• Imperative Care, Inc. v. Inari Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00728 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9, 10, 15–18, and 20–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Schaffer with Hartley or Eller; claims 1–3, 5, 6, 9, 15–18, and 21–24 are also obvious over Hartley and Eller.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition lacks specificity. That definition, if interpreted generically, could mean that a person may qualify as a POSA if they had, for example, a B.S. in mechanical engineering and only two years of experience designing any type of product in any field. That is too broad. We find that a POSA would have had the agreed-upon educational credentials—an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline. Ex. 1003 ¶ 35; Ex. 2033 ¶ 61. We find that a POSA would also have had 2–4 years of design or engineering experience related to products in the field of the invention, which involves endovascular devices and the surgical procedures that use such devices. Ex. 1001, 1:16–54 (background of the invention). Such devices include, but are not limited to, hemostasis valves and catheters for testimony of the parties’ experts, the POSA need not have had first-hand experience designing hemostasis valves. See, e.g., Ex. 1037 (Zalesky Tr.), 72:11–73:7 (testifying direct experience “designing” hemostasis valves or aspiration catheters is not necessary, but “general experience with vascular devices and procedures” is required). Further, as Dr. Zalesky testified, the POSA’s experience related to developing such devices “could be as simple as bench testing and looking at clinical data.” Id. at 74:5–75:1. Lastly, a POSA would have understood such devices’ design requirements as determined by the needs of the physician, patient, and procedure, which understanding may be informed by work experience or study. Ex. 2030, 24:5–21.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “above (supra Section III.C), a filament requires flexibility, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Schaffer describes that feature in its valves. Instead, Patent Owner persuades us that Schaffer describes “rigid U-shaped actuating members—not a ‘filament.’” PO Resp. 23–24.13 We find Dr. Zalesky’s interpretation of Schaffer more credible than Mr. Thornton’s on the question of whether a POSA would have regarded Schaffer’s actuating members as being substantially rigid structures. Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 91–100 (testifying, inter alia, that a POSA would have understood from Schaffer’s disclosure about making the actuator and actuating members from machining pre-existing amounts of metals and/or plastics, and further explaining that flexible parts would deform and be difficult to machine through conventional techniques); Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 81–82. Mr. Thornton testifies that Schaffer’s disclosed manufacturing techniques for the actuator/actuating members are only examples and “a person of ordinary skill in the art could have simply purchased pre-made [and flexible] flat wire or plastic tapes or ribbons.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 79. Such testimony invokes, at best, obviousness-based reasoning. This does not establish that Schaffer alone describes a filament sufficient to anticipate the claims. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed.” slip op. at 28

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner cites intrinsic evidence in support of its interpretation, which include claim 1’s recitation of an “active tensioning mechanism” comprising the filament and the Specification’s description of a filament that can be both “loosened” and “tightened.” PO Resp. 14–17 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, 9:36–37, 9:53–56 (teaching “the filament 150 is tightened” when the actuator buttons are released and “the filament 150 is loosened” when the buttons are pressed to open the valve)); see also Ex. 2025, 1288 (defining “tension” as to “tighten to a desired or appropriate degree”). These descriptions from the patent are more consistent with the view that the filament is characteristically flexible, not rigid. 10 We reached the same conclusion, based on substantially the same records, in the Institution Decision and the Final Written Decisions in the 1157, 156, and 289 IPRs. Inst. Dec. 14–18; Ex. 1042, 14–24; Ex. 1048, 16–23; Ex. 1049, 14–17 (noting the parties’ agreement at oral hearing that there was no additional argument or evidence about whether a filament requires flexibility that was not already addressed in related matters). After we construed the “filament” term to require flexibility at institution, Petitioner provided no further argument or evidence on this issue in its authorized trial briefing or at oral hearing. See generally Pet. Reply. embodiments (where the filament forms one or more loops like depicted and described in Figures 6–7) require a flexible structure. See, e.g., Ex. 2032, 15–16 (explaining that the device would not work to constrict the tubular sidewall and lumen (analogous to the elongate member defining a lumen of the claims here) if the filament forming the loop(s) was inflexible); Ex. 1001, Figs. 6–7 (filament 150, with sub-filaments 150-A and 150-B). Although flexibility of the filament in the patent’s “bight” embodiments (e.g., as shown in Figures 8 and 9) is less clear, there is a dearth of evidence from Petitioner—either intrinsic or extrinsic to the patent—showing why a POSA would have understood the bights as embracing rigid structures. See Ex. 1001, Figs. 8–9. Moreover, as admitted by Petitioner’s expert, that a filament may be made from various materials described in the patent (e.g., synthetics or metals) does not, absent more information, lead to a conclusion that a filament is “rigid.” Ex. 2030, 125:2–126:4 (testifying “the relative stiffness or rigidity is not clear from those . . . materials without knowing much more information”).” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Schaffer anticipates claim 1 or any of the other challenged claims, each of which requires at least one “filament.” We are unpersuaded above (supra Section III.C), a filament requires flexibility, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Schaffer describes that feature in its valves. Instead, Patent Owner persuades us that Schaffer describes “rigid U-shaped actuating members—not a ‘filament.’” PO Resp. 23–24.13 We find Dr. Zalesky’s interpretation of Schaffer more credible than Mr. Thornton’s on the question of whether a POSA would have regarded Schaffer’s actuating members as being substantially rigid structures. Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 91–100 (testifying, inter alia, that a POSA would have understood from Schaffer’s disclosure about making the actuator and actuating members from machining pre-existing amounts of metals and/or plastics, and further explaining that flexible parts would deform and be difficult to machine through conventional techniques); Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 81–82. Mr. Thornton testifies that Schaffer’s disclosed manufacturing techniques for the actuator/actuating members are only examples and “a person of ordinary skill in the art could have simply purchased pre-made [and flexible] flat wire or plastic tapes or ribbons.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 79. Such testimony invokes, at best, obviousness-based reasoning. This does not establish that Schaffer alone describes a filament sufficient to anticipate the claims. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,844,921 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,844,921
• CSPC Pharmaceutical Group Limited / CSPC Ouyi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. et al. v. Ipsen Biopharm Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01531 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 7, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed drug sequence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, for purposes of this proceeding, it does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 8. Based on the entirety of the trial record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA’s skill level because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’552 patent and prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We decline to discount Dr. Oberstein’s opinion based on the alleged conflict of interest and bias. Dr. Oberstein testified that the consulting fees he receives from Patent Owner reflect a small fraction of his income. Ex. 1210, 402:21–403:9. We also agree with Patent Owner that an oncologist prescribing an FDA-approved regimen does not evince bias. See Sur-reply 23; see also Ex. 1206, 49 (showing NALIRIFOX is a category 1, NCCN-preferred first-line therapy for metastatic pancreatic cancer), 69 (explaining category 1 is based upon high-level evidence). Petitioner also contends that Dr. Oberstein “offers conclusory opinions,” “fails to properly apply the law, continues to look at each reference in isolation, refuses to acknowledge logical suggestions in the art, and imports new limitations into the claims.” Reply 3–4. We evaluate each piece of evidence, including Dr. Oberstein’s opinion, as it relates to our substantive patentability analysis, and accord it proper weight.” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving that the material sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a); see also Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”)15 § II.K (“A motion to exclude must explain why the evidence is not admissible.”). For the reasons explained below, we deny Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Whether a reference qualifies as a “printed publication” involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is publicly accessible upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence can locate it. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Conroy was published on May 12, 2011. Ex. 1003, 1. Conroy refers to Conroy Protocol (Ex. 1004), stating that “[t]he protocol, including the statistical analysis plan, is available with the full text of this article at NEMJ.org.” Ex. 1003, 3. When questioned whether he has “any reason to believe that the protocol would not have been provided on NEJM.org with this text when it was published,” Dr. Oberstein testified that “if they say they provided it, then I think they probably provided it.” Ex. 1210, 165:20–166:2. 17 Alternatively, to the extent necessary, under the circumstances of this case, we waive the requirement of § 42.63(b). See 37.C.F.R. § 42.5(b). In addition, Dr. Ratain testified that “most top journals require that the protocol be submitted at the time of initial submission, and it’s always published alongside any major paper.” Ex. 2073, 42:2–5. According to Dr. Ratain, “[c]ertainly, New England Journal of Medicine does that.” Id. at 42:6–7. We credit the testimony from both Dr. Oberstein and Dr. Ratain on this issue. Accordingly, we find Exhibit 1004 was publicly accessible at the same time Conroy was published. slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 11,344,552 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,344,552
• CSPC Pharmaceutical Group Limited / CSPC Ouyi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. et al. v. Ipsen Biopharm Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00505 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over the first § 103 combination; claims 2, 7, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not support the claimed drug sequence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that [t]he person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) would have been an M.D. and/or Pharm. D who would have completed training in medical oncology, particularly in the field of gastrointestinal (GI) cancers, or a Ph.D. in clinical pharmacology, pharmaceutical sciences, pharmaceutics, and/or drug delivery, also particularly in the field of GI cancers, or their equivalents, along with at least 1-2 years of post-doctoral experience. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44–46). Patent Owner states that, for purposes of this proceeding, it does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 8. Based on the entirety of the trial record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA’s skill level because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’552 patent and prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We decline to discount Dr. Oberstein’s opinion based on the alleged conflict of interest and bias. Dr. Oberstein testified that the consulting fees he receives from Patent Owner reflect a small fraction of his income. Ex. 1210, 402:21–403:9. We also agree with Patent Owner that an oncologist prescribing an FDA-approved regimen does not evince bias. See Sur-reply 23; see also Ex. 1206, 49 (showing NALIRIFOX is a category 1, NCCN-preferred first-line therapy for metastatic pancreatic cancer), 69 (explaining category 1 is based upon high-level evidence). Petitioner also contends that Dr. Oberstein “offers conclusory opinions,” “fails to properly apply the law, continues to look at each reference in isolation, refuses to acknowledge logical suggestions in the art, and imports new limitations into the claims.” Reply 3–4. We evaluate each piece of evidence, including Dr. Oberstein’s opinion, as it relates to our substantive patentability analysis, and accord it proper weight.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In the DI, the Board stated that the ordinary understanding of a claim reciting a “method of treating metastatic adenocarcinoma of the pancreas” that comprises “administering an antineoplastic therapy to the patient” in order “to treat the metastatic adenocarcinoma of the pancreas” is that the “treatment” would have more than a de minimis therapeutic benefit or efficacy for the patient being treated. DI 14. We, however, rejected the notion that the claims “would require some particular degree of clinical efficacy” because “the level of clinical efficacy is not a claim limitation.” Id.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached

    “The parties, however, disagree over whether each recited dose must be the starting dose. Petitioner argues that “claim 1 requires that the method of treatment is a first-line therapy, but does not require that the claimed doses be used as a starting dose.” Paper 51, 1. In contrast, Patent Owner argues that “[t]he specification describes that the recited dose of each drug is a ‘starting’ or ‘initial’ dose.” Paper 50, 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 13:38–45, 30:5–7). For purposes of this Decision, we do not need to resolve this dispute. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). As explained below, we agree with Petitioner that, even if claim 1 recites the starting dose for each drug, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior art teaches each dose and a POSA would have had a reason to start with the recited doses. See infra Section II.G.3; Paper 51, 3 n.2. Because we find that the prior art teaches or suggests the claimed subject matter even under Patent Owner’s proposed narrower claim interpretation, we need not further construe the disputed claim language.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,344,552 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,344,552
• Qiagen Sciences, LLC v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00026 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 5–10 are anticipated by Porreca and obvious over Schmitt and McCloskey; claims 4 and 7 are also obvious over the listed Illumina combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “On the initial trial record, we agreed with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had experience with next generation sequencing, but were not persuaded that this would only be possible in the field of molecular biology. Instead, we found that a person of ordinary skill would have had either (1) a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry or (2) a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Inst. Dec. 8. We specifically found that “[t]he person of ordinary skill would have had experience with next generation sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned.” Id. at 8–9. Patent Owner now submits that it does not dispute the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as laid out in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 13. Reviewing the entire trial record, we maintain the same definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art and note that it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’357 patent and prior art. We further note that the skill level does not affect our analysis or our final decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, the Board adopted Petitioner’s construction of the term “adaptor.” Inst. Dec. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction. PO Resp. 13–14. During oral argument, Petitioner argued that claim 1 requires “an adapter to be ligated onto a target DNA, and that adapter needs to have two different sequences of DNA that are used for identification” including a “socalled identifier that's one to eight nucleotides in an indexing site.” Tr. 6:19–7:2. Patent Owner, again, did not dispute this characterization of “adaptor.” See generally Tr. Based on the entirety of the trial record, we continue to apply Petitioner’s construction of the term “adaptor,” although we note that it does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the entirety of the trial record, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s reading of either the claims or the prior art because Patent Owner takes too narrow a view of both. First, based on the plain language of Porreca, we find it uses a combination of the sequence reads of the target sequence and differentiator tag sequences to determine whether there is duplication. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 139–140, 143, 148, 153. All that the claim requires is that the method identifies sequence reads with identical identifier and target sequences as duplicates. Because claim 1 contains the transition “comprising,” the claim is still satisfied if the category of identified duplicate reads contains identical labels and also contains more. Patent Owner admits that the identifier and target sequence do not have to be used simultaneously. Tr. 46:16–48:4. Instead, Patent Owner challenges whether Porreca uses the required elements in combination as recited in the challenged claims. Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner’s position especially in view of the open-ended nature of the claims and Patent Owner’s own admission that there is no temporal requirement for the use of target sequences and differentiator tag sequences. Specifically, we find that Porreca teaches using the combination of the target sequences and the differentiator tag sequence to determine whether particular sequence reads are unique or PCR duplicates. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 139–140, 143, 148, 153. The use of both such sequences meet the claim limitations. This finding is consistent with the prosecution history of the ’357 patent and how the applicant and examiner interpreted the claims. See Ex. 1013, 69–70, 78–79. Second, we find the disclosure of Porreca sufficient to demonstrate to an ordinarily skilled artisan that “collapsing” is done by comparing target sequences and differentiator tag sequences. Porreca specifically explains that: after multiple reads have been collected for a given locus, it is possible that due to bias (e.g., caused by PCR amplification steps), a large fraction of the reads are derived from a single originating molecule. This would skew the population of target sequences observed, and would affect the outcome of the genotype call.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner for at least two reasons. First, Patent Owner fails to address the fact that Schmitt cites to McCloskey 2007. We find that the citation of McCloskey 2007 in Schmitt indicates that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered the teachings of McCloskey to be highly relevant to the teachings of Schmitt and would have considered them to be both useful in the field of sequencing. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 6. Second, Patent Owner fails to explain or even identify the purported structural differences between Schmitt and McCloskey that would prevent the teachings of McCloskey from being relevant to Schmitt. In addition, we credit the testimony of Dr. Metzker that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the benefits of adding a barcode to target sequences and would have looked to McCloskey and the batch-stamps it teaches because both Schmitt and McCloskey are in the same field and address the same problems. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110, 114. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have had sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Schmitt and McCloskey to arrive at challenged claim 1.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 11,098,357 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,098,357
• Illumina, Inc. v. Molecular Loop Biosciences, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2024-01419 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to disclose the claimed correcting step, and Chee was not prior art to claims 1–3 and 9.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “We have considered both parties’ arguments and evidence and determine that Patent Owner has presented sufficient evidence of reasonable the invention to practice every day during the critical period in order to demonstrate reasonable diligence. See Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus America, Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[D]iligence need not be perfectly continuous—only reasonably continuous.” Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., Inc., 919 F.3d 1320, 1331 (2019). The key question is whether, “in light of the evidence as a whole, the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Applying this standard, we determine that Patent Owner sufficiently demonstrates reasonably continuous diligence throughout the critical period.” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “introduced during said workflow by collapsing target:differentiator tag combinations observed more than once into a single count.” Ex. 1001, 131:46–48 (emphasis added). The “determining step” of claim 2 recites “determining a consensus base call for the target nucleic acid molecule sequences,” but performs “collapsing all sequence reads comprising a same differentiator tag into a single read,” before the “determining step.” Id. at 131:49–53. Patent Owner proposes an interpretation of these “collapsing” and “determining” steps recited in claims 1 and 2 and asserts that they should be construed as distinct steps performed in a particular order in which the “collapsing step” is performed before the “determining step.” PO Resp. 42–45. We agree. First, Patent Owner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “collapsing step” of claim 1 is distinct from, and must occur before, the “determining step” of claim 2 based on the plain language of claims 1 and 2. PO Resp. 42–43. Patent Owner argues that the “collapsing step” and the “determining step” are distinct steps because claims 1 and 2 use different terms to describe these distinct steps that are performed sequentially according to the claim language. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 131:47–54; Ex. 2023 ¶ 133; Ex. 2024, 57:11–58:22). More specifically, Patent Owner explains that claim 1 recites a “collapsing step,” followed by claim 2, which depends from claim 1 and refers to “collapsing” before “determining a consensus base call” such that “claim 2 describes determining a consensus base call from collapsed reads, not performing ‘collapsing’ by determining a consensus base call.” Id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 131:47–54). collapsing corrects for skewing, an issue related to over- or under-amplification, which is a separate and distinct problem from the sequence errors that a consensus base call is designed to address.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1001, 27:47–50, 32:29–34). Patent Owner contends further that “‘[c]ollapsing’ is a different step, performed separately from determining any consensus base call, to provide even greater accuracy when subsequently determining a consensus base call” such that “if one were to collapse by determining the consensus base call, errors from amplification bias could still be represented in the consensus base call generated.” Id. at 43–44 (emphasis omitted, citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 134–37). Second, Patent Owner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “collapsing step” of claim 1 is distinct from the “determining step” based on the specification of the ’730 patent. PO Resp. 43–45. For example, Patent Owner explains that the specification states that “[f]or any target:differentiator tag combination observed more than once, all such reads are ‘collapsed’ into a single read before consensus basecalls are determined. This will cancel the effect of bias on consensus basecall accuracy.” Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 72:63– 73:5) (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 133, 138–142).” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We have considered both parties’ arguments and evidence and agree with Patent Owner’s position. As discussed above, we agree with Patent Owner that the “collapsing step” recited in claim 1 and the “determining step” recited in claim 2 are two different steps required by the challenged claims such that “collapsing” does not mean determining a consensus base call or sequence, and must occur before any determining step. As a result, we determine Chee’s step of determining a consensus sequence does not disclose the “collapsing step” recited in claim 1 that requires collapsing “target:differentiator tag combinations.” We are also unpersuaded by Petitioner’s reliance on Chee’s process of correcting for amplification bias as disclosing the claimed collapsing step. As recognized by Patent Owner, the claim language of the “collapsing step” requires “collapsing target:differentiator tag combinations,” rather than collapsing only differentiator tags. In view of this requirement, Chee does not disclose the “collapsing step” because Chee teaches quantifying the starting nucleic acid molecules using their unique identifiers, rather than target:differentiator tag combinations. As Petitioner admits, “Chee’s technique for correcting amplification bias corrects quantitative errors without correcting sequencing errors” (Reply 15), whereas claim 1’s “collapsing step” corrects both quantitative errors and sequencing errors by using target:differentiator tag combinations. See Ex. 1001, 131:47–49 target:differentiator tag combinations).” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Given this claim interpretation requiring collapsing target:differentiator tag combinations, it is undisputed that McCloskey, who uses unique barcodes alone, does not teach this limitation. Petitioner does not rely on Bignell as teaching this collapsing step. Accordingly, we conclude Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Bignell and McCloskey teaches the “collapsing step” recited in claim 1. Because claims 4 through 6 depend from claim 1, they also require the “collapsing step” of claim 1 that is not taught by the combination of Bignell and McCloskey.” slip op. at 54

  Patent outcomesUS 11,840,730 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,840,730
• Integrated Dna Technologies, Inc. v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 8, 2026 · IPR2024-01504 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9, and 10 are unpatentable under § 102 over Bielas and § 103 over Iafrate and Kivioja and Bielas.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “On the initial trial record, we agreed with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art is higher than warranted when Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill “further would have had specific experience with implementing and designing library preparation methods.” Pet. 21–22. We disagreed with Patent Owner, however, that an ordinarily skilled artisan only needs to “have had experience with DNA sequencing methods” (see Prelim. Resp. 8) because an artisan with experience based only on pre-NGS sequencing methods would not qualify as a person of ordinary skill. Instead, we found that a person of ordinary skill would have had either (1) a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry or (2) a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Inst. Dec. 9. We specifically found that “[t]he person of ordinary skill would have had experience with NGS sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned.” Id.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “indexing site” Petitioner argues that the ’357 patent defines “indexing site” as a sample index, specifically, “a nucleic acid sequence that acts as an index for multiple polynucleotide samples, thus allowing for the samples to be pooled together into a single sequencing run, which is known as multiplexing.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:40–44). Patent Owner did not disagree initially with Petitioner’s proposed construction other than to argue that no claim requires construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. In our Institution Decision, we noted that the ’357 patent states: An indexing site is a nucleic acid sequence that acts as an index for multiple polynucleotide samples, thus allowing for the samples to be pooled together into a single sequencing run, which is known as multiplexing. the ’357 patent to provide a definition for “indexing site,” and we construed the term in accordance therewith. The parties do not dispute this definition and we maintain that construction for our analysis here. See PO Resp. 9; Reply 6–14.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In some embodiments, duplicate sequencing reads are differentiated from one another as being true duplicates versus apparent or perceived duplicates. Apparent or perceived duplicates may be identified from sequencing libraries and using conventional measures of duplicate reads (i.e., reads were mapped using bowtie), where all reads with the same start and end nucleic acid coordinates were counted as duplicates. True duplicates may be identified from sequencing libraries having had an identifier site introduced through ligation to differentiate between fragments of DNA that randomly have the same start and end mapping coordinates. Ex. 1004, 14:21–31; see id. at Fig. 5; see also Example 1, 18:6-15 (When evaluating two million random reads, the apparent duplicates were found to comprise 39% of all reads. However, the true duplicates, identified through The methods employing the use of an identifier site were found to considerably increase the resolution of the true number of duplicates within the pool of reads.). The ’357 patent also discloses in Example 5: “Any read that has identical sequence to any other read is identified as a duplicate and removed from the population, thus, only a single copy is retained within the file.” Ex. 1004, 20:60–62. Analyzing the patent disclosure in light of the parties’ arguments, we determine that “duplicates” in claim 1 of the ’357 patent means the sequences possess an identical sequence for both the identifier and the length of the sequence read that is obtained. Additionally, we agree with the parties that there is no temporal requirement for “identifying sequence reads” using the identifier and the target sequence, and the two do not have to be used simultaneously. Rather, based on both Examples 1 and 5 of the ’357 patent, the claims only require that the two data points be used for “identifying sequence reads.”” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “4. “comprising” The Board preliminarily construed “comprising” as an open-ended transition that is not limited to the listed steps. See Inst. Dec. 13 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 811). Patent Owner agrees that the “comprising” transitional phrase of the challenged claims leaves open the possibility that additional steps can be included in the method, but argues that it should not “be interpreted so broadly as to effectively eliminate the step of identifying duplicates as claimed.” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner argues that a “broad interpretation of the claims cannot be read to include a method in which the identifying duplicates step only identifies sequences with PCR or SBS errors and does not identify duplicates in the manner include only identification of reads without duplicate sequences (those that contain PCR or SBS errors) makes this limitation superfluous and cannot be the correct interpretation.” Id. Patent Owner argues that the proper construction of the claims (1) covers a method of identifying sequence reads that are identical as duplicates through a process that uses both the identifier and at least a portion of the target sequence, and (2) does not exclude methods that include a step of identifying PCR errors in addition to the claimed step of identifying duplicates. Id. at 19. Petitioner agrees with Patent Owner and states “[a]ll claim 1 requires is that two sequences are identified as duplicates using the claimed method, even if the method identifies as duplicates additional sequences that are not 100% identical.” Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1124, 55:11–57:3; Ex. 1117). The Board agrees with the parties and we construe “comprising” as an open-ended transition, meaning the claims require, but are not limited to, the listed steps.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,098,357 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,098,357
• Imperative Care, Inc. v. Inari Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2025-00156 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Schaffer combined with Hartley or Eller, with or without Garrison; anticipation by Schaffer and obviousness over Schaffer alone were not shown.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties propose essentially the same formal educational background for the POSA, but we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition lacks some specificity concerning the POSA’s work experience. That definition, if interpreted generically, could mean that a person qualifies as a POSA if they had, for example, a B.S. in mechanical engineering and only two years of experience with any type of product in any field. That is too broad. We find that a POSA would have had the agreed-upon educational credentials—an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline. Ex. 1003 ¶ 35; Ex. 2008 ¶ 76. 10 Although unspecified in this proceeding, in the related 1157 IPR, Patent Owner stated that the field of the invention is “hemostasis valves for use during intravascular procedures.” IPR2024-01157, Paper 13 at 22. engineering experience related to products in the field of the invention, which involves endovascular devices and the surgical procedures that use such devices. Ex. 1001, 1:24–60 (background of the invention). Such devices include, but are not necessarily limited to, hemostasis valves and catheters for minimally-invasive vascular surgeries. Id. Furthermore, as pointed out by Petitioner and consistent with the testimony of the parties’ experts, the POSA need not have had firsthand experience designing relevant medical devices, including hemostasis valves. Pet. Reply 28; see, e.g., Ex. 1019 (Zalesky Tr.), 72:11–73:7 (testifying direct experience “designing” hemostasis valves or aspiration catheters is not necessary, but “general experience with vascular devices and procedures” is required); Ex. 2006 (Thornton Tr.), 180:13–19. As Dr. Zalesky testified, the POSA’s experience related to such devices “could be as simple as bench testing and looking at clinical data.” Ex. 1019, 74:5–75:1; see also id. at 82:3–6 (testifying a POSA need not “have specific experience with different methodologies of hemostasis”). Lastly, a POSA would have had an understanding of such devices’ design requirements as determined by the needs of the physician, patient, and procedure, which understanding may be informed by work experience and/or study. Ex. 2006, 24:5–21.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “aspiration catheter” Claim 1’s preamble recites “[a]n aspiration catheter.” Ex. 1001, 22:10. Petitioner contends that, as a general rule, a preamble does not limit the scope of a claim, and that the term “aspiration” here merely describes a non-limiting “intended use” of an otherwise structurally-complete invention defined by the body of the claim. Pet. 18–19. Patent Owner responds that 11 In the related 1157 IPR, Patent Owner moved to exclude Mr. Thornton’s testimony, which motion we denied. IPR2024-01157, Paper 35 at 70–72. Patent Owner filed no motion to exclude here. Owner’s arguments here.” PO Resp. 30. We need not further construe “aspiration catheter” as no dispute turns on that term’s meaning or whether it is limiting. Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375 (explaining that claims need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve matters in dispute).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “That does not, however, resolve the dispute about “flexibility.” On that issue, after considering the full record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that a “filament” as claimed is flexible. The claims support Patent Owner’s interpretation. Patent Owner cites the claim language, including the recitation that “the first filament [is] formed into a loop around the collapsible tubular sidewall defining a valve lumen” and that “a diameter of the valve lumen decreases in response to reducing a diameter of the loop.” As Patent Owner argues, and as we recognized at the institution stage, the claimed filament “must be flexible to constrict the valve lumen.” PO Resp. 23; Inst. Dec. 15–16; Ex. 2008 ¶ 68 (testifying that a POSA would understand this property of flexibility is essential to achieving the claimed loop formation and function). The Specification supports this understanding. Consider the “loop” embodiments as illustrated in Figures 6 or 7. Ex. 1001, Figs. 6–7. If the filament forming each depicted loop was somehow rigid, applying a force that seeks to pull the respective ends of the filament in opposing directions would not decrease the size of the loop—the loop would stay the same size and the filament would not circumferentially constrict and seal the elongate member’s lumen as described in the patent. Ex. 1001, 13:18–29.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is unavailing. A steel beam or a plastic broom handle are longer than they are wide and yet conventionally rigid. And, specific to the subject matter here, as Mr. Thornton admits, machining the valve’s actuating members from plastic or metal, which Schaffer actually describes, would produce rigid members. Ex. 2005, 168:2–6; see also Ex. 2006, 152:8–10 (testifying a flexible aluminum wire would not be made from machining aluminum). Moreover, considering Schaffer’s cited drawings— Figure 32, in particular—does not show the actuating members changing shape or dynamically conforming to the outer surface of the seal module that those members are compressing, which, had that been shown, might indicate flexibility. Maybe the absence of any dynamic conformance of the surface of the actuating members is an unintended limitation or artifact of the drawing. Or maybe not, and what is shown is a rigid structure consistent with Schaffer’s other disclosures as already explained. We decline to find anticipation where Schaffer does not, with sufficient clarity and detail, describe a valve with a “filament” as claimed.21 Ultimately, on whether Schaffer describes rigid or flexible U-shaped actuating members, Dr. Zalesky’s interpretation of the reference is more plausible and we find greater evidentiary support for Patent Owner’s position on this issue. Notwithstanding Mr. Thornton’s testimony in his rebuttal declaration that a POSA reading Schaffer would have understood 21 Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Anticipation requires that a single reference describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.”) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). testimony on cross-examination was equivocal—he admitted “[i]t’s not clear” whether Schaffer’s U-shaped actuating members are flexible or rigid. Ex. 2006, 115:16–23 (testifying “[t]he material properties of the U-shaped actuating members are not clearly defined in the Shafer [sic] application”). Dr. Zalesky, in contrast, has consistently testified that a POSA would have understood that Schaffer describes rigid actuating members. See, e.g., Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 66–74 (citing, inter alia, Schaffer’s illustrations of the valve in operation, and the disclosed manufacturing and assembly methods as indicating that “the actuating members 55 are rigid rather than flexible”).” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 11,697,012 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,697,012
• Integrated Dna Technologies, Inc. v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00016 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1–3, 5–12, and 14–19 not shown unpatentable because Meyer did not disclose the claimed enrichment, which the obviousness grounds did not supply.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “for purposes of this Decision, we find a POSA would have had a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry. Alternatively, a POSA would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Additionally, the POSA would have had knowledge of how those methods functioned. Id. at 12.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “As an initial matter, we acknowledge that the definition “to process so as to add or increase the proportion of a desirable ingredient” has two possible interpretations. In the first interpretation, “add or increase” shares the same object “the proportion of a desirable ingredient.” When the proportion of one ingredient goes higher, the proportion of at least another ingredient would necessarily go lower. Thus, the enrichment process under this interpretation results in a higher proportion of the desirable ingredient relative to other ingredients. Patent Owner adopts this interpretation. See PO Resp. 17 (“In the context of preparing a sequencing library, [Patent Owner] Tecan proposes that a nucleic acid sequence of interest is ‘enriched’ when the proportion of nucleic acid fragments containing the sequence of interest is increased relative to other nucleic acid fragments in the sample.”). According to Patent Owner, “amplifying the one or more oligonucleotide extension products . . . thereby enriching the nucleic acid sequence of interest, by generating amplified products comprising the enriched nucleic acid sequence of interest” in step (c) means “increas[ing] the proportion of the nucleic acid sequence of interest relative to the nucleic acid fragments in the solution not containing the sequence of interest by amplifying the oligonucleotide extension product and its complement.” Id. at 19–20. Under the second interpretation, the object for “add” is “a desirable ingredient,” whereas the object for “increase” is “the proportion of a desirable ingredient.” This interpretation is broader than the first one in that the result of the enrichment process not only encompasses a higher proportion of the desirable ingredient relative to other ingredients, but also more desirable ingredient in raw number.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Dr. Sims. As explained above, the amplification step must result in at least some enrichment of the sequence of interest, even though it does not have to be the only cause. See supra Section II.C.2.b. Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that “at least some of the enrichment must result from the recited steps.” Reply 12. Because Meyer’s enrichment for mRNA using the SMART protocol occurred before any recited steps of claim 1, we find it does not meet the claimed “enrichment” under our construction.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “shown that Meyer discloses step (c) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not address that limitation in this ground, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claims 8, 17, and 18 would have been obvious over Meyer. F. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer and Siebert Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the nucleic acid fragment comprises genomic DNA.” Petitioner asserts that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert. Pet. 62–65. Petitioner relies on Siebert for teaching the additional limitation recited in claim 2 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (c) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Siebert for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 10,876,108 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,876,108
• Integrated Dna Technologies, Inc. v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00015 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 5–22 were not shown unpatentable because Meyer does not disclose the claimed enrichment, and the other grounds rely on Meyer for that limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “for purposes of this Decision, we find a POSA would have had a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry. Alternatively, a POSA would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Additionally, the POSA would have had experience with NGS sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned. Id. at 14. After institution, Patent Owner states that, for purposes of this proceeding, it adopts the Board’s definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 18. After reviewing the record developed during trial, we see no reason to change our finding on this issue. As we stated in the DI, our “definition of a POSA is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’012 patent and prior art.” DI 14.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “to “enrich” means to “increase[] relative to the rest of the fragments.” Tr. 12:25–26. The panel asked: “In the starting material, there are three components, A, B, C, that say it’s 30 percent, 50 percent and 20 percent. You do PCR and it -- they all get amplified and the end result is still 30 percent, 50 percent, and 20 percent. Anything got enriched?” Id. at 12:18–21. Petitioner responded that “petitioner’s position is that in that situation, there is no enrichment.” Id. at 12:22–23. In other words, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner that mere increase in the raw number is not enrichment. See also id. at 13:7–9 (“[W]e would agree that if it is truly unbiased amplification, that does not result in an increase in the proportion, and so that does not meet the plain meaning of enrich.”). We find the record, including the testimony from all three declarants, supports Patent Owner’s argument. See Sur-reply 1–5 (citing Ex. 1125, 283:1–6, 286:22–287:14; Ex. 1126, 170:18–171:1; Ex. 2037, 150:18–22, 173:15–17; Ex. 2038 ¶ 95), 8 (citing Ex. 1125, 271:10–15; Ex. 2037, 188:22–189:1). Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal that “a nucleic acid sequence of interest is ‘enriched’ when the proportion of nucleic acid fragments containing the sequence of interest is increased relative to other nucleic acid fragments in the sample.”9 See PO Resp. 19.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Dr. Sims. As explained above, the amplification step must result in at least some enrichment of the sequence of interest, even though it does not have to be the only cause. See supra Section II.C.2.b. Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that “at least some of the enrichment must result from the recited steps.” Reply 12. Because Meyer’s enrichment for mRNA using the SMART protocol occurred before any recited steps of claim 1, we find it does not meet the claimed “enrichment” under our construction.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “F. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer and Siebert Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the nucleic acid fragment comprises genomic DNA.” Petitioner asserts that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert. Pet. 69–72. Petitioner relies on Siebert for teaching the additional limitation recited in claim 2 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (d) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Siebert for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert. G. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer and Kelley Claim 9 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the barcode sequence is 12 nucleotides in length.” Petitioner asserts that claim 9 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Kelley. Pet. 72–74. Petitioner relies on Kelley for teaching the additional limitation recited in claim 9 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (d) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Kelley for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 9 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Kelley. H. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer, Caruccio, and Bronner Each of claims 15 and 17–19 depends from claim 1. Claim 15 further recites “the second strand of the partial duplex adaptor is ligated to a 3′ end of the nucleic acid fragment.” Claim 17 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, further comprising performing bridge amplification of the annealed strand after step e).” Claim 18 further recites “the sequencing comprises use of four labeled reversible terminators.” And claim 19 further recites “the sequencing comprises semiconductor sequencing.” Petitioner asserts that claims 15 and 17–19 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer, Caruccio, and Bronner. Pet. 75–80. Petitioner relies on Caruccio and Bronner for teaching the additional limitation recited in claims 15 and 17–19 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (d) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Caruccio and Bronner for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claims 15 and 17–19 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer, Caruccio, and Bronner.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 10,036,012 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,036,012
• Pacificorp / Interstate Power & Light Company et al. v. Birchtech Corp.Other
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00687 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 10–18 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandInstituted

    “Paper 34, 1 (requesting “Director Review of the Director’s August 22, 2025 Decision Referring the Petition to the Board (‘Referral Decision’)”). Patent Owner argued that institution of IPR2025-00687 and IPR2025-00688 “should be discretionarily denied.” Id. at 5. Petitioner opposed. Paper 37. The Director granted review and found that “granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims of the ’370 patent and ’218 patent 2” was an “abuse[] of discretion.” Paper 40, 1. The Director remanded the cases “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions challenging each of the ’370 and ’218 patents to institute.” Id. at 3. Pursuant to the Director’s instruction that we choose only one of the two petitions challenging the ’370 patent to institute, and for the reasons set forth below, we choose to institute review of the ’370 patent in this Petition, and not in IPR2025-00688.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b). See, e.g., Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019)” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner “[does] not, at this time, contend that any term requires construction,” and instead, states that “[a]ll terms have been accorded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Patent Owner asserts that it “does not presently propose any constructions,” but discusses the Board’s claim construction in IPR2020- 00834, Paper 18, 7–8. Prelim. Resp. 7. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,933,370

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.