• Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Oct 31, 2025 · IPR2025-00900 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1– 20 of the ’727 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relating to the subject matter of the ’727 Patent as of [November 1, 2016] would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology. APPLE-1003, Section V. Additional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background. Id. Pet. 3–4. Patent Owner at this stage utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 5. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “On this record, we agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner, in contending that Park’s hybrid CSI signal does not describe two signalings, does not address Petitioner’s mapping of the claimed “first signaling” and the claimed “second signaling.” Petitioner persuasively maps the claimed “first signaling” to Park’s hybrid CSI signal (Pet. 21), and persuasively maps the claimed “second signaling” to Park’s DCI format signal (Pet. 30). Patent Owner does not explain why Park’s DCI format signal does not describe the claimed “second signaling.” On this record, we are sufficiently persuaded by Petitioner and Dr. Akl that Park’s DCI format signal, which triggers the UE to perform aperiodic CSI reporting, describes a “second signaling . . . used to determine the Q2 antenna port(s)” as recited in limitation 1.6. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–142; Ex. 1005, 38:20–36.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “include Shin’s CSI request field provides the benefit of allowing the network to directly configure the CSI report behavior of a UE, such that the base station can obtain channel state information regarding specific channels used by the UE and the base station in order to exchange data as taught by Shin. Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71). Petitioner also contends that adding Shin’s CSI request field to the DCI format signal of Park is the combination of familiar elements according to known methods that yields a predictable result, and that the combination uses Shin’s known technique of including a CSI request field in a DCI format signal to improve Park’s DCI format signal in the same way. Id. at 58 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–421 (2007)).” slip op. at 9

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,063,727
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00180 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Parallel petitionsDenied

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. Petitioner has complied with our guidance by filing a statement ranking the petitions. See Practice Guide, 59–60. For reasons discussed in our concurrent Decisions Denying Institution in IPR2025-00181 and IPR2025- meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”). Claim construction arguments should not be relegated to patentability arguments on the facts. warranted. Given our Decisions to Deny Institution in IPR2025-00181 and IPR2025-00182 and the official guidance we have received in the Practice Guide, we have no option but to deny Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny institution on all three of the petitions challenging the ’275 patent. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to the deny institution in the instant proceeding. E. Anticipation of Claim 1 by Zhang” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not address the level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’275 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.7 7 If Patent Owner disagrees with this formulation of the level of skill in the art, it must raise that disagreement in its Response. If a different level of skill would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue as well. The failure of Patent Owner to describe how a different level of skill in the art is determinative will be a forfeiture of that argument. If there is a dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position. See 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner states that all of the limitations “should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a” person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 19. Although Petitioner argues that none of the limitations are means-plus-function terms, Petitioner provides constructions to the extent that there are means-plus-function terms. Pet. 19–20. Patent Owner does not respond. See Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.8 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor 8 If either party intends to argue a claim construction at trial, including what is the plain and ordinary meaning of a term, they should do so in a clearly designated section of their briefing. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 21, 2019) (“Practice Guide”), 46, 49 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Parallel Petitions” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,785,275
• Netflix, Inc. v. VL Collective IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2023-00891 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Comps; the majority finds Comps’s Tracks 1 and 3 example meets the claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the prior art and supported by the testimony of Dr. Bederson. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30. Dr. Goodrich testifies that “Dr. Bederson and Petitioner offer a slightly different definition of the POSITA, which is similar to my definition” and that his “opinions would not change were” he “to adopt the definition of POSITA offered by Petitioner.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 54. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which is materially the same as Patent Owner’s proposal for purposes of this Final Written Decision, as Dr. Goodrich testifies. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “1. content-related data segments Claim 1 recites “content-related . . . data segments.” Patent Owner construes this phrase as “segments of content data that have a syntactical meaning within the respective data file.” PO Resp. 12. As Patent Owner notes, the ’794 patent specification states that “[t]he term ‘content-related’ is understood to mean that first and second data segments have a syntactical meaning within the respective data file, such as e.g. a plurality of succeeding second data segments represent the speech signal of a specific speaker within a dialog sequence.” Id. at 12–13 (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:9–22); Ex. 1001, 4:9–22 (second emphasis added). The ’794 specification supports Patent Owner’s position that the emphasized sentence essentially defines the term “content-related . . . data segments.” PO Resp. 13–15. However, as Petitioner argues, nothing in the sentence restricts “content-related data segments” to “content” only, for example, “sampled audio,” instead of also including information relating to the content. See Reply 3 (arguing that “the phrase ‘content data’ appears nowhere in the ’794 patent and was not part of the ‘inventors’ express lexicography’ for ‘content-related . . . data segments,’ as P[atent] O[wner] incorrectly contends”). Petitioner points out that Patent Owner’s reliance on the specification refers to “content-related . . . data segments” and “contentbased data segments.” Id. (emphasis by Petitioner) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:9– 22). Petitioner also contends that the specification refers to describing data, contradicting Patent Owner’s position that the data segments must include content. Id. at 7 (“[A]ccording to at least one embodiment of the invention, media data, in particular video or audio data, and/or metadata, in particular encoded according to the XML standard, are described by way of the first and/or second data file.”) (emphasis by Petitioner) (quoting Ex. 1001, 3:4– 10). Moreover, as Petitioner argues, “the word ‘data’ should be given its plain and ordinary meaning,” so that “even if the [unrecited] phrase ‘content data’ is included in the Board’s construction . . . . the term ‘content data’ would include any information relating to the content.” Id. at 4. As noted above, both parties point to the specification’s definition of “content-related . . . data segments”: “The term ‘content-related’ is understood to mean that first and second data segments have a syntactical meaning within the respective data file, such as e.g. a plurality of succeeding second data segments represent the speech signal of a specific speaker within a dialog sequence.” Ex. 1001, 4:9–22. This passage indicates that data segments are content-related or include content, such as a “speech signal,” and that these segments “have a syntactical meaning” with respect to the source of the signal, such as a speaker. See Inst. Dec. 9 & n.8, 17 (observing that “[t]he term ‘content-related’ is somewhat subjective because there is not much guidance in the ’794 patent specification as to what a ‘syntactical meaning’ encompasses”). In context, one plain meaning of the term “syntax” is “[t]he way in which words are put together to form phrases and sentences.” Ex. 3002 (THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1305 (1976)). However, as indicated above, the ’794 patent refers to video images and audio sounds with a syntactical meaning, showing that it embraces broader subject matter than the plain meaning of “syntax.” Patent Owner’s argument that the ’794 patent refers to “content-” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “segments.’”). Comps supports Petitioner and states that “two syllables represented by the fields TEXT[1] and TEXT[2] must be presented to the user.” Ex. 1004, 3:39–40 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Petitioner persuasively maps each of these text fields to an “associated one of the content-related first data segments [Nf3 and Nf4, respectively] on the basis of an assignment rule [the SYNCH process],” as claim 1 requires.” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Claim 6 Petitioner identifies particular passages in Comps and Wan as teaching or suggesting the subject matter additionally recited in claim 6 and provides reasons for combining the teachings. Pet. 50–51. The record supports Petitioner’s showing. See id. Patent Owner does not provide separate arguments for claim 6. See generally PO Resp. Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner shows by a preponderance of evidence that Comps and Wan render claim 6 unpatentable. 2. Claims 7, 8, and 22 Claim 7 recites “[t]he method as claimed in claim 1, further” slip op. at 68

  Patent outcomesUS 8,605,794 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,605,794
• Meta Platforms, Inc. / Instagram, Inc. et al. v. VL Collective IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00923 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Handley, Basturk, and PacketCable; Judge McKone dissented over the printed-publication findings.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “broadly, how skilled artisans in the cable industry in 1999 shared information, is not based on her expertise and should not be given any weight. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, (1993) (“Presumably, this relaxation [in FED. R. EVID. 702] of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge—a rule which represents ‘a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information,’ ’ is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.” (internal citation omitted)); FED. R. EVID. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception.”). I would find that Dr. Hall-Ellis’s opinions are not based either on her expertise or her perception; thus, I would give her opinions no weight. As to matters within her expertise, Dr. Hall-Ellis testified that she searched the Wayback Machine and library cataloging resources (e.g., WorldCat) for PacketCable and did not find it as of December 1, 1999. 25:19–26:8, 36:13–15. She further testified that she has no knowledge of whether or how PacketCable was cataloged, on CableLabs’ website or elsewhere. Id. at 50:5–13, 51:10–52:8. This testimony is credible, as it is within her expertise. Thus, I believe Dr. Hall-Ellis that no sources typically consulted by librarians cataloged or recorded PacketCable in 1999. When her expertise is considered, all Dr. Hall-Ellis has been able to establish is that there is no evidence that PacketCable was stored or cataloged, in 1999, in the places where a librarian was apt to look.” slip op. at 108

  • Skill levelOther

    “VI. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artUnpatentable

    “Conclusion for Reasons to Combine We agree with Petitioner that Basturk teaches generating signatures “on-the-fly” as transmission proceeds in order to avoid slowing down the regular flow of data. Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1006, 12). We agree with Petitioner that Handley’s RTP protocol used for video conferences would benefit from Basturk’s protocol for high speed networks in order to provide secure video conferences as taught by Basturk. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 66). We agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Basturk’s technique of computing signatures “on-the-fly” with Handley’s internet conferencing architecture to provide the known benefits of transmitting data faster, reducing jitter, and reducing computing power. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). We agree with Petitioner that Handley describes the need for providing authentication in a multicast environment, and that Basturk addresses this need as well as provides a solution. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1005, 13; Ex. 1006, 3; Ex. 1003 ¶ 68). We agree with Petitioner that modifying Handley’s RTP transport protocol to include Basturk’s known authentication method of generating signatures “on-the-fly” while transmitting data is “the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for improvement.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70); KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In addition, we find that Dr. Houh’s testimony supports Petitioner’s reasons to combine Handley and Basturk. As discussed above, we find Dr. Houh’s testimony more persuasive than Dr. Stubblebine’s testimony because Dr. Houh’s testimony is supported by and consistent with the disclosures of Basturk and Handley. Dr. Houh testifies that generating a signature “on-the-fly” as data is being transmitted provides the benefits of transmitting data faster, reducing jitter, reducing computing power, and reducing latency in a live transmission. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64. We agree with Dr. Houh and find that a person of ordinary skill in the art, faced with the need to provide a signature at the application layer in Handley’s multimedia conferencing architecture as taught by Handley (Ex. 1005, 2, 13) while minimizing latency as taught by both Handley (Ex. 1005, 13–14) and Basturk (Ex. 1006, 7, 12), would have computed the signature “on-the-fly” as taught by Basturk (Ex. 1006, 7, 12) at the application layer of Handley to yield the benefits of authenticating data while minimizing latency as taught by Basturk. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–70. Dr. Houh testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art, in order to” slip op. at 40

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for patent owner

    “Handley, Ex. 1005, qualifies as a prior art printed publication. I also disagree that Petitioner has shown that PacketCable qualifies as a prior art printed publication. Thus, I would not find that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any claim of the ’682 is unpatentable. Accordingly, I dissent.” slip op. at 92

  Patent outcomesUS 7,266,682 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,266,682
• Meta Platforms, Inc. / Instagram, Inc. et al. v. VL Collective IP LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00924 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Zhao; claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “Decision is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 as to the patentability of claims 1–16 of the ’980 patent. We determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable, and Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “being present in another image or comparing that probability to a detection threshold.”). Dr. Saber was consistent with this testimony on cross-examination. Ex. 1051, 167–251. When I weigh the evidence, I find it to be one-sided, with all of the expert testimony weighing against Petitioner or avoiding the issue altogether. Thus, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Zhao teaches claim limitation 1e. Moreover, even if the Majority is correct about how Zhao’s RCR algorithm works, all that shows is that the detection of object presence in a previous image can be used to disambiguate segments (e.g., limbs) of an already detected object (e.g., a person), not that it can be used to detect the object in the image in the first place, as required by the claim language. For this additional reason, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden.” slip op. at 84

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of “obviousness” are primarily assertions of how a POSITA would have understood Zhao’s disclosures. For example, with regard to claim 1, Petitioner repeatedly asserts how “a POSITA would have understood Zhao” (Pet. 13, 18, 21, 27) and for each limitation contends that Zhao “disclosed or at least rendered obvious” (or a variation thereof) the limitation (id. at 13– 15, 17–18, 21, 23, 25–27). We will, accordingly, address these “obviousness” contentions when addressing the respective limitations.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 7,436,980 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,436,980
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Netflix, Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00628 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 8–11 as anticipated by Mehta, and claims 1–14 as obvious over Mehta and Schläpfer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms require specific construction to resolve the unpatentability issues presented in the Petition. Pet. 23; PO Resp. 10–11. We agree and do not construe any terms.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Analysis We agree with Petitioner. Mehta discloses storing “functionally equivalent programs having the same name that are capable of running on multiple kinds of devices that even may be written using different languages.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 98. Mr. Wechselberger testifies that this disclosure shows that Mehta’s “MAS receives, stores and supports functionally equivalent programs capable of running on multiple devices because each program corresponds to a different device having different device capabilities (e.g., written using different languages).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 66. This testimony is consistent with that of Dr. Goodrich, who testifies that “each application has a single version made for a particular device type.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 66. Dr. Goodrich later testifies that paragraph 98 of Mehta describes that there could be two functionally equivalent programs with the same name that are compatible with a single user’s computer. Id. at ¶ 88; see PO Resp. 31–32 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 87–88). We do not credit this later testimony, because it is inconsistent with Dr. Goodrich’s earlier testimony that “each application,” or program of Mehta, is “made for a particular device type.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 66. We agree with Mr. Wechselberger and find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have understood that Mehta’s disclosure of functionally equivalent programs having the same name that are capable of running on multiple kinds of devices means that each program corresponds to a different device having different capabilities. Further, Mehta discloses that “the MAS only lists those applications that are supported by the subscriber’s device. This allows the subscriber to avoid the problem of having to explicitly select a compatible application.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 117; see Pet. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 75, 77). Mr. Wechselberger testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have understood this disclosure to mean that the MAS provides the subscriber with only a single subscriber-appropriate version that will work for the subscriber. Ex. 1002 ¶ 77. Although Patent Owner contends that Mehta is silent on whether only a single description would be provided if there were multiple implementations (PO Sur-Reply 10–11), we agree with Mr. Wechselberger and find that when multiple implementations have the same name, each implementation corresponds to a different device, and therefore, the MAS would only present to the subscriber the one implementation that works with the subscriber’s device. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 66, 75, 77.” slip op. at 28

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “piece of content, while the versions of Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs are different implementations.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 39. Dr. Goodrich, in his deposition, when asked if “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’790 patent would also understand that Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Mac are also functionally equivalent, correct?” answered “Yes . . . . But they would be even stronger than simply functionally equivalent. They would be different implementations of the same product.” Ex. 1029, 43:14–24. However, later in his deposition, Dr. Goodrich testifies that Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Mac are separate applications, not different implementations of the same application. Ex. 1029, 48:1–20. We disagree with this later testimony. Neither Dr. Goodrich nor Patent Owner persuasively explains why Dr. Goodrich changed his unambiguous position from both his declaration and his earlier deposition testimony. For example, Dr. Goodrich testifies in his deposition that “for the Lion King example, a .MP3 and a .MOV are different implementations of the same product. They’re also functionally equivalent, but functionally equivalent is broader.” Ex. 1029, 45:7–11. Dr. Goodrich continues, “when Mehta is disclosing functionally equivalent, it is not referring to it as different implementations of the same product. Instead, it’s [describing] how to disambiguate [applications] not clustered in terms of implementations . . . based on other metadata.” Id. at 45:14–21. This explanation is unpersuasive because it is inconsistent with Dr. Goodrich’s declaration testimony, in which Dr. Goodrich explicitly testifies that the different versions of Lion King, as well as the different versions of Microsoft Word, are different implementations of the same product. Ex. 2020 ¶ 39. Specifically, in his declaration, Dr. Goodrich testifies that the “various versions of Lion King (such as an .mp3 file or an .mov file) are the implementations of the Lion King. For another example, . . . the versions of Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs are different implementations.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 39. Dr. Goodrich testifies again that “Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs” are “multiple implementations of an individual item of digital content.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 70. Further, the reason given in the explanation in his deposition, that Mehta needs to disambiguate applications that are not clustered in terms of implementations based on other metadata, would also apply to the different versions of Lion King, yet Dr. Goodrich consistently testifies that these different versions are different implementations, both in his declaration and in his deposition. Id.; Ex. 1029, 45:7–10. Petitioner contends, and we agree, that the inconsistent testimony of Dr. Goodrich appears to be an attempt to cure Patent Owner’s and Dr. Goodrich’s incomplete analysis of Mehta’s disclosure. See Reply 7–8. In particular, the Petition quotes Mehta’s disclosure that the MAS stores “functionally equivalent programs having the same name that are capable of running on multiple kinds of devices that even may be written using different languages.” Pet. 28 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 98). Dr. Goodrich addresses this disclosure by explaining that two applications, such as Microsoft Word and Apple Pages, are functionally equivalent but are two different applications, not multiple implementations of a single application. Ex. 2020 ¶ 70. In this analysis, Dr. Goodrich does not address the full disclosure of Mehta, which describes that the “functionally equivalent programs hav[e] the same name” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 98), such as Dr. Goodrich’s example of Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs. See id. Thus, although Dr. Goodrich is correct in testifying that some functionally equivalent programs, such as Microsoft Word and Apple Pages, are not different implementations of an item of digital content, he is also correct in testifying that “Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs” are “multiple implementations of an individual item of digital content.” Id. Yet Dr. Goodrich does not identify any difference between the multiple implementations of Microsoft Word and the functionally equivalent programs having the same name as described by Mehta.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,233,790 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,233,790
• Netflix, Inc. v. VL Collective IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00630 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 22 are anticipated by Cassin; all claims are also obvious over Cassin and Huston and over Huston.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require specific construction to resolve the unpatentability issues presented” in the Petition. Pet. 15–16. Similarly, Patent Owner contends that “no express construction of any term is required.” PO Resp. 18. For purposes of this decision, we do not construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “is included in the indication. See PO Resp. 40. However, the ’559 patent does not describe what is included in the claimed “listing.” Rather, throughout the disclosure of the ’559 patent, the phrase “the listing of one or more pieces of content stored in memory” or a variation thereof is repeated without any further elaboration. Ex. 1001, 3:13–15, 3:26–36, 12:22–26, 12:50–52, 13:29–30. For example, the Specification does not disclose that the listing of one piece of content includes the title of the piece of content, nor an identification number of the piece of content, nor any other information about the piece of content. The disclosed listing is no more than an item of information that indicates that a specific piece of content is stored in the memory of the terminal. Therefore, the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim term “a listing of one . . . piece[] of content stored in the memory,” read in light of the Specification of the ’559 patent, encompasses an item of information that indicates that a specific piece of content is stored in the memory of the terminal. We agree with Petitioner and find that Cassin’s indication that the client currently has the media content item describes an item of information that indicates that a piece of content is stored in the memory of the terminal. Therefore, Cassin’s indication that the client currently has the media item describes “a listing of one . . . piece[] of content stored in the memory” as claimed.” slip op. at 33

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Analysis We agree with Petitioner and find that Cassin’s offer to download an item describes “a response . . . that instructs the terminal to perform one or more actions” as claimed. Reply 11 (citing Pet. 25–26), 13–14. Cassin discloses that the server uses the user information received from the client to query a database in the server for a list of content to which the user is entitled. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 162, 164. Cassin discloses that the server offers an item from the list to the client for downloading. Id. ¶ 163 (The server offers every item on the list), ¶ 164 (The server attempts to send an item on the list). Cassin discloses that the client checks to see if it already has the item. Id. ¶¶ 163, 164. If the client has the item, the client refuses the download offer. Id. If the client does not have the item, the client accepts the download of the item and stores the item in its content repository. Id. Thus, the client responds to the offer to download an item from the server by (a) checking to see if it has the offered item, and (b) either refusing the download if the client has the item or accepting the download if the client does not have the item. Therefore, we agree with Petitioner and find that “when the server offers a media item for the client to download, the server is ‘instructing the terminal to perform one or more actions to thereby control the flow of content.’” Reply 11 (citing Pet. 25–26). We agree with Petitioner that in response to the server’s offer, “the client will either ‘refuse the download’ (if it has the content) or ‘accepts the download of the media content item from the server and stores the media content in the local content repository’ (if the client does not have the content).” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 163). We agree with Petitioner and find that by checking to see if it has the item, and “by refusing or accepting the download offer, the client is doing ‘something to control the flow of content’ in response to the server’s instruction.” Id. (quoting PO Resp. 23). We disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions to the contrary. In particular, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that the server’s offer “has not instructed the client to do anything—the client takes action based on other factors (whether or not it already has the media content item).” PO Sur-Reply 3; see PO Resp. 31–32; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 91–93. We find that the client performs the actions of checking to see if it already has the item and, depending on whether it has the item, either accepting or refusing the offer, in response to receiving the offer from the server. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 163, 164; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–75. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the server’s offer instructs the client to (a) determine whether the client has the item and (b) depending on whether the client has the item, either accept or refuse the offer, which describes “instructing the terminal to perform one or more actions to thereby control the flow of content” as claimed. We further find that, because the offered item is from the server’s list which was determined using information from the user and information from the server’s database, the offer to download the item describes “a response to the content status . . . based upon the terminal status information and the server status information” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,440,559 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,440,559
• Platinum Optics Technology, Inc. v. Viavi Solutions Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01489 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: Hendrix anticipates them, and the listed combinations also render their respective claims obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted a slightly modified version of this definition in which we removed the open-ended term “at least.” Inst. Dec. 10–11. Patent Owner does not address the definition of a POSA. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Clemens applies Petitioner’s definition, but does not opine on whether it is correct. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 22–23. As in the Decision on Institution (Inst. Dec. 10), we apply the same slightly modified version of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art that removes the open-ended term “at least.” We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ794 patent and the” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “filter comprises “a third set of layers on the second side, whether the third set of layers includes oxygen.” Ex. 1001, 10:41–49. Petitioner argues that the proper construction of this limitation “means that there is a third set of layers on the opposite side of the substrate, whether or not [the layers] include oxygen” – i.e., that the third set of layers do not need to include oxygen. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner agrees that this is the “literal” reading of the language, but contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have appreciated that this language was intended to read ‘wherein’ rather than ‘whether’” and that the claim requires that this set of layers must include oxygen. PO Resp. 24–26 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–55). We agree with Petitioner’s representation that each of the challenges presented either anticipates or renders obvious a third set of layers with oxygen on a second side of a substrate (Pet. 8) and therefore, no claim construction is necessary for this term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “415 F.3d at 1314): “a first set of layers on the first side, wherein the first set of layers includes silicon and hydrogen” (claim 1) and “a first set of layers including silicon and hydrogen” (claims 9 and 15). Ex. 1001, 10:41–49, 10:65–11:4, 11:17–12:5. As the parties agree, these recitations are broadly worded. See Pet. 14 (describing the recitations of the claims as “broad” and directed to “layers of any material that has both ‘silicon and hydrogen’”); PO Resp. 42 (describing the claims as “simply specifying physical layers including silicon and hydrogen in them”), 44 (describing the disputed terms as “open-ended claiming of layers including hydrogen and silicon”). Despite this broad language, Patent Owner contends that we must read “layers including silicon and hydrogen” in conjunction with other limitations in the claims reciting a “near infrared bandpass filter.” PO Resp. 35–37 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 65–66). For purposes of our analysis, we limit “layers including silicon and hydrogen” to only materials suitable for NIR bandpass filters, as suggested by Patent Owner. We next examine the rest of the intrinsic evidence. The specification of the ’794 patent does not contain language that generally describes “layers including silicon and hydrogen.” Instead, the specification describes only layers of hydrogenated silicon: its abstract is directed to an “optical filter” that “includes a filter stack formed of hydrogenated silicon layers” (Ex. 1001, code (57)); the technical field of the invention is described as “relat[ing] to optical filters including hydrogenated silicon layers and to sensor systems comprising such optical filters” (id. at 1:20–23); the summary of the invention describes “the present invention” as an optical filter or sensor system “comprising” “a plurality of hydrogenated silicon layers” (id. at 2:57–3:19); and the detailed description begins with a hydrogenated silicon (Si:H) layers” (id. at 4:19–20). The specification only mentions silicon and hydrogen separately with respect to the disclosed sputter-deposition system “used to produce the hydrogenated silicon material.” Id. at 4:35–5:61, 7:10–19. In particular, the specification describes how “cathode 430 includes a silicon target 431, which is sputtered in the presence of hydrogen (H2), as well as an inert gas such as argon, to deposit the hydrogenated silicon material as a layer on the substrate 420.” Id. at 4:44–47. The specification also describes how altering the hydrogen flow rate in the deposition process affects the optical properties of hydrogenated silicon produced by the deposition system. See id. at 5:1–61. But the only end product described from the sputter-deposition process using silicon and hydrogen is hydrogenated silicon. See id. at 4:35–5:61, 7:10–19. As such, the specification does not provide any indication of materials beyond hydrogenated silicon that are within the scope of “layers including silicon and hydrogen.”” slip op. at 15

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “hydrogen” defines a genus. The test for providing a written description that supports a genus claim is whether the description provides “either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “Regarding whether common structural features must exist between a claim and a putative priority disclosure, those features must constitute the near-entirety of the structures being compared.” Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 61 F.4th 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Yet the patentees only disclosed hydrogenated silicon as a possible species. Indeed, the specification focuses on a singular example of a sputterdeposition system that is used to produce an improved hydrogenated silicon material. See Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 36–38. Patent Owner cites this deposition process as written description support for “the claimed layers containing silicon and hydrogen.” See PO Resp. 44. But this example supports only how to make hydrogenated silicon and does not include any indication about what other materials would be within the scope of the claimed genus. Under these circumstances, the specification’s disclosure of a single species is not an adequate number to show possession of the entire genus of “layers including silicon and hydrogen.” Beyond the disclosure of the sputter-deposition process for producing hydrogenated silicon, Patent Owner does not identify—and we cannot discern—any other examples of a “structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. This is particularly noteworthy given that undisputed record evidence shows numerous other potential filter materials “including silicon and hydrogen.” See supra § II.D.1.a. In the absence of structural description supporting “layers including silicon and hydrogen,” we determine that an” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 11,131,794 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,131,794

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.