- PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2016 · IPR2014-01368 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, and 10 of the ’469 patent were held unpatentable; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable because the cited art did not disclose the required current connection status.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“In Straight Path, the Federal Circuit held that the claim language “is connected to the computer network” has a facially clear meaning, that “the query transmitted to the server seeks to determine whether the second unit is connected at that time, i.e., connected at the time that the query is sent.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360.11 The Federal Circuit held that the query asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate.” Id. The Federal Circuit further explained that “[i]t is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained, “[w]hen claim language has as plain a meaning on an issue as the language does here, leaving no genuine uncertainties on interpretive questions relevant to the case, it is particularly difficult to conclude that the specification reasonably supports a different meaning. The specification plays a more limited role than in the common situation where claim terms are uncertain in meaning in relevant respects.” Id. at 1361. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit construed the limitation “is connected to the computer network” as “is connected to the computer network at the time the query is transmitted to the server.” Id. at 1363.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“and NetBIOS fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 35, 49–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. Microsoft Manual discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1012, 62– 63, 68–69. Microsoft Manual discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. Microsoft Manual further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, Microsoft Manual discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in Microsoft Manual will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. Microsoft Manual discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1012, 68, 150. As such, we determine that Microsoft Manual does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein. Similarly, NetBIOS discloses a registration process for resources or nodes to receive a unique name by registering a name. Ex. 1014, 379. During a name query (discovery), a datagram is sent requesting the name and address of another resource. Id. at 396. The NBNS maintains a database of resource names through explicit name deletion, where the node specifies a deletion function and implicit name deletion, which occurs when a node ceases operation. Id. at 379. NetBIOS explains that implicit name deletion “is a frequent occurrence.” Id. Implicit name deletion is managed by assigning nodes a specified lifetime for registered names, where a name is silently released if a node fails to refresh the registered name before the lifetime expires. Id. NetBIOS further discloses a mechanism where the NBNS may correct the information stored after an incorrect response is provided to a requesting node. See id. at 409. However, similar to Microsoft Manual, NetBIOS discloses that the information stored by the NBNS may be incorrect, and, therefore, will not determine whether a second process is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. Therefore, NetBIOS also does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible.” Given that the combination of Microsoft Manual and NetBIOS fails to teach or suggest the claims as construed, we need not reach the remaining arguments presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that “WINS is an implementation of NetBIOS” and, therefore, Petitioner contends that “one having skill in the art would have known about and been motivated to combine Microsoft Manual with NetBIOS.” Id. at 34 (citing 67 Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 88–89). We are persuaded by Petitioner that the combination is reasonable because Microsoft Manual demonstrates that Microsoft TCP/IP has combined the elements of NetBIOS and Microsoft Manual in the same manner in which Petitioner proposes to combine NetBIOS and Microsoft Manual. See 67 Ex. 1012, 3, 11. Microsoft Manual discloses that Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows NT provides support for application interfaces, including NetBIOS for establishing logical names and sessions on the network. Id. at 11. Microsoft Manual describes that “[w]hen WINS servers are in place on the network, NetBIOS over TCP/IP resolves names on a client computer by communication with the WINS server.” 67 Pet. 34 (quoting 67 Ex. 1012, 62). We are persuaded that Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows NT utilizes NetBIOS features for name resolution, as disclosed by Microsoft Manual, and a person with ordinary skill in the art would have readily combined the disclosures of Microsoft Manual and Microsoft Manual.” slip op. at 25
- BurdenFwd mixedUnpatentable
“8. Conclusion We have reviewed the Petition and supporting evidence and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ʼ469 patent are obvious over Microsoft Manual and NetBIOS, and claim 10 is unpatentable because it depends from a cancelled claim. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 5, and 10 of the ʼ469 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,131,121 - PTAB · May 20, 2014 · IPR2013-00124 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claims 1-26 and allowed substitute claims 27-44, but denied substitute claim 45 as unpatentable over Behan.
RulingsFinal written decision- ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“patent claims. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(ii).” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“partes review must set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundMixed
“In order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on structural similarity, the prior art must provide a reason to make the claimed compound, and there must also be “„adequate support in the prior art‟ for the 7 P.E.A. Teal et al., (Z)-11-Hexadecen-1-ol: A Behavioral Modifying Chemical Present in the Pheromone Gland of Female Heliothis Zea (Lepidoptera:Noctuidae), 116 CAN. ENTOMOLOGY 777-79 (1984). Ex. 2003. 8 Yih-Shen Hwang et al., Structure-Activity Relationship of Unsaturated Fatty Acids as Mosquito Ovipositional Repellents, 10 J. OF CHEM. ECOLOGY 145-51 (1984). Ex. 2004. change in structure.” Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729, 731-32 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that the test for obviousness of a compound based on structural similarity is in accordance with the legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), specifically, that it is important to identify “„a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does‟ in an obviousness determination.” Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1356-57 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Thus, “in cases involving new chemical compounds, it remains necessary to identify some reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound in a particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a new claimed compound.” Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundDecided for petitioner
“We acknowledge that McMahon and the Zhang Declaration are evidence that the ordinary artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation that, because a compound is known to repel mosquitoes, such as Aedes aegypti, the compound would also repel ticks, such as Amblyomma variegatum. Claim 45, however, encompasses the use of isolongifolanone when R1 is a hydrogen atom and R2 is an oxygen atom, which is the same compound specifically taught by Behan. See Pet. 7-8 (showing the structure of isolongifolanone, and discussing how it is encompassed by the chemical formula set forth in claim 1). As discussed above, Behan teaches the use of isolongifolanone to repel mosquitoes or cockroaches. Patent Owner provides no evidence that ticks and mites would not be present on the same objects or areas where mosquitoes and cockroaches are found, which are the insects addressed by Behan. Thus, by applying the isolongifolanone taught by Behan to an object or airspace for the purpose of repelling mosquitoes or cockroaches, one would also inherently repel ticks and mites. “It is a general rule that merely discovering and claiming a new benefit of an old process cannot render the process again patentable.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the realization of a new benefit of an old process does not render that process patentable); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating in the context of a claimed process that was drawn to the same use comprising the same steps of the prior art, “[n]ewly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.”). We, therefore, conclude that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the patentability of proposed claim 45.” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,579,016 - PTAB · Apr 28, 2014 · IPR2013-00067 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claims 1–46 and denied entry of substitute claims 47–50 because Nike did not establish their patentability and they would have been obvious over Nishida and Schuessler I and II.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“a patent reexamination proceeding. The substitute claims proposed in a motion to amend are not entered automatically and then subjected to examination. Rather, the proposed substitute claims will be added directly to the patent, without examination, if the patent owner’s motion to amend claims is granted. In a motion to amend, the patent owner is not rebutting a rejection in an office action, as though this proceeding were a patent examination or a reexamination. Instead, the patent owner, as the movant, bears the burden of establishing the patentability of the proposed substitute claims over the prior art of record and also other prior art known to Patent Owner. We deny the motion to amend because (1) Patent Owner has not met this burden and (2) Petitioner has shown that the substitute claims would have been rendered obvious over the combination of the teachings of Nishida and Schuessler I and II.” slip op. at 34
- ExcludeOther
“The current situation does not require us to assess the merits of Petitioner’s motion to exclude. As discussed above, even without relying upon the aforementioned portions of the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Frederick, we have concluded that Patent Owner has demonstrated that the term “flat knit edges” of substitute claims 47-50 is supported by the disclosure of the ’289 Application. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 41
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In construing the term “flat knitting,” we apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of the words in their ordinary usage, as those words would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account any definitions supplied by the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Specification of the ’011 Patent expressly describes flat knitting as a sub-type of weft knitting. Ex. 1002, col. 7, ll. 5-8. Ultimately, “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be . . . the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Further, Patent Owner presents evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand flat knitting to describe a sub-type of weft knitting. Paper 44, 1 (quoting a textile dictionary (Ex. 2011, 6) to state that “the trade uses the term flat knit fabric to refer to weft knit fabrics made on a flat machine, rather than warp-knit fabrics”); see also Ex 2017, 5; Ex. 2018, 6. Despite its argument, Petitioner identifies no portion of the Specification of the ’011 Patent that describes flat knitting with respect to warp knitting or any other type of knitting, beyond weft-knitting. See Paper 37, 2-3. In addition, before the filing date of the motion to amend, Dr. Frederick, Petitioner’s expert, testified that “[f]lat knitting would be another type of weft knitting that would involve an end result that was . . . on a curved 15 surface, but more or less flat.” Ex. 2009, 89, ll. 6-11. Therefore, we determine that the term “weft knitting” describes a type of knitting in which a continuous yarn is carried in crosswise rows, and we construe the term “flat knit” to recite a sub-type of weft knitting, in which the weft knit textile is produced as a sheet of more or less flat material.5” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner contends that Nishida and Schuessler I are in similar fields and address the same problem, namely the formation of two-dimensional textile elements having edges that are joined to form three-dimensional, wearable items. Paper 37, 11; cf. Ex. 1005, figs. 1 (two-dimensional layout 2) and 3 (three-dimensional, shoe upper 3); Ex. 1020, figs. 1 (two-dimensional helmet swatch) and 2 (three-dimensional helmet). Further, Schuessler II teaches that the two-dimensional helmet swatch of Figure 1 of Schuessler I may be knit to shape on a flat knitting machine. Paper 37, 11 (citing Ex. 1023 ¶ 15). Petitioner contends, therefore, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to combine the teachings of these three references to achieve the invention recited in substitute claim 47. Id. Patent Owner does not argue Petitioner’s assessment of the teachings of these references. Patent Owner also does not dispute that all of the limitations of the claims are taught in the prior art. Instead, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine Nishida’s teaching regarding the reduction of waste by placing layouts in adjoining positions and Schuessler I’s teaching regarding knitting textile elements to shape is illogical. Paper 44, 5. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s reason for combining these teachings is somehow flawed because “after they are combined the elements of each reference serve the same purpose.” Id. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, however, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious 38 unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 555 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). In this case, that the elements of the prior art references would “serve the same purpose” when combined is a factor in favor of an obviousness determination, and not a suggestion of nonobviousness, as urged by Patent Owner. Because we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that the teachings of Nishida and Schuessler I and II teach or suggest all of the limitations of substitute claim 47 and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of these references to achieve the recited article of footwear, we determine that Patent Owner fails to meet its burden of showing that it is entitled to the relief requested in its motion to amend. Because we group substitute claims 48-50 with claim 47 for purposes of assessing patentability, we also determine that Patent Owner fails to meet its burden of showing that it is entitled to the relief requested in its motion to amend with respect to substitute claims 48-50. Consequently, the portion of Patent Owner’s motion to amend requesting entry of substitute claims 47-50 also is denied for failing to demonstrate that the substitute claims are patentable over Nishida and Schuessler I and II.” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,347,011
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.