• International Business Machines Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2015 · IPR2014-00587 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish that Hughes and Abraham qualify as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction, in light of the Specification, of “contents of the packet” in step c is the header and/or payload of the packet. Petitioner’s construction is supported, sufficiently, by the ’694 patent, itself, which discloses embodiments of selecting access rules based upon the header and/or payload of the packet. The ’694 patent discloses a first embodiment in which the firewall selects a rule based on header parameters only, and discloses that, based on the header parameters, the packet may be passed or dropped. See Ex. 1004, col. 2, ll. 35–37, 40–43, col. 3, ll. 10–12, Fig 1 (path formed by steps 101, 102, 103, and 104). The ’694 patent also discloses that an access control proxy selects a rule based on an analysis of the payload of a single or multiple packets. Id. at col. 3, ll. 4–8, 18–22, 30–32, col. 4, ll. 28–34, 38–40, Fig. 1 (path formed by steps 106 and 107). The ’694 patent further discloses alternate embodiments in which the “access control proxy selects an access rule that pertains to the packet based both on an analysis of the payload and the header parameters of the packet” (Ex. 1004, col. 3, ll. 38–41) and the “access rule is retrieved based upon a combination of the contents and header parameters of the packet” (id. at col. 4, ll. 36–38).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “To establish an actual reduction to practice, the patentee must prove that he (1) constructed an embodiment or performed a process that meets all the claimed limitations of the invention, and (2) determined that the invention worked for its intended purpose. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “The essential inquiry here is whether the advance in the art represented by the invention . . . was embodied in a workable device that demonstrated that it could do what it was claimed to be capable of doing.” Scott v. Finney, 34 F. 3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 3278, 333 (2d Cir. 1963)). “In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, an inventor’s testimony must be corroborated by independent evidence. . . . [A] ‘rule of reason’ analysis is applied to determine whether an inventor’s testimony regarding reduction to practice has been sufficiently corroborated.” Cooper, 154 f.3d at 1330 (citation omitted); see also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (corroboration requirement “arose out of a concern that inventors testifying in patent infringement cases would be tempted to remember facts favorable to their case by the lure of protecting their patent or defeating another’s patent”). The sufficiency of corroboration is determined according to a “rule of reason.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This, however, does not dispense with the requirement that some independent evidence provide corroboration. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The requirement of “independent” corroboration requires evidence other than the inventor’s testimony. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “of the evidence, that the challenged claim is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden includes, inter alia, showing that any reference on which it relies is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1576 (holding that accused infringer “bore the burden of persuasion . . . on all issues relating to the status of [the asserted reference] as prior art”). Hughes and Abraham presumptively constitute prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) or 102(e) because their filing dates are prior to the ‘694 patent’s earliest effective filing date, giving rise to Patent Owner’s burden of coming forward with evidence supporting a date of invention before September 9, 1998. Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1576–77; see Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that when party challenging validity came forward with art that is prior to the challenged patent’s application date, the patentee has the burden of going forward with evidence that “the asserted claim is entitled to the benefit of a filing date prior to the alleged prior art”). Upon consideration of the all the evidence, we are persuaded that Patent Owner has met its burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to corroborate independently inventor Mr. Dutta’s testimony that the inventors of the ’694 patent reduced to practice the claimed invention “at least as early as early 1996 but no later than June 11, 1996” (PO Resp. 36). Thus, we are not persuaded that Hughes and Abraham are prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) or 102(e). C. Obviousness over Hughes and Abraham Petitioner fails to demonstrate that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because Petitioner has not demonstrated that Hughes and Abraham are prior art.” slip op. at 18

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “under Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 602. Pet. Mot. 4–5; Pet. Mot. Reply 1–3. FRE 602 states that “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Exhibit 2006 is the Declaration of Partha Dutta. According to Petitioner, in paragraphs 22, 23, and 26, Mr. Dutta testimony contains statements that require an understanding of the proper legal scope of the ’694 patent, but there is insufficient evidence to support a finding Mr. Dutta has personal knowledge of that proper legal scope of the ’694 patent. Id. at 4. We dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude paragraphs 22, 23, and 26 paragraphs of Exhibit 2006 as moot because we do not rely upon the statements made in these paragraphs that Petitioner alleges to require an understanding of the proper legal scope of the ’694 patent in reaching our decision. Although we cite to paragraphs 22, 23, and 26 of Ex. 2006 above, we only rely upon other statements in those paragraphs, which do not address the legal scope of the ’694 patent, such as “the prototype code is no longer available.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 26.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,826,694 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,826,694
• Compass Bank / Commerce Bancshares, Inc. et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2015 · IPR2014-00786 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Rubin and obvious over Norman and Rubin; Cunningham was not shown to anticipate claim 1.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction, in light of the Specification, of “contents of the packet” in step c is the header and/or payload of the packet. Petitioner’s construction is supported, sufficiently, by the ’694 patent itself, which discloses embodiments of selecting access rules based upon the header and/or payload of the packet. The’694 patent discloses a first embodiment in which the firewall selects a rule based on header parameters only, and discloses that, based on the header parameters the packet may be passed or dropped. See Ex. 1004, col. 2, ll. 35–37, 40–43, col. 3, ll. 10–12; Fig 1 (path formed by steps 101, 102, 103, and 104). The ’694 patent also discloses that an access control proxy selects a rule based on an analysis of the payload of a single or multiple packets. Id. at col. 3, ll. 4–8, 18–22, 30–32; col. 4, ll. 28–34, 38–40; Fig. 1 (path formed by steps 106 and 107). The ’694 patent further discloses alternate embodiments, in which the “access control proxy selects an access rule that pertains to the packet based both on an analysis of the payload and the header parameters of the packet” (Ex. 1004, col. 3, ll. 38–41) and the “access rule is retrieved based upon a combination of the contents and header parameters of the packet” (id. at col. 4, ll. 36–38).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Given the above, we determine that the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the Specification, of step b is to choose the access rule based upon the contents of the payload of the received packet. Likewise, the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the Specification, of step c is the access rule is chosen based upon a combination of the contents of the received packet and another packet. The broadest reasonable construction of these steps does not require selecting the rule by choosing the access rule from set of rules or preclude selecting the access rule by choosing whether or not the rule is pertinent. Although the Specification discloses selecting a rule from a set of rules (Ex. 1004, col. 3, ll. 10–12, 30–32, col. 4, ll. 47–59), claim 1 does not set forth a set of rules or require that the rule is selected from a set of rules. Limitations appearing in the Specification but not recited in the claim are not read into the claim. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “This burden includes, inter alia, showing that any reference on which it relies is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1576 (holding that accused infringer “bore the burden of persuasion . . . on all issues relating to the status of [the asserted reference] as prior art”). Cunningham presumptively constitutes prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) because its September 9, 1998 filing date is prior to the ’694 patent’s earliest effective filing date, giving rise to Patent Owner’s burden of coming forward with evidence supporting a date of invention before September 9, 1998. Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1576–77; see Technology Lic. Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that when party challenging validity came forward with art that is prior to the challenged patent’s application date, the patentee has burden of going forward with evidence that “the asserted claim is entitled to the benefit of a filing date prior to the alleged prior art”). Upon consideration of Patent Owner’s proffered evidence, as discussed above, we are persuaded that Patent Owner has met its burden of coming forward with sufficient independently corroborated evidence showing that the inventors of the ’694 patent reduced to practice the claimed invention “at least as early as early 1996 but no later than June 11, 1996” (id. at 40). Thus, upon consideration of all of the evidence, we are not persuaded that Cunningham is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” slip op. at 25

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “was publicly accessible in February 1997 and, thus, qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The determination of whether a given reference qualifies as a prior art “printed publication” involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Dr. Aviel Rubin testifies that Rubin is a true copy of the paper, which was presented by his co-author David Martin at the Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, held on February 10–11, 1997. Ex. 1027 ¶¶ 1–2, 6. Dr. Rubin also testifies that he personally attended the symposium and that he observed that copies of Rubin were freely available to the several hundred attendees. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8–9. Dr. Rubin further testifies that Rubin was published in the Proceedings of the Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, which are handed out to participants at the symposium. See id. ¶¶ 1, 13. Dr. Rubin’s testimony is consistent with Rubin itself, which states that it was “[r]eprinted from The Proceedings of the 1997 Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security.” Ex. 1009, n. 1. Given the above, we determine that Rubin was a printed publication publicly available as of February 1997 and is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (paper orally presented at a scientific meeting open to all persons interested in the subject matter, with written copies distributed without restriction to all who requested, is a printed publication). Thus, Rubin cannot be overcome by proving prior invention.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 6,826,694 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,826,694
• Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2015 · IPR2015-00065 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 and 30–58 of the ’813 patent and claims 1–7 and 9–20 of the ’496 patent are unpatentable as obvious under § 103.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction of “leak” deviates from the ordinary meaning of the term. PO Resp. 31–33. LSI relies on extrinsic evidence to supports its contention that the ordinary meaning of “leak” as recited in the ’813 and ’496 patents is limited to unintended or fugitive emissions. PO Resp. 33. LSI’s contention fails to recognize and distinguish the express teaching that chemicals of interest from flares, exhausts, vents or blow off valves are expressly described as uses of the claimed invention. Ex. 1001, 12:17–25. Indeed, one portion of the specification that LSI relies on to distinguish known versus unknown emissions, indicates that the invention is used to survey known emissions of gas from vents. Ex. 1001, 20:28–31; see PO Resp. 34. Although LSI admits that exhaust valves and flares will have known emissions and that the invention is used to survey these structures (PO Resp. 32), LSI argues that the term “leak” does not include the known emissions from these structures, as the ordinary use of the term is limited to fugitive or unknown emissions. We disagree, concluding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the specification describes a chemical of interest that is present in valves and exhausts that have known emissions. Ex. 1001, 12:22, 20:28–32.15 Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, LSI’s extrinsic evidence does not persuade us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “leak” as used in the specification and claims is limited to only unknown or fugitive emissions. Accordingly, on the full record, we maintain our construction of “leak” as including both fugitive and non-fugitive emissions.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for petitioner

    “PO Resp. 27. Specifically, LSI argues that “in the context of the full claims, this limitation should be construed to mean that an infringing method must operate to image gas leaks under real-world field conditions, without taking steps to artificially control any variables such as background temperature, wind, etc.” Id. at 25. LSI does not provide any argument or evidence that the patent describes the range of “real-world” versus “artificially controlled” conditions. Instead, LSI’s construction merely seeks to eliminate any conditions obtained in a lab or test setting from ambient conditions in other settings. We are not persuaded that the patent claims’ references to variable ambient conditions are limited to “real-world” conditions. As we previously noted, a person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that the claimed system and method would typically be used outdoors, where environmental conditions change, at the point where a leak may occur. Dec. ’411, 18. For example, in the summer, a chemical of interest may be present at higher temperature than the same chemical of interest in the winter. Id. Similarly, exhaust temperature may vary depending on conditions. LSI admits that “the claim does not specify what the normal operating conditions would be” under given circumstances. Oral Argument Transcript (“Tr.”) 62:23–24. LSI also admits that a smokestack, for example, would have “a different range of normal operating conditions.” Tr. 63:6–8. Because these conditions vary and the ’813 and ’496 patent specifications are silent on the range or limits of normal operating conditions, we are not persuaded by LSI’s attempt to exclude controlled environments from the claimed ambient conditions. See PO Resp. 26–27. We find no support for LSI’s contention that “variable ambient conditions” or “normal operating in variable ambient conditions” is limited to those instances that are not constrained or controlled in some artificial manner. Id. On the full record, we maintain our constructions of “produce a visible image of the chemical emanating from the component under variable ambient conditions of the area around the leak” as meaning “being able to produce a visible image under the ambient conditions of the area around the leak.”” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by LSI’s arguments. The case LSI relies on, Virginia Innovation, is neither binding authority nor persuasive authority. The facts in Virginia Innovation can be distinguished from the facts of the present case, as the prior art in question in Virginia Innovation was not sufficiently shown to be generally on sale to the interested public, and was instead “restricted” to members of a publishing organization, which required membership dues for access. See 983 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. Indeed, the district court in Virginia Innovation noted that there was no evidence that the document was available for sale to the general public outside of the publishing organization members. Id. In the present case, no membership fee or organization membership is required for access to the Merlin User’s Guide, which testimony shows was available and sold to the interested public as early as late 2000. See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–19; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 12–14; Ex. 1016 ¶ 12. Based on the complete record, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that distribution of the Merlin User’s Guide with the sale of the Merlin MID camera shows sufficient public accessibility and distribution. The cost to obtain the camera does not negate the evidence that the camera and accompanying user’s guide was available to the interested public. The testimony evidence shows that the Merlin User’s Guide was available for sale and distribution to the interested as early as 2000. Thus, FLIR has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Merlin User’s Guide was a publicly available printed publication.” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “relevant experience with passive IR (infrared) systems in addition to the requisite engineering or physics education. Paper 2, 10–11 (IPR ’065); Reply 19–20. LSI contends that in addition to the requisite physics or optical science/engineering education a person of ordinary skill the art would have experience developing IR camera systems generally. PO Resp. 22. LSI’s contention is that FLIR’s definition of a person of ordinary skill is too narrowly focused on passive IR systems and is evidence of hindsight bias. PO Resp. 23. LSI’s arguments are contradictory and confusing; asserting not only that FLIR’s person of ordinary skill in art is overly narrow and defined as a “specialist in the [’813 and ’496 patents’] specific solution to the problem being solved,” but also that FLIR’s artisan “would not [] have been familiar with the technical problem being addressed by the invention.” PO Resp. 22 (emphasis omitted). Regardless, FLIR argues that the invention would have been obvious under either FLIR’s or LSI’s proposed person of ordinary skill in the art. Reply 20. Based on the full record, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is evidenced by the prior art references and the type of problems and solutions described in the ’813 and ’496 patents (Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:34), and includes experience in imaging of chemical gases using IR camera systems generally in addition to the requisite engineering, physics or optical science education. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Moreover, and apart from any differences of opinion between FLIR and LSI on the precise background and knowledge of one skilled in the art, the prior art itself is highly indicative of the level of skill. See id. (“the level of ordinary skill in the art . . . was best determined by appeal to the references of record”). In any event, we do not find that a person of ordinary skill’s understanding of the teachings of the prior art would differ if an ordinarily skilled artisan possessed knowledge of both active and passive IR systems rather than knowledge of passive IR systems alone. See PO Resp. 22–24.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,426,813 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,426,813
• Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00434 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 and 30–58 of the ’813 patent and claims 1–7 and 9–20 of the ’496 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the instituted prior-art combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “construction of “leak” deviates from the ordinary meaning of the term. PO Resp. 31–33. LSI relies on extrinsic evidence to supports its contention that the ordinary meaning of “leak” as recited in the ’813 and ’496 patents is limited to unintended or fugitive emissions. PO Resp. 33. LSI’s contention fails to recognize and distinguish the express teaching that chemicals of interest from flares, exhausts, vents or blow off valves are expressly described as uses of the claimed invention. Ex. 1001, 12:17–25. Indeed, one portion of the specification that LSI relies on to distinguish known versus unknown emissions, indicates that the invention is used to survey known emissions of gas from vents. Ex. 1001, 20:28–31; see PO Resp. 34. Although LSI admits that exhaust valves and flares will have known emissions and that the invention is used to survey these structures (PO Resp. 32), LSI argues that the term “leak” does not include the known emissions from these structures, as the ordinary use of the term is limited to fugitive or unknown emissions. We disagree, concluding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the specification describes a chemical of interest that is present in valves and exhausts that have known emissions. Ex. 1001, 12:22, 20:28–32.15 Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, LSI’s extrinsic evidence does not persuade us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “leak” as used in the specification and claims is limited to only unknown or fugitive emissions. Accordingly, on the full record, we maintain our construction of “leak” as including both fugitive and non-fugitive emissions.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by LSI’s arguments. The case LSI relies on, Virginia Innovation, is neither binding authority nor persuasive authority. The facts in Virginia Innovation can be distinguished from the facts of the present case, as the prior art in question in Virginia Innovation was not sufficiently shown to be generally on sale to the interested public, and was instead “restricted” to members of a publishing organization, which required membership dues for access. See 983 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. Indeed, the district court in Virginia Innovation noted that there was no evidence that the document was available for sale to the general public outside of the publishing organization members. Id. In the present case, no membership fee or organization membership is required for access to the Merlin User’s Guide, which testimony shows was available and sold to the interested public as early as late 2000. See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–19; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 12–14; Ex. 1016 ¶ 12. Based on the complete record, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that distribution of the Merlin User’s Guide with the sale of the Merlin MID camera shows sufficient public accessibility and distribution. The cost to obtain the camera does not negate the evidence that the camera and accompanying user’s guide was available to the interested public. The testimony evidence shows that the Merlin User’s Guide was available for sale and distribution to the interested as early as 2000. Thus, FLIR has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Merlin User’s Guide was a publicly available printed publication.” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “relevant experience with passive IR (infrared) systems in addition to the requisite engineering or physics education. Paper 2, 10–11 (IPR ’065); Reply 19–20. LSI contends that in addition to the requisite physics or optical science/engineering education a person of ordinary skill the art would have experience developing IR camera systems generally. PO Resp. 22. LSI’s contention is that FLIR’s definition of a person of ordinary skill is too narrowly focused on passive IR systems and is evidence of hindsight bias. PO Resp. 23. LSI’s arguments are contradictory and confusing; asserting not only that FLIR’s person of ordinary skill in art is overly narrow and defined as a “specialist in the [’813 and ’496 patents’] specific solution to the problem being solved,” but also that FLIR’s artisan “would not [] have been familiar with the technical problem being addressed by the invention.” PO Resp. 22 (emphasis omitted). Regardless, FLIR argues that the invention would have been obvious under either FLIR’s or LSI’s proposed person of ordinary skill in the art. Reply 20. Based on the full record, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is evidenced by the prior art references and the type of problems and solutions described in the ’813 and ’496 patents (Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:34), and includes experience in imaging of chemical gases using IR camera systems generally in addition to the requisite engineering, physics or optical science education. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Moreover, and apart from any differences of opinion between FLIR and LSI on the precise background and knowledge of one skilled in the art, the prior art itself is highly indicative of the level of skill. See id. (“the level of ordinary skill in the art . . . was best determined by appeal to the references of record”). In any event, we do not find that a person of ordinary skill’s understanding of the teachings of the prior art would differ if an ordinarily skilled artisan possessed knowledge of both active and passive IR systems rather than knowledge of passive IR systems alone. See PO Resp. 22–24.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the [inventor].” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We will not, however, “read into a reference a teaching away from a process where no such language exists.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). LSI’s evidence that the Merlin references disclose an emission based instrument and that Kulp and Strachan disclose an absorption based instrument, does not show that the references teach away from their combination. Indeed, LSI’s citation to the testimony of Dr. Martini does not demonstrate that the Merlin references discourage their combination with Strachan or Kulp. To the contrary, the record shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the filter teachings of Strachan with the camera disclosed in the Merlin references. Ex. 1030, 50:1–16, 84:14–85:19, 87:16–88:19, 160:4–14; see Ex. 1036 ¶ 22. Although LSI’s witness, Dr. Hossack, disputes where the filter would have been placed on a Merlin camera, he does not dispute that Strachan discloses modifying a similar camera to detect gas. Ex. 1030, 50:1–16, 84:14–85:19, 87:16–88:19; 160:4–14. LSI’s argument that the combinations of the Merlin camera disclosed in the Merlin references would destroy the intended functionality of the camera and fundamentally alter its principle of operation is equally unpersuasive. See PO Resp. 49–52. LSI has not shown that modification of the Merlin camera as disclosed in the Merlin User’s Guide or Brochure would no longer be useful for imaging gas as described. We credit the testimony of Dr. Sandsten in finding that the Merlin MID operates on the principles of thermography before and after modification as disclosed in Kulp and Strachan. Ex. 1036 ¶ 74. In addition, modification of such a camera is expressly taught by Strachan and Kulp. Therefore, regardless of whether the possibility of modifying the Merlin MID camera was disclosed in the Merlin references, the combination of Kulp and/or Strachan with the Merlin references teaches one of ordinary skill in the art that the standard filter could be replaced in a passive IR camera, such as the Merlin MID, to improve imaging. See, e.g., Ex. 1030, 50:1–16, 84:14–85:19, 87:16–88:19; 160:4–14; Reply 15. Indeed, Strachan and Kulp both disclose that gas can be successfully imaged by optimizing the spectral selectivity of a passive IR system using a narrow bandpass filter tuned to the gases of interest. Kulp specifically discloses that a cold filter and Strachan includes a Dewar flask for cooling. Ex. 1008, 493; Ex. 1012, 270. LSI’s arguments regarding the modifications of the camera disclosed in the Merlin references fail to address the teachings of the Merlin references in combination with Kulp and/or Strachan. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (attacking references individually cannot demonstrate nonobviousness; rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art). slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,193,496 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,193,496
• Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00411 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 and 30–58 of the ’813 patent and claims 1–7 and 9–20 of the ’496 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the listed prior-art combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction of “leak” deviates from the ordinary meaning of the term. PO Resp. 31–33. LSI relies on extrinsic evidence to supports its contention that the ordinary meaning of “leak” as recited in the ’813 and ’496 patents is limited to unintended or fugitive emissions. PO Resp. 33. LSI’s contention fails to recognize and distinguish the express teaching that chemicals of interest from flares, exhausts, vents or blow off valves are expressly described as uses of the claimed invention. Ex. 1001, 12:17–25. Indeed, one portion of the specification that LSI relies on to distinguish known versus unknown emissions, indicates that the invention is used to survey known emissions of gas from vents. Ex. 1001, 20:28–31; see PO Resp. 34.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by LSI’s arguments. The case LSI relies on, Virginia Innovation, is neither binding authority nor persuasive authority. The facts in Virginia Innovation can be distinguished from the facts of the present case, as the prior art in question in Virginia Innovation was not sufficiently shown to be generally on sale to the interested public, and was instead “restricted” to members of a publishing organization, which required membership dues for access. See 983 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. Indeed, the district court in Virginia Innovation noted that there was no evidence that the document was available for sale to the general public outside of the publishing organization members. Id. In the present case, no membership fee or organization membership is required for access to the Merlin User’s Guide, which testimony shows was available and sold to the interested public as early as late 2000. See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–19; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 12–14; Ex. 1016 ¶ 12. Based on the complete record, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that distribution of the Merlin User’s Guide with the sale of the Merlin MID camera shows sufficient public accessibility and distribution. The cost to obtain the camera does not negate the evidence that the camera and accompanying user’s guide was available to the interested public. The testimony evidence shows that the Merlin User’s Guide was available for sale and distribution to the interested as early as 2000. Thus, FLIR has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Merlin User’s Guide was a publicly available printed publication.” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “relevant experience with passive IR (infrared) systems in addition to the requisite engineering or physics education. Paper 2, 10–11 (IPR ’065); Reply 19–20. LSI contends that in addition to the requisite physics or optical science/engineering education a person of ordinary skill the art would have experience developing IR camera systems generally. PO Resp. 22. LSI’s contention is that FLIR’s definition of a person of ordinary skill is too narrowly focused on passive IR systems and is evidence of hindsight bias. PO Resp. 23. LSI’s arguments are contradictory and confusing; asserting not only that FLIR’s person of ordinary skill in art is overly narrow and defined as a “specialist in the [’813 and ’496 patents’] specific solution to the problem being solved,” but also that FLIR’s artisan “would not [] have been familiar with the technical problem being addressed by the invention.” PO Resp. 22 (emphasis omitted). Regardless, FLIR argues that the invention would have been obvious under either FLIR’s or LSI’s proposed person of ordinary skill in the art. Reply 20. Based on the full record, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is evidenced by the prior art references and the type of problems and solutions described in the ’813 and ’496 patents (Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:34), and includes experience in imaging of chemical gases using IR camera systems generally in addition to the requisite engineering, physics or optical science education. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Moreover, and apart from any differences of opinion between FLIR and LSI on the precise background and knowledge of one skilled in the art, the prior art itself is highly indicative of the level of skill. See id. (“the level of ordinary skill in the art . . . was best determined by appeal to the references of record”). In any event, we do not find that a person of ordinary skill’s understanding of the teachings of the prior art would differ if an ordinarily skilled artisan possessed knowledge of both active and passive IR systems rather than knowledge of passive IR systems alone. See PO Resp. 22–24.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the full record, we find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that FLIR has provided articulated reasons with rational underpinnings for the proposed combinations of prior art. FLIR’s evidence shows that combinations of the Merlin Brochure with Strachan or the Merlin User’s Guide with Kulp is the combination of known elements that yield predictable results. See Paper 2, 17–18 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 55), 20–21 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 60) (IPR ’065); Paper 2, 37–38 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81) (IPR ’411). In addition, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art demonstrates that it would have been an obvious design choice to one skilled in the art to replace the filters disclosed in Strachan and Kulp to target hydrocarbon gases of interest using the camera disclosed in the Merlin Brochure and Merlin User’s Guide. Paper 2, 38–39 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 81– 82) (IPR ’411). Accordingly, we do not agree with LSI that FLIR’s expert testimony is conclusory. PO Resp. 23, 61, 67–68.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 8,426,813 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,426,813
• Unverferth Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. J&M Manufacturing Co., Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2015 · IPR2014-00758 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Grieshop, Christianson, and Parker.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We have carefully considered both positions, but find Mr. Kucklick’s testimony to be more persuasive. We are not persuaded by Mr. Smith’s position that Grieshop and Christianson are “completely” or “entirely” different. Given the field of the invention, bulk handling of farm products, and the fact that each is a grain handler, we find that they are in the same field of endeavor and also logically would commend themselves to the attention of the skilled artisan at the time the invention was made. For example, Grieshop describes “[a] wagon for transporting grain and other particulate matter” (Ex. 1002, Abst.) and Christianson notes in its Background section that “grain handling equipment commonly makes use of vertically extending tubing to elevate and direct grain into a truck or grain bin.” Ex. 1003, 1:19–22. Although we do not wish to understate the engineering work required on the part of Mr. Wood, replacing the non-askewed hinge with an askewed hinge was known in the art, even if Mr. Wood was unaware of it at the time. We find that askewed hinging was known in the field of grain carts. See, e.g., Ex. 1007 (depicting a Par-Kan grain cart with an askewed hinge). We juxtapose the hinge of Figure 7 of the instant patent (rotated 90 degrees) with that of prior art Par-Kan grain cart (Ex. 1007), known as early as 2006, below.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We have carefully considered both positions, but find Mr. Kucklick’s testimony to be more persuasive. We are not persuaded by Mr. Smith’s position that Grieshop and Christianson are “completely” or “entirely” different. Given the field of the invention, bulk handling of farm products, and the fact that each is a grain handler, we find that they are in the same field of endeavor and also logically would commend themselves to the attention of the skilled artisan at the time the invention was made.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “We find Petitioner’s observation about the Grieshop patent, which expired in 2008, has some merit. It seems evident that farm equipment manufacturers will enforce their patents from time to time, so it is reasonable to conclude that the existence of the Grieshop patent could have had a chilling effect on development. See, e.g., Ex. 1016, 47:19–49:15. In particular, the following testimony is pertinent to this issue: Q. And do you remember approximately when J & M asserted the '208 Patent against these companies? A. It would be in the early '90s. Q. So shortly after the patent issued, they would have asserted the patent against these companies -- A. Correct. Q. -- is that fair to say? A. Correct. Q. And is it your understanding that these efforts to enforce the '208 patent against these competitors resulted in those competitors taking front fold single auger grain carts off the market?” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that these items provide the requisite nexus to the instant claims. Although Patent Owner characterizes the hinge structure as “slightly different,” the provisional applications reference an “offset angle” for the conveyor sections. Exs. 200809. We are not provided with any persuasive explanation about how the hinge would fall within the claimed subject matter. The same is true of the advertising material. As a consequence, we find this position and evidence unpersuasive. Patent Owner’s Efforts Patent Owner turns to its efforts to develop an acceptable solution.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,585,343 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,585,343
• Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Mymedicalrecords, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2015 · CBM2015-00022 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 8–12 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to nonstatutory subject matter; the Board did not reach the anticipation or obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “Second, we consider the challenged claims as an ordered combination. Id. at 2359. On this record, when viewed as a whole, the challenged claims 8–12 simply recite the concept of user management performed by a generic computer. The challenged claims, for example, do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they improve another technology or technical field. Petitioner additionally relies on the Declaration of Dr. Bysinger (Pet. 20–28), who testifies that the recited elements including “server,” “storing files . . . in a computer readable storage medium,” and “user interface on a computing device” were well-known conventional concepts in 2005. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32. Dr. Bysinger additionally states “the abstract idea of privately accessing and managing patient medical records . . . [has] existed since at least the promulgation of HIPAA.” Id. ¶ 33. We credit Dr. Bysinger’s statements because they are consistent with the challenged claims. Challenged dependent claims 9–12 add nothing that alters the above analysis under § 101. Claims 9, 10, 11, and 12 recite additional limitations, such as wherein the access information comprises a password, receiving files from a second provider, wherein the files comprise image format files including wills and powers of attorney, respectively. Based on the present record, these comprise either generic limitations, such as using a password for access or sending a file in a known image format, or they relate to organizing human activities, such as user management of legal and financial documents, in addition to health records. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8–12 of the ’466 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because they are directed to non-statutory subject matter.” slip op. at 11

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “Petitioner asserts that claims 8–12 of the ’466 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because they are directed to the abstract concept of allowing individuals to manage and access their health records and other medical or legal files privately. Pet. 19. We agree with Petitioner that the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea: privately managing files by the user. The preamble and all claim limitations of the challenged claims support this view of the claims, and the ’466 Patent consistently describes the invention as allowing an individual to control access to their medical records. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:21–23. Management or control by the user or patient rather than by the health care provider is a method of organizing a human activity. On this record, the concept is an abstract idea, just like the basic hedging concept at issue in Bilski and the abstract idea of intermediated settlement in Alice.3” slip op. at 8

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We conclude that receiving and sending data is a routine and conventional computer function. As explained in Alice, “use of a computer to obtain data . . . and issue automated instructions . . . are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional actitiv[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2359; see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). Restricting access by password also is routine and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712–13, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that representative claim 1 is patent ineligible although it recites “a fourth step of restricting general public access.”). Similarly, providing a user interface is an insignificant activity. See Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (determining that claim 1 is patent ineligible although it recites a “claim folder,” which “manages claim information . . . by providing a structured and easy to use interface.”). Claim 8 includes additional recitations relating to how data is stored and managed on the server. We determine that these limitations recite generic functions performed by a generic server and computing device. Storing files is a basic computer function. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (“Using a computer to create and maintain ‘shadow’ accounts amounts to electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a computer.”). Additionally, regarding the recitation in challenged claim 8 of “wherein the files are maintained on the server independently from any files maintained by the health care provider” (Ex. 1001, 17:18–19 (emphasis added)), we note the representative claim in Alice had a similar recitation. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352. In particular, in Alice, the representative claim included the following:” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner additionally relies on the Declaration of Dr. Bysinger (Pet. 20–28), who testifies that the recited elements including “server,” “storing files . . . in a computer readable storage medium,” and “user interface on a computing device” were well-known conventional concepts in 2005. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32. Dr. Bysinger additionally states “the abstract idea of privately accessing and managing patient medical records . . . [has] existed since at least the promulgation of HIPAA.” Id. ¶ 33. We credit Dr. Bysinger’s statements because they are consistent with the challenged claims.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 8,301,466 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 8,301,466
• Skyhawke Technologies, LLC v. L&H Concepts, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2015 · IPR2014-00437 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 8–11, 14, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Palmer, Osamu, and Vanden Heuvel under § 103(a).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We think neither witness is persuasive on this point, and the inventor’s original disclosure is closer to the actual state of the art at the time the invention was made. We thus turn to the Patent Specification, at Ex. 1001, 2:27–40, as representative of a more objective form of evidence. In its most basic form the inventive apparatus is a comfortably handheld, self-contained computer unit having a non-volatile memory, a power source, a general output display for selectively displaying a plurality of informational screens stored in the memory, and a program that determines logical screen and information sequence and processes the data entered. The unit is provided with key entry means for retrieving and selectively displaying various screens from the memory on the display and for entering game data into each screen to be stored in the memory. The provision of a general output display, the variety of specialized screens for organization of data, and the handheld portability of the invention result in a device with nearly unlimited potential. We believe this passage reflects most fairly the field of the invention. Therefore, we find the field to be that of portable computing devices for the entry, organization, and analysis of data, including, but not limited to, sports data.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the preamble is non-limiting. A claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. When the claim preamble recites structural limitations of the claimed invention, the PTO and courts give limiting effect to that usage. Conversely, when the claim body defines a structurally complete invention and the preamble only states a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not limiting. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). While the preambles in the challenged claims may give some overall context for the claim limitations, we find that they are not necessary to give life to the claim terms or breathe meaning into the claims. The claims and the Specification indicate that the challenged claims may be used in the field of golf or similar sporting events, without necessarily limiting their application only to golf.4 We observe that claims 9–11 and 18 each contain specific references to golf in the body of the claim. Ex. 1001, 18:31– 65, 21:10–34. Claims 8 and 14 do not. Id. at 18:5–30, 19:34–62. In any event, as Palmer describes a handheld golf device, for purposes of this decision we see no practical difference in whether the “golf” portion of the preamble applies to the challenged claims, as handheld golf devices were well known.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “asserts multiple errors with the Petitioner’s construction, and that the claim language “is clear on its face and needs no additional construction.” Prelim. Resp. 9. In its Response, the Patent Owner effectively asserts that “pre-game,” to have a meaning distinct from game interactive, must not include game play or practice. PO Resp. 20. While the claims are lengthy, they are easily understood without reference to additional sources. We observe that no particular order of steps is recited or required except where expressly temporally limited in the claim (e.g., pre-game, game interactive, and post-game). We determine that pre-game means at any time prior to a game. Likewise, game-interactive means during a game, and post-game means after a game.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do think this additional testimony undercuts at least one portion of the motivation rationale put forth by the Petitioner. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have made the combination for one reason advanced by Dr. Gutwin — increasing the display size.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 5,779,566 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,779,566
• Skyhawke Technologies, LLC v. L&H Concepts, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2015 · IPR2014-00438 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Palmer and Vanden Heuvel; claims 4, 5, 13, and 17 are unpatentable over Palmer, Vanden Heuvel, and Osamu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We have determined that Mr. Ball’s testimony as to the level of ordinary skill in the art is most credible and accurate – while the level of skill in the pertinent time period was somewhat low, that “an ordinary artisan would have at least some experience working in the field” either “designing or building” portable computing devices. Ex. 2014 ¶ 18. In other words, the skilled artisan would have a grasp as to what was practicable to do back in the time the invention was made.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the preamble is non-limiting. A claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. When the claim preamble recites structural limitations of the claimed invention, the PTO and courts give limiting effect to that usage. Conversely, when the claim body defines a structurally complete invention and the preamble only states a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not claim limiting. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). While the preambles in the challenged claims may give some overall context for the claim limitations, we find that they are not necessary to give life to the claim terms or breathe meaning into the claims. The claims and the Specification indicate that the challenged claims may be used in the field of golf or similar sporting events, without necessarily limiting their application only to golf.4 We observe that claims 1–5 and 17 each contain specific references to golf in the preamble of the claim. Ex. 1001, 16:65– 17:41, 20:50–21:9. Claim 13 does not discuss golf in either the body or the preamble. Id. at 19:3–33. In any event, as Palmer describes a handheld golf device, for the purposes of this decision, we see no practical difference in whether the “golf” portion of the preamble applies to the challenged claims, as handheld golf devices were well-known.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyMixed

    “To invoke § 112, paragraph six, the alleged means-plus-function claim element must not recite a definite structure that performs the described function. Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As in Cole, the drafter of the instant claims was “enamored of the word ‘means,’” id., utilizing it seven times in the final paragraph of claim 1 to include a piece of structure which essentially was completely recited within the claim. Stripped of the excessive “means” verbiage, claim 1 recites: key entry . . . wherein the key entry . . . includes first key . . . comprising one entry key for selectively displaying information screens, second screen-dependent field select key . . . the second screen-dependent field select key . . . comprising two bi-directional tab keys for scrolling in opposite directions through the data input fields on a displayed information screen, and third screen-dependent value select key . . . the third screen-dependent value select key . . . comprising two bi-directional scroll keys for scrolling in opposite directions through the predefined data associated with the data input field on the displayed information screen. Ex. 1001, 17:7–26 (“means” language deleted). We are persuaded that such detailed recitation of structure (including three particular types of keys with particular functions) removes these limitations of claim 1 from the ambit of § 112, sixth paragraph. As a consequence, we conclude the final paragraph of claim 1 describes a user 5 Because the ’566 patent has an effective filing date before September 16, 2012, we refer to the pre–AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. key interface which requires three types of keys, each having the particular function recited — an entry key for selecting a display screen, two bi-directional tab keys for scrolling through entry fields in a display screen, and two bi-directional scroll keys for scrolling through data to input in a display screen.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We believe the Patent Owner is misinterpreting the guidance of the Supreme Court in its argument. As the Supreme Court noted: A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. . . . When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. . . . [We] must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417–21 (2007). While the Petitioner’s proposed screen size motivation is no longer persuasive (or necessary) to this panel and this decision, we conclude that a preponderance of evidence in this trial supports a conclusion that replacing an alphanumeric keyboard with a set of tab and scroll keys was a substitution of one known data entry method with an equivalent data entry mechanism. We expressly reject the screen washout argument made, and the underlying testimony in Mr. Ball’s Declaration.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 5,779,566 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,779,566
• Clariant Corporation v. CSP Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2015 · IPR2014-00375 · APJ Phillip J Kauffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by Hekal ’108 and as obvious over Wheeler with one of Hekal ’108, Hekal ’937, or Sacherer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “wherein the flexible lip seal member is designed to be sufficiently deflective so as to provide a sealing position, when the skirt of the lid is closed over the top container, which results in a substantially moisture proof seal between the lid and the container. Claim 1 does not state explicitly that the flexible lip seal member is deflected when in the closed position, nor does claim 1 specify a minimum amount of deflection in the form of a quantitative amount of deflection. Rather, claim 1 states that the flexible lip seal member has the characteristic of being “sufficiently deflective” so as to provide a sealing position (when closed) that is substantially moisture proof. In doing so, claim 1 defines sufficiently deflective as the characteristic of being deflective enough to provide a substantially moisture proof seal. That is, the flexible lip seal member is “sufficiently deflective” as claimed so long as it provides a substantially moisture proof seal between the lid and the container, even if it is not deflected.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “deflection of a flexible lip seal member (annular seal 74). PO Resp. 24˗29. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill would not understand that seal 74 is thicker than gap 81 because the reference uses the terms “about” and “ranging from” to describe the dimensions, and because Petitioner has “cobbled together” dimensions from different parts of the reference. PO Resp. 24˗25. Further, Patent Owner contends that a container having the dimensions provided by Petitioner would not be closeable or resealable, and the force required for closing would deform and damage the container. Id. at 25˗29 (citing to and explaining finite element analysis performed by Dr. Oswald on a container having the dimensions provided by Petitioner). Patent Owner asks us to interpret Hekal ’108 to disclose a container that cannot be closed or resealed, and when closed, would be deformed and damaged to the extent that the container is rendered unusable. This contention not supported by the references. Neither Hekal ’108 nor Abrams describes the container as disposable or otherwise suitable for only a single use. Exs. 1015, 1016, passim. Abrams explicitly indicates that the container may be closed by describing that the vial provides a substantially hermetic seal when closed. Ex. 1016, 1:12˗15. Hekal ’108 describes the container as” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Oswald’s finite element analysis suffers from several shortcomings. First, the analysis assumes the container and lid are made of polypropylene, although the reference discloses that the container is preferably made of polypropylene and the lid is made from polyethylene (a more flexible material). See Ex. 2001 ¶ 53–54 (relying on polypropylene for the container and lid); Ex. 1015, 2:29˗34; 4:28˗3013 (stating that the container is polypropylene and the optional lid is preferably polyethylene); 13 At oral hearing, Patent Owner was asked to identify support for the assertion that the container and lid are both formed of polypropylene as used by Dr. Oswald’s analysis. Tr. 68. Patent Owner identified the sections of Exhibit 1015 cited here, neither of which supports Patent Owner’s contention. Id. Pet. Reply 5; Ex. 1027, 154:8–9 (conceding that polyethylene is more flexible than polypropylene). Second, Patent Owner takes the somewhat inconsistent position of contending that the dimensions are not accurate and then asks that we consider test results based upon a container having such dimensions. Third, Dr. Oswald presumed the lid was closed straight down, while the reference discloses that the hinge angles the cap to permit a progressive closing rather than straight down. See Pet. Reply 6; Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 8˗10.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “measurement of Wheeler’s Figure 7. Rather, Mr. Sheehan illustrated with a dotted line that, when closed, sealing bead 20' of flange 19' interferes with neck 2' of container 1', causing flange 19' to deflect inward and it seal the inside surface of neck 2'. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 82 (at pages 71˗72); Pet. 52 (citing to this portion of Ex. 1008); Pet. Reply 11. Mr. Sheehan’s analysis of Figure 7 is proper because drawings may be used to establish relative sizes and relationships between the various components which are clearly depicted therein, such as the relationship between flange 19 and the interior of neck 2 of container 1. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir 1991); see also In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972) (things that patent drawings show clearly are not disregarded); In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914 (CCPA 1979) (citation omitted) (“[drawings are evaluated] ‘on the basis of what they reasonably disclose and suggest to one skilled in the art”’). Further, Petitioner’s assertion that flange 19' corresponds to a flexible lip seal member as claimed is based upon more than just Wheeler’s Figure 7. Contra PO Resp. 39 (contending that Petitioner’s entire position is based upon Figure 7 of Wheeler). Petitioner correctly notes that Wheeler discloses a substantially moisture proof container that includes a cap 7' formed of a resilient material and having internal flange 19', suggesting flange 19' is flexible and may be deflected. Pet. 49, 52; Ex. 1023, 3:4˗8. Petitioner also correctly explains that Wheeler discloses that internal flange 19' with bead 20' creates a fluid-tight seal inside the mouth of neck 2' of container 1'. Pet. 49, 52 (citing Ex. 1023, 4:27˗31, Figs 7, 8; Ex. 1008 ¶ 82). Similar to the argument against the prior ground of unpatentability, Patent Owner asks us to interpret the reference as disclosing a container that cannot be closed properly and if closed, would be deformed. This contention is not supported by the reference. Wheeler does not describe container 1' as disposable or otherwise suitable for only a single use. Ex. 1023, passim. To the contrary, Wheeler describes a cap and container assembly for medicines that is child-proof, so that once reclosed the cap can only be removed with ease by an adult. Ex. 1023, 1:4˗2:24; see also 3:18˗45 (describing alignment that permits reopening the container). Patent Owner’s contention that Wheeler’s container cannot be closed or is deformed by closing is further undermined by Wheeler’s express disclosure of how cap 7' is positioned when closed. Specifically, Wheeler discloses that shoulder 17' retains anchor band 21 on container 1' by engaging under lower bead 5 to retain anchor band 21 on container 1'. Ex. 1023, 3:65˗ 4:9, Figs. 7, 8. A preponderance of the evidence suggests that flange 19' corresponds” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,528,778 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,528,778

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.