• Satco Products, Inc. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., LtdRehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 8, 2020 · IPR2020-00248 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that Sanga disclosed the claimed spacer-layer bandgap requirement.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “support of its assertion that Sanga’s n-side multilayer has a bandgap lower than a GaN layer. Reh’g Req. 10–12. For example, Petitioner attempts to rely on an annotated figure from Exhibit 2005, an exhibit submitted by Patent Owner with its Preliminary Response. Reh’g Req. 10–12. Although we did refer to Exhibit 2005 in our Decision (Dec. 13–14), Petitioner did not rely on Exhibit 2005 in its Petition, and the annotated figure Petitioner presents in the Rehearing Request, along with the corresponding arguments, are entirely new. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s newly annotated figure and the accompanying discussion in the Rehearing Request, we note that it is composed entirely of attorney argument. Reh’g Req. 10–12. There is no testimony from Petitioner’s declarant regarding the figure, the annotations, or conclusions drawn therefrom. We further note that none of the alleged superlattice structures shown on Figure 26 of Ex. 2005 match the composition of Sanga’s GaN/In0.03Ga0.97N n-side multilayer 10 in Example 1 that Petitioner relies upon. As such, on the present record, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion that “regardless of the precise bandgap of the multilayer structure, even very low indium content in part of a superlattice structure causes the bandgap of the overall structure to be lower than the ~3.5eV bandgap of a GaN layer.” Reh’g Req. 12.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “We further note that for purposes of the bandgap requirement of the spacer layer limitation, Petitioner relies on the specific barrier layer, spacer layer, and quantum well layer described for Example 1. Pet. 35–36 (comparing the bandgap of the In0.03Ga0.97N layer of Example 1 with the GaN barrier layer of Example 1 and the In0.3Ga0.7N quantum well layer of Example 1). Example 1 does not expressly include an n-side multilayer structure with an InxGa1-xN/InyGa1-yN configuration, wherein each layer contains indium and x<y≤ 0.1. Therefore, Petitioner’s analysis of the bandgap requirement for claim 9, which expressly relies on Sanga Example 1, requires replacing the actual spacer layer in Example 1 with a different layer, while keeping the barrier layer and quantum well layer the same for purposes of bandgap comparison. Petitioner, however, has not provided adequate justification for doing so. Petitioner’s citation to Sanga’s general disclosure of “a multilayer having a periodic structure repeating InxGa1-xN/InyGa1-yN (0≦x<y<1)” in support of its InGaN/InGaN stack argument is unhelpful. Reh’g Req. 3. We acknowledge that this statement discloses the use of stacked InGaN layers of varying indium composition in general. But Petitioner does not direct us to bandgap values for this generic periodic structure, and to arrive at the bandgap requirement of the spacer layer limitation of claim 9, Petitioner refers back to Example 1, and its analysis of the bandgap values of the specific barrier layer, spacer layer, and quantum well layer disclosed therein. As such, we are not persuaded this general disclosure of Sanga cures the deficiencies discussed above.” slip op. at 6

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Rehearing Request, Petitioner presents new arguments in support of its assertion that Sanga’s n-side multilayer has a bandgap lower than a GaN layer. Reh’g Req. 10–12. For example, Petitioner attempts to rely on an annotated figure from Exhibit 2005, an exhibit submitted by Patent Owner with its Preliminary Response. Reh’g Req. 10–12. Although we did refer to Exhibit 2005 in our Decision (Dec. 13–14), Petitioner did not rely on Exhibit 2005 in its Petition, and the annotated figure Petitioner presents in the Rehearing Request, along with the corresponding arguments, are entirely new. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s newly annotated figure and the accompanying discussion in the Rehearing Request, we note that it is composed entirely of attorney argument. Reh’g Req. 10–12. There is no testimony from Petitioner’s declarant regarding the figure, the annotations, or conclusions drawn therefrom. We further note that none of the alleged superlattice structures shown on Figure 26 of Ex. 2005 match the composition of Sanga’s GaN/In0.03Ga0.97N n-side multilayer 10 in Example 1 that Petitioner relies upon. As such, on the present record, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion that “regardless of the precise bandgap of the multilayer structure, even very low indium content in part of a superlattice structure causes the bandgap of the overall structure to be lower than the ~3.5eV bandgap of a GaN layer.” Reh’g Req. 12.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “bandgap requirement to the spacer layer as a whole, but Patent Owner argued that this requirement should be construed such that it requires all the layers comprising the spacer layer to meet the bandgap requirement. Reh’g Req. 6. Petitioner, however, never identifies any particular matter that we misapprehended or overlooked in connection with this argument. Furthermore, Petitioner did not propose a construction of the bandgap requirement in the Petition (Pet. 7–20), and Patent Owner argued that Petitioner’s arguments fail regardless of how the bandgap limitation is construed (Prelim. Resp. 36). In this regard, we note that in our Decision we determined that we did not need to construe the bandgap requirement. Dec. 6.” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction
  Patents in suitUS 9,716,210
• Apple Inc. v. MPH Technologies OYSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2020 · IPR2019-00823 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5–8, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 4, 9, and 11 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’494 patent as one who would have had “a Bachelor’s (B.S.) degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2–5 years of academic or industry experience in the field of Internet security.” Dec. on Inst. 7–8 (citing Pet. 17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner does not dispute our adoption of Petitioner’s definition, nor otherwise address the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention of the ’494 patent. See generally PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2002 ¶ 22. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’494 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We apply Petitioner’s definition in our analysis below. IV.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “A. Unique Identity In the Petition, Petitioner argues that “unique identity” means “one or more parameters that uniquely identify a secure connection.” Pet. 18. In our Decision on Institution, “we concluded that no express claim construction of the term ‘unique identity’ [wa]s necessary” because in its Preliminary Response “Patent Owner d[id] not argue that RFC3104 or Grabelsky fails to disclose this term and, therefore, this term is not in controversy.” Dec. on Inst. 9 (citations omitted). In the subsequent papers, the parties confirm “that there is no reason to construe this term” because “Patent Owner does not dispute that some form of a unique identity is found in the primary reference.” PO Resp. 20; see also Pet. Reply 8 (agreeing that this term need not be construed). Accordingly, we find that no express construction of “unique identity” is needed. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Specification support its proposed construction for this term. First, we find that Patent Owner conflates “mobility” with “mobile computer.”5 The Specification states that “the term mobility . . . meant moving from one network to another,” rather than the term “mobile computer” having this meaning. Ex. 1001, 4:34–38 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Specification uses the term “mobility” as a capability or condition. For example, the Specification uses the term “mobility” as follows: (i) certain “protocols are not well suited to mobility”; (ii) “[t]he intermediate host might be a Mobile IP home agent, that provides mobility for the connection between the mobile terminal and the home agent . . . .”; (iii) a disclosed “method solves the mobility problem, at the cost of adding extra headers to packets”; and (iv) “[o]ne example of a change in the [security association (‘SA’)] between the first computer and the intermediate computer is the change of addresses for enabling mobility.” Ex. 1001, 5:7–8, 5:17–21, 5:33–34, 7:56–58 (emphases added). In other words, mobility is a capability a mobile computer has, rather than being synonymous with mobile computer. As such, these passages from the Specification support Petitioner’s construction” slip op. at 17

  • Strike new argumentNot reached

    “Lastly,12 we find that Patent Owner’s remaining arguments for this limitation are premised on either its (i) proposed construction (i.e., a mobile computer is “a computer that moves from one network to another as opposed to a computer that is only capable of a static secure connection”), which we do not adopt; or (ii) inapposite argument that the mobile computer needs to 12 We need not, and thus do not, reach whether Petitioner’s arguments for this limitation in its Reply (Pet. Reply 8–14) are new arguments, as Patent Owner argues in its Sur-Reply (PO Sur-Reply 13–24), because we do not rely on them, but instead, we rely on Petitioner’s arguments, and citations to the record evidence, from the Petition. maintain the same secure connection. See PO Resp. 25–51. Thus, we find these arguments unavailing. Likewise, Dr. Borella’s declaration testimony is not helpful to our analysis as his “declaration employs the assumption that the ‘mobile computer’ recited in the claims moves from one network to another,” which is contrary to our construction, as we discuss above. Ex. 2010 ¶ 42; supra Section IV(B) (construing mobile computer).” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 9,712,494 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,712,494
• Apple Inc. v. MPH Technologies OYNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2020 · IPR2019-00821 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable: Ahonen and Ishiyama do not teach establishing the first secure connection as active when formed, and adding Gupta does not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We have considered Dr. Goldschlag’s testimony about the meaning of this limitation, but we accord it little weight because it is contrary to the plain claim language and the Specification’s teachings, and is without sufficient factual corroboration. See Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 39–43; Ex. 1001, 7:13–16, 7:39–46, 7:45–46, 12:19–22; see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’302 patent as one who would have had “a B.S. degree in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 3–5 years of academic or industry experience in network security, or comparable industry experience.” Dec. on Inst. 7 (citing Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not dispute our adoption of Petitioner’s definition, nor otherwise address the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention of the ’302 patent. See generally PO. Resp.; see also Ex. 2002 ¶ 24. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’302 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We apply Petitioner’s definition in our analysis below. IV.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “A. Secure Connection In the Petition, Petitioner argued that a secure connection means “one or more . . . security associations.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–43). In our Decision on Institution, we concluded that “we need not decide whether a ‘secure connection’ should be limited to one or more SAs[, but r]ather, it is sufficient that the parties do not dispute that a secure connection covers one or more SAs.” Dec. on Inst. 9 (citations omitted). In the subsequent papers, the parties confirm that they do not dispute that a secure connection covers one or more SAs. Pet. Reply 3; PO Sur-Reply 2. Accordingly, we find that no express construction of “secure connection” is needed. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “B. Establishing Patent Owner argues that “‘establishing a first/second secure connection’ requires forming or creating a new secure connection.” PO Resp. 22; see also id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:39–41, 7:45–48, 10:12–16, 12:19–25; Ex. 2002 ¶ 69). Petitioner agrees that “‘[e]stablishing’ should be construed to mean ‘forming or creating a new secure connection,’ as proposed by” Patent Owner. Pet. Reply 4. We conclude that the ’302 patent’s Specification supports this proposed construction, and we construe “establishing a . . . secure connection” as meaning “forming or creating a new secure connection.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 7:13–15, 7:39–41, 10:12– 16. V.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 8,037,302 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,037,302
• Huizhou TCL Mobile Communication Co. Ltd. / TCT Mobile (US) Inc et al. v. Wi-Lan IncRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 21, 2020 · IPR2020-00302 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not show that the Board misapprehended or overlooked its arguments on the Hong and Zhuang obviousness ground.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Response (Paper 6), we determined that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any ground presented in the Petition, and, therefore, we denied institution. Paper 8 (“Dec.”), 20.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found

    “demonstrate that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found the random access channel limitation obvious in view of the description of the initial ranging channel in Hong, based on the combined teaching of Hong and Zhuang.” Req. Reh’g 8. We also addressed Petitioner’s reasons to combine Hong and Zhuang in the Decision denying institution as follows: Petitioner’s argument is based on Zhuang’s use of terms as equivalents without sufficiently explaining how Zhuang’s disclosures apply to Hong. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have combined the teaching of Zhuang that random access and ranging are equivalent terms with Hong’s teaching of fast handover in order to achieve fast handover in other wireless systems based on TDMA, FDMA or CDMA.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 13; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 101–106). But Petitioner does not explain how the use of equivalent terms in Zhuang creates a fast handover in Hong, and, as discussed above, Petitioner does not explain how Hong’s ranging request messages are random access signals in the sense taught in Zhuang. Dec. 11. Petitioner’s focus on the alleged interchangeability of, or equivalence between, terms is not persuasive given the differences between Hong and Zhuang, as discussed in the Decision. Dec. 10–11.” slip op. at 6

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,259,688
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd v. Uusi, LLC D/B/A NartronSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2020 · IPR2016-00908 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Remand

  Claims 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 48, 61–67, 69, 83–86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, and 102 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 37–39 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which vacated our Decision and remanded the matter to us. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. UUSI, LLC, 775 F. App’x 692 (Fed. Cir. 2019). As to the earlier instituted claims, the Court instructed that we should consider “whether Samsung has shown that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teaching of Gerpheide with the teachings of Ingraham [I]/Caldwell to arrive at the claimed invention.” Id. at 697. The Court further instructed us to “consider the patentability of claims 37, 38, and 39” (id.) because, on April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instruction in this case and in light of SAS Inst., Inc., we modified our Decision on Institution to institute review of claims 37–39 of the ’183 patent as obvious over Ingraham I, Caldwell, and Gerpheide. Paper 40. We further held a teleconference on August 15, 2019, with respective counsel for the parties, to hear their proposals on how to proceed with this trial. Paper 41, 2. Having considered the parties’ proposals, we authorized the parties to submit concurrent briefs and subsequent responses addressing the following issues (id. at 6):” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a minimum of: (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or equivalent thereof; and (2) “two to three years of experience in the relevant field, which includes touch systems technology.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 19). Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Cairns, opines that a person of ordinary skill “in the art of capacitive touch sensors would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or electrical engineering or equivalent industry experience in the field.” Ex. 2002 ¶ 14. In our Final Written Decision, we noted that the levels of ordinary skill proposed by the parties do not differ significantly, but adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition as more representative, indicating that our analysis would be the same under either definition. Paper 35, 9–10. On remand, neither party disputes the definition adopted in the Final Written Decision. Furthermore, no argument presented by the parties on remand would be affected by adopting one of the proposed definitions over the other. We maintain here the definition adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “transition term[s]” should be considered in determining the meaning of a claim term, but asserts without further support that the presence of a semicolon after “supply voltage” and the use of the transition term “wherein” do not compel the preliminary construction. Id. As we addressed in denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, claim 37 employs the open-ended transition term “comprising” followed by a colon to indicate that a list elements follows, and employs semicolons to separate the elements of that list. Paper 17, 5. The first element of the list, element 37a, describes an oscillator and includes the supply voltage limitation preceded by a comma and the transition term “wherein.” Id. Element 37a then ends with a semicolon and the claim proceeds to element 37b, which recites a microcontroller. Id. Petitioner thus nominally acknowledges consideration of punctuation, but advances a construction that asks us to disregard punctuation affirmatively recited in the claim. To do so would be “inconsistent with the punctuation [patentee] chose for this claim.” In re Pelz, 379 F. App’x 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Likewise, as to Petitioner’s assertion that we read an additional limitation into the claim (Pet. Br. 10), we observe that, if the claim is limited to a particular exemplary embodiment, such a limitation results from the claim being drafted to cover only that embodiment. While we confirmed in the Decision on Institution that the use of the term supply voltage is consistent with its use in the Specification (Dec. on Inst. 9), the limitation of the claim to the oscillator is based on the language of the claim, not on definition or disavowal. Therefore, even accepting, for the sake of argument, that there is no disavowal or definition in the Specification of “supply voltage,” the term refers in independent claim 37 to supply voltage of the oscillator.” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments because they are not responsive to the combination of teachings at issue in the references before us. Patent Owner focuses on particular features of Gerpheide that it alleges either “would not work . . . in the proposed Caldwell-Ingraham system” or “can only work” in the presence of a component Patent Owner argues that “neither Ingraham nor Caldwell uses.” PO Br. 1–2, 12–13. These arguments are based on a mistaken premise that one or more components or physical configurations of Gerpheide must be incorporated into the combination of Ingraham I and Caldwell in order to show a reasonable likelihood of success. Under the Federal Circuit’s construction of the “selectively providing” limitation, the combination of Ingraham I, Caldwell, and Gerpheide need not incorporate the specific features of Gerpheide identified by Patent Owner. Petitioner asserts, supported by evidence from Dr. Subramanian, that the Ingraham I-Caldwell combination would have been modified based on Gerpheide “to provide features that adjust[] the oscillator signal frequency provided to the input portions 13 to negate the effect of interference on the input portions 13 and touch sensing circuits.” Pet. 26–27. This modification would not require any of the particular components or configurations of Gerpheide highlighted by Patent Owner. Thus, even if one or more of Patent Owner’s arguments as to the infeasibility of incorporating particular aspects of Gerpheide were correct, Patent Owner’s arguments do not address Gerpheide’s particular teaching of adjusting oscillator signal frequency to negate the effect of interference, and therefore, Patent Owner’s arguments are not responsive to the proposed combination and evidence relied upon by Petitioner. In view of the above, we find that Petitioner has shown that the skilled artisan would have combined Gerpheide with Ingraham/Caldwell as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed subject matter.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 5,796,183 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 5,796,183
• Huizhou TCL Mobile Communication Co. Ltd. / TCT Mobile (US) Inc. et al. v. Wi-Lan IncInstitution denied
  PTAB · Aug 5, 2020 · IPR2020-00304 · APJ Scott E Bain · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted obviousness ground against claims 1–22.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We have considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, and accompanying exhibits submitted by the parties. For the reasons explained below, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with and adopt Patent Owner’s construction of “single service.” As Patent Owner asserts, the ’577 patent consistently describes a single service as comprising integrated data that has been divided up for communication across different channels, and does not mean a communications “service provider.” For example, the ’577 patent discloses: For an exemplary embodiment of channel aggregation, each wireless communication link 106 may be comprised of two or more aggregated (communication) channels 110. As illustrated in particular for wireless link 106(m), a single service 112 is being communicated using multiple aggregated channels 110. More specifically, a first channel 110(1) and a second channel 110(2) are channel-aggregated for communications via wireless link 106(m) for single service 112. Although only two channels 110(1) and 110(2) and a single service 112 are explicitly illustrated, channel aggregation may be implemented using any number of two or more communication channels and may involve more than one service. In an example embodiment, integrated data is divided into first data and second data. The first data is transmitted on a first channel. The second data is simultaneously transmitted on a second channel such that the first data and the second data are transmitted in a coordinated manner by aggregating the first channel and the second channel.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s explanations, however, do not sufficiently demonstrate that Gorokhov teaches or suggests the recited “single service.” First, as discussed above in section II.A, we construe “single service” to refer to a specific data service, not a service provider. Thus, Gorokhov’s description of “different provider[s]” using different parts of the wireless spectrum does not equate to teaching “produc[ing] data for a single service” as recited in claim 1. As Patent Owner argues, Gorokhov repeatedly discloses the creation of discontinuous bands due to a “communications service provider not being licensed in that bandwidth at that location.” Prelim. Resp. 57; Ex. 1004, 13:15–19; see also id. at 2:49–51 (“where the discontinuous bands were separated by a bandwidth corresponding to the width of a service provider’s carrier, e.g., 1.25 MHz or more in some cases”). Service providers creating discontinuous bands, however, is not producing “data for a single service,” as recited in claim 1. The term “single service” is not disclosed in Gorokhov. Prelim. Resp. 58. Further, although Gorokhov discloses that only a particular service provider can use certain licensed spectrum, a single service provider is not (for the reasons explained above) a “single service” as recited in claim 1. Petitioner argues that Gorokhov’s disclosure of “FFTs” (Fast Fourier Transforms) would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill to mean “data would need to be combined.” Pet. 32. Petitioner, however, provides no support for this argument other than a passage in Dr. Lo’s testimony that merely repeats Petitioner’s citations to Gorokhov (including Gorokhov’s general description of performing FFTs). Petitioner also asserts that “Gorokhov’s processor combines the downlink data from the disjoint portions of bandwidth (the first/second communication channel) to produce data for a single service.” Pet. at 31 (emphasis added). Again, however, Petitioner has not provided any citations or explanation regarding this alleged teaching in Gorokhov. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness challenge to claims 1 and 12 based on Gorokhov.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the challenged claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). This rule adopts the same claim construction standard used by federal district courts, which follow Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under this standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill8 at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. For purposes of determining whether to institute trial, we construe the term “single service” as described below. We need not address the constructions of any other terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 8 Petitioner asserts, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that a “person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) with respect to the claimed subject matter in the ‘577 Patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and around two years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent, [and] [a]dditional educational or industrial experience could qualify if those additional aspects compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003, ¶15. We adopt this undisputed description of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,854,577
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Portal Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 22, 2020 · IPR2019-00513 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Junqua and Julia; the motion to amend is denied because proposed substitute claim 31 is unpatentable over the prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, relying on testimony of Mr. McNair, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement the database of Junqua using the well-known query language of SQL as taught by Julia, for the benefit of providing “a standard interactive and programming language for getting information from and updating a database” as taught by Julia. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1005, 8:56–64, 9:2–18; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28, 74). We determine for the reasons given that converting the text in searchable form to a database query as taught by Junqua, where the database query is written in the well-known query language of SQL as taught by Julia, does no more than yield the predictable result of getting information from a database using the standard programming language of (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “Ordinary Skill in the Art Claim 31 depends from claim 21. The Petition has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 21 would have been obvious over the combination of Junqua and Julia, as discussed in our analysis above. Claim 31 recites “wherein the location/proximity module consists of a radio frequency identification reader.” Petitioner, relying on testimony of Mr. McNair, contends Amitay teaches this limitation. Opp. 12 (citing Ex. 1018, 6:17–19, 6:37–41; Ex. 1022 ¶ 58). Amitay discloses a location sensor which may be an RF reader. Ex. 1018, 6:17–19, 6:37–41. For the reasons given, we determine that Amitay teaches this limitation. Claim 31 recites “the location/proximity device consists of an art museum exhibit equipped with a radio frequency identification tag.” Petitioner contends that Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation. Opp. 12–14 (citing Ex. 1018, 6:27– 32, 7:32–33; Ex. 1027; Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 34, 58). Patent Owner contends that Amitay does not teach tagging art exhibits with RFID tags. Mot. 18. We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Amitay alone does not teach this limitation, because, as Petitioner demonstrates, Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation. Amitay discloses tagging an item with an RFID tag. Ex. 1018, 7:31–33. Mr. McNair testifies that tagging an art museum exhibit with an RFID tag was within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1022 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1026). Mr. McNair also testifies that using an” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelOther

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Amitay alone does not teach this limitation, because, as Petitioner demonstrates, Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation. Amitay discloses tagging an item with an RFID tag. Ex. 1018, 7:31–33. Mr. McNair testifies that tagging an art museum exhibit with an RFID tag was within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1022 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1026). Mr. McNair also testifies that using an guests about art museum exhibits was known in the art. Id. (citing Ex. 1027, 78–79, 84–87). Mr. McNair testifies that using the device of Junqua, Julia, and Amitay to provide information about art exhibits to museum guests yields the known benefit of reducing museum costs by providing virtual docents instead of human ones. Id. (citing Ex. 1027, 86). We rely on the testimony and supporting evidence of Mr. McNair to determine that Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,376,645 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,376,645
• Ring LLC v. Skybell Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2020 · IPR2019-00446 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7, 15, 20, and 21 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over the respective combinations of Siminoff, Almomani, Imao, and Huisking.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner and its declarant Dr. Baker “adopt[] Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 35). We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Based on the full trial record and in view of the parties’ agreement, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, with the exception of the language “at least,” which introduces ambiguity, consistent with the Decision on Institution. See Dec. on Inst. 6–7; Pet. 12–13; PO Resp. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 28; Ex. 2001 ¶ 35.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “including the testimony of Dr. Madisetti and the various additional references described above, is unrebutted in the record before us. We find this evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “an application is not ‘open’ until it is brought to the foreground and viewable by the user.” Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶ 5). Rather than rebut Petitioner’s evidence, Patent Owner offers only Dr. Baker’s conclusory declaration testimony that an “application is ‘started,’ i.e. open, when the signal is sent by the remote computing device to start the SIP session.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 58). This statement, however, is in tension with Dr. Baker’s subsequent deposition testimony that the ’109 Patent discloses an embodiment of its invention in which the remote computing device is turned on, communication occurs between the remote computing device and the doorbell, and the doorbell control application is not yet opened by the user. Ex. 1020, 47:21–48:7 (discussing Ex. 1001, 16:1–11). In particular, Dr. Baker opines, “I think it’s safe to assume that the application is not opened by the user, but running as a background program.” Id. Patent Owner does not explain in the record before us how one might harmonize this statement with Dr. Baker’s earlier testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand an application started in the background to be open. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 58.” slip op. at 36

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The ’109 patent’s Specification states, “automatically, i.e. without the user instructing.” Ex. 1001, 15:11–16. Petitioner treats this statement as definitional. Reply 21–22. Patent Owner does not address the import of this statement on the claim term. Sur-Reply 8–10. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit instructs that a patentee is free to act as their own lexicographer in order “to define the specific terms used to describe his or her invention, [but] this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, we agree with Petitioner and find this statement defines the claim term automatically as “without the user instructing” because the definition employs the term “i.e.” (“id est” or “that is”), which “signals an intent to define the word to which it refers.” Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“i.e.” is definitional when it “comports with the inventors’ other uses . . . in the specification and with each and every other reference”).” slip op. at 46

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s evidence of common usage of the term “open” in the art, including the testimony of Dr. Madisetti and the various additional references described above, is unrebutted in the record before us. We find this evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “an application is not ‘open’ until it is brought to the foreground and viewable by the user.” Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶ 5). Rather than rebut Petitioner’s evidence, Patent Owner offers only Dr. Baker’s conclusory declaration testimony that an “application is ‘started,’ i.e. open, when the signal is sent by the remote computing device to start the SIP session.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 58). This statement, however, is in tension with Dr. Baker’s subsequent deposition testimony that the ’109 Patent discloses an embodiment of its invention in which the remote computing device is turned on, communication occurs between the remote computing device and the doorbell, and the doorbell control application is not yet opened by the user. Ex. 1020, 47:21–48:7 (discussing Ex. 1001, 16:1–11). In particular, Dr. Baker opines, “I think it’s safe to assume that the application is not opened by the user, but running as a background program.” Id. Patent Owner does not explain in the record before us how one might harmonize this statement with Dr. Baker’s earlier testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand an application started in the background to be open. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 58. Accordingly, based on the complete trial record and in particular on the foregoing facts and analysis, we find a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood claim 20 to encompass communication between the device and doorbell, including via the application running in the background upon startup of the device, prior to the application being opened by the user. With this understanding of the claim scope, we turn next to the teachings of Huisking.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,179,109 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,179,109
• Ring LLC v. Skybell Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2020 · IPR2019-00447 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7–15, and 18–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Siminoff and Almomani, Siminoff, or Siminoff and Ring.com, as applicable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary skill in the art of the ’049 Patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or equivalent training, as well as at least one year of technical experience in the relevant field. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education or training, and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 28, cited in Pet. 9. In the Decision on Institution, we agreed with this assessment, with the exception of the language “at least,” which introduces ambiguity. Dec. on Inst. 9–10. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5 (“For the purposes of this IPR proceeding, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill.”). Based on the full trial record and in view of the parties’ agreement, we determine, consistent with the Decision on Institution, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or equivalent training, as well as one year of technical experience in the relevant field. See Dec. on Inst. 9–10; Pet. 9; PO Resp. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 28; Ex. 2001 ¶ 28.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached

    “1. Live view mode Patent Owner argues that “live view mode,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 11, means a “mode by which live video and/or audio from the doorbell is transmitted to and displayed on the remote computing device.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 46). Petitioner disagrees with this construction. Pet. Reply 2–6. As explained below, we find the asserted prior art teaches a “live view mode” under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Therefore, we apply Patent Owner’s construction in our patentability analysis below, and we need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to the meaning of “live view mode.” See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1001, 11:52–58. Furthermore, “sleep mode” is described throughout the ’049 patent as a mode used to save power. Ex. 1001, 3:6–8, 3:56–57, 12:20– 26, 15:24–30, 17:16–30. Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of “constant power” in claim 21 contradicts the entire purpose of a “sleep mode,” which is to save power. For this reason, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s construction.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Almomani’s teachings of remotely activating the doorbell camera “would frustrate Siminoff’s intended purpose of saving power by rendering the camera inoperable when motion is not detected.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 62). According to Patent Owner, in the proposed combination, “the low power consumption mode would not be used, and battery power would be wasted recording video for which there [is] no associated motion or activity.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 63). We disagree with these arguments because, as Petitioner correctly points out (Pet. 27), Siminoff discloses that an “activation trigger” for switching “from low-power mode to active mode” may include “a signal from [a] user at [a] remote communication device.” Ex. 1005, claim 1. Thus, Siminoff is not limited to exiting low power mode only upon motion detection. Rather, Siminoff expressly discloses exiting a low power mode based on a signal from a remote device. Almomani provides the express disclosure of using a mobile phone to activate a camera to stream live video, as discussed above, thereby supplying the details that Petitioner acknowledges are lacking in Siminoff. See Pet. 19 (“Siminoff lacks express details as to whether this activation signal [of Siminoff’s claim 1] also causes the camera to begin recording. Almomani, however, teaches that a user of an application on a mobile device may selectively activate a door-based camera and receive streaming video.”).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,743,049 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,743,049
• Ring LLC v. Skybell Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2020 · IPR2019-00445 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 12 and 18 are unpatentable: claim 12 as obvious over Tylicki and Claiborne, and claim 18 as anticipated by Tylicki and Claiborne.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1003 ¶ 28, cited in Pet. 12–13. In the Decision on Institution, we agreed with this assessment, with the exception of the language “at least,” which introduces ambiguity. Dec. on Inst. 8. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 8 (“For the purposes of this IPR proceeding, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill.”). Based on the full trial record and in view of the parties’ agreement, we determine, consistent with the Decision on Institution, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or equivalent training, as well as one year of technical experience in the field of embedded computing systems (including sensors and automation) and wireless networking. See Dec. on Inst. 8; Pet. 12–13; PO Resp. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 28; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–34.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that independent claim 1’s affirmative recitation that “the chime that is . . . remotely located with respect to the doorbell” is conspicuously absent from independent claims 12, 18, and 23 and that its inclusion in claim 1 tends to show that “remotely located” is not an intrinsic feature of the claimed chime, as disclosed in the ’107 patent. See Pet. Reply 2. Otherwise, there would be no need to affirmatively recite this limitation in claim 1.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “recites “sending a data file comprising information to the chime that is communicatively coupled to the communication device.” Unlike the limitation reciting “selecting the sound by a communication device,” the “sending” limitation does not require the recited “communication device” to send the data file comprising information to the chime. Nonetheless, we have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions, and we are persuaded it would have been obvious to download (i.e., send) the sound files from the cellular phone of Tylicki in view of Claiborne’s teachings of downloading audio files from a device such as a cellular phone to the chime. See Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1003, 49–51; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 27, 41, Fig. 3. As Petitioner points out, “Tylicki does not specify which particular peripheral devices may be used to accomplish the task of downloading,” but Claiborne provides “an identified and predictable solution,” namely using a cellular phone to download files to the chime. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59). Tylicki identifies “cellular telephones” as examples of user interface devices that can connect to and configure various features of the chime system, including selecting which file to play. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 18–19. Tylicki also discloses downloading sound files from peripheral devices to the chime system. Ex. 1005 ¶ 16. Tylicki does not state expressly that the peripheral devices that can be used for downloading files include cellular telephones. In view of Tylicki’s other disclosures of using cellular telephones as user interface devices to configure the system, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use a cellular phone to send sound files to the chime, as disclosed in Claiborne. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 59 (Dr. Madisetti testifying that “an artisan looking to implement Tylicki’s door chime would have found a predictable solution in Claiborne. Claiborne teaches that a cellular phone was one such peripheral device known in the art to enable the downloading of sound files to a chime. . . . Claiborne’s teaching is just one example of the common practice of transferring files from a cellular phone to another device.”) (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 27).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “portion of a building” and “wherein the doorbell is located along an outside portion of the building.” Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to place a chime inside a building and a doorbell outside a building because “the well-known purpose of a chime is to alert occupants of a building to the presence of a visitor at the door” and “the well-known purpose of a doorbell is to provide visitors a way to alert occupants to their presence outside.” Pet. 32–33, 35–37. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions. We agree with Petitioner that “the well-known purpose of a doorbell is to provide visitors a way to alert occupants to their presence outside.” Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003, 58). Thus, we find a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a doorbell is mounted outside, by a door for example. We also agree with Petitioner that “the well-known purpose of a chime is to alert occupants of a building to the presence of a visitor at the door.” Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 4). In view of this, Petitioner argues that “it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that Tylicki’s chime speaker may be mounted inside the business or large residential dwelling so as to alert various dwelling occupants to the presence of a visitor outside.” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003, 52–53; Ex. 1006, claim 1). We are persuaded by this argument because it is generally known that a doorbell chime rings inside a building to provide notice to those inside of someone outside. See Ex. 1003, 52–53 (Dr. Madisetti testifying that a chime is placed inside to alert occupants).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,179,107 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,179,107

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.