- Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00509 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Throughtek-2012 and the Lorex Video; claims 1–3, 6, 10, 12–14, 17, and 18 are also unpatentable under two other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Bims, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’842 patent would have been a person having a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 15–16). Patent Owner does not provide any proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’842 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving the controversy in this proceeding.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 55; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. §42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS RE47,842 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Innolux Corporation v. Phenix Longhorn LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00044 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition violated Rule 42.104(b)(3) and did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, and 6 were unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) “would have had at least a bachelor of science degree in physics, electrical engineering, or the equivalent thereof and three (3) years of experience in circuit design or display technologies.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). According to Petitioner “[s]uch a POSA would have had knowledge of integrated circuits, gamma correction, and storage of gamma correction voltage values within memory, and would have understood how to search available literature for relevant publications.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. This assessment is consistent with the ’788 Patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“and 5 recites “means for executing.” Ex. 1001, 7:36–40, 8:35–37. The use of the term “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments (Prelim. Resp. 36–39), the Petition does not address the presumption and, more specifically, the Petition does not provide any argument or evidence as to why the presumption is rebutted. Furthermore, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s newly presented argument that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of ‘means for executing a predetermined algorithm . . . ’ connotes a general-purpose processor, which is understood as structure sufficient to perform the function” (Pet. Reply 5), such argument is not persuasive as it is not supported by evidence earlier presented in the Petition or otherwise. Furthermore, even if the plain and ordinary meaning of means for executing a predetermined algorithm were a general-purpose processor, for a computer implemented means-plus-function term the corresponding structure must be the specific algorithm implemented by the processor as argued by Petitioner. Pet. Reply 6.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,557,788 - Google, LLC. v. Escapex IP LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00337 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 based on five § 103 grounds involving Fuloria and Andler with additional references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We, therefore, grant Petitioner’s request to institute inter partes review of the challenged claims on the asserted grounds.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar field and three years of professional computer programming experience, including experience with networked media and databases, where additional education can substitute for experience or vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31). The level of ordinary skill in the art is usually evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, and thus, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “to the extent that [the term “engagement”] requires construction, it should be construed as ‘an indication that a user should be distinguished with respect to the content over another user.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:53–55; Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Based on the record before us, we see no need for express construction of any term for the purposes of this Decision. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstituted
“We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence. Fuloria teaches “a mechanism for user to promote social networking objects to other users.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 1. Fuloria displays a news feed containing social media content items. Id. at code (57), ¶¶ 6, 27. Users in Fuloria may like a piece of content or “for a given price” the user may turn their like into a “super-like.” Id. ¶ 37. “The ‘super-liked’ story is priced and directed toward users in a similar manner as a social ad. In particular embodiments, sponsored story system 304 may also add a weight to the story to alter its direction toward users.” Id. ¶ 39. Petitioner argues that “[t]his functionality represents uncapped engagement . . . because Fuloria places no limitation on how many times a user can super-like a piece of content.” Pet. 24–25. Dr. Bederson supports Petitioner by noting that Fuloria does not “place any limitation on how many credits a user can spend to increase the reach of the content.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 76. Further, Dr. Bederson states that “[m]ultiple different users can also promote the same content item. By allowing users to promote or ‘super-like’ content which also increases engagement with that content by other users, Fuloria’s system also facilitat[es] uncapped engagement with that content.” Id. ¶77. We find these arguments to be persuasive. The ’687 patent states that “[s]o long as the user has sufficient resources, the user may promote herself or others with uncapped (i.e., unlimited) engagements, which may facilitate getting noticed by other users, whether with respect to a social media content item.” Ex. 1001, 2:6–10. Similarly, Fuloria allows users to expend their resources and to have the super-like displayed according to the amount paid for the super-like. Ex. 1004 ¶ 57 (“In particular embodiments, the advertisement system adjusts the display of the ‘super-liked’ story based upon social factors as well as the real-world value of the credits paid.”); see also id. ¶ 38 (“[T]he social networking system may deduct the credits based on a cost per impression (CPM), effective cost per impression (eCPM), cost per click (CPC), or cost per action (CPA) pricing model”). Fuloria teaches likes from any number of users which is argued to disclose the multiple users recited in the claim. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 82 (discussing Fuloria’s display of engagement by a user and pointing out that Figure 9A shows 1,884 likes); see also id. ¶ 87 (“Fuloria teaches that ‘super-likes’ are available to users in general (and thus to first, second, third, etc. users).”). As to the number of engagements displayed by the first, second, and” slip op. at 16
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,474,687 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01463 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“predict how the district court in the related district court litigation will proceed because the court may determine whether or not to stay any individual case . . . based on a variety of circumstances and facts beyond our control and to which the Board is not privy.” Sand Revolution II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp., IPR2019-01393, Paper 24, 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative). We decline to speculate on how the court may rule on the pending motion to stay. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. We decline to deny the Petition on a discretionary basis as requested by Patent Owner. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–10 of the ’706 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra are result effective variables and that copper foils having ΔPD, TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra values that meet the values recited in claim 1 have advantageous properties. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 45 (Kim ’761, disclosing that preferably the “difference in peak count roughness Rpc between the shiny surface . . . and the matte surface . . . of the electrolytic copper foil . . . is preferably 60 or less” because “when the difference in the peak count roughness Rpc exceeds 60 capacity maintenance of the secondary battery is deteriorated.”);15 Ex. 1007, 3:16–23, 4:14–23 (Cheng, disclosing that the foils of Cheng’s invention have (220) and (311) surfaces that provide increased elongation and that solve a high roughness problem that rendered traditional products unsuitable for use in a lithium ion secondary battery), 10:27–34 (Cheng, disclosing that in the foils of Cheng’s invention “the roughness difference between both sides was extremely small” and thus “it was . . . not easy for the electrolytic copper foil to break or fracture during the charging-discharging cycles and the life of a battery is thus increased”), Tables 3 & 4 (Cheng, disclosing embodiments and comparative examples with TC(220) values meeting the requirements of claim 1); Ex. 1008, 6:36–44 (Wolski, disclosing that “the surface roughness Rz at the matte side of the untreated copper foil of the present invention is the same or smaller than the surface roughness Rz at the shiny side . . . so that the surface treated copper foil . . . becomes more low-profiled . . . whereby it becomes a foil having a large etching factor”), 9:1–29 & Table 2 (Wolski, disclosing 15 Dr. Randall testifies that “Kim ’761’s peak count roughness Rpc corresponds to the peak density PD of the ’706 patent.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 52. At this stage in the proceeding, this testimony is unrebutted. 38 embodiments meeting the ΔRz/Ra of claim 1, describing them as having “matte side roughnesses” that are “sufficiently small,” and as having “excellent” “high temperature elongation characteristics”), 11:37–41 (Wolski, describing comparative examples as having “large” matte side roughnesses “whereby etching factors are not good”), 12:12–27 (Wolski, teaching that “as compared with a conventional untreated copper foil, both surfaces of the untreated copper foil obtained by [Wolski’s] invention are flat” resulting in a low profile foil that has “excellent elongations at room temperature and high temperature and also high tensile strength”). The teachings in the prior art support the presently unrebutted testimony of Dr. Randall explaining why the POSA would have been motivated to modify Kim ’761’s copper foil to have the claimed TC(220) and ΔRz/Ra. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68, 71–74; Pfizer Inc., v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 94 F.4th 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Where [a gap in prior art] includes a parameter not necessarily disclosed in the prior art, it is not improper to consider whether or not it would have been recognized as result-effective. If so, then the optimization of that parameter is ‘normally obvious.’”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner failed to articulate a sufficient motivation to combine the references. To the contrary, the preliminary record presents a strong showing that the POSA would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner described in the Petition.” slip op. at 38
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’706 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,591,706 - Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01462 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“experience working on the development of materials or components for electronic devices such as batteries.” Pet. 2. Petitioner further contends that “[a]dditional education, such as a graduate degree, could compensate for less work experience, and additional work experience could compensate for less formal education.” Id. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’014 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). in this proceeding.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe any term in order to determine that institution should be denied.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Hanafusa in light of Dobashi with a reasonable expectation of success as Petitioner contends. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that the subject matter of claim 1, and claims 4 and 8 that depend therefrom, would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Hanafusa and Dobashi.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner also focuses on Hanafusa’s teaching that all known methods can be used to make a rough surface low-profile, and Dobashi’s teaching that RSm can be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface, to support its contention that a POSITA would have been motivated to apply Dobashi’s RSm to further achieve Hanafusa’s purpose, without explaining how and why that would be the case. In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz adequately explain why a POSITA looking for ways to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile would look to methods to achieve as the period of waviness, RSm can also be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface.” Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1, 6:23–26. Dobashi explains that waviness is “an indicator for determining whether the fine pattern forming performance is good or bad,” and “[t]he surface has small waviness and is smooth when RSm is large, and the surface has large waviness and is rough when RSm is small.” Id. at 3:1–3, 6:27–29. Dobashi also teaches that surface roughness Rzjis is used as a low-profile indicator. Ex. 1005, 2:66– 3:1. Dobashi, therefore, teaches that RSm is an indicator of surface waviness, which Dobashi explains is different than surface roughness. Id. at 2:66–3:3, 6:23–29. Given these teachings in Dobashi, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz sufficiently explains how or why a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Dobashi’s RSm values to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile. See Pet. 10–12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–52.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,346,014 - Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01461 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–10 were unpatentable over either asserted § 103 ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in materials science, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, or related field, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with at least two years of experience working on the development of materials or components for electronic devices such as batteries.” Pet. 4. Petitioner further contends that “[a]dditional education, such as a graduate degree, could compensate for less 7 We refer to the page numbers added by Petitioner to the bottom-center of the page. formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 10). Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’689 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We are not persuaded, on this record, that Petitioner adequately establishes that Khatibi discloses a CTE in the claimed range of 16 to 22 µm/(m·°C.). Petitioner’s argument that Khatibi’s reported values meet this claim limitation are based solely on Dr. Randall’s testimony that Khatibi’s measurement method would produce results that would not significantly differ from results determined using the claimed method. See Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56–60). Dr. Randall’s testimony, however, is largely conclusory and unsupported by adequate explanation and/or objective evidence. For example, Dr. Randall does not provide adequate explanation or objective evidence to support his opinion that Khatibi’s use of a laser speckle based dilatometer instead of the claimed thermomechanical analyzer “is unlikely to significantly impact the CTE value” because “variations in equipment and a heating speed of 5° C/min would not significantly alter the results.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 58. In particular, Dr. Randall neither explains what constitutes a “significant” impact on CTE, nor provides objective evidence to support his contention that equipment variations and heating differences would not “significantly alter” the resulting measurements. And although Dr. Randall opines that “the heating rate (5°C per minute) is typical for certain devices” such as a thermomechanical analyzer or dilatometer, and “[t]ypically, these devices use temperature ramp rates between 2°C and 20°C per minutes, so the ‘5° C./min’ recited in [1d] is common and should not drastically affect the measurement results,” Dr. Randall fails to point us to any evidence showing that these temperatures are “typical” or that the claimed heating rate is “common.” Id. ¶ 59 (emphases added). to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 12 at 5 (PTAB Feb. 10, 2023) (finding that “the Board was correct in giving little weight to Petitioner’s expert because the expert declaration merely offered conclusory assertions without underlying factual support”); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.” (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins and Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985))); see also In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding that the Board properly gave “little weight” to conclusory expert testimony of objective indicia). Because Petitioner offers Dr. Randall’s testimony to supply a limitation missing from the prior art, namely, the CTE measurement method, and we give Dr. Randall’s unsupported and conclusory testimony little weight, we are not persuaded that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of showing that Khatibi discloses limitation [1d].” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“second surfaces of the electrolytic copper foil ranges from 3 to 92.” Ex. 1001, 13:62–63. Petitioner contends that “Kim teaches that the electrolytic copper foil (e.g., untreated or treated copper foil) having Rz less than 2 µm is advantageous toward battery efficiency and performance,” and, similarly, Griesi describes the use of untreated electrolytic copper foil with an Rz value less than 2 µm in printed circuit boards that are compatible with secondary batteries. Pet. 58–59 (citing Ex. 1012, claim 2, ¶¶ 13, 25, 27; Ex. 1003 ¶ 157). In particular, Petitioner notes that Griesi’s Figure 3.16 describes an “Rz value of 1.2 µm.” Id. at 59 (citing Ex. 1015, 53–54; Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). Petitioner asserts that “Dr. Randall explains that a POSITA would have also recognized another surface roughness-related parameter, Rpc, in Griesi as a potentially useful parameter that can be optimized to further enhance uniformity or generally improve Kim’s copper foil surface, for example, to prevent wrinkles or achieve other advantageous effects.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 159). Although Dr. Randall demonstrates that Griesi’s Pc (or Rpc) value is 19.2 over a 4 mm sampling length (Ex. 1003 ¶ 155), Petitioner does not contend that Griesi addresses this value, or indicates any benefit that might be derived from its use. Instead, Griesi’s Pc value appears to be an incidental finding, which is not discussed or analyzed in the reference. See incidental, unexamined finding would lead a POSITA to import Griesi’s Pc value into Kim’s copper foil, absent a hindsight desire to reconstruct the claimed invention. As such, Petitioner’s arguments with respect to Kim and Griesi are not persuasive. See Cheese Sys. Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Obviousness cannot be based on the hindsight combination of components selectively culled from the prior art to fit the parameters of the patented invention.” (internal quotations marks omitted)). Thus, we are not persuaded, on this record, that the combined disclosures of Kim and Griesi teach all of the elements of limitation [1g].” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,811,689 - Solus Advanced Materials Co, Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01460 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–11 because the Fintiv factors, including the early trial date and close merits case, favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review. A. Real Parties-in-Interest” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Board’s projected statutory deadline to issue a final written decision. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. “If the court’s trial date is at or around the same time as the projected statutory deadline . . . the decision whether to institute will likely implicate other factors.” Id. Conversely, “[i]f the court’s trial date is earlier than the projected statutory deadline,” this has generally weighed “in favor of exercising authority to deny institution.” Id.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art and arguments were before the Examiner during prosecution and Petitioner’s has not demonstrated that the Examiner erred in a material manner when allowing the claims. Pet. 17–18. Given our discretionary denial of the Petition in view of the Fintiv factors, we do not address Petitioner’s further arguments with respect to § 325(d).” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s recited level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan for purposes of this decision as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,480,090 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd. / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2023-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 were not shown unpatentable under any of five § 103 grounds because Petitioner failed to establish sufficient motivation to modify or combine the prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“A petition must identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) Here, Petitioner merely provides general assertions about multiple references, without clearly identifying how, or why a POSITA would have been motivated, to modify the processes disclosed in those references to arrive at the claimed invention. Thus, the Petition does not state with particularity that Saxler’s particular technique for etching is to be used instead of Beach’s etching step when substituting Beach’s self-aligned process for Saxler’s two mask process. Nor does the Petitioner provide a sufficient reason, absent hindsight, why a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the references to result in a process that forms Saxler’s Modified Figure 1A. Thus, for these additional reasons, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Saxler, Beach, and Shenoy.” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Both parties agree that the differences between the definitions do not impact the analysis. Resp. 11; Reply 2. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’347 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’347 patent and the prior art. We also note that our Decision would be the same under either parties’ definition.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyOther
“Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Shealy states that he understands paragraph 52 to mean that it is “fair game to pull the recess out of any of those figures [Figures 1A through 6].” Ex. 2004, 39:12–21. Dr. Shealy, however, also clarifies that “[a]s I said before, I think you could take all the embodiments and bring in which ones you want, depending on what you’re trying to accomplish.” Ex. 2004, 40:24–41:1. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that Dr. Shealy’s “statement to modify the reference depending on what you're trying to accomplish” means that “a POSITA may modify with reason to do so. A POSITA would have removed Saxler’s recess to obtain the benefits of enhancement-mode.” Tr. 19:19–25. Again, the Petition does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have removed Saxler’s gate recess.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“remove the recess in Saxler Figure 1A to arrive at the allegedly enhancement mode transistor of Modified Figure 1A. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions in its Reply and at the hearing, the Petition makes no argument that a POSITA would have removed the recess from Saxler Figure 1A to realize the benefits of an enhancement mode transistor. See Reply 4–5; Pet. 24–68. Rather, the Petition merely asserts that a POSITA would have understood that the gate recess of Figure 1A is optional without providing any persuasive reason why a POSITA would have removed the gate recess but retained the sloped sidewalls of Figure 1A. Pet. 25, 40, 45. For example, Petitioner asserts that Saxler’s gate contact may be “recessed or non-recessed” and that when the gate recess shown in Figure 1A is not utilized, Saxler would have the structure of Saxler Modified Figure 1A. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1007 ¶ 52, 66); see also Pet. 40, 45 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 52). Neither of these paragraphs provide sufficient motivation to a POSITA to remove the gate recess from Saxler Figure 1A. Saxler paragraph 52 states: Exemplary devices according to some embodiments of the present invention are schematically illustrated in FIGS. 1A through 6. Thus, while embodiments of the present invention are described herein with reference to a recessed gate structure or a non-recessed gate structure, other embodiments of the present invention may include or not include a gate recess. Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention should not be construed as limited to the particular exemplary embodiments described herein but may include any suitable structure having a cap layer and/or passivation layer as described herein. Ex. 1007 ¶ 52. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Shealy states that he understands paragraph 52 to mean that it is “fair game to pull the recess out of any of those figures [Figures 1A through 6].” Ex. 2004, 39:12–21. Dr. Shealy, however, also clarifies that “[a]s I said before, I think you could take all the embodiments and bring in which ones you want, depending on what you’re trying to accomplish.” Ex. 2004, 40:24–41:1. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that Dr. Shealy’s “statement to modify the reference depending on what you're trying to accomplish” means that “a POSITA may modify with reason to do so. A POSITA would have removed Saxler’s recess to obtain the benefits of enhancement-mode.” Tr. 19:19–25. Again, the Petition does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have removed Saxler’s gate recess.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 9,748,347 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,748,347 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd. / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2023-01384 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Yoshida and Saxler; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“In light of the record before us, we determine that we do not need to reach a specific finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we declined to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the “side surfaces” limitation and determined that it was not necessary to further construe this term because “[t]he parties do not dispute that the language ‘side surfaces extending horizontally’ encompasses a gate material with sloped side surfaces as depicted in Figure 5 of the ’335 patent.” Inst. Dec. 11–16 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We invited the parties to address this limitation further during the course of this trial, but neither party provided additional evidence or argument regarding the “side surfaces” limitation. Inst. Dec. 16; see generally PO Resp.; Reply; Sur-reply. Accordingly, we maintain our determination from the Institution Decision that we do not need to construe the “side surfaces” limitation. Inst. Dec. 15– 16.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“This evidence, particularly the language in the ’335 patent itself, undermines Patent Owner’s argument that “[t]he process for forming gate ledges using separate masks instead of the self-aligned process disclosed in the ’335 patent cannot produce ledges that are ‘substantially symmetric.’” PO Resp. 39 (emphasis added); see also PO Resp. 42–43 (arguing that a gate structure with ledges having substantially equal widths is “not achievable” without using a single photo-mask process). We have considered the evidence presented by Patent Owner and Dr. Schubert in support of Patent Owner’s arguments. PO Resp. 38–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 49–51. We, however, are unable to discern sufficient evidence supporting a conclusion that using separate masks cannot produce ledges that are substantially symmetric, particularly when the ’335 patent suggests otherwise. See Ex. 1001, 4:60– 63 (referring only to the “possibility of misalignment”). Even if, as Patent Owner and Dr. Schubert contend, misalignment “naturally” occurs when using a two-mask process, that does not foreclose the possibility that the” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“It is well settled that “[a] reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, “teaching that a composition may be optimal or standard does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,312,335 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,312,335 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd. / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01383 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not sufficiently establish a reason to modify the asserted prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s argument because it fails to address Dr. Schubert’s academic and other experience with GaN transistors. Dr. Schubert is currently a tenured full professor in the Department of Electrical Computer, and Systems Engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and was previously a tenured full professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Boston University. Ex. 2001, 129. Additionally, Dr. Schubert was the director of Boston University’s Semiconductor Devices Research Laboratory. Ex. 2001, 129. Dr. Schubert persuasively explains that his general expertise is in the field of electrical engineering and applied physics, including semiconductors, processing, and devices and his specific expertise is in the field of semiconductor materials (such as GaN), semiconductor devices, semiconductor integrated circuits, ohmic contacts, Schottky contacts, HEMTs, and optoelectronic devices such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs). Ex. 2001 ¶ 11, App’x A pp.129–137. His experience includes “the design, growth, fabrication, and testing of semiconductor devices as well as the employment of these devices in a variety of applications” and he is “familiar with both the design of such transistors [HEMTs] and the manufacturing processes used for FETs. Ex. 2001 ¶ 11, App’x A, pp. 129–137. He is an author or co-author of numerous text books and articles, and co-inventor of numerous patents, including those dealing with HEMT transistors and GaN devices. Ex. 2001 ¶ 13, App’x A, pp. 129–137. Petitioner fails to present any persuasive argument or evidence that Dr. Schubert’s extensive education and experience regarding GaN transistors is insufficient or lacking such that his testimony should be given little weight. Finally, we disagree with Petitioner’s additional argument that that its expert’s testimony (Dr. Shealy) should be given more weight than Patent Owner’s expert’s testimony (Dr. Schubert) because “[u]nlike Dr. Schubert, Dr. Shealy is one of the pioneer scientists in the field of GaN transistors.” Reply 34 (stating that Dr. Shealy’s research lab built the first GaN HEMT device on silicon in 1999 and citing Ex. 2002, 87:19–238). Obviousness is determined through the lens of a “person of ordinary skill in the art,” not through the lens of a person with extraordinary skill or a pioneer in the field. Given Dr. Schubert’s extensive relevant education and experience, Petitioner does not persuasively explain why Dr. Shealy’s testimony on any specific topic, or his testimony in general, should be given more weight than Dr. Schubert’s.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes abbreviated herein as “POSITA”). Graham, , 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioner argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex 1003 ¶ 69). Patent Owner did not dispute this proposed definition prior to institution. See generally Prelim. Resp. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. After institution, Patent Owner asserted a slightly different definition of a POSITA, namely someone who “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, physics, material science, or a closely related field, and three years of professional work experience in the epitaxial growth, design, and fabrication of semiconductor electronic devices, including those of GaN.” Resp. 17. Relevant graduate education could substitute for the professional work experience. Id. Upon review of the full record, we see no reason to modify, and we thus maintain, the definition of a POSITA applied in our Decision on Institution. We also determine that our decision would be the same under either of the parties’ proposed definitions.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“During the proceeding, the parties also dispute the proper construction of “etching away the doped GaN layer, except a portion of the doped GaN layer beneath the gate contact” as recited in step [1e4] and provided briefing on this issue. Papers 35, 36, 37, 38. Because, as explained below, our determination rests upon Petitioner’s failure to show a sufficient reason to modify the asserted art, which is not dependent upon any particular claim construction, we need not, and do not, address these claim construction issues. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 13
- ExcludeDenied
“III. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT 2008 Petitioner filed a Motion to Exclude (Paper 25, “Mot.”) Exhibit 2008, which is a hearing transcript from the parallel ITC investigation. Mot. 1. Because we do not rely upon Exhibit 2008 in our Decision, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion as moot.” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 8,404,508 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,404,508
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.