• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 10,379,301
• Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 4, and 7–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12–13; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundInstituted

    “On the current record, this argument does not identify a deficiency in Petitioner’s position as to clauses 1C and 1D. Patent Owner implies that the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D require functionality recited elsewhere in the claim—namely, forming a “fluid dispersion” (Prelim. Resp. 4)—but Patent Owner does not adequately present evidence supporting this implied claim construction. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Instead, Patent Owner cites to the entirety of claim 1 in support of these implied functional requirements. See Prelim. Resp. 4. Stated differently, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why any particular component (or collection of components) must perform the function of forming the “fluid dispersion” recited in clause 1G. Moreover, even assuming as correct Patent Owner’s assertion that Sevy “requires downstream separation,” Patent Owner has not explained why such a 8 In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner appears to use different terms for the same concept: “downstream separation”; “post-formation correction”; and “post-atomization correction.” See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3 (“downstream separation”), 4 (“post-formation correction”), 5–6 (“post-atomization correction”). In any response, Patent Owner should clarify the scope of these terms. requirement would fall outside of the scope of claim 1. See Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘[A]ttorney argument is not evidence’ and cannot rebut other admitted evidence.” (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017))). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Sevy discloses or suggests the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,583,449
• Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution

  Instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 3–8 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 As Paper 7 in this proceeding, Patent Owner mistakenly filed the Preliminary Response in a related proceeding. one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears generally consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceedings that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, as revised above.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

    “At this stage of the proceeding, the record on the analogous art issue is incomplete. Petitioner seems to take the position that Kaiser is in the same “field” (Pet. 47), but Petitioner does not fully address the issue of analogous art. Although Petitioner was not required to anticipate this argument with its initial filing (see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharma., Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023)), Petitioner may wish to address this issue as appropriate in future briefing. We will consider the full record on this issue, if necessary, as part of our analysis in any final written decision. On the current record and in view of our decision to institute based on other grounds, we reach no conclusion as to whether Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Goubet and Kaiser as proposed.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,092,918
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Douglas and Mark.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “A claim is unpatentable under § 103 “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103; see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21); Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision. Only Petitioner’s proposed level is supported by testimonial evidence on the preliminary record, and it appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “CLAIM CONSTRUCTION B. In an IPR, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). This generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; Prelim. Resp. 9. However, the parties’ positions depend on interpreting the claim language in a particular way, and we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “At this stage, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner appears to equate a “fabrication profile” with a toolpath description, but nothing in the plain language of claim 1 supports that narrow interpretation. The ’774 patent describes a “fabrication profile” broadly and states that the profile can simply “include the dictionary [of configuration information],” or be “used to determine which machineready representation is available or suitable for a target printer.” Ex. 1001, 23:49–52. The preliminary evidence suggests that Douglas’s “operational parameters” would count as a “fabrication profile” because it is “the basis for generation of a machine-ready representation of the three-dimensional model that is executable on the target printer.” Id. at 23:37–39; see infra Section III.C.8. We also disagree that Petitioner’s argument is impermissible hindsight, because it is based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a sufficiently persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”). Finally, Petitioner appears to rely on Mark for providing a particular example of a fabrication profile, not to replace Douglas’s overall system in which the 3D printer can receive “operational parameters” rather than just G-code. See Pet. 8–10, 17–23; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 41 (the print queue, which stores tool instructions, may be maintained locally on printers 204 or on print servers 208); see In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))).” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Boyer.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “approximately two weeks before the statutory deadline for a final written decision, but the most recent median time-to-trial statistics for Judge Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas indicate that the actual trial date will likely be in July 2026, which is later than the statutory deadline to issue a final written decision in this proceeding in mid-June 2026. See Ex. 2001, 7 (median time from filing to trial of 23.2 months); Prelim. Resp. 10. Thus, we find this factor is neutral or weighs slightly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’713 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “We note that, as discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’713 patent without expressly construing the term “from multiple print heads or deposition lines.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As for Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner has failed to carry its burden to identify how the claims are to be construed, we disagree on the present record. Although Petitioner does not provide a preferred construction for the single term it proposes requires construction, Petitioner does identify which of its two alternative constructions applies to each of its asserted grounds of unpatentability. Pet. 6 (“Under the first construction, [the obviousness grounds] are applicable, and [the anticipation ground] would be excluded from the claim scope. Under the alternative construction, all of [the asserted grounds] are applicable.”). In our view, this approach does not fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden under 37 U.S.C. § 42.104(b)(3).” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Koki Holdings America Ltd. v. Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00261 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Haley anticipates claims 1, 7, 8, 17, and 20 and Haley with Lai renders the remaining claims obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

    “Patent Owner argues that we should discretionarily deny the Petition based on alleged deficiencies in the Petition. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that “even if arguments as to a few claims might have been properly presented in the Petition, a decision to institute here would require the Board to address—for the first time and with no Petitioner input—critical claim construction issues affecting nearly every claim” in contravention of the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Prelim. Resp. 33–35. For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded on the current record that Petitioner has violated 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), or that critical and unresolved claim interpretation issues justifying discretionarily denying the Petition exist. We, therefore, decline to deny institution on this basis. E. Claims 1, 7, 8, 17, and 20: Anticipation by Haley” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “1. Lifter The Petition contends that the “lifter” limitation is a means-plus- function limitation, Pet. 7, which Patent Owner does not dispute, Prelim. Resp. 10–14. Patent Owner argues, however, that Petitioner has “fail[ed] to identify any structure in the ’007 Patent to perform the claimed function.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We disagree. Petitioner identifies the structures in the Specification corresponding to the “lifter” as follows: The “lifter” (“lifter member”) of the ’007 patent includes a rotatable cam lifter 100 (yellow below left), with pin 104, 106, and 108 (green) on its face surface that engage protrusions 92 (blue) on the driver member 90 (orange). ’007 patent, 9:36–52, 16:39–53, Fig. 12. The ’007 patent also discloses two-pin variants: lifter members 465 and 480 in Figs. 31, 33. ’007 patent, 32:23–38, 32:56–33:4. Pet. 17. This identification of corresponding structure is sufficient to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). We also note that at this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that Petitioner has correctly identified the corresponding structure. The parties may further address the proper interpretation of “lifter” at trial.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “gas pressure system” recited in the preamble of independent claims 1 and 17. Prelim. Resp. 21–22. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner, through its comparison of claims 1 and 17 to Haley, improperly implies that the “gas pressure system” can be “limited to a distinct portion of a power tool.” Id. at 23. Patent Owner contends that such an interpretation is improper because the “gas pressure system” must refer to “the entire system,” because the “structure of the claims themselves . . . include[s] . . . every component of the tool.” Id. We disagree. The “gas pressure system” recited in the preambles of claims 1 and 17 expressly refers to a system that is “for a power tool” and thus does not necessarily refer to “the entire” tool or “every component of the tool.” Ex. 1001, 39:6 (claim 1), 40:51 (claim 17). Neither claim 1 nor claim 17 recites, for example, the lifter or driver, which are required elements of an “entire” tool. Id. at 39:6–22 (claim 1), 40:51–67 (claim 17). The lifter and driver are introduced in dependent claims 2 and 18. Id. at 39:23–30 (claim 2), 41:1–9 (claim 18). Still other necessary components of a tool, e.g., a motor and power source, are introduced in dependent claims 5 and 19. Id. at 39:40–42 (claim 5), 41:10–13 (claim 19). By contrast to claims 1 and 17, independent claims 9 and 14 recite a “portable fastener driving tool” and expressly recite many necessary components of such a tool including the driver, lifter, prime mover, and power source. Id. at 39:54 (claim 9), 40:20 (claim 14). Accordingly, we find that the “gas pressure system” of claims 1 and 17 broadly refers to a portion of a power tool rather than the “entire system” or “every component of the tool.” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,034,007
• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther

    “On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Lululemon Athletica Canada Inc. / Lululemon USA Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00189 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7, 8, and 11–16 are unpatentable over Arrasvuori; claims 5, 6, 9, 10, and 17–20 are not unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’256 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Lynch (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43, 44).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “simultaneously communicate in real-time to the first user at the first location and the second user at the second location, an interface indicating whether the challenge has been met.” Ex. 1001, 40:64–67 (emphasis added). The claim language itself suggests that “continuously generat[ing]” an interface in “real-time” allows the interface to indicate whether a challenge “has been met,” and doing so “in real-time” suggests that updates to the interface are generated as developments occur that may affect whether the challenge “has been met.” Notably, the subject claim limitation explicitly recites “continuously” generating the interface “in real-time”; it does not recite— but easily could have if intended—“periodically” generating the interface (i.e., at predetermined time intervals independent of the occurrence of developments that may affect whether the challenge has been met).3” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends Arrasvuori qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(e) based on its filing and publication dates. Pet. 24. Patent Owner does not contest the prior art status of Arrasvuori. Also, on this record, we have no evidence of an invention date other than the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged claims. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that Arrasvuori qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) because Arrasvuori’s publication date of October 11, 2007, is before the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged claims, which is March 3, 2008, and under § 102(e) because Arrasvuori’s filing date of March 29, 2006, is before the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged claims (March 3, 2008). Ex. 1001, codes (22), (60), (63); Ex. 1005, code (22), (43).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Arrasvuori discloses (a) “[m]onitoring” of “users performing real- world fitness tasks” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 38), using (b) “monitoring equipment . . . integrated into . . . wireless nodes and/or other computers of users, and/or [] attached to bodies of users” (id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis added)), where (c) “[u]sers might . . . wear their wireless nodes and/or other computers” (id. (emphasis added)), and where (d) “[t]he phrase[] ‘computer’ . . . refer[s] but [is] not limited to . . . a computerized watch” (id. at ¶ 90 (emphasis added); see id. at ¶ 40 (disclosing that “employed monitoring equipment might include one or more sensors”)). We find that these descriptions in Arrasvuori provide an anticipatory disclosure, particularly to the skilled artisan, of the limitation “wirelessly-connected sensor worn on an appendage of a first user.” See Ex. 1017 ¶ 45; Ex. 2006, 84:10-85:22. Although Arrasvuori does not recite in a single sentence the substance of disclosures (a) through (d) above, such as explicitly stating that its “wireless node is a computerized watch,” this is not necessary for the skilled artisan to understand that Arrasvuori discloses such a feature. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832–33 (anticipation “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test”). Moreover, as argued by Petitioner, Arrasvuori’s disclosure of sensors “attached to bodies of users” and of users “wear[ing]” sensors itself discloses the subject limitation as broadly recited, even without considering the additional disclosure of a computerized watch. See Pet. Reply 17 (“Arrasvuori teaches wrist-worn sensors by stating that its users can ‘wear their wireless nodes and/or other computers.’” (citing Ex. 1005 ¶39)).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,278,256 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,278,256
• Bj’S Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. v. Walmart Apollo, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01528 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–19 are unpatentable: the Board found claims 15–16 anticipated or obvious and claims 17–19 obvious; it did not reach the Yong-Xavier-Cason ground for claim 17.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the ’435 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected by those sources is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner

    “technologies, [and he admits] that his only retail technology experience is limited to MBA case studies from the early 1990s.” Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1022, 15:20–22, 16:3–7, 17:22–23; Ex. 2010). Based on this, Petitioner advances that we “should afford little weight to Dr. Williams’ testimony.” Id. Patent Owner counters that we should afford full weight to Dr. Williams’s testimony. PO Sur-reply 2. Patent Owner contends that Dr. Williams meets Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. According to Patent Owner, “Dr. Williams surpasses the education requirement” and meets the experience requirements. Id. at 3. Addressing Petitioner’s concerns about retail technology experience, Patent Owner asserts that “Dr. Williams testified that his MBA curriculum contained coursework that included study of POS systems, particularly though case studies.” Id. (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 3; Ex. 1022 16:3–7). “This is precisely the ‘more education’ in the [person of ordinary skill in the art] definition that can ‘supplement practical experience,’” Patent Owner argues. Id. (citing Pet. 12). Patent Owner persuades us that Petitioner’s concerns regarding Dr. Williams’s retail technology and knowledge and experience are not a basis for affording less weight to Dr. Williams’s testimony.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, the ’435 patent’s Specification supports Petitioner’s position. As Petitioner argues, the Specification’s disclosure that “[u]ser identification information may include a username, a password, [or] both a username and password” conveys that “a username, a password, [or] both a username and password” is a short, non-exhaustive list of user identification information according to the ’435 patent. Ex. 1001, 6:2–4 (emphasis added). This comports with the plain meaning of “user identification information,” which seemingly would refer to information that identifies a user. Consistent with this, the claim language does not convey any meaning of “user identification information” other than its plain meaning. See, e.g., id. at 24:7–9. Accordingly, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s suggestion that limitation 16a’s “user identification information” requires a username, a password, or both. PO Resp. 72; PO Sur-reply 30. Instead, we conclude that “user identification information” encompasses information that identifies a user.” slip op. at 16

  • BurdenPetitioner expert creditedUnpatentable

    “Weighing all of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner has shown that Fletchall discloses performing all of limitations 15h–15j’s actions by the same server, specifically payment server 130. For example, Petitioner persuades us that Fletchall discloses payment server 130 performing the actions of limitations 15h and 15i: “retrieving . . . payment information to complete the transaction” and “completing . . . the transaction based on the payment information.” Ex. 1001, 23:43–24:2; Pet. 24–26 (citing Ex. 1008, 4:35–49, 11:3–12, 12:42–45, 13:9–14, 13:45–47; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 199–204, 206–208, 210; Ex. 1001, 10:59–11:3, Fig. 2B). Petitioner’s evidence also shows that Fletchall discloses limitation 15j’s “transmitting . . . a confirmation receipt to the mobile phone in response to completion of payment for the transaction” by payment server 130 on its own. Ex. 1001, 24:3–5; Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1008, 9:26–32, 11:57–61; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 213–214). For example, Petitioner cites Fletchall’s disclosure of at least one embodiment in which “the electronic receipt is generated by the payment server (130) and provided to the transaction module (106b) of the mobile POS application (106).” Ex. 1008, 9:26–29; Pet. 27. Thus, Petitioner demonstrates that Fletchall discloses performing all of limitations 15h–15j by payment server 130. This showing is not diminished by Patent Owner’s observation that the Petition mentions Fletchall’s product database 121 when discussing limitation 15j. PO Sur-reply 27 n.12 (citing Pet. 26–27). In the passages Petitioner cites, Fletchall contains multiple, alternative disclosures about creating and sending a receipt. Ex. 1008, 9:26–32, 11:57–61; Pet. 27. For example, Fletchall contains (1) a disclosure that a receipt can be generated and transmitted by payment server 130 on its own (Ex. 1008, 9:26–29) and (2) an alternate disclosure that “[t]he electronic receipt may be generated by the product database (121) in cooperation with the payment server (130) and provided to the transaction module 106(b) of the mobile POS application (106)” (id. at 9:29–32). As Dr. Shamos notes, Fletchall also discloses that “[t]he electronic receipt may be generated by the payment server.” Ex. 1008, 11:19–20; Ex. 1002 ¶ 213. Immediately following this disclosure, Fletchall describes handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 and product database 121 working in cooperation as an alternative to handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 on its own: The electronic receipt may be generated by the payment server, by the product database in cooperation with the payment server and/or by a mobile application installed on the mobile device directly. Once generated, the electronic receipt may be sent to the mobile device to be stored in a memory or in a storage device of the mobile device. Ex. 1008, 11:19–25 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s reliance on Fletchall’s disclosure of handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 on its own supports Petitioner’s case, regardless of Fletchall’s alternate disclosure of handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 in cooperation with product database 121.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,803,435 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,803,435

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.