• Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00398 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 over Kalliola and Vauclair; claims 2, 3, and 6 with Kalayjian; claim 5 with Turunen; and claim 9 with Trimble.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner agrees with the qualifications proposed by Petitioner: “this description reasonably represents the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 Patent, as well as the prior art cited in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 22). For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’680 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that, based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction in the parallel litigation, we construe “pairing signal” as “[p]rocessor signal to initiate a wireless device pairing sequence.” Pet. 6 (quoting Ex. 1009, 15–168). In Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s interpretation of this term. PO Resp. 14. We adopt the parties’ proposed construction for this term. We determine that we need not construe any other claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Second, Petitioner demonstrates that the combination of Kalliola and Vauclair teaches claim limitations 1(d)(iv) and 1(d)(v). As discussed and cited to above, the Petition identifies that, with Kalliola’s touch screen as the claimed “touch screen,” Kalliola’s processor presents a graphical user interface via its touch screen as set forth for limitation 1(c) and 1(d)(ii), and Kalliola’s processor operates in conjunction with its graphical user interface to perform claimed steps as set forth for limitation 1(d)(iii). See Pet. 20–29. We agree that the assertions are supported by Kalliola’s disclosure of a touch screen with a graphical user interface presented thereon, where “tactile elements” “allow the user . . . to enter data . . . into the device.” See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26, 40, 42, 44, 51, 71, Figs. 3, 5. Petitioner also asserts, and we agree, that Kalliola teaches the use of Bluetooth-enabled emitters in remote devices that communicate with its wireless communication device with a signal emitter. Pet. 29–31 (citing Ex. 104 ¶¶ 9, 71, 73–75, 77, 107, Fig. 5). Petitioner contends, and we agree, that Vauclair provides additional specificity regarding the pairing process between two devices with its disclosures of a pairing process between devices using protocols that include Bluetooth, wherein a user can select a pairing option from a menu on a display. Id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 22, 24, 28, 30, 34–36, 49, Fig. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 164–167). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to configure Kalliola to use its processor to present “a pairing menu to enable a user to initiate a Bluetooth pairing process between the WCD and the signal emitter by selecting a pairing option via the WCD’s touchscreen,” with Vauclair teaching at least the selection of a pairing option presented on its display, because the presented pairing menu on Kalliola’s touch screen would allow the user to pair the WCD with the user’s personal item signal emitters and would also allow the devices to recognize each other on subsequent connections. Id. at 34–35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 172); see also Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 30, 36. Consequently, we also agree with Petitioner’s assertion that it would have been obvious to a person of skill of ordinary skill in the art that Kalliola’s graphical user interface on its touch screen would have generated signals corresponding to the user’s inputs at least to carry out designated functions, like the initiation of a pairing process, and “the signals generated by the GUI from interaction at the touchscreen would be sent to the WCD’s processor so that the processor can interpret the user’s inputs and take the appropriate action.” Pet. 35; see also Pet. Reply 2–7. Petitioner also asserts, and we agree, that generating processor signals in response to a user indication was a known mechanism for wireless devices, as were Bluetooth pairing and corresponding pairing menus, and there would be no change to the respective functions of Kalliola’s’ wireless communication devices and Vauclair’s pairing menu. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 175). The Petition argues, and we agree, that because Bluetooth pairing and pairing menus were conventional prior to time of the invention, there would have been a reasonable expectation of success configuring Kalliola’s wireless communication device. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 176); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–75 (Dr. Buehrer providing evidence on Bluetooth-connected devices and associated pairing). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence of rationale to combine Kalliola and Vauclair, a reasonable likelihood of success in the combination, and that the prior art teaches limitation 1(d)(iv). As to limitation 1(d)(v), we also agree with Petitioner that in response to a generation of a pairing signal as discussed in limitation 1(d)(iv), Vauclair discloses that wireless transceivers communicate a series of RF signals back and forth to pair the devices. Pet. 37–38. Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that, in combination, it would have been obvious to configure Kalliola’s Bluetooth transceiver with Vauclair’s teachings for the communication of RF signals to pair devices. Id. at 39. Petitioner contends, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Kalliola teaches that its wireless communication device performs Bluetooth communications with signal emitters, with the user selecting a desired signal emitter for locating objects, and that this pairing would also allow two Bluetooth devices to recognize each other on subsequent connections. Id. (Ex. 1003 ¶ 184). Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that applying Vauclair’s known technique of communicating RF signals to pair devices would improve Kalliola’s wireless communication device and yield the predictable result of Bluetooth-paired devices. Id. We also agree with Petitioner’s argument that this pairing was an understood and conventional feature of Bluetooth mobile communication devices, so there was a reasonable expectation of success in the combination. Id. at 40 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 186); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–72 (Dr. Buehrer providing evidence on Bluetooth-connected devices). Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence of rationale to combine Kalliola and Vauclair, reasonable likelihood of success in the combination, and that the prior art teaches limitation 1(d)(v).” slip op. at 40

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1003 ¶ 172. The Petition also asserts that, in the combination, there would be no change to the respective functions of either Kalliola’s WCD or Vauclair’s pairing menu. Pet. 36. Thus, the Petition relies on Kalliola’s processor, and its touchscreen, and graphical user interface with Vauclair’s teachings for the pairing menu displayed, wherein pairing signals are generated by Kalliola’s graphical user interface by interaction with the screen. As we discuss further below, Petitioner includes assertions that Vauclair itself teaches that the pairing signal is generated by its graphical user interface. See id. at 33, 37. The Petition, however, also relies on the combination of Kalliola and Vauclair to teach generating a pairing signal by Kalliola’s graphical user interface by interaction with its screen, as discussed above. Id. at 35. Accordingly, it is not necessary to reach the issue of whether Vauclair alone teaches that its graphical user interface generates the pairing signal. Additionally, we do not find that Petitioner’s further arguments in its Reply concerning interaction with Kalliola’s wireless communication device through its graphical user interface were impermissibly presented in view of the Petition’s specific assertions on the teachings of the combination of Kalliola and Vauclair, as discussed above, and its reliance on user interaction with Kalliola’s graphical user interface for the teaching of generating the pairing signal. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 11,265,680 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,265,680
• Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00399 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 11–14 over Kalliola, Turunen, Oswald, Vauclair, and Kalayjian; claims 15–18 with Thorn; and claim 19 with Thorn and Sharp.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar technical field and 2-4 years of experience with wireless ranging and positioning systems, wireless communication devices, and associated computer programming.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). “Patent Owner agrees that this description reasonably represents the level of ordinary skill required to understand and implement the teachings of the ’246 Patent, as well as the prior art cited in the Petition.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 22). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “device.” This term appears twice in claim 11, once in the phrase “an orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device,” and once in the phrase “rotation of the mobile communication device detected by the orientation sensor.” Ex. 1001, 39:13–14, 39:36–38. Patent Owner argues that we should construe this term as limited to “detecting the rotation of the mobile communication device as a whole, not the movement of individual components.” PO Resp. 15–18. Petitioner disputes this, arguing that “rotation of the mobile communication device” should be construed not only to cover rotation of the device as a whole but also should “encompass[] any rotation of the mobile communication device relative to any object, including itself,” which would extend to rotation of “any component of the device.” Reply 4–5. We need not resolve this dispute to determine the outcome of Petitioner’s asserted challenges to the ’246 patent. As discussed more fully below, under either party’s proposed construction of “rotation of the mobile communication device,” Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “On the record developed during trial, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Kalliola teaches “an orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device,” where “rotation of the mobile communication device” includes rotation of the device as a whole, regardless of whether it also includes rotation of one portion of the device relative to another. Kalliola teaches “motion sensors integrated in WCD 100” that are “used to detect when WCD 100 is being moved,” as well as to detect “when user 110 moves WCD 100 too quickly for an accurate DoA estimation.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 84, 86. Although Patent Owner argues that Kalliola’s motion sensors do not detect rotation of the device, this is incorrect on the record as developed at trial. Kalliola teaches that the motion sensor may take “the form of a semiconductor gyroscope chip.” Id. ¶ 84. There is ample evidence that gyroscopes detect rotation. Ex. 1013, 38 (identifying as an “orientation sensor” a “[t]hree-axis gyro” and a “[d]ynamic [h]igh [r]ange [gyro]”); Ex. 1046, 49:18–20 (Dr. Feuerstein testifying that gyroscopes “can be used to detect angular velocity”); Ex. 1047 ¶ 47 (citing Ex. 1051, 170; Ex. 1053, 9) (Dr. Buehrer testifying that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that gyroscopes are well-known inertial sensors that specifically detect rotational motion”). Thus, by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner has shown that Kalliola teaches the “orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device” of this limitation.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “whether Kalliola’s teaching of pausing and resuming its DoA estimation based on detected rotational motion, or Kalliola’s teaching of speeding up its DoA estimation based on detected rotational motion, amounts to determining direction based on rotation. Pet. 63–64; PO Resp. 25–27; Reply 24–27; Sur-Reply 11–14. On the record developed during trial, we are persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Kalliola teaches determining direction based on rotation. First, Kalliola discloses “pausing a DoA estimation until the motion of the WCD is detected by the motion sensors,” then resuming “the updating of the DoA estimation” when motion is detected. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 84. Second, Kalliola discloses a “correction or compensation mode” that is “employed when user 110 moves WCD 100 too quickly for an accurate DoA estimation,” with this “increase[d] speed of the DoA estimation” being triggered by the “[i]ncreased activity detected by motion sensors in WCD 100.” Id. ¶ 86. As discussed above with respect to limitation 11(d), the detected motion that triggers either of these modes can be rotational motion of the WCD detected by a gyroscope.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,350,246 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,350,246
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Boyer.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “approximately two weeks before the statutory deadline for a final written decision, but the most recent median time-to-trial statistics for Judge Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas indicate that the actual trial date will likely be in July 2026, which is later than the statutory deadline to issue a final written decision in this proceeding in mid-June 2026. See Ex. 2001, 7 (median time from filing to trial of 23.2 months); Prelim. Resp. 10. Thus, we find this factor is neutral or weighs slightly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’713 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “We note that, as discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’713 patent without expressly construing the term “from multiple print heads or deposition lines.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As for Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner has failed to carry its burden to identify how the claims are to be construed, we disagree on the present record. Although Petitioner does not provide a preferred construction for the single term it proposes requires construction, Petitioner does identify which of its two alternative constructions applies to each of its asserted grounds of unpatentability. Pet. 6 (“Under the first construction, [the obviousness grounds] are applicable, and [the anticipation ground] would be excluded from the claim scope. Under the alternative construction, all of [the asserted grounds] are applicable.”). In our view, this approach does not fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden under 37 U.S.C. § 42.104(b)(3).” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00311 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 3–11, and 17–22 on all asserted grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 1 over Mazumder and Mori.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “based on Petitioner’s first stipulation filed on December 18, 2024.15 Prelim. Resp. 13–15. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s updated second stipulation filed on April 8, 2025. This updated second stipulation mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of any potentially conflicting decisions. See Sand at 12. We therefore find that this factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. See id., n.5. 5. Whether Petitioner and the Defendant in the Parallel Proceeding are the Same Party Whereas Petitioner does not address factor 5, Patent Owner argues that the parties to this proceeding are both in the related district court litigation. Pet. 98–99; Prelim. Resp. 15. While it is common in IPR proceedings for the petitioner and patent owner to also be parties in a related district court proceeding, this factor weighs slightly in favor of discretionary denial. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 13–14.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “c) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Mazumder and Mori. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review with respect to all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 5. Claims 3, 5–7, 9, 10, and 19–22 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’324 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. See Prelim. Resp. 28–46. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “reference must be analogous art to the claimed invention. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For a reference to be analogous art, it must be “either in the field of the applicant's endeavor or [be] reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor was concerned.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). “A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor's endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “Mazumder because “the presentation of both image types would have beneficially aided the remote user to more easily visually compare the actual image and virtual image to quickly identify any defects or problems with the fabrication process.” Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 113). Patent Owner argues that “it is hindsight to use ‘the invention to define the problem the invention solves.’” Prelim. Resp. 43 (quoting Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012); citing AT&T Services Inc. et. al. v. Innovative Sonic Ltd., IPR2024-001143 (PTAB Feb. 11, 2025)). According to Patent Owner, because neither Mazumder nor Mori teaches visual comparison of image types, the idea to improve the Mazumder-Mori combination by simultaneously displaying different image types and thus permitting visual comparison must be driven by hindsight. Id. at 44–45. But Petitioner cites evidence other than the ’324 patent to support the person of ordinary skill in the art having a desire to visually compare the different images presented in the Mazumder-Mori combination. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 113). Specifically, Dr. Wolfe testifies that “the presentation of the actual images captured by the camera and the virtual images simultaneously within the user interface would have beneficially aided the remote user to more easily visually compare the actual image and virtual image to quickly identify any defects or problems with the fabrication process” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized this. Ex. 1003 ¶ 113. Thus, Petitioner has shown sufficiently for the purpose of the present decision that Mori teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claim 1. We encourage the parties to develop the arguments and the record surrounding this issue further during the trial.” slip op. at 26

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,562,324
• Njoy, LLC / Njoy Holdings, Inc. v. Juul Labs, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00231 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 14–16, 18, 27–29, 31, and 32 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish the claimed airflow path or a reason to make the proposed combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of skill are similar and differ in that Petitioner’s relevant degrees and corresponding two years of experience additionally includes “industrial design” and “product design” and familiarity with “electrically powered vaporizing articles, their components or the underlying technologies” where Patent Owner requires two years of experience “designing electro-mechanical consumer products or an advanced degree.” Compare Pet. 7, with PO Resp. 2. Patent Owner alleges that “Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability under either standard,” indicating that the level of skill in the art is not a dispositive issue. PO Resp. 3. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’123 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’123 patent and the prior art. We note that the outcome of this Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “In this case, Mr. McAlexander meets both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art. As a result, we are persuaded Mr. McAlexander has the requisite skill and relevant expertise to offer testimony in this matter. For example, Mr. McAlexander has a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and far more than 2 years of experience in the electrical engineering field. Ex. 1027, 3–6, 7. In addition, Mr. McAlexander has provided expert consulting services in a wide range of technology areas involving the process and design of electro-mechanical consumer products. Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Through one of Mr. McAlexander’s business ventures, his laboratory has “performed detailed airflow analyses, designing and constructing specialized apparatuses to emulate human breath, allowing for precise activation testing of ENDS devices.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 16. That said, a declarant’s expertise, even clothed as a skilled artisan, does not entitle a naked opinion persuasive weight. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, Patent Owner had the opportunity to, and in fact did, thoroughly cross examine Mr. McAlexander about the purported deficiencies in his testimony. See, e.g., Exs. 2052, 2054; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Vigorous cross examination [and] presentation of contrary evidence . . . are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). Therefore, to the extent Patent Owner credibly identifies deficiencies in Mr. McAlexander’s testimony or that testimony lacks factual support or is based on broad, conclusory assertions, we will assign appropriate weight. See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that it is within the Board’s discretion, as the trier of fact, to accord appropriate weight to the evidence presented).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends that the parties proposed a construction for “pressure valve,” a limitation appearing in claims 18 and 31, during the ITC investigation. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 41:58–65). Patent Owner contends that the terms of the ’123 patent should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. PO Resp. 4. Because resolution of the issues presented in this case do not require construction of the term “pressure valve,” we do not expressly construe this claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. To anticipate a claim, a reference “must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369. “The requirement that the prior art elements themselves be arranged as in the claim means that the claims cannot be treated . . . as mere catalogs of separate parts, in disregard of the part-to-part relationships set forth in the claims.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Indeed, the prior art reference “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “[D]ifferences between the prior art reference and the claimed invention, however slight, invoke the question of obviousness, not anticipation.” Id.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,130,123 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,130,123
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00065 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–44 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the Petition’s strong merits.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “stipulation would only eliminate the District Court’s consideration of Haddad204. Despite the stipulation, the District Court would still have to consider invalidity of every claim the Petition addresses and would still have to consider the Alie, Baggenstoss, and Park references. Cf. Stellar at 4 (“Petitioner’s invalidity arguments in the district court are more expansive and include combinations of the prior art asserted in these proceedings with unpublished system prior art, which Petitioner’s stipulation is not likely to moot.”). In other words, “Petitioner’s stipulation does not ensure that [this proceeding] would be a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Id. at 3–4. Because of the remaining overlap between the Petition and the District Court proceeding, Fintiv factor four weighs strongly in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther

    “for back side illumination (BSI), which appears to teach or suggest a textured region with surface features “located on the light incident side of the semiconductor layer and configured to interact with incident [EMR].” Pet. 22–27 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 5, ¶¶ 53, 68, 96; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 88–95, 101–107). As Petitioner and its expert explain, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device because BSI devices allow more incident light to reach the semiconductor layer, resulting in more light being absorbed, an increase in the quantum efficiency, and an improvement in the signal to noise ratio. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 68, 70; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 92, 95). Patent Owner argues that Alie does teach, suggest, or disclose “a textured region comprising a plurality of shallow trench isolation features.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. But it appears Petitioner has at least shown Alie teaches or suggests this element. See discussion supra. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner fails to present any proof that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device. Id. at 11–15. But, in our view, Petitioner has provided an adequate motivation to modify Alie—so that more light will be absorbed, yielding an increase in the quantum efficiency and an improvement in the signal to noise” slip op. at 18

  • Parallel petitionsNot reached

    “17 Petitioner filed petitions for IPR2025-00064 and IPR2025-00065 at the same time. Both petitions address the ’682 patent but apply different art. Patent Owner also argues the second petition (IPR2025-00065) should be denied because one petition is sufficient. Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioner’s Notice Ranking Parallel Petitions, Paper 11. Because we deny institution based on Fintiv discretion, it is not necessary to reach Patent Owner’s multiple petition argument.” slip op. at 20

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,347,682
• Apple Inc. v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00255 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 4, and 6–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Bhattacharya and Zeng, and over Bhattacharya, Zeng, and Spain; claims 1, 3, and 11 were disclaimed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Second, the key differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention is that Patent Owner asserts “experience in wireless telecommunications and cellular technology is necessary,” as well as a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology with two years of industry experience working in the same, would be required. PO Resp. 22–23 (citing Ex. 2018 ¶ 46); see also id. 44– 45. The ’104 patent is directed to locating a wireless mobile device in a geographic region. Ex. 1001, 1:13–20; PO Resp. 44. Bhattacharya is 9 Patent Owner refers to IPR2024-01209, but the correct citation is IPR2023- 01209. See PO Resp. 22. 1005, code (57), ¶¶ 1, 13; PO Resp. 44. Zeng is directed to handoff from one cell to another in a wireless cellular communication system to achieve continuous service. Ex. 1006, 1; PO Resp. 44. Spain is directed to a method for locating the concentration of mobile radio traffic in a coverage area. Ex. 1007, code (54), ¶¶ 1, 11; PO Resp. 44. We find that there is support in the ’104 patent and prior art consistent with Patent Owner’s assertion that the qualifications of a person of skill in the art would include knowledge of radio navigation and mobile communications technology. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed

    “In this case, Patent Owner attempts to make much of Dr. Sundaresan’s statement that he had been informed of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 41–43. Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony, however, set forth this understanding of the requisite level of skill in the art (Ex. 1003 ¶ 8). In his supplemental declaration, Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that: I agreed with this POSITA definition when preparing the Declaration, and I continue to hold the opinion that the POSITA definition is both correct and appropriate based on the disclosures of the ’104 patent and the prior art analyzed in the Declaration. Ex. 1055 ¶ 17. Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that “[i]f I did not agree with the POSITA definition, then it would not have been included in paragraph 8 of the Declaration.” Id. ¶ 18. Dr. Sundaresan’s inclusion of the definition of the level of ordinary skill in his original declaration indicates that he agrees with the definition, as confirmed by his cited subsequent testimony. We note that, even with Patent Owner’s arguments, the record is clear that Patent Owner was on notice of Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill at the time of the Petition. Pet. 7; cf. Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that Petitioner is not required to anticipate all arguments in its Petition and allowing consideration of reply where patent owner had sufficient notice of petitioner’s position and adequate opportunity to respond).” slip op. at 14

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner adequately establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to reach the Bhattacharya-Zeng combination with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 44

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “explained below, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s additional requirement of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area represented by a grid point should not be included in the construction of either “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area” and maintain that construction for this Final Written Decision. The construction of “grid point” we adopt is supported by the Specification of the ’104 patent. Namely, the ’104 patent discloses that “[i]n general, a non-uniform grid point (NUG) may represent the signal characteristics and/or calibration data over a given region,” and “NUGs represent an area of collected calibration data.”18 Ex. 1001, 3:50–60. The district court identified the second quoted passage, which is identically recited in the ’104 patent (see Ex. 2018, 3:56–60) as “provid[ing] a clear indication of the meaning of ‘grid point.’” Ex. 2012, 19 (emphasis added). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Although the ’104 patent does not explain how a generic “grid point” might differ from the described “nonuniform grid point,” we do not find this distinction pertinent to construing “grid point” in this case because neither party raises this issue. Also, based on the claim wording “non-uniform grid point,” a “non-uniform grid point” is a type of grid point. See Pet. Reply 3 (explaining why that plain meaning supports Petitioner’s proposed construction). Furthermore, the district court construed “grid point” only, not “non-uniform grid point.” Ex. 2012, 18–20.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,561,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,561,104
• Green Revolution Cooling, Inc. v. Midas Green Technologies, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · May 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00196 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 under both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim would have been obvious over Best-2008 and Osada.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “Under our current guidance, the filing of a Sotera-type stipulation is not conclusive, but remains “highly relevant” and will be considered “as part of [our] holistic analysis” here. See Guidance Memo. Whether Petitioner has other bases for invalidating the ’457 patent, such as the CarnoJet prior art product identified in the district court, is not a consideration here if such bases could not be asserted in this proceeding (and are not being used to argue over the asserted prior art here as a loop hole from the stipulation, of which there is no evidence).” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “satisfied that Petitioner has met its burden for institution. No argument by Patent Owner persuades us otherwise. Petitioner has shown that each limitation and element of claim 1 is taught or suggested by the combination of Best-2008 and Osada. Moreover, Petitioner’s asserted reason to combine the references is supported by the references’ disclosures: Best-2008 suggests filtration of its coolant is desirable, but provides no specific means for doing so; Osada teaches a way of filtering fluid from an open-top tank, similar to Best-2008’s.” slip op. at 42

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A POSITA[12]in the field of the ’457 patent at the time of the earliest possible effective filing date (December 14, 2012) would have had Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical or chemical engineering and at least two years of experience relating to the design and/or implementation of fluid circulation systems involving application of fluid dynamics and heat transfer principles. Additional education may serve as a substitute for a lack of experience and vice versa. (Ex-1003- Dahm at ¶¶36-41, 63-70.) Pet. 18–19. Patent Owner applies this same definition. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. At this stage of the proceeding, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. It appears that Petitioner’s proposed definition comports with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ‘457 patent, itself. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Although either of the district court proceedings’ definitions of the term “weir” appears to accurately describe the feature, at this stage of the proceeding, we do not find it necessary to expressly interpret this claim language.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,405,457
• Juul Labs, Inc. v. Njoy, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00160 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–48 not shown unpatentable on any of six § 103 grounds because the asserted references did not teach the required housing aperture and the proposed combinations lacked adequate support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelDecided for patent owner

    “time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner does not provide its own definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Instead, Petitioner asserts: In previous litigation involving the ’881 patent – the parent patent to the ’864 patent (Fuma International LLC v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company, Case No. 1:19-cv-260 (M.D.N.C. 2019)) with an identical specification – Patent Owner’s predecessor-in-interest asserted that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the purported invention would have had a mechanical or electrical engineering degree, industrial design degree, or a similar technical degree, or equivalent work experience, and 5 to 10 years of experience in electromechanical devices. Ex. 1007, ¶¶14-17. Pet. 11–12; see also Ex. 1007 ¶ 16 (Mr. Sturges testifying that he meets “that qualification” without affirmatively providing a definition for a POSITA). Before institution, Patent Owner stated it did not challenge this definition (Prelim. Resp. 9), and we adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition in our Decision granting institution. During trial, Patent Owner also adopted this definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Upon a complete record, we see no reason to change and we maintain the agreed upon definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues, and Petitioner does not dispute, that an aperture is a “hole” or an “opening.” See, e.g., id. at 21; see generally Reply. Patent Owner asserts that, in the proper context, the plain and ordinary meaning of a housing having an aperture is that the aperture is a hole, or an opening, on the housing structure itself. Id. at 21–22. We agree. In order for an object to have an “aperture” or an “opening,” the aperture or opening must be on the structure itself and not on a separate object that is located in the structure. This construction is in accord with the Specification of the ’864 patent, which refers to apertures in context of the structure on which they are located. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:12–18 (referring to a first end comprising a first aperture), 7:11–12, 7:65–67 (stating that the wall of an airflow passageway may have apertures).” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “large obstructions that force the air flow to near the peripheral surface of the housing, render the passageway non-central. During prosecution of the ’864 patent, the Examiner rejected certain claims (i.e., dependent claims 49, 63, and 75) over Han. To overcome this rejection, the applicant argued that Han cannot meet the limitation “wherein the airflow passageway extends centrally and axially from the first aperture to the second aperture.” Ex. 1002, 273. The applicant explained that Han does not meet this limitation because Han’s shell (b) does not include a central airflow passageway and instead places the perforated component for liquid storage (9) in the middle of shell (b), thereby forcing the airflow around the peripheral surface of the perforated component for liquid storage (9). Id. at 273–274. The examiner relied on this argument in determining that the applicant had overcome an earlier rejection. Id. at 195. Thus, some obstructions of a passageway render the passageway non-central; in particular those obstructions that force air to flow near the peripheral surface of the housing are large enough to render the passageway non-central.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “lacks motivation and is plagued by improper hindsight.” Sur-reply 15–17. On the record developed during trial, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Xia with those of Wang to arrive at the claimed limitations. Relying on the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Singhose, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have known a central straight path has less airflow resistance than a circuitous one.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1035, 127:15–128:9). But the same witness also testified that higher airflow resistance might be desirable and explained that providing more resistance to airflow might result in improved mixing. Ex. 1035, 21:21–22:12, 127:20–24, 170:10–14. In addition, Dr. Singhose testifies that the complicated design of the airflow passageway in Xia “serves important functions,” including “allow[ing] large droplets to be reabsorbed by the liquid-guiding mechanism,” allowing “excessive liquid in the airflow [to] condense,” and “prevent[ing] the chemical liquid from being sucked into the mouth.” Ex. 2022 ¶ 190 (citing Ex. 1004, 11, 13–14, 16). Although Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Sturges testifies that a straight airflow passageway “would provide improved, smoother air flow,” he does not provide any evidence supporting the view that the air flow would be improved. Ex. 1007 ¶ 144. We credit the testimony of Dr. Singhose that using a straight passageway in Xia would have been detrimental rather than beneficial. Ex. 2022 ¶ 190. slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 11,497,864 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,497,864
• Juul Labs, Inc. v. Njoy, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00161 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness grounds failed to establish the claimed central airflow passageway or a reason to combine the references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Relying on the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Singhose, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have known a central straight path has less airflow resistance than a circuitous one.” Reply 22–23 (citing Ex. 1035, 127:15–128:9). But the same witness also testified that higher airflow resistance might be desirable and explained that providing more resistance to airflow might result in improved mixing. Ex. 1035, 21:21–22:12, 127:20–24, 170:10–14. In addition, Dr. Singhose testifies that the complicated design of the airflow passageway in Xia “serves important functions,” including “allow[ing] large droplets to be reabsorbed by the liquid-guiding mechanism,” allowing “excessive liquid in the airflow [to] condense,” and “prevent[ing] the chemical liquid from being sucked into the mouth.” Ex. 2022 ¶ 183 (citing Ex. 1004, 11, 13–14, 16). Although Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Sturges testifies that a straight airflow passageway “would provide improved, smoother air flow,” he does not provide any evidence supporting the view that the air flow would be improved. Ex. 1007 ¶ 118. We credit the testimony of Dr. Singhose that using a straight passageway in Xia would have been detrimental rather than beneficial. Ex. 2022 ¶ 183. Petitioner also argues that the inventors’ use of a straight path is evidence that the use of a straight passageway was “merely common-sense obviousness.” Reply 22–23. This is hindsight. Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The inventor’s own path itself never leads to a conclusion of obviousness; that is hindsight.”). Moreover, it does not address the testimony of Dr. Singhose that the use of a complicated passageway like that in Xia had benefits not present in a straight central passageway.” slip op. at 29

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had a mechanical or electrical engineering degree, industrial design degree, or a similar technical degree, or equivalent work experience, and 5 to 10 years of experience in electromechanical devices.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 16). Prior to institution, Patent Owner stated that, for “the limited purpose of this Preliminary Response,” it “does not challenge the definition of a POSITA set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 9. We adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition in our Decision granting institution. During trial, neither party disputed this definition. Upon a complete record, we see no reason to change the adopted definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues, however, that this presumption is overcome in the present case, and we agree. PO Resp. 28–32. We note that, although the claims require the first aperture to be “on the first end,” the claims still require that the “housing hav[e] a first aperture.” Thus, the issue is whether the aperture must be on the housing itself or part of the housing, as well as whether the aperture is on the first end of the housing. Although “having” and “includes” are used with respect to the solution holding medium to refer to elements located inside the housing, the specification of the ’881 patent suggests that the ends of the housing are part of the housing itself, rather than located inside the housing. First, “the first end . . . can be integrated into a single assembly as part of the housing.” Ex. 1001, 6:16–17. Second, “the housing . . . may comprise the cylindrical wall and two end-caps,” or “the housing . . . may comprise the cartridge wall and a single end-cap.” Id. at 3:55–59. The only figures of the ’881 patent that depict first end 206 show it at the end of the housing rather than located within the interior of housing 202. Id. at Figs. 2, 3. Moreover, there is no requirement to construe a claim term uniformly across multiple uses in the claims when doing so would be nonsensical. Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, construing a first element that is recited as “having” or “includ[ing]” a second element always as encompassing not only second elements that are part of the first element, but also second elements that are located within the interior of the first element, would lead to nonsensical results. Claim 2 recites an airflow passageway “having a length having a circular cross section.” Ex. 1001, 17:59–60. It would be nonsensical to interpret this claim as encompassing an airflow passageway of non-circular cross section that contains another object that has a circular cross section, and neither party argues in favor of such a reading. Similarly, claim 16 recites an “airflow passageway having an interior having a uniform cross-sectional area,” and there is no reason to interpret this claim as encompassing an airflow passageway of non-uniform cross-sectional area that contains another object that itself has uniform cross-sectional area. Id. at 19:47–48. Thus, the claims do not use “having” or “includes” consistently to refer to elements located within the interior of an object; instead, they sometimes use these terms to refer to elements that are a part of an object. See Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1030–31 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (terms should be construed based on the context of how the terms are used in the claims).” slip op. at 13

  • Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “When we instituted trial, we preliminarily construed this phrase to encompass apertures that are located within the first end of the housing, determining on the record available at that time that “[t]he term does not require that the first aperture be located in the housing itself.” Inst. Dec. 16. We invited the parties to “address [the] construction of this term during trial,” id., and, on the full record developed during trial, we reach a different conclusion.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 10,334,881 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,334,881

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.