PTAB
Advanced fields
288 decisions · 495msnewest first
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 5 is unpatentable over Gao-2 and over Gao-2 with Goubet; claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–8 were not shown unpatentable on any ground, and substitute claim 17 was denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; PO Resp. 5–6. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited 11 This refers to the recitation in clauses 1F and 5F that the “diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber.” discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 3 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s opinion that the prior art does not render the claims obvious is premised on an interpretation of certain claim limitations that are inconsistent with both parties’ constructions” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 12

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “referring to the same direction as the separation of the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” (vertically in both Figure 6 of the challenged patent and Figure 1 of Goubet), we turn back now to Petitioner’s discussion of clause 1F, which includes the limitation at issue. There, Petitioner does not discuss why the “diffusion assembly” is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” but instead, Petitioner discusses why a component of the “diffusion assembly”—the “atomizer assembly”—is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber”: Pet. 39. In the end, we need not assess whether the “atomizer assembly” identified by Petitioner is “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” under the proper construction of that term (which, again, we need not and do not determine here) because the “disposed between” limitation does not involve the “atomizer assembly.” Instead, we find that, by failing to address why the identified “diffusion assembly” is “disposed between” the identified “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” Petitioner has failed to provide persuasive evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation. Pet. 38–39 (discussing the claim language “said diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber” but only discussing the location of the “atomizer assembly”); see 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review . . . , the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). For the reasons above, we find, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 10,092,918 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,092,918
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

      “Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed

      “As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32

    Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 10,583,449
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 7–9 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet; proposed substitute claim 21 is denied as indefinite.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “The record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration, as asserted in Petitioner’s overall argument. See Pet. Reply 1–2. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited general discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 2 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s declaration is premised on understandings of claim scope that are inconsistent with the constructions advanced by both of the parties” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read the cited portions of Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also Pet. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1046, 112:4–12, 113:13–20, 115:15–18). Next, we turn to each of the four specific claim terms that Petitioner highlights in its further arguments.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 5. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Florida Litigation a Joint Claim Construction statement that included stipulated claim constructions and disputed claim constructions for terms in the challenged patent as well as the ’449 patent and the ’918 patent. See Ex. 1018, Exhibit A (Stipulated Claim Constructions), Exhibit B (Disputed Claim Constructions). The parties stipulated to the construction of the terms “fluid dispersion” and “baffle” as recited in the challenged claim. See id., Exhibit A.10 10 When staying the Florida Litigation, the District Court cancelled the scheduled claim construction hearing. See ECF No. 67 (April 8, 2025) (granting joint motion to stay); ECF No. 68 (April 8, 2025) (cancelling the The stipulated construction of “fluid dispersion” merely restates the express definition of “fluid dispersion” from the challenged patent (although the definition is not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 3:8–20. Similarly, the stipulated construction of “baffle” essentially parrots one sentence in the challenged patent (again, not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 7:57–59. To the extent necessary, we determine that the complete record supports the parties’ stipulated constructions of “fluid dispersion” and “baffle,” and we apply those constructions below.” slip op. at 10

    Patent outcomesUS 9,527,094 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 9,527,094
  • PTAB · May 11, 2026 · PGR2025-00013 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–16 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted prior art did not establish the claimed quick-connect system during reciprocation, and Clark was not analogous art.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The prior art may reflect the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “During oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it would not object to the Board adopting the construction that Petitioner proposes in the district court litigation. JUDGE MARSCHALL: I think the Petitioner wouldn’t object if we adopted the construction that Petitioner proposed in the district court, especially the “designed to” construction, correct? MR. BERG: No. We wouldn’t object to that. And we think that our Petition is on all fours with that construction. Tr. 81:12–16. As Petitioner does not object to adopting its construction from the district court litigation, we construe claim element 1[e] in accordance with Petitioner’s construction from the district court litigation.” slip op. at 11

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

      “The invention, a reciprocating massage device, is in a predictable field, namely the electro-mechanical arts. Also, there is no evidence that the recited quick-connect system is complex, even considering Patent Owner’s alleged understanding of it. Rather, Dr. Pratt testifies that many different types of connectors, whether they require alignment or not, were known. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54–58. Given the predictability of the electro-mechanical arts and lack of complexity of the recited quick-connect system, a low level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement. See RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Given the predictability of electro-mechanical inventions such as the one at issue here, and the lack of complexity of the particular claim limitation at issue—i.e., reciting the length of a heating member—‘a lower level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement than for unpredictable arts.’” (quoting Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). In view of the low level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the Specification’s example of a quick-connect system configured to secure the massaging head as the piston reciprocates fails to provide sufficient written description support for the “quick-connect system” recited in independent claims 1 and 18.” slip op. at 14

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

      “Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Specification provides guidance as to what amount of deviation from a perfect cylinder is still “substantially cylindrical.” The Specification describes: Quick-connect system 600 includes a piston 602 that has a hollow-end bore 608 for receiving the shaft 621 of a massaging head 620. Located within the bore 608 of piston 602 is a cylindrical seat 604. Cylindrical seat 604 retains a magnet 606. Magnet 606 is illustrated with its north pole located flush with the seat and facing toward the opening in bore 608. Massaging head 620 includes a shaft 621 having a cylindrical pocket 622 at the distal end. Located within the cylindrical pocket 622 is a magnet 624. Magnet 624 is positioned so that its south pole is located at the distal end of shaft 621. Accordingly, when the shaft 621 of massaging head 620 is slid into opening in bore 608, the magnets 606 and 624 are attracted to one another and magnetically hold massaging head 620 firmly in place. Ex. 1001, 6:57–7:3. In view of the description of quick-connect system 600, the Specification sets forth a standard for ascertaining whether the bore and the seat located within the bore are “substantially cylindrical.” To wit, the bore and the seat within the bore are “substantially cylindrical” when the massaging head and magnet are respectively received therein so that the magnet in the seat and the magnet in the pocket of the massaging head can magnetically hold the massaging head firmly in place. Furthermore, Dr. Pratt testifies that “[m]agnetic connectors comprise a magnet on at least one of the two objects to be joined. These types of connectors are ubiquitous even today for driving threaded fasteners.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 56. Dr. Pratt also testifies that a POSITA would understand how to take into account certain variances, like runout. Ex. 2033, 25:3–17. Dr. Pratt’s testimony shows that magnetic connectors are well known and that a POSITA would be able to determine whether the bore and the seat within the bore were “substantially cylindrical” for a secure connection of the massaging head. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the claim term “substantially cylindrical” recited in claims 13–16 fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, the shapes of the bore and the structure within the bore. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of claims 13–16 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 11,938,082 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 11,938,082
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01452 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, 13, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable over Slater or Slater and Weaver.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 of the ’716 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 188–196. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 191– 196. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,763,716
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00191 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board held claims 15 and 21 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 381), affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1, 10, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 9,763,716 B2 (“the ’716 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether either of dependent claims 15 and 21 is unpatentable. Stryker, slip op. at 17.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 15 and 21 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claims 15 and 21 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claims 15 and 21. Pet. 31–33; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 124. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 31–33. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claims 15 and 21.” slip op. at 13

    Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,763,716
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00190 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board determined claim 15 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater because Slater discloses every limitation, including the flared hips and opposing generally parabolic wings.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • BurdenUnpatentable

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claim 15 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 15 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 15. Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 15.” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claim 15 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 15 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 15. Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 15.” slip op. at 13

    Patent outcomesUS 9,351,776 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,351,776
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01450 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 6, 8–10, 14, and 17 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable, based on anticipation by Slater and obviousness over Slater and Weaver.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandMixed

      “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 49),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 46) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1 and 11 of U.S. Patent No. 8,529,608 B2 (“the ’608 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether dependent claims 2–6, 8–10, 12–14, and 17 (the “Remanded Claims”) are similarly unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s challenges relying on the Slater reference. Stryker, slip op. at 14–15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Stryker Corporation and Wright Medical Technology, Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”) and OsteoMed LLC (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Stryker, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6, 8–10, 14, and 17 are unpatentable. We also conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2–5, 12, and 13 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 12, and 13 of the ’608 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 37–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 161–169. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 162– 163. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 37. Patent Owner raised no separate argument regarding the patentability of claims 6 and 8, instead relying solely on its argument that Slater does not anticipate independent claim 1, on which claims 6 and 8 depend. PO Resp. 46; Reply 4 (“Patent Owner does not challenge the combination of Slater and Weaver for claims 6 and 8.”). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 6 and 8 and find that Petitioner establishes that the combination of Slater and Weaver discloses all of the limitations of claims 6 and 8, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Slater and Weaver for the reasons provided by Petitioner. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 37–39.” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 8,529,608 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,529,608
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01451 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, and 13 were held unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, and 12 were not shown unpatentable because Slater lacks the claimed central axis.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

      “addressing the ’085 patent and by the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, and 12 of the ’776 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169–74. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169– 74. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 17

    • RemandOther

      “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 49),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 46, “FWD”) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1 and 10 of U.S. Patent 9,351,776 B2 (“the ’776 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether dependent claims 2–6 and 8, 9 and 11–13 (the “Remanded Claims”) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s challenges relying on the Slater reference. Stryker, slip op. 14– 15.” slip op. at 2

    Patent outcomesUS 9,351,776 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,351,776
  • PTAB · Apr 20, 2026 · PGR2024-00053 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · PGR · Final written decision

    Petitioner did not prove claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 unpatentable under § 112(a), § 112(b), or any asserted § 103 ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties’ proffered definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art differ in the details of the experience a POSITA would possess. Petitioner’s definition requires experience with rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, whereas Patent Owner’s definition requires experience with devices for human use and interaction. These differences, however, do not affect our analysis of the issues in this case. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “During oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it would not object to the Board adopting the construction that Petitioner proposes in the district court litigation. JUDGE MARSCHALL: I think the Petitioner wouldn’t object if we adopted the construction that Petitioner proposed in the district court, especially the “designed to” construction, correct? MR. BERG: No. We wouldn’t object to that. And we think that our Petition is on all fours with that construction. Tr. 81:12–16. As Petitioner does not object to adopting its construction from the district court litigation, we construe claim element 34[e] in accordance with Petitioner’s construction from the district court litigation.” slip op. at 10

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

      “The invention, a reciprocating massage device, is in a predictable field, namely the electro-mechanical arts. Also, there is no evidence that the recited quick release connector is complex, even considering Patent Owner’s alleged understanding of it. Rather, Dr. Pratt testifies that a POSITA would be able to recognize a quick release connector for a particular application. According to Dr. Pratt, A person of ordinary skill in the art would consider a number of factors, depending on the context and specific application of the connector, to determine whether a connector provides a “quick release.” Such factors could include whether the connector is designed to manually and easily connect and disconnect two objects, and whether tools are necessary to do so. Other factors to be considered may be based on the specific application or operating environment. Ex. 1002 ¶ 58. Given the predictability of the electro-mechanical arts and lack of complexity of the recited quick release connector, a low level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement. See RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Given the predictability of electro-mechanical inventions such as the one at issue here, and the lack of complexity of the particular claim limitation at issue—i.e., reciting the length of a heating member—‘a lower level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement than for unpredictable arts.’” (quoting Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). In view of the low level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the Specification’s example of a quick release connector configured to secure the massaging head as the piston reciprocates fails to provide sufficient written description support for the “quick release connector . . . configured to secure a first massaging head while the piston reciprocates a predetermined stroke length at the first speed” recited in claim element 34[e]. 4. Conclusion for Written Description For the reasons set forth above in sections II.C.1–3, Petitioner has not persuaded us that any aspect of claim element 34[e] lacks written description support. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 34, as well as any of claims 35–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 18

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

      “Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Specification provides guidance as to what amount of deviation from a perfect cylinder is still “substantially cylindrical.” The Specification describes that quick-connect system 600 includes two magnets with opposite poles facing each other: magnet 606 in the distal end of piston 602 and magnet 624 located in cylindrical pocket 622 of massaging head 620. Ex. 1001, 6:57–67, Figs. 6, 6A. The Specification further describes that “when the shaft 621 of massaging head 620 is slid into opening in bore 608, the magnets 606 and 624 are attracted to one another and magnetically hold massaging head 620 firmly in place.” Id. at 6:67–7:3. In view of the description of quick-connect system 600, the Specification sets forth a standard for ascertaining whether the pocket is “substantially cylindrical.” To wit, the pocket is “substantially cylindrical” when the pocket receives a magnet therein so that the magnets can magnetically hold the massaging head firmly in place. Furthermore, Dr. Pratt testifies that “[m]agnetic connectors comprise a magnet on at least one of the two objects to be joined. These types of connectors are ubiquitous even today for driving threaded fasteners.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 55. Dr. Pratt also testifies that a POSITA would understand how to take into account certain variances, like runout. Ex. 2033, 25:3–17. Dr. Pratt’s testimony shows that magnetic connectors are well known and that a POSITA would be able to determine whether the pocket was “substantially cylindrical” for a secure connection of the massaging head. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the claim term “substantially cylindrical” recited in independent claim 34 fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, the shape of the pocket. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 34, as well as claims 35–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 11,857,482 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,857,482
Page 1 of 29
← Previous12345…Next →

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.