- PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00932 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, 1 and 4–20, and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Prusik and over Prusik with Vaillant.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’818 patent. We institute this inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“degree in computer science, electrical engineering, systems engineering, biomedical engineering (or a related or equivalent field), and two . . . years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating embedded systems, graphically encoded icons, or diagnostic systems that provide dynamic information,” and that “less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard.” Pet. 7. Petitioner also asserts that “[a] POSITA may be part of an interdisciplinary team with others having the relevant experience set forth above,” and that the prior art evidences the level of skill in the art. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–21). Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response and thus does not currently dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we find Petitioner’s formulation sufficient at this stage, except that we need not decide at this stage whether a POSITA would have been “part of an interdisciplinary team with others having the relevant experience,” or who would have been part of such a team. With or without that provision, Petitioner’s proposal appears at this stage to be generally consistent with the technical background described in the ’818 patent, and with the prior art of record. See Ex. 1001, 1:31–2:43; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). To the extent that we may need to further characterize the level of ordinary skill, the parties may develop this issue at trial.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Based on the teachings cited by Petitioner, discussed above, we preliminarily determine that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that Prusik teaches or suggests each of the limitations 8pre–8e to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Thus, at this stage, we determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that claim 8 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“provide temperature exposure information to a user for product preservation purposes,6 and that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Prusik with Vaillant’s marketing management system to systematically and automatically control a product whose preservation in a distribution circuit depends on the temperature. Pet 34–35 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:58–51; Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). For example, according to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Prusik’s system with Vaillant “to prevent the sale of a 6 Petitioner indicates that Vaillant is cited on the face of the patent issued from Prusik (Ex. 1022). Pet. 34. product where the dynamic data in the two-dimensional barcode indicates that the product has been exposed to a temperature exceeding a predetermined threshold.” Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 177). Petitioner also contends that “applying a sale acceptance/rejection functionality to Prusik’s barcode reader is a mere application of a known method of product handling and processing to Prusik’s system to achieve the predictable result of preventing sale of products that have been exposed to hazardous or improper environmental conditions.” Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 176). Based on the forgoing, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence and reasoning to demonstrate that the combination of Prusik and Vaillant would have rendered claim 1 obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Thus, at this stage, we determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,392,818 - Nokia Of America Corporation / AT&T Services, Inc. v. Iarnach Technologies LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00900 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–11 because the petition did not show that G.984.3 and Khermosh teach or suggest the claimed parameter sets determined according to link quality.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the arguments of the parties and the evidence of record, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) pertinent to the ’359 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or similar discipline and had at least two years of experience with optical communications and networks. Ex. 1003, ¶ 22. A person with a different degree but with additional relevant experience could still qualify if the additional experience compensates for the different educational background. Id. Pet. 10. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention and presents a near-identical description of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 9. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record may also reflect the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Institution Decision, we adopt the description offered by Petitioner as it is not disputed by the Patent Owner and is consistent with the ’359 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[t]he [claim] terms should receive their respective plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art under Phillips.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner agrees. Prelim. Resp. 9. No need exists to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that “[t]he values in this message, except for P1 and P2, are selected according to OLT parameters and preferences” and that P1 and P2 (length of preamble bits) are chosen by the OLT in order to ensure the total length of the burst overhead meets certain preset length restrictions. Id. at 32; see also Ex. 1005, 110. These notes confirm Petitioner’s acknowledgement that the parameters in this table are not determined based on link quality. Id.; see also id. at 35, 39. Thus, the upstream burst overhead parameters in the table in G.984.3, reproduced above, are not determined by the OLT “according to different levels of link quality” as this limitation requires.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,934,359 - Microsoft Corporation v. Reald Spark, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2024 · IPR2023-01046 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 and 16–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5, 10, 12–14, and 18 as anticipated by Ganin; the remaining claims as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but offers a definition of its own. PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s or master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, electrical and computer engineering, computer science, or similar educational background; or equivalent on-the-job training, including approximately two to three years of experience in machine learning and/or pattern recognition.” Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 22). Patent Owner asserts that the “level of skill is approximate and more experience would compensate for less formal education and vice versa.” Id. We note that the differences between the parties’ descriptions are immaterial and find Petitioner’s description to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’985 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision, albeit without the two instances of “at least,” which introduce ambiguity. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that it “applied plain and ordinary meanings of all terms and no express constructions are required here.” Pet. 5. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner that there are no claim terms that require construction for purposes of the Board’s final decision. PO. Resp. 8–9. We therefore determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Chalom’s large RFC with Aslan’s teacher-student MLA pair would have rendered the ensuing system more complex, and thereby inefficient. As correctly noted by Petitioner, Chalom indicates that the RFC can be embodied in a mobile computing device. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1005, 22:33– 37, 19:65–20:6). And Dr. Karam persuasively explains that using the teacher model to train the student model is more efficient because the teacher’s knowledge allows the student model to converge faster. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 2009, 178:14–24). Accordingly, we find that a POSITA would have found sufficient motivation to replace Chalom’s RFC with Aslan’s teacher-student models to enhance the efficiency of the MLA pair in a mobile computing environment. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the proposed combination of Chalom and Aslan would predictably result in the teacher MLA generating motion vector fields for user gaze correction (i.e., first reference or editing instructions) that are passed to the student MLA, which subsequently generates motion vector fields (i.e., second reference or editing instructions) for further refining the received first reference data. Id. at 58. Consequently, we reiterate that because the proposed combination involves known elements performing their ordinary functions to produce a predictable result, a POSITA would have appreciated that the proposed combination is proper.4 After considering Patent Owner’s arguments, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed combination of Chalom and Aslan is sufficiently supported by the requisite motivation to teach limitations 1[D] and 1[E].” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Because Chalom explicitly indicates that its RFC can be trained using any suitable techniques(s) including compressing the classifier, we agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have looked to Aslan’s teacher-student architecture that proposes compressing large models such as Chalom’s RFC into smaller models so they can be more readily deployed on computing devices with limited resources. Pet. Reply 11–12. As correctly noted by Petitioner, the experts of the parties agree that both Aslan and Chalom involve classifiers. More particularly, as acknowledged by Patent Owner’s representative during the hearing, compression is desirable for Chalom’s RFC. See Tr. 56:21–57:4. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have looked to a similar compression operation of classifiers in Aslan for training a more compact MLA at runtime or offline. Pet. Reply 11–12. For these same reasons, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Chalom and Aslan are directed to different objectives or techniques. Further, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that replacing Chalom’s large RFC with Aslan’s teacher-student MLA pair would have rendered the ensuing system more complex, and thereby inefficient. As correctly noted by Petitioner, Chalom indicates that the RFC can be embodied in a mobile computing device. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1005, 22:33– 37, 19:65–20:6). And Dr. Karam persuasively explains that using the teacher model to train the student model is more efficient because the teacher’s knowledge allows the student model to converge faster. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 2009, 178:14–24). Accordingly, we find that a POSITA would have found sufficient” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 10,740,985 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,740,985 - Aptiv Services US, LCC v. Microchip Technology Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00803 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–18 obvious over Verhaege, Verhaege and Miller, or Ker.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“(‘POSITA’) in the field of the ’665 patent in 2007 would have at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and three to five years of experience in integrated circuit design.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s definition is “excessively high.” Prelim. Resp. 3 n.1. In Patent Owner’s view, “a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or an equivalent technical degree and two years of experience in mixed-signal (i.e., analog/digital) circuit design.” Id. (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 30–34). We need not resolve this dispute because our decision would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In Patent Owner’s view, “the claims require sharing ESD charge from one pad with a different I/O pad.” Prelim. Resp. 27. Patent Owner argues that charge sharing is the only way that charging the pad capacitance can reduce a maximum voltage, as recited. Id. at 24–25. Apart from the charge sharing, Patent Owner argues that the recited enable or control circuitry is not located in the circuit where the ESD event occurs. Id. at 27–33. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner disagrees with this interpretation. Id. Petitioner, though, argues that it would have been obvious to duplicate Verhaege’s and Ker’s protection circuits. See, e.g., id. at 18 (discussing claim 1 and Verhaege), 48 (discussing the Verhaege-Miller combination), 66 (discussing claim 1 and Kerr). For example, Petitioner argues that “a POSITA would have been motivated to use the improved protection circuit of Verhaege, apply it at every I/O pad, and share the ESD energy across multiple pad circuits as taught by Miller.” See id. at 48 (emphasis added). From statements like these, Patent Owner draws the conclusion that Petitioner must also be interpreting the claims to require charge sharing. Prelim. Resp. 25–27. For the reasons discussed in Section II.C below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of showing that any claims are unpatentable even under the implied claim construction used in its obviousness rationale. The Board need not expressly construe any claims in reaching that conclusion.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner argues, “It would have been obvious to a POSITA that, because an ESD event could occur at any I/O pad, the Verhaege invention should be repeated at every I/O pad.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 67); id at 30–32 (claim 6); id. at 43 (claim 14). Yet Petitioner acknowledges that “there were many obvious ways to activate multiple circuits during an ESD event.” Id. at 51. The Petition does not sufficiently explain why it would have been obvious to have chosen the way that is claimed. See id. at 18, 30– 32, 43. Rather, Petitioner’s obviousness rationale appears to be based on impermissible hindsight gleaned entirely from the challenged patent’s 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It appears that [the expert] relied on the . . . patent itself as her roadmap for putting what she referred to as pieces of a ‘jigsaw puzzle’ together.”). For this additional reason, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenges to claims 1, 6, and 14.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,564,665 - ROKU, Inc. v. Ecolink Intelligent Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2024 · IPR2023-00792 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Lamb and Williams; claims 1 and 11 are also unpatentable as obvious over Sharma.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In sum, we determine that Mr. McNair has experience in residential security and alarm systems and sixty years of experience in the research, design, development, and engineering of the technology underlying such systems that is sufficient for him to at minimum possess ordinary skill in the art. Id. ¶¶ 6–12. Also, his years of experience at the Security and System Reliability Architecture Group at AT&T Bell labs alone (id. ¶ 10; see also, id. at p. 147) meets the three or more years of commercial design and development experience in security and alarm systems, under Patent Owner’s definition (PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 34)). Thus, on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Bruce McNair lacks knowledge and skill at least of an ordinarily skilled artisan—even under Patent Owner’s definition. See PO Resp. 6. In this decision, we assign Bruce McNair’s testimony the appropriate weight, as discussed in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, in electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two or more years of experience or equivalent study in sensor systems.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 10031 ¶¶ 37–40). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. at 12–13. Patent Owner disagrees and argues, [A person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had at least a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in electrical or electronic engi-neering or an equivalent field, and three or more years of com-mercial design and development experience in residential or business security and alarm systems. 1 Exhibit 1003 is the declaration of Bruce McNair. The differences between the two skill levels does not affect the Board’s analysis of Petitioner’s challenge. In fact, Patent Owner’s addition of experience in “security and alarm systems” only increases the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 6. Our conclusion that Petitioner has shown that all challenged claims are unpatentable is the same under either definition.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Either way, “defining a particular claim term by its function is not improper.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found that there is “nothing improper about defining ‘datalink’ as a link that conveys data.” Id. at 1375. “Many devices take their names from the functions they perform. The examples are innumerable, such as ‘filter,’ ‘brake,’ ‘clamp,’ ‘screwdriver,’ or ‘lock.’” Id. (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the functions recited in claims 1 and 11 limit what the “timed alarm signal” indicates, how it is used as well as its relationship to a timer, alarm, and security panel. If not for a timer associated with the security panel, there is no clear purpose for transmitting the “timed alarm signal” only when the specific determination is made, and that claimed determination would be rendered superfluous. A construction that requires the purpose of initiating a timer associated with the security panel is consistent with rest of the functions and steps recited in claims 1 and 11. Considering the claim as a whole, the other expressly recited functions and steps support our decision to include the signal’s purpose in our construction.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. Petitioner’s obviousness rationale is persuasive and supported by the evidence of record. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Essentially, Lamb assumes that the detected person is authorized. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 37, 40, 58–59, cited in Pet. 17. Williams’s system permits authorized persons to use the space, while retaining security against intruders. Ex. 1010, 2:31–38, cited in Pet. 18. Petitioner persuasively supports the assertion that waiting for an authorization code would enhance system security in Lamb because one of ordinary skill in the art would been motivated “to verify—and not assume— that a potential alarm was triggered by an authorized person.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1010, 2:35–38). We credit Bruce McNair’s testimony on this issue (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–54) because it is supported by the record (Ex. 1010, 2:31–38; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 37, 40, 58–59).” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 10,692,340 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,692,340 - PTAB · Oct 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00714 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Valve would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To show that a claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the challenging party must demonstrate that each and every claim element, arranged as recited in the claim, is found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We consider prior art references “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user.” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 33). Patent Owner also argues that formal education could substitute for practical experience, and vice versa. Id. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’907 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:14–62. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision because it is sufficiently persuasive to meet Petitioner’s “reasonable likelihood” burden at institution. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we disagree with Patent Owner that the term defining in claim 1 requires that the recited position and range information must be user-modifiable. Although claims 8 and 15 (not claim 1) recite a “program comprising instructions for . . . defining position and range information,” nothing in these claims explicitly requires that this program has any interaction with a user. Ex. 1001, 14:24–25, 14:64–65. Also, although the ’907 patent disclosure refers to computer architecture components for rendering a haptic effect within a boundary range, Patent Owner has not pointed to any disclosure in the ’907 patent suggesting that range settings must be user-modifiable. The ’907 patent does refer to “trigger data” that is “based on user input data,” but this trigger data appears to be collected by firmware, suggesting that the user’s involvement in creating trigger data consists of simply pulling or pushing the triggers of the controller. See Ex. 1001, 7:1–6, 8:10–16 (trigger data is “received from [the] controller . . . by peripheral firmware”), 8:58–65 (trigger data is obtained from potentiometers in the controller and sent to peripheral firmware), Fig. 3 (showing “[t]rigger data” 323 as part of peripheral firmware 320). Further, the ’907 patent discloses that the primary and secondary ranges at least “may be fixed or variable.” Ex. 1001, 5:29–30. This suggests that an embodiment in which all the range information is fixed (i.e., unalterable by a user) would be within the scope of the claimed invention. As to Patent Owner’s argument that defining would exclude something that is pre-defined, Patent Owner provides no evidence of this in the ’907 patent, its prosecution history, or extrinsic evidence. We find the proposition that something “pre-defined” is not “defined” illogical, and we” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“To show that a claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the challenging party must demonstrate that each and every claim element, arranged as recited in the claim, is found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We consider prior art references “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,627,907 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,825 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00730 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 4, 5, 10, and 11 were anticipated or obvious over Lee or Zheng.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Petition, to justify institution of review, must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the Petition has not met this standard. Therefore, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“capability to include one or both first CBs and second CBs within any one of the CBGs. Prelim. Resp. 9–10. The plain and ordinary meaning of the CB/CBG limitation, however, does not provide such a requirement. Instead, the plain and ordinary meaning of “each of the multiple CBs is included in any one of the multiple CBGs” simply requires that at least one CBG contain each CB. Although the description in the Specification of the configuration example of Figure 11(c) arguably describes the capacity of a system to include the first and second CBs in any one of CBGs, the Specification’s permissive language does not appear in the challenged claims. That description reads:” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“multiple CB/CBG limitation, we nevertheless find it necessary to construe the limitation. Upon review of the record, we construe the limitation as requiring that at least one CBG includes each of the multiple CBs. The plain meaning of “each of the multiple CBs is included in any one of the multiple CBGs” is that each CB is included in a CBG, which means that at least one CBG includes each of the multiple CBs. Further, the Specification supports construing the limitation to have this plain meaning. Figure 11 of the ’509 patent, shown below, provides a configuration example of CBGs (Ex. 1001, 23:7–8):” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“multiple CB/CBG limitation, we nevertheless find it necessary to construe the limitation. Upon review of the record, we construe the limitation as requiring that at least one CBG includes each of the multiple CBs. The plain meaning of “each of the multiple CBs is included in any one of the multiple CBGs” is that each CB is included in a CBG, which means that at least one CBG includes each of the multiple CBs. Further, the Specification supports construing the limitation to have this plain meaning. Figure 11 of the ’509 patent, shown below, provides a configuration example of CBGs (Ex. 1001, 23:7–8):” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,196,509 - Google LLC v. Safecast Limited LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00652 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–9, and 12–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Plotnick and Parekh; the Board did not reach the Plotnick-only ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that an artisan of “ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or equivalent education or work experience, and at least two years of work or research experience in multimedia systems.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41–45). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “adopt[s] Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’302 Patent as well as the asserted prior art.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the Response. See Reply 1; see generally Response. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. As Patent Owner argues, Petitioner’s proposed art and ’302 patent specification, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the stated amount of experience.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Petitioner persuasively explains further as follows: By the 2000s, the V-chip was known by POSITAs, and even in mainstream media, as a technology that would enable parents to program restrictions in their TVs to block offensive content from being played to their children. [Ex. 1040] ¶226. Thus, the motivation to reduce the risk of minors being exposed to inappropriate content was well-known by POSITAs at the time of the invention. Ex-1040 ¶227. This motivation applied equally, if not even more so, when PVR technology made it possible to record content for time-shifted viewing and thus made it possible to record late night content and for playback during the day. Ex-1040 ¶227. Plotnick itself describes that “the relative appropriateness of the prepared ad schedule may change as circumstances change” and that “[s]uch circumstances may include, but are not limited to, the time of day, program or type of program being watched channel selection, identity of the current viewer, and timing/duration of the upcoming avail.” Ex- 1006 ¶51 (incorporated by reference into Ex-1005 ¶¶2–14, 36, 194); Ex-1040 ¶227. Plotnick thus teaches and provides a motivation to ensure that time-shifted advertisements are appropriate for the time of day that they are played, including considerations based on the identity of the viewer. Id. And a POSITA would have looked to common standards, including local broadcasting regulations, to determine what timing and general public as appropriate. Ex-1040 ¶228. Reply 14–15. As Petitioner shows, Plotnick, viewed through the lens of a person of ordinary skill in the art aware of well-known program restrictions to block offensive TV content from children, teaches restricting time-shifted viewing of inappropriate ads based on the time of day and identity of the viewer in order to comply with local regulations, thereby further suggesting implementing Parekh’s FCC time restrictions. Accordingly, as outlined above, the record supports Petitioner’s showing based on the combined teachings of the references.” slip op. at 35
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board own§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“claims 1 and 12, Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure is “hardware and/or software arranged to perform steps 102, 104, and 112 of FIG. 8 of the ’302 Patent, as described at 6:40–62 and 7:17–27 of the specification.” Pet. 16–17. Tracking the claim language in limitations 1.e.1 and 1.f, Petitioner identifies the recited function of the “control means” as follows: (1) “to read said first field and said clock signal and said rules database”; (2) “to apply said local broadcasting time regulation to each advertisement before said advertisement is shown”; and (3) “to update the second field in the header of said advertisement when said advertisement is again shown during time-shifted viewing.” Id. at 16. However, steps 102, 104, and 112 of Figure 8 represent structure do not clearly link to recited functions (1)–(3) of the control means. First, steps required by claim 1. See Ex. 1008, Fig. 8 (Step 102 describing a “mix of adverts”; step 112 describing “record any key depressions”), 7:17–17 (describing other functionality not required by the claim 1). Second, to the extent the process flow of Figure 8 also represents some algorithmic structure, it is unclear how much of any such structure clearly links to the recited functions of claim 1––as opposed to the unclaimed functionality described in Figure 8. As we did in the Institution Decision, we construe the corresponding structure of the control means as PVR hardware and/or software arranged to perform the recited functions of (1) to read said first field and said clock signal and said rules database; (2) to apply said local broadcasting time regulation to each advertisement before said advertisement is shown; and (3) to update the second field in the header of said advertisement when said advertisement is again shown during time-shifted viewing. See Inst. Dec. 12. It is uncertain whether the specification clearly links specific hardware and/or software to these claimed functions, other than generally disclosing a PVR, which Petitioner also points to as corresponding structure. See Pet. 17 (pointing to the disclosed PVR as performing disclosed steps 102, 104, 112); Ex. 1001, 4:43 (describing “a PVR 60 for use in a system according to the invention” according to Figure 4 (described above)).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“asserting that Plotnick does not teach a first field with “a local broadcasting time,” “the time of day at which said advertisement may be shown,” or similar specific language, limitation 1.c.1 does not require such specificity. PO Resp. 10; Sur-reply 5–6, 18.5 Rather, limitation 1.c.1 recites “a header comprising a first field related to a local broadcasting time regulation,” as Petitioner argues. See Reply 5. Like the claim language, the ’302 patent specification also does not support Patent Owner’s narrow claim construction requiring a specific form of a time of day restriction in the header’s first frame. The specification generally states that “[e]ach advert . . . contains a header . . . which records . . . any restriction on the time of day at which it may be viewed.” Ex. 1001, 3:67–4:24 (emphasis stated). It also generally states that “[t]he time of day 5 The Response at page 10 obliquely slips in what appears to be a claim construction argument in one sentence and the Sur-reply adds pages to expand the argument. Compare Response 10 (possible claim construction argument) and Reply 5–6 (refuting Patent Owner’s argument by relying on “the words of the claims), with Sur-reply 4–6 (expounding on the claim construction argument), 15–19 (similar). regulations.” Id. at 3:14–15 (emphasis added). In any event, even if these embodiments specify a certain form for the time of day information or restriction (they do not), limitation 1.c.1 is broader than these embodiments because it does not require storing a specific form for a time of day restriction or information in the first header frame either directly or by implication. The Sur-reply points to Table 1 of the ’302 specification, but Table 1 lists several items, including a “Field Name” that includes “Warnings,” namely, “Keywords to match against viewing regulations.” See id. at 4:1–22 (Table1, “Fields in advertisement headers”); Sur-reply 5–6 (arguing without support that “claim 1 requires the ‘first field’ to have ‘a local broadcasting time’ of the advertisement which is regulated by the ‘local broadcasting time regulation’), 18 (arguing that (1) “[n]either Parekh nor Plotnick discloses ‘the metadata of an advertisement includes the local broadcasting time regulation,’” and (2) “‘the time of day at which said advertisement may be shown’ is not included in the metadata of the combination of Plotnick and Parekh.”).6 Patent Owner appears to rely on the disclosure of the “Time of Day” Field Name in Table 1 and describes “[c]ode to indicate time of day when advert may be shown.” See Sur-reply 5–6 (reproducing Ex. 1001, Table 1). Again, limitation 1.c.1 is broader than various descriptions of different types of header fields described in the specification, for example, it 6 These two Sur-reply arguments contradict each other by implying the metadata (claimed header first frame) must include both “the local broadcasting time regulation” and “the time of day at which said advertisement must be shown.” In any case, as determined herein, limitation 1.c.1 requires neither.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,392,302 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,392,302
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.