- Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Clearwater Paper Corporation v. Graphic Packaging International LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland and obvious over Nakagawa and over Nakagawa combined with Tanner.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering, materials science, polymer science, or equivalent coursework, at least a year of experience developing paper-based laminates involving the application of polymer coatings to a substrate, and the appropriate industry familiarity with biodegradability standards and degradability techniques [and] . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 50). Clearwater’s definition is uncontested, and we apply that definition here, as it accords with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the problems addressed in the specification of the ’126 patent. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We have reviewed the cited testimony of Clearwater’s expert, including their calculations for arriving at a coat weight in Nakagawa that falls within the claimed range. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–33. We find that testimony, which is unrebutted, both credible and supported by the evidence of record. Thus, in light of Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the unrebutted testimony of Clearwater’s expert, we are persuaded that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each and every element of claim 1. See Pet. 45–54, 60–64. Clearwater also persuades us that Cleveland discloses the additional subject matter of dependent claims 2, 3, and 11. See Pet. 64–66. Thus, we determine that Clearwater demonstrates that claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. F. Ground 3—Obviousness Over Nakagawa and Tanner” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Inst. Dec. 4 n.5. We were persuaded by Clearwater’s proof that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (Ex. 1005) and that the provisional provides written description support for at least claim 1 of Cleveland. See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1006, 2–6, 9). We were also persuaded by Clearwater’s showing that the provisional provides written support for the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland. Id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–9). We are still persuaded by Clearwater’s showing. Thus, we see no reason to disturb our earlier finding that Cleveland is prior art to the ’126 patent.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“protectant layers has “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2.” As noted by Clearwater, Cleveland discloses a total coat weight for layers 14 and 16 as falling within the claimed range. Pet. 32–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 32). In particular, Cleveland discloses that “the coextruded layer of copolyester (irrespective of which side of the substrate the layer is disposed) is of a total coat weight of between about 10 and about 40 lb/3000 ft2 in any combination of between about 80/20 to 20/80 parts by weight of Ecoflex to Biomax,” of which “a total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 is preferred.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 32. As disclosed, Cleveland’s total coat weight range of 10–40 lb/3000 ft2 falls almost entirely within the claimed range, and the preferred total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 falls squarely within the claimed range. Thus, Cleveland satisfies claim elements [1.3.2] and [1.5.2]. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art.”) (citation omitted). As such, we find that Clearwater adequately demonstrates that Cleveland discloses all the elements of claim 1. 4. Dependent Claims” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,637,126 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish that Usui’s interconnect structure or Yu’s metal gate stacks satisfy the construed “electrode stack” limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 6–7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’562 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“comprises the recited metals and has the recited thickness, which forms an electrical contact for use on a semiconductor device generally or a group III- V semiconductor in particular. This is consistent with our determination that “electrode stack” is a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device We disagree with Patent Owner that “electrode stack” as used in the challenged claims should be limited to the specific electrodes shown in the embodiments described in the Specification. See PO Resp. 4–9. Although the Specification describes embodiments using source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes as electrical contacts, we see no reason to construe the term “electrode stack” itself to be limited to these components as Patent Owner proposes. Claims 1 and 13 expressly recite that electrode stacks comprise the claimed “electrical contact,” without expressly including or precluding any specific type of electrode. Ex. 1001, 5:54–63, 6:37–47. The Federal Circuit advises that the Specification “is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language. ‘Specifications teach. Claims claim.’” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). The Specification does teach electrical contacts that include source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes, but claims 1 and 13 are directed to electrical contacts that are not expressly so limited. Patent Owner’s proposed construction would effectively rewrite the claim by adding limitations, which we decline to do under the guise of claim construction. See id. (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the claim term “electrode stack” to mean “a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.”” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Piner testifies, with evidentiary support, that interconnects (such as Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure) and electrical contacts (such as that claimed in the ’562 patent) are not the same thing. See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 63–70. For example, Dr. Piner explains: In other words, not all metals in a semiconductor device have the same purpose and could not be said to be interchangeable. By August 2009 it was well known to a POSA how to discern if a metal component in a transistor is an interconnect or serves as an electrical contact such as a gate contact or ohmic contact, based on the structure and functionality of the metal component. For example, interconnects are made up of metal strips and are deposited on insulators. EX-1011 (Mishra) at 216. Interconnects are low resistance conductors that can carry very high current densities. Id., 216, 217. Unlike Schottky contacts and ohmic contacts, interconnects do not provide non-linear IV response like Schottky contacts nor inject electrons and holes into semiconductors like ohmic contacts. Id., 218. As many of the references cited by Dr. Zhao illustrate, electrical contacts had their own highly complex design challenges. EX-1008 (Pearton), 41-59 (Pages 53-71 of 383) (discussing electrical contacts); EX-1017 (Kramer), 11-126 (Pages 18-130 of 151) (same). And while Dr. Zhao cites these as supporting a POSA’s knowledge of an electrical contact, none of these references describe electrical contacts as interconnects. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Piner further testifies that Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure is an interconnect, and not an electrical contact, because “Usui states that ‘[t]he structures fabricated by the process of the present invention are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.’” Id. ¶ 148 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:11–14) (alteration in original); see also id. ¶¶ 150– 151 (Dr. Piner testifying that Usui’s interconnect metallization structure is not an “electrode stack” under a broad definition of electrode). Dr. Piner’s testimony in this regard rebuts Petitioner’s and Dr. Zhao’s conclusory assertions to the contrary.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.” Thus, Petitioner must show that Usui’s layers 13–15, 18, and 19 provide a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. After reviewing the complete trial record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has done so. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Zhao to support its contention that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential).” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,686,562 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,686,562 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther
“On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,421,713 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteomed LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00189 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
Claim 16 is unpatentable because Slater anticipates it.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“undisputed limitations of claim 16 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 16 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 16. Pet. 28–30; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 106. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 16.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,529,608 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,529,608 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc v. Osteomed LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01452 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, 13, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable over Slater or Slater and Weaver.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 of the ’716 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 188–196. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 191– 196. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,763,716 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc v. Osteomed LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00191 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 15 and 21 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 381), affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1, 10, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 9,763,716 B2 (“the ’716 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether either of dependent claims 15 and 21 is unpatentable. Stryker, slip op. at 17.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 15 and 21 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claims 15 and 21 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claims 15 and 21. Pet. 31–33; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 124. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 31–33. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claims 15 and 21.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,763,716 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteomed LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00190 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board determined claim 15 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater because Slater discloses every limitation, including the flared hips and opposing generally parabolic wings.
RulingsRemand decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claim 15 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 15 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 15. Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 15.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claim 15 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 15 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 15. Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 15.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 9,351,776 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,351,776 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteomed LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01450 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 6, 8–10, 14, and 17 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable, based on anticipation by Slater and obviousness over Slater and Weaver.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 49),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 46) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1 and 11 of U.S. Patent No. 8,529,608 B2 (“the ’608 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether dependent claims 2–6, 8–10, 12–14, and 17 (the “Remanded Claims”) are similarly unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s challenges relying on the Slater reference. Stryker, slip op. at 14–15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Stryker Corporation and Wright Medical Technology, Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”) and OsteoMed LLC (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Stryker, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6, 8–10, 14, and 17 are unpatentable. We also conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2–5, 12, and 13 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 12, and 13 of the ’608 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 37–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 161–169. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 162– 163. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 37. Patent Owner raised no separate argument regarding the patentability of claims 6 and 8, instead relying solely on its argument that Slater does not anticipate independent claim 1, on which claims 6 and 8 depend. PO Resp. 46; Reply 4 (“Patent Owner does not challenge the combination of Slater and Weaver for claims 6 and 8.”). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 6 and 8 and find that Petitioner establishes that the combination of Slater and Weaver discloses all of the limitations of claims 6 and 8, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Slater and Weaver for the reasons provided by Petitioner. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 37–39.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,529,608 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,529,608 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteomed LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01451 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, and 13 were held unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, and 12 were not shown unpatentable because Slater lacks the claimed central axis.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“addressing the ’085 patent and by the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, and 12 of the ’776 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169–74. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169– 74. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 17
- RemandOther
“Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 49),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 46, “FWD”) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1 and 10 of U.S. Patent 9,351,776 B2 (“the ’776 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether dependent claims 2–6 and 8, 9 and 11–13 (the “Remanded Claims”) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s challenges relying on the Slater reference. Stryker, slip op. 14– 15.” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 9,351,776 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,351,776
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.