- Mobileye Global, Inc. v. Facet Technology Corp.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01110 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place on claim 15 based on the Gallagher–Lumia obviousness challenge.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“or overlooked any matter. As we explained in the Institution Decision, the ’255 patent discloses that the recited characterization profile allows the system to convert the intensity values measured by the intensity sensor into luminance values based on the sensor’s ability to sense the particular color of the measured light. Inst. Dec. 21; Ex. 1001, 11:41–48. The ’255 patent states that “the light intensity sensor’s 280 ability to sense . . . a particular color” is the “the light intensity sensor’s 280 profile for [that] particular color.” Ex. 1001, 11:45–47. The ’255 patent further states that this “[l]ight intensity sensor 280 characterization is essential for high precision computations.” Id. at 11:48–49. Thus, as we stated in the Institution Decision, the recited “characterization profile” refers to a conversion factor used to convert the measured light intensity into luminance. As this conversion factor is based on the light intensity sensor’s ability to sense the particular color of light reflected by the road sign, we agree that it is empirical information. Patent Owner fails to explain adequately how the fact that the ’255 patent discloses storing multiple conversion factors for multiple colors of measured light in a digital look-up-table (see id. at 11:56–59 (“The light intensity sensor characterization 275 is empirical information about the light intensity sensor 280 that is used to create the [look-up table] 475.”)) has any bearing on our interpretation.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Owner to the Institution Decision where we fully addressed Patent Owner’s contentions. See Inst. Dec. 29–31. As we explained, “Petitioner proposes to incorporate Lumia’s teaching of measuring luminance values into Gallagher’s system, and argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success given Gallagher’s disclosure of determining calibration factors for each individual sensor in the array of sensors.” Id. at 30. In other words, Petitioner proposes to use Gallagher’s array of sensors to measure luminance in the manner taught by Lumia. We also explained in the Institution Decision how Lumia discloses using a video camera to measure the luminance of a road sign. Id. at 27–29. We further explained that, in the Petition, “Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning to support its contentions that it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of Gallagher and Lumia” by, for example, “argu[ing] that implementing Lumia’s teaching of determining the luminance of traffic signs in Gallagher’s system would allow Gallagher’s system to calculate the retroreflectivity of road markers as a means of identifying any markers that do not meet minimum acceptable reflectance levels.” Id. at 30–30 (citing Pet. 46). We further explained that Petitioner’s arguments were supported by the testimony of it witness, Dr. Thorpe. Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,335,255 - PTAB · Mar 22, 2021 · IPR2020-00336 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place for claims 10, 12, 13, 16, and 17 because no construction error or abuse of discretion was shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“IV. CONCLUSION On this record, Patent Owner neither persuades us that we overlooked or misapprehended any matter, nor sufficiently shows that instituting an inter partes review of claims 10, 12, 13, 16, and 17 of the ’725 patent was an abuse of discretion. V. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We maintain, at this stage of the proceeding, that the construction of conversational flow should not include “(for instance, the running of an application on a server as requested by a client), where some conversational flows involve more than one connection, and some even involve more than one exchange of packets between a client and a server.” As we explained in the Institution Decision, phrases beginning with “for instance,” “where some,” and “some” are “merely exemplary and non-limiting.” Inst. Dec. 31. Patent Owner does not persuade us, on this record, that omission of these phrases from our definition of “conversational flow” is, as a matter of claim construction, erroneous. See Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 811 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that exemplary language “introduces an example of a broader genus rather than limiting the genus to the exemplary species”).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“proceeding, that our construction of “conversational flow” is the result of a misunderstanding or misapprehension of the claimed invention or the prior art. IV. CONCLUSION On this record, Patent Owner neither persuades us that we overlooked or misapprehended any matter, nor sufficiently shows that instituting an inter partes review of claims 10, 12, 13, 16, and 17 of the ’725 patent was an abuse of discretion.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,665,725 - PTAB · Feb 9, 2021 · IPR2020-00892 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Wildcat Licensing WI LLC’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion or overlooked matter in granting institution of the challenges.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if substantial evidence does not support a factual finding, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Also, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) sets forth, in relevant part that: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“As we determined in the Decision, Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims in its challenges based on IBM. Petitioner argued that “IBM’s ‘[H]all effect sensor’ indicates tool ‘TORQUE’ to IBM’s controller 6 so that IBM’s controller requires IBM’s tool to achieve the ‘set torque’ at each fastening location in the ‘correct process sequence.’” Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003, 81– 82). Petitioner also argued that IBM teaches that an operator “must also wait for the set torque to be achieved on each screw before moving onto the next screw.” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003, 82) (emphases added). Petitioner’s declarant opined that “IBM’s microcontroller 6 measures the applied torque with ‘a [H]all effect sensor.’” Ex. 1002 ¶ 111 (citing Ex. 1003, 81–82). Petitioner’s arguments and declarant testimony found support in the preliminary record. As quoted in the Decision, IBM itself states that “controller circuit 6 . . . sense[s] when correct torque is achieved by linking As discussed in the Decision, IBM also states that that “[t]he problem is to ensure that four screws 5 fixing two product parts 3 & 4 together are tightened to a specific torque in a specific sequence.” Dec. 19–20 (quoting from Ex. 1003, 82) (emphasis added); see also Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52–53 (asserting what IBM teaches). Also, the only figure of IBM shows “TORQUE” being sent to controller circuit 6. Ex. 1003, 81; see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 108 (“IBM diagrammatically illustrates the tool’s sensed ‘TORQUE’ as a signal input being received by IBM’s microcontroller 6 from the torque-sensing ‘[H]all effect sensor in the driver 11’ ([Ex. 1003] p. 82).”). Thus, Petitioner’s arguments, Petitioner’s declarant testimony, and IBM itself sufficiently showed at the preliminary stage that IBM senses or measures correct torque by linking into a Hall effect sensor in driver 11. Pet. 35–36; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52–53, 108; Ex. 1003, 82. Further, Patent Owner’s arguments for IBM raised a factual question regarding what IBM teaches or suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art, and such issues are best decided on a full record. See Prelim. Resp. 26–49. We agree that Patent Owner does not have a burden to show IBM does not measure torque; however, for purposes of institution, Petitioner sufficiently showed that IBM senses or measures torque.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 7–11 (PTAB. Feb. 13, 2020) (Decision Denying Institution) (precedential). Req. Reh’g 13–15 (citing Prelim. Resp. 54–64; Dec. 27). Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Decision “conflates or overlooks the two separate requirements in the first part of Advanced Bionics’ framework (art or arguments)” because we concluded “only that ‘Petitioner’s arguments were not previously presented to the Office.’” Id. at 14. However, even assuming arguendo, that substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, the record and Petitioner sufficiently show that the Examiner materially erred for the reasons discussed in the Board decision reversing the rejection based on Gass alone. The record also shows that the Examiner did not address that error subsequently before allowing the claims. Specifically, the Examiner failed to identify the Office. Additionally, as discussed in the Decision, Petitioner’s demonstration of a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges based on IBM, as well as the Federal Circuit’s determination in SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018) were considered in our analysis of determining whether to institute review. Dec. 28–29. We determined that our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) was not sufficiently implicated so that § 325(d)’s statutory purpose would be undermined by instituting on all of Petitioner’s challenges. Id. at 28–29. Further, even if exercise of our discretion under § 325(d) to deny the challenges based on Gass was warranted, the record provided no reason for extending our discretion under § 325(d) to the IBM-based challenges to deny the entire Petition under the circumstances presented in this proceeding. Id. at 29.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“The Decision also considered the prior Board decision regarding a rejection based on Gass. Dec. 30 (discussing Ex. 1018). As discussed above and in the Decision, the preliminary record did not indicate that Gass teaches away from the challenged claims. Thus, we do not agree that the Decision overlooked or misapprehended the prior Board decision regarding the rejection based on Gass and overlooked or misapprehended that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges based on Gass.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial - PTAB · Dec 21, 2020 · IPR2020-00337 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Rehearing
Denied Patent Owner’s request to reverse institution of review of claims 1–3, 7, 16, and 18; Patent Owner did not show an erroneous construction or abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We maintain, at this stage of the proceeding, that the construction of conversational flow should not include “(for instance, the running of an application on a server as requested by a client), where some conversational flows involve more than one connection, and some even involve more than one exchange of packets between a client and a server.” As we explained in the Institution Decision, phrases beginning with “for instance,” “where some,” and “some” are “merely exemplary and non-limiting.” Inst. Dec. 29. Patent Owner does not persuade us, on this record, that omission of these phrases from our definition of “conversational flow” is, as a matter of claim construction, erroneous. See Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 811 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that exemplary language “introduces an example of a broader genus rather than limiting the genus to the exemplary species”).” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We nevertheless preliminarily construed “conversational flow” as a “sequence of packets that are exchanged in any direction as a result of an activity.” Inst. Dec. 29. We explained that we saw no “reason to include the additional phrases of the prior Board and district court constructions”— namely, the phrases “for instance, the running of an application on a server as requested by a client,” “where some conversational flows involve more than one connection,” and “some even involve more than one exchange of packets between a client and a server.” Id. (emphases added). We maintain, at this stage of the proceeding, that the construction of conversational flow should not include “(for instance, the running of an application on a server as requested by a client), where some conversational flows involve more than one connection, and some even involve more than one exchange of packets between a client and a server.” As we explained in the Institution Decision, phrases beginning with “for instance,” “where some,” and “some” are “merely exemplary and non-limiting.” Inst. Dec. 29. Patent Owner does not persuade us, on this record, that omission of these phrases from our definition of “conversational flow” is, as a matter of claim construction, erroneous. See Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 811 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that exemplary language “introduces an example of a broader genus rather than limiting the genus to the exemplary species”).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION On this record, Patent Owner neither persuades us that we overlooked or misapprehended any matter, nor sufficiently shows that instituting an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 7, 16, and 18 of the ’646 patent was an abuse of discretion. V. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,771,646 - Foursquare Labs, Inc. v. Mimzi, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 19, 2020 · IPR2019-01287 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution on claims 1–19 in place because the challenged prior-art and priority arguments did not show an abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id. The Board applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a decision on a petition for rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“As an initial matter, we first note that we determined in the Institution Decision that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over Ramer3 and Hayashi.4 Inst. Dec. 28–32. Patent Owner does not seek rehearing of that determination. Thus, even were we to agree with Patent Owner that Yoo is not prior art, we conclude that Patent Owner has not shown that the Institution Decision should be modified because we still would have instituted an inter partes review based on the Ramer/Hayashi ground. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (prohibiting institution “unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); cf. Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two dependent claims out of twenty challenged claims); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 3 Ramer, US 2007/0061302 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004, “Ramer”). 4 Hayashi, US 2007/0255831 A1, filed Apr. 28, 2006, published Nov. 1, 2007 (Ex. 1005, “Hayashi”). 24, 2019) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two claims out of twenty-three challenged claims).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportOther
“governing statute was 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2013), as amended by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”). Inst. Dec. 13–19. On the record available at the time, we agreed with Petitioner that the ’981 Patent included claims with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013, the effective date of the AIA amendment to § 102. See id.; Reply 1–2; AIA § 3(n)(1). Specifically, we determined (preliminarily) that the challenged claims are not adequately supported by the written description of U.S. Patent Application No. 12/181,956 (“the ’956 Application”), and, thus, could not claim priority to the ’956 Application, the only application in the priority chain that was filed before the AIA’s relevant effective date. Inst. Dec. 17–19. Under post-AIA § 102(a)(2), a published patent application of another inventor (like Yoo) is prior art if it “was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” Yoo was filed on May 6, 2008. Ex. 1003, code (22). Consequently, under post-AIA § 102(a)(2), Yoo would qualify as prior art because its filing date is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.2 Ex. 1001, code (60). 2 We note that Yoo’s effective filing date precedes all of the possible effective filing dates listed on the face of the ’981 Patent, including the July 29, 2008 filing date of the ’956 Application. See Ex. 1001, code (60). As noted above and discussed further below, however, whether the claims are supported by the ’956 Application relates to the threshold issue of whether post-AIA § 102(a)(2) applies to Yoo.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“As an initial matter, we first note that we determined in the Institution Decision that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over Ramer3 and Hayashi.4 Inst. Dec. 28–32. Patent Owner does not seek rehearing of that determination. Thus, even were we to agree with Patent Owner that Yoo is not prior art, we conclude that Patent Owner has not shown that the Institution Decision should be modified because we still would have instituted an inter partes review based on the Ramer/Hayashi ground. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (prohibiting institution “unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); cf. Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two dependent claims out of twenty challenged claims); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 3 Ramer, US 2007/0061302 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004, “Ramer”). 4 Hayashi, US 2007/0255831 A1, filed Apr. 28, 2006, published Nov. 1, 2007 (Ex. 1005, “Hayashi”). 24, 2019) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two claims out of twenty-three challenged claims).” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,128,981 - PTAB · Jun 21, 2019 · IPR2019-00158 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no misapprehension or oversight in its preliminary § 112(f) construction of “tool” for institution.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). On rehearing, the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the Decision, in this case, Patent Owner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In our Decision, when considering the meaning and scope of the claim language, we “preliminarily determine[d] that the term tool is used merely as a generic placeholder meant to cover ‘the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’” Dec. 16. Based on this understanding, we preliminarily agreed with” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). On rehearing, the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the Decision, in this case, Patent Owner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In our Decision, when considering the meaning and scope of the claim language, we “preliminarily determine[d] that the term tool is used merely as a generic placeholder meant to cover ‘the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’” Dec. 16. Based on this understanding, we preliminarily agreed with plus-function limitation having the function of imparting a deforming force on the deformable member, and the corresponding structure is a wedge, swage, shoulder, cone, ramp, mandrel, plug, and dart, as exemplified by tools 102, 122 and 142 disclosed in the ’439 patent.” Id. at 17–18. In its Preliminary Response, other than disputing Petitioner’s proposed construction, Patent Owner did not advance its own construction of tool. Prelim. Resp. 21–45. Now, Patent Owner’s stated basis for requesting rehearing is that we erred in preliminarily interpreting tool as a means-plusfunction (“MPF”) term. Req. Reh’g. 1.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(Paper 1, “Petition” or “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–23 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,080,439 B2 (Ex. 1003, “the ’439 patent”). Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC, (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition (Paper 6, “Prelim. Resp.”). On April 15, 2019, we entered a Decision on Institution (Paper 9, “Decision” or “Dec.”) in this proceeding, determining that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’439 patent. Dec. 33. Patent Owner timely filed this Request for Rehearing of the Decision. Paper 12 (“Request” or “Req. Reh’g.”).” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,080,439 - Nikon Corporation v. ASML Netherlands B.V. Carl Zeiss AGRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 4, 2018 · IPR2018-00688 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place for claims 1–4, 6, 7, 15, 16, and 19 because it found no abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that the Decision should be modified is on Patent Owner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Decided for petitioner
“function limitations because, according to Patent Owner, we did not address Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner’s analysis did not show that the prior art structures are the same or equivalent to structures disclosed in the Specification for performing the functions recited in claims 15, 16, and 19. Req. 3–6. We did address Patent Owner’s contention in our Decision. Dec. 18. In our analysis of the means plus function limitations recited in claim 15, we stated that The Petition identifies the structure in the Specification corresponding to the claimed “first filtering means” as a linear matched filter, and identifies the equivalent structure in Yow as a matched bandpass filter. Pet. 13–14, 27. The Petition identifies the structure in the Specification corresponding to the claimed “second filtering means” as a non-linear filter, and identifies the equivalent structure in Yow as a non-linear edge detector. Pet. 14, 27. Id. Our Decision includes similar analyses for claims 16 and 19. See Dec. 19. Patent Owner does not persuade us that we misapprehended the law for means plus function limitations. Rather, Patent Owner simply disagrees with our Institution Decision on this issue. Mere disagreement with our conclusion is not a proper basis for rehearing.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner did not establish sufficiently that Yow Thesis was available as a printed publication, we should not have instituted trial on the grounds based on Yow Thesis. Req. 6–7 (citing Dec. 26). However, at this time, if the Board institutes a trial, the Board will institute on all challenges raised in the Petition. See Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, April 26, 2018, available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 4
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,463,163 - Sonos, Inc. v. D&M Holdings Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 31, 2018 · IPR2017-01045 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left institution in place for claims 1–20 and 25–27.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS Standard of Review When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Accordingly, after review of Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request for Rehearing, we remain of the opinion that Petitioner provided sufficient evidence and explanation to establish a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable, and thus we decline to change our Decision to institute inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Patent Owner has not met its burden of showing an abuse of discretion in our Decision. We, therefore, deny Patent Owner’s request to reverse our determination to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner demonstrated that Lambourne ’853 is an issued patent (Pet. 13) that has a filing date of September 11, 2007 (Pet. 14), which is before the October 16, 2007 filing date of the ’294 patent (Ex. 1013). Thus, Petitioner established at least a prima facie case that Lambourne ’853 is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). At this point, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that the ’294 patent is entitled to its provisional application’s filing date of October 17, 2006. Patent Owner did not meet this burden of production, and accordingly, the burden of production never shifted back to the Petitioner to show Lambourne ’853 was entitled to the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application, Lambourne ’407. Thus, we deny Patent Owner’s request for rehearing for this reason.” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Applying these burdens to the present case, the ultimate burden of persuasion was on the Petitioner to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 claim based on the information presented. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner also had the initial burden of production to provide argument and evidence to establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability for at least 1 claim, and chose to do so by relying on Lambourne ’853 in addition to other prior art references. Petitioner demonstrated that Lambourne ’853 is an issued patent (Pet. 13) that has a filing date of September 11, 2007 (Pet. 14), which is before the October 16, 2007 filing date of the ’294 patent (Ex. 1013). Thus, Petitioner established at least a prima facie case that Lambourne ’853 is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). At this point, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that the ’294 patent is entitled to its provisional application’s filing date of October 17, 2006. Patent Owner did not meet this burden of production, and accordingly, the burden of production never shifted back to the Petitioner to show Lambourne ’853 was entitled to the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application, Lambourne ’407. Thus, we deny Patent Owner’s request for rehearing for this reason.” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,987,294 - Topgolf International, Inc. v. Amit AgarwalRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 5, 2017 · IPR2017-00928 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left in place institution of inter partes review of claims 1 and 6 based on the reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Bertoncino and Foley.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must, in relevant part, “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“most end located at the forward portion of the target green ha[s] an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end.” We note that the term “significantly lower” is a relative term, and Patent Owner does not offer a construction of that term.1 Nor does Patent Owner point us to anything in the prosecution history as providing a construction for that term. In addition, we note further that the Specification of the ’389 patent also does not define the relative term “significantly lower.” The Specification of the ’389 patent, however, teaches that each target green includes a target flag and a receptacle hole that is located near the front section of the green. Ex. 1001, 4:29‒32. According to the Specification of the ’389 patent, the target green is sloped downhill and has the general shape of a concave surface so that the receptacle hole is at the lowest portion of the green. Id. at 4:32‒35. Figure 4C of the ’389 patent is reproduced below: 1 We acknowledge that the ’389 patent expired as of September 2012, and we are, thus, guided by the principle that the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). But, “[i]n determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Figure 4C shows a cross-sectional view of a target green. Id. at 3:28‒29. As taught by the ’389 patent, “[t]arget green 30 would appear to the golfer at the teeing area to have a sudden drop off near the front portion of the green, and then a gradual slope upwardly toward the back of the green.” Id. at 4:37‒40. Thus, at best, the Specification of the ’389 patent appears to support a construction of the claim limitation of a target green profile whose “forward most end located at the forward portion of the target green ha[s] an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end” as a green that has a sudden drop off near the front portion of the green and then a gradual slope upward toward the back of the green.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“established sufficiently a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims were rendered obvious by the combination of Bertoncino and Foley. Dec. 22. In particular, as to the limitation that the target green has a profile whose “forward most end located at the forward portion of the target green ha[s] an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end,” for purposes of institution, we determined: that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that this claim limitation is rendered obvious by Bertoncino. In particular, Figure 5 of Bertoncino clearly shows that the front ends of the target green on the driving range are substantially lower than the back ends. Ex. 1004, Fig. 5. In addition, we determine that to the extent they are not, Petitioner has reasonably demonstrated that Bertoncino makes such a green obvious by teaching that the ability to see the lie of the ball is dependent on the ability to visually follow the path of the ball (id. at 1:26‒ 29), as well as teaching a “sloped driving range” (id. at 4:12‒ 13; see also id. at 5:37‒39 (“Each target . . . preferably comprises a surface generally sloped towards the tee stands area)). Id. at 19.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 49. Figure 5 of Bertoncino, as addressed above, is a schematic perspective of a sloped driving range of Bertoncino. Petitioner also relied on its version of Figure 4 of Bertoncino, which was altered in line with the teaching of that reference that the target green may have only the inner section 22 (Ex. 1004, 6:61–65), and including the slope of the driving range shown in Figure 5 of Bertoncino, reproduced below: Pet. 49 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 92). Figure 4 of Bertoncino is a cross-sectional view of the sloped circular target of Figure 3. Ex. 1004, 4:8‒9. That is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Robbins, who declares that “[a] person of skill in the art would interpret Bertoncino to disclose a range with a plurality of target greens, each of which is composed of a single section with the slope profile of inner section 22” as depicted above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 92. Thus, as we concluded in the Decision on Institution (Dec. 17‒18), Petitioner in its Petition has established reasonably that Bertoncino teaches a target green having a profile wherein the “profile’s forward most end located at the forward portion of the target green having an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end.” That is, Petitioner has established reasonably for purposes of institution that the target green of Bertoncino meets the “significantly lower” limitation as construed above, as it has as a green that has a sudden drop off near the front portion of the green due to the concave shape of the target green and then a gradual slope upward toward the back of the green. See Ex. 1004, 6:3‒11, 12:6‒12, Figure 4.” slip op. at 12
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,370,389 - PTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00662 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Harvard’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place on anticipation by Buchanan and obviousness over Buchanan and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan for claims 24, 26, and 29.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We will grant a request for rehearing of a petition decision if the requesting party demonstrates “an abuse of discretion” in the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). That party must also “specifically identify . . . the place where each matter [that we misapprehended or overlooked] was previously addressed.” Id. § 42.71(d). After considering Patent Owner’s request for rehearing, our decision, and the evidence currently of record, we determine Patent Owner has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we deny the request for rehearing.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“We are not persuaded that, based on the current record, we have misinterpreted Buchanan’s disclosure. First, Buchanan’s Example 3 does not state, as Patent Owner argues, “that the inventive method can be expanded from forming a multicomponent metal oxide as specifically described in Example 3, to forming a single metal oxide by ‘utilizing one precursor source mixture which contains only one precursor.’” Request 5. Patent Owner leaves out a portion of the statement, which says that the method “can be expanded to include growth of any single component metal, metal oxide, metal nitride or metal silicide film.” Ex. 1005, 20:63–67 (emphasis added). If the statement were to be limited to the use of one of the two precursors discussed in Example 3, it would mean that the method could be expanded only to deposit films containing either zirconium or hafnium, not to films based on “any . . . metal.” It may be that the evidence adduced at trial will show that “any . . . metal” should be interpreted as limited to zirconium and hafnium, but it is not apparent from the present record why this should be the case. If our conclusion on this record that Example 3 can be expanded to include the deposition of films based on any metal is correct, however, then it follows that the use of precursors other than zirconium nitrate and hafnium tertbutoxide is contemplated.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“tetrakis(dimethylamino) hafnium, and tetrakis(diethylamino) hafnium in particular would have been selected as better in Buchanan’s Example 3 than any of the other compounds disclosed by Buchanan.” Request 13–15. As discussed above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of instituting review that, at least on the present record, Buchanan discloses using any of its suitable precursors in the method of its Example 3. Given this, Petitioner was not required to show that these particular compounds “would have been selected as better . . . than any of the other compounds disclosed by Buchanan” in order for us to conclude that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of succeeding in demonstrating the obviousness of claims 24, 26, and 29 over the combination of Buchanan and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The law does not require that the use of the claimed compound be “better . . . than [the use of] any of the other disclosed compounds,” because “[a] finding that the prior art as a whole suggests the desirability of a particular combination need not be supported by a finding that the prior art suggests that the combination claimed . . . is the preferred, or most desirable, combination.” Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 713 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Instead, it requires only that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of the prior art. Here, to support its obviousness ground, Petitioner will need to show at trial that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine Buchanan’s teaching in Example 3 of a particular ALD process with Buchanan’s teaching that “tetrakis(dimethylamino), [and] tetrakis (diethylamino) Ti, Zr, Hf, Si, Ge, Sn, or Pb” were suitable precursors for use in an ALD process. In our Institution Decision, we were persuaded that, given Buchanan’s disclosure of using any suitable precursor in the process of Example 3, Buchanan’s disclosure that any of its precursors were suitable for use in any ALD process, and the description of these particular precursors as “preferred” and “highly preferred,” Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would succeed in making this showing at trial. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that we abused our discretion in coming to this conclusion.” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Banerjee, testified “that a person of ordinary skill ‘would have at once envisaged’ the use of Buchanan’s named precursors in Buchanan’s Example 3.” Paper 11, 9 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 134). Although we noted that this testimony was disputed by Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Gladfelter, we were required to resolve the factual dispute in the light most favorable to Petitioner for purposes of the Institution Decision. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c); Ex. 2101 ¶ 127). Patent Owner now argues that Dr. Banerjee’s testimony is entitled to no weight because it “is in the form of conclusory statements and fails to adequately explain why one of ordinary skill ‘would have at once envisaged’ the use of Buchanan’s named precursors in Example 3.” Request 10–11. Patent Owner cites to page 21 of its Preliminary Response as the place where it raised this argument previously. Id. at 10. Patent Owner did not previously raise the argument that Dr. Banerjee’s testimony is entitled to no weight, either on page 21, or on any other page, of its Preliminary Response. Under our rules, a party requesting rehearing must “specifically identify . . . the place where each matter [that we misapprehended or overlooked] was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Accordingly, we will not grant Patent Owner’s request for rehearing on this basis. Moreover, we note that Dr. Banerjee’s testimony cites to Buchanan’s statement that “[t]he precursor source mixture of the present invention can be used in any CVD or ALD process with any delivery means currently employed” as the reason that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at once envisaged that the other precursors are applicable to Example 3.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 134 (quoting Ex. 1005, 7:30–34). We need not determine at this point whether this reasoning is sufficient, in light of Dr. Gladfelter’s testimony to the contrary, to establish as a factual matter that a person of ordinary skill in the art actually “would have at once envisaged that the other precursors are applicable to Example 3,” which is an issue to be determined at trial. We do note, however, that, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, Dr. Banerjee does offer at least some explanation for his opinion.” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,969,539
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.