the frame assembly 4, and when the child-carrying units are mounted thereon, one behind the other, they are in a compact echelon formation, one of the connector sockets 106 of each component 100 being at a higher level in relation to the ground than the other connector sockets 106. The higher connector socket 106 and further connecting leg 102 are both connected to the respective opposite ends of an upper mounting piece 107. In addition, on the inner side of the lower connector sockets 106 there is a downwardly curved lug 108 which serves to rest upon a part of the basket frame 44, such that the weight of two infants is fully supported by the frame assembly 4. A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]. Ex. 1051, 9:23–36 (emphasis added). That passage shows that, rather than reversibility of the sub-frame, the reference to Offord ’797 is more aptly directing the reader to the arrangement and details of a similarly curved lug structure in the stroller sub-frame of Offord ’797. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 of Offord ’797, reproduced below, disclose just such a curved lug in the context of “corner pieces 20” having “channel 21.” Ex. 1054, 4:10–23.” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 11,731,682 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,731,682 - Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00153 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry 1 US 2009/0313034 A1, pub. Dec. 17, 2009 (Ex. 1004, “Ferro”). 2 EP 1,920,968 A1, pub. May 14, 2008 (Ex. 1005, “Oyobe”). 3 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 4 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 5 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 6 US 6,662,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–15). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’987 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“1. “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider” In the Petition, Tesla proposes that we construe “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” as recited in every independent claim, to mean “a changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price) of electricity for purchase from an electric charge provider.” Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla improperly narrows the meaning of this claim limitation. PO Resp. 15 (arguing this claim term “is not just limited to ‘changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price)’ as alleged by the Petition” (emphasis added)). Although we consider Tesla’s proposed construction to identify an exemplary “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” we see no need to limit the meaning of this limitation as proposed by Tesla. Indeed, Tesla agrees. See Pet. Reply. 7 (arguing only that this claim limitation “at least includes” such an example). And Charge Fusion does not contend otherwise. See PO Resp 15 (arguing only that this limitation “is not just limited to” cost fluctuations). As such, we see no need to further construe this claim limitation. 2. “determine . . . a charging schedule for the vehicle” Limitation 1[g] recites “determine, based at least on the one or more charging preferences and at least one current value of a dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider, a charging schedule for the vehicle.” Independent claim 8, 15, and 22 recite a materially identical limitation. Tesla submits that this limitation should not be construed as a means-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). See Pet. 5. Charge Fusion agrees that “nothing in the claim invokes [§] 112(6).” PO Resp. 16. As such, we discern no dispute regarding the meaning of this claim limitation.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:53–15:8 (emphases added). The Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:3–8. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:49–57 (emphasis added). More specifically, annotated Figure 7 of the ’987 patent, reproduced below, demonstrates how a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a desired mileage range 720 or a percentage level 718. See Pet. Reply 2. As shown in red, annotated Figure 7 illustrates that a user selects “desired charge level 720” on “vehicle charge indicator 714” by moving a slider to a value specified in “miles” (e.g., 110 miles). The Specification, after discussing selecting a desired charge percent level 718, explains: The user may also or alternatively view and/or change the desired charge range level 720. An estimate of how far the vehicle can travel on a given charge amount (which may be a general average and/or may be computed based on a specific itinerary and/or past driving habits) can be determined, for example, and utilized to express the desired charge level in terms of distance capable of being traveled. In such a manner, for example, a user may determine a desired distance to travel (e.g., how far it is from home to work or vice versa) and may set the desired charge range level 720 to match the desired distance. Ex. 1001, 14:65–15:8. Thus, the Specification confirms that “amount of charge” may be expressed in terms of a desired mileage as well as a desired percentage level.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. Charge Fusion’s reliance on Wonderland is misplaced and does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Wonderland, the district court denied the accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there was sufficient motivation to combine the prior art. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. As such, the district court’s Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on the motivation to combine issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the district court’s ruling neither addresses the issue nor reflects how the issue was resolved at trial. See Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, contrary to Charge Fusion’s assertion, Tesla correctly notes that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2006, 54:8–55:9. Nonetheless, Ferro does describe manual options for initiating charging, and Tesla’s expert credibly testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without having to leave the vehicle. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146, 151, 152 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109). Accordingly, we find that Tesla establishes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,631,987 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,631,987 - Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–14 over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre; claims 5, 10, and 15 with Seelig; claims 16 and 17 with Knockeart.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, 1 US 2008/0136371 A1, pub. Jun. 12, 2008 (Ex. 1011, “Sutardja”). 2 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 3 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 4 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 5 US 6,622,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 9. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’788 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“shown in Figure 7 of the ’788 patent. Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla’s proposed construction should be rejected because it “wrongly import[s] embodiments from the specification.” PO Resp. 14–16. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because, contrary to what Charge Fusion argues, Tesla does not contend that this limitation is “required to be limited to” the bar graph embodiment of Figure 7, only that it “at least includes” that embodiment. Compare Pet. 5, with PO Resp. 14–16. Tesla also argues that the “first” and “second” portions of the unitary vehicle charge indicator—which indicate the charged and uncharged capacities of the battery—recite merely “communicative content,” and thus, are “not entitled to any patentable weight” because they are directed to nonfunctional printed matter. Pet. 5–7 (citing various case law). At the same time, however, Tesla maintains that “[r]egardless, Donnelly teaches a bar graph indicating the amount of charge and uncharged capacity.” Pet. Reply 11–12 (citing Pet. 33–34); see also Hrg. Tr. 74:22–25, 75:9–11. For reasons expressed below, we agree that Tesla persuasively demonstrates that the asserted combination teaches the “unitary vehicle charge indicator element” as claimed and construed by Charge Fusion. Accordingly, we need not decide the printed matter issue.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:63–15:18 (emphases added). In particular, the Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:8–18. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:59–67 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“full charge” for the battery, and thus, Tesla fails to explain how the combination of Sutardja with Donnelly’s battery bar graph image “would allow a user to select a specific amount of charge or how this would result in a unitary vehicle charge indicator,” as claimed. PO Resp. 30. According to Charge Fusion, “[l]imiting the single option of ‘full charge’ as described in Sutardja would defeat the purpose of implementing a slider” as taught by Donnelly. Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 72). We disagree. Charge Fusion’s argument rests on the mistaken premise that Sutardja only contemplates selecting a full amount of charge for the battery and not an amount below a full charge, i.e., a partial charge. But that is not what Sutardja says. More accurately, Sutardja teaches that the user specifies the amount of charge—"The user interface module 108 may comprise a key pad, a display, a microphone, and/or a speaker (all not shown). A user of the vehicle 102-1 may use the user interface module 108 to set charging parameters for charging the battery 14.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 243. Elsewhere, Sutardja teaches that the user may set a “predetermined level” of charge— The charge monitoring module 150 may inform the control module 112 when the battery 14 is charged to a predetermined level (e.g., full charge) that may be indicated in the charging parameters. Subsequently, the charge monitoring module 150 may stop charging the battery 14 by deactivating the converter 156 and the charging module 152. The power meter 24 may measure the amount of power received from the utility company 23 during the charging operation. Id. ¶ 270 (emphases added). Although that passage indicates that a “full charge” is an example of a “predetermined level” of charge, nowhere does it exclude the selection of a lesser amount. Indeed, the passage contemplates the ability to “stop charging the battery,” which indicates that selection of the predetermined level may be less than a full charge. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded by Charge Fusion’s argument to the contrary. Rather, in our view, Tesla demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the Sutardja-Donnelly combination teaches a “unitary vehicle charge indicator” that includes at least “first” and “second” portions and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to successfully combine their respective teachings in a manner that allows a user to predetermine, i.e., specify, an amount of charge. slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,990,788 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,990,788 - Klipsta Pty Ltd v. Lindsay AlbaneseSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00346 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over the asserted grounds; claims 1–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would be a regular consumer/shopper with a rudimentary knowledge of the use of magnetic clips and a basic understanding of clip construction.” Pet. 13. We find that the ’047 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’047 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- BurdenMixed
“Petitioner’s mapping of the components of KR ’458’s fastening device is insufficient. Although Petitioner maps the center line of fastening member 115 to the recited second end, Petitioner fails to adequately map the recited first end of the second strap or explain why one of skill in the art would consider the second ferromagnetic member (convex member 117) to be disposed at the first end of the second strap as required by claim 1. that the first end is “upward to connector 117.” Pet. 24. This is not the end of the second strap. As discussed above, the end of the second strap wraps around rectangular ring 210 and is then secured to itself.7 Connector 117 is positioned below the true end of the strap, more in the middle of this segment of the strap. In other words, Petitioner arbitrarily defines the strap as only the portion of hat holder 110 between the center line and connector 117, in contradiction to what KR ’458 actually discloses. Nowhere does Petitioner explain why connector 117 is disposed at the first end of the second strap. Neither does Petitioner explain why we should disregard the true end of the strap, nor why one of skill in the art would consider only a middle portion of the strap to be the second strap. Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied its burden in this regard. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that KR ’458 discloses “a second strap having a first end and a second end, the second strap joined to the first strap,” with “a second ferromagnetic member disposed at the first end of the second strap.” For the foregoing reasons, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence does not support that claim 1 is anticipated by KR ’458.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The ’047 patent discloses that in addition to being separate straps, the rear strap and the front strap “can be formed from a single piece of material.” Ex. 1001, 3:40–44, 5:24–32, 10:18–25. In particular, Figures 5A–5B of the ’047 patent illustrate rear strap 510 and front strap 520 as being “formed from a single piece of material that is folded approximately in half where a first half can be the rear strap 510 and a second half can be the front strap 520.” Id. at 10:18–21, Figs. 5A–5B. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges “[i]t should be noted that forming the first and second straps from a single piece of material is well within the scope of the claimed invention.” Ex. 1007, 5 (citing the ’047 patent at 3:37–44). Moreover, we note the positions taken by the parties are consistent with the fact that claim second strap are formed from a single folded strap.” Ex. 1001, 14:47–48. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of “the second strap joined to the first strap” to include “a single piece of material.”” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” to include a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object” is based on function, rather embodiments in the Specification of the ’047 patent. Although strap-style hook 340 of Figures 3A–3C is a flexible component rather than a more rigid component like hook 140 shown in Figures 1A–1C , both can be considered types of hooks. All of the embodiments, whether rigid or flexible, can be considered to have a hook-like structure when serving the function of attaching the hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s proposed construction would render the term “hook” meaningless, as various types of structures could be used to attach the hat holder to another object, that would not reasonably be considered to be a “hook.” For example, a snap, safety pin, ring, or button could be used to attach a hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s identification of different embodiments in the ’047 patent of hook-like structures does not show why one of skill in the art would consider almost any structure to be considered a “hook.” We, therefore, reject Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” as a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object.” “wherein the first strap and the second strap are configured to retain a” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,413,047 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,413,047 - GD Energy Products, LLC v. Kerr Machine CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · PGR2025-00031 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious under each of four asserted grounds: Kerr; Aplex and Stanton; Blume, Stanton, and Wilkinson; and the sale of the Kerr Pump.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The person of ordinary skill in the art would have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or petrochemical engineering, or a comparable engineering discipline, and a minimum of 3-5 years of work experience in the design and/or manufacturing of reciprocating pumps and valves, including fluid ends and/or comparable high pressure fluid components, for industrial applications, including for use in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., EX1003, ¶32.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We decline to expressly construe any claim language. slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Regarding the combining of Aplex and Stanton, Petitioner asserts that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that providing a packing/stuffing arrangement, as taught by Stanton, within a fluid end housing, as taught by Aplex, would improve pressure and fluid isolation compared with an arrangement where the packing was bolted to the outside of the fluid end as in Aplex unmodified. Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 236). Patent Owner does not dispute this rationale. We find this to be a reason, with rationale underpinning, why the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29
- Adverse judgmentOther
“The record indicates that Patent Owner has statutorily disclaimed claim 15 as of April 28, 2025. Ex. 2206.” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 12,152,582 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,152,582 - Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00032 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 based on the asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner submits that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For the purposes of our analysis below, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’338 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that “amount of charge” reflects no express limitation on the manner of expressing the “amount” or the “charge.” And the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user may specify an “amount of 3 As recited in independent claims 10, 19, and 28 charge.” For example, the Specification describes that a user may specify an amount of charge by specifying a desired travel distance as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Ex. 1001, 19:49–57 (emphasis added). Therefore, “amount of charge” may also refer to a desired mileage or range. Figure 7 further demonstrates that a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a “percent” or a “range” as shown in Petitioner’s annotated version of the pertinent portion of that figure as shown below.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner. First, Patent Owner’s reliance on Wonderland as announcing a rule having broad effect is misplaced. Patent Owner contends that the “Federal Circuit has confirmed that where the primary reference already includes the function of the secondary reference, an allegation to incorporate that function into the primary reference is improper hindsight and no motivation to combine exists.” Id. at 29 (citing Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 988 F.Supp. 2d 479, 498–99 (W.D. Pa. 2013), aff'd, 644 F. App'x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016); citing Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2012))). Patent Owner’s citation to Wonderland does not support the proposition for which it is cited, namely that the Federal Circuit has “confirmed” that incorporating a function from a secondary reference into a primary reference is “improper hindsight” that precludes a motivation to combine teachings from the primary and secondary references. In Wonderland, the district court denied an accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, due to its finding that genuine issues of material fact existed for the issue of whether sufficient motivation to combine prior art existed. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. The Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on that issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the final ruling by the district court does not address the issue or reflect how the issue was resolved at trial. Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Second, Petitioner also correctly points out that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2003, 54:8–55:9. Ferro also describes manual options for initiating charging, Ex. 1003¶ 146 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109), and that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without the user having to leave the vehicle, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 151, 152. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner’s argument fails to account for the level of skill and creativity of an ordinarily skilled artisan, who would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in engineering and could have easily accounted for the differences in scale depicted by Letendre’s and Donnelly’s controls. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 247–249. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner’s showing on the motivation to combine teachings of Ferro, Donnelly, and Letendre to arrive at limitation 1h is persuasive. slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,563,338 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,563,338 - First Quality Retail Services, LLC / First Quality Consumer Products, LLC et al. v. Essity Hygiene And Health ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01487 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 20–22, 24, and 25 are unpatentable, based on anticipation by Bergstrom and obviousness over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition. Dec. 9–10. In its Response, Patent Owner cites to Petitioner’s definition and states that Patent Owner “applies Petitioners’ definition.” PO Resp. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We begin our analysis with the language of the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312; see also SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 874–875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There is a ‘heavy presumption’ that the terms used in the claims ‘mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.’”). Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “said fluid flow control structure being a layered structure comprising a non-perforated fibrous polymeric layer and a first perforated polymeric layer.” Ex. 1001, 13:62–64 (limitation [1h]). The plain language of claim 1 does not address additional properties of the perforated polymeric layer; the language of the dependent claims, however, imposes additional limitations on the properties of the perforated polymeric layer such as a particular basis weight (claim 2), a particular makeup (claim 3), a particular aperture size (claim 7), a particular open area (claim 8), and that it “is a three-dimensionally formed layer having penetrating apertures extending from a first surface of the first perforated polymeric layer towards a second surface of the first perforated polymeric layer and forming protrusions on said second surface” (claim 4). The dependent claims’ additional language indicates that the term “perforated” within the term “perforated polymeric layer” in claim 1 is not limited in the manner asserted by Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“layer pierced through with holes or apertures,” we are persuaded that Petitioner meets its burden as to this limitation. Petitioner argues that under our construction, Bergstrom’s express disclosure of forming element 60, and Bergstrom’s explanation of the properties of forming element 60, meets the claimed “perforated polymeric layer” limitation. Pet. 38–41 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 114–117). Even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction, Petitioner argues, forming element 60 would also allow free flow of liquid bodily waste. Pet. Reply 3– 4 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 20–23). Importantly, Bergstrom expressly discloses: “suitable materials for the forming element 60 are plastic films, perforated plastic films and reinforced tissue or reinforced nonwoven materials.” Ex. 1004, 10:1–4. This express disclosure is clear. Even though the forming element 60 in Bergstrom might be “typically” liquid-impermeable (Ex. 1004, 9:24–30), that does not preclude a layer that is perforated, particularly where Bergstrom expressly discloses a perforated plastic film as one of the possibilities for forming element 60. Ex. 1004, 10:1–4. Additionally, although Patent Owner focuses on Bergstrom’s disclosure that forming element 60 is “typically liquid-impermeable” (PO Resp. 58–60; Ex. 1004, 9:24–30), we do not view Bergstrom’s use of the word “typically” as mandating that the forming element always be liquid impermeable. We agree that the word “typically” does not mean “always” and that such a reading would render “typically” superfluous. Pet. Reply. 5. We do not find any ambiguity in Bergstrom’s disclosure regarding possible use of perforated plastic films for its forming element 60; whether or not the forming element 60 provides other functions (like stiffness) does not dictate whether it may also be perforated, or be part of a fluid flow control structure. On this point, we credit Petitioner’s arguments and explanation, as supported by Dr. Pourdeyhimi’s testimony. Pet. Reply 6–7; Ex. 1021 ¶ 27–28 (“components of absorbent articles could be multifunctional”).” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“from the start” (PO Resp. 29), and that “using all or part of [Glaug’s] fluid-acquisition system in place of [Nakazawa’s] diffusion sheet would be antithetical to the teachings of both references” (id. at 35), we agree that the proposed combination of Nakazawa’s structure with the layers of Glaug is sufficiently motivated and reasonably expected to result in a successful article, for the reasons articulated by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 59–65; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 176–192. Namely, although fluid may flow in both Z directions in Nakazawa (PO Resp. 30), that does not foreclose the combination with Glaug in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See generally Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 176–192; see id. ¶ 184 (detailing the mechanics of the proposed combinations), ¶¶ 188–191 (discussing motivation to combine), ¶ 192 (discussing reasonable expectation of success). The combination can be achieved “either by adding the lower acquisition layer 64 [of Glaug] to diffusion sheet 63 [of Nakazawa], or by replacing diffusion sheet 63 [of Nakazawa] with the two-layer fluid acquisition system 34 [of Glaug],” and as persuasively explained by Dr. Pourdeyhimi, the arrangement constitutes a “fluid flow control structure.” See Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 45–47. Additionally, the diffusion sheet in Nakazawa can be made from the same material as used in Glaug, namely, AquiDry™. Id. ¶¶ 53–55; see also Tr. 17:25–18:3 (“although Glaug does not specify the name AquiDry in its disclosure, Patent Owner’s expert testified that it’s his understanding that Glaug is discussing the AquiDry material, the same material that is in Nakazawa . . . . they disclose using the same material, and Nakazawa says this material work[s]”). When asked if Patent Owner’s expert had any concerns that AquiDry was not the same as between Nakazawa and Glaug, Patent Owner’s counsel replied “They are the same, Your Honor. And we embrace that.” Tr. 46:8–12; see also id. at 58:19 (Petitioner’s counsel commenting about Patent Owner’s counsel: “they agree, AquiDry is used in both Nakazawa and Glaug”). Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet and Glaug’s fluid acquisition layer have different purposes because Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet allegedly must promote fluid flow in the Z-directions, both toward and away from the body (PO Resp. 29–37; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 26–28, 30– 35)) is not clearly supported by Nakazawa, and is also contravened by the shared disclosure of Nakazawa and Glaug as to the composition of the disputed layer. We have reviewed the complete record, including Patent Owner’s and Mr. Sheldon’s assertions that Nakazawa requires promoting fluid flow in both Z-directions (see id.), but find that Petitioner carries its burden to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Nakazawa and Glaug with a reasonable expectation of success. On this complete record, Petitioner explains sufficiently why and how a person of ordinary skill would modify Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet, i.e., to use Glaug’s fluid acquisition system, or the lower non-perforated layer of its fluid acquisition system, in Nakazawa, and Petitioner provides well-supported reasons for doing so.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 9,308,138 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,308,138 - Geneoscopy, Inc. v. Exact Sciences CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01330 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 4, and 12–19 are unpatentable as obvious under each asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
- Expert testimonyOther
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“embody claims of the ’746 patent, the product has features not covered by the ’746 patent’s claims, some of which are critical unclaimed elements according to Patent Owner. Accordingly, Cologuard is not coextensive with the challenged claims, and no nexus between the product and the challenged claims is shown on this record.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“developed where the patient need not manipulate their fecal sample to portion it, but the law of obviousness does not require an option to be the best option to be obvious. For these reasons, bearing in mind that the ultimate burden here is always on Petitioner, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. We also reject Patent Owner’s argument that only impermissible” slip op. at 60
Patent outcomesUS 11,970,746 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,970,746
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.