- Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01377 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success, including that GMW14400 likely qualifies as prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–25 of the ’227 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv at 6. Here, Fintiv factors one and five are neutral, factors two and three favor discretionary denial, factor four strongly weighs against discretionary denial, and favor six weighs against discretionary denial. The integrity of the system will benefit from institution because of the strong merits the Petition presents (factor six), and the ITC Investigation will not resolve these merits (factor four). This outweighs any potential inefficiency as indicated by factors two and three. We further note that any inefficiency in resolving the grounds the Petition presents is mitigated by the stay of the district court action (factor one). We, thus, decline to exercise discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“After considering the record as a whole, we determine that Petitioner has adequately demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. As we explain in Section III(G), infra, Petitioner’s challenges to the ’227 patent appear strong based on the current record, and Patent Owner’s present arguments to the contrary are weak. Given the strength of Petitioner’s challenges on the present record, this is not a situation where we would say that “reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art,” and we therefore determine that the Examiner erred by not considering the art in substantially the combination Petitioner proposes. Where Patent Owner states that “evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination” is lacking (PO Sur-Reply 5), we disagree. If the Examiner considered these references in combination, the Examiner would have, given the apparent strength of Petitioner’s position on the merits on this record, issued a rejection. The lack of a rejection based on the combination proposed in the Petition provides some evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination (because the lack of such a rejection raises the likelihood that the Examiner did not make such a consideration). 3. Conclusion Because Petitioner adequately made a showing of material error, we decline to exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–9.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,326,227 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01376 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–30 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success, including that GMW14400 likely qualifies as prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenged claims 1–30 of the ’602 patent. At this juncture in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, or with respect to claim construction. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–30 of the ’602 patent is hereby instituted with respect to all grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 36
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv at 6. Here, Fintiv factors one and five are neutral, factors two and three favor discretionary denial, factor four strongly weighs against discretionary denial, and favor six weighs against discretionary denial. The integrity of the system will benefit from institution because of the strong merits the Petition presents (factor six), and the ITC Investigation will not resolve these merits (factor four). This outweighs any potential inefficiency as indicated by factors two and three. We further note that any inefficiency in resolving the grounds the Petition presents is mitigated by the stay of the district court action (factor one). We, thus, decline to exercise discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“After considering the record as a whole, we determine that Petitioner has adequately demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. As we explain in Section III(G), infra, Petitioner’s challenges to the ’602 patent appear strong based on the current record, and Patent Owner’s present arguments to the contrary are weak. Given the strength of Petitioner’s challenges on the present record, this is not a situation where we would say that “reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art,” and we therefore determine that the Examiner erred by not considering the art in substantially the combination Petitioner proposes. Where Patent Owner states that “evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination” is lacking (PO Sur-Reply 5), we disagree. If the Examiner considered these references in combination, the Examiner would have, given the apparent strength of Petitioner’s position on the merits on this record, issued a rejection. The lack of a rejection based on the combination proposed in the Petition provides some evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination (because the lack of such a rejection raises the likelihood that the Examiner did not make such a consideration). 3. Conclusion Because Petitioner adequately made a showing of material error, we decline to exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–9.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,961,602 - PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00032 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 on all asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 of the ’494 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“an IDS in the ’494 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that the record shows that Bhattacharya and Spain10 were listed on an IDS during prosecution of the parent ’358 patent, which the ’494 patent Examiner was required to consider. Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing MPEP 609.02). As such, we determine that Bhattacharya and Spain were presented previously to the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 9; Advanced Bionics at 7–8. We also agree with Patent Owner that the addition of Meunier does not substantially impact our § 325(d) analysis because of the Petition’s limited reliance on this reference. For these reasons, we determine that the first prong of Advanced Bionics is met and turn to the second prong.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with working with navigation and/or geolocation systems. 1003 ¶ 8; Pet. 6, n.2. According to Petitioner, “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 43. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’494 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,786,494 - Zebra Technologies Corporation v. Lone Star SCM Systems, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2022-01377 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10–12, and 14–22 are unpatentable: claims 1–8, 12, and 14–22 as anticipated by Garber; claims 10 and 11 as obvious over Garber and Andersen.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“3. The Alleged Anticipation of Claim 1 a. A portable interrogator, comprising: Petitioner contends that the preamble is not limiting, but, to the extent that it is, Garber discloses a portable interrogator. Pet. 12–13 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005, 14:59–62, 15:63–65). Petitioner asserts that Garber discloses a portable interrogator in the form of a hand-held RFID device, and points to, inter alia, Garber’s description of Figure 4 as depicting “a block diagram of an RFID interrogation system interacting with an RFID tag.” Id. at 12 (quoting Ex. 1005, 3:46–47) (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not raise any arguments regarding this contention. b. an antenna configured to receive a first signal from a first object; Petitioner contends that Garber discloses a hand-held RFID device having an antenna for the RFID reader. Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1005, 15:43– 46, 16:11–13, Fig. 13; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 75–78). Petitioner further contends that Garber’s Figure 13 depicts the antenna receiving an RFID signal from a tag attached to a library book. Id. at 13. Petitioner additionally contends that Garber discloses the identification, by the RFID device, of multiple items via code signals 202, thus disclosing an antenna configured to receive a first signal from a first object. Id. at 14. Petitioner notes that Garber states, “[t]he hand-held RFID device . . . is capable of identifying multiple items that are within the range of the device.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1005, 14:40–45) (emphasis and alterations in original). Petitioner further asserts that “Garber also teaches that ‘if items used in the library are first placed on a book cart [in close proximity without obstructions], for example, the hand-held device could make a single pass by the items on the cart to record them.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1005, 18:25–27) (emphasis and alterations in original). Patent Owner does not raise any arguments regarding these contentions. c. a control and processing subsystem configured to discern a presence of said first object from said first signal; and Petitioner contends that: Garber discloses a control and processing subsystem (e.g., the processor in the hand-held RFID device/computer 108) configured to discern a presence of (e.g., decoding response from tags to identify tagged item) said first object (e.g., the RFID tags) from said first signal (e.g., signals produced by tags/response code signal 202). Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 79–84); see also id. at 14–17. Patent Owner does not raise any arguments regarding this contention.” slip op. at 38
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“4. Motivation to Combine Garber and Andersen Relying on the testimony of Dr. Sharony, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Garber and Andersen for several reasons. Pet. 49, 52 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 187–196). First, Petitioner argues that Garber and Andersen are analogous art to the ’293 patent “because they are in the same field of endeavor—namely, interrogation systems.” Id. at 49. Specifically, Petitioner argues that Garber and Andersen are analogous to the ’293 patent “because they are reasonably pertinent to the technical problem allegedly addressed by the claimed invention.” Id. Petitioner contends that “[t]he ’293 Patent identifies deficiencies in the prior art as including [inter alia] a requirement ‘that each device be interrogated separately’ (versus ‘[t]he ability to interrogate a plurality of closely spaced tags simultaneously’).” Id. at 49–50 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:16–25, 5:56–6:15, 6:40–46) (third alteration in original). According to Petitioner, Garber discloses, among other things, that “‘[a]nother benefit’ of the RFID device as ‘the ability to process multiple items at one time’ where ‘conventional devices having only optical bar code scanners can process only a single item . . . at one time.’” Id. at 50 (citing Ex. 1005, 13:25–30, 13:30–36 (“greatly reduc[ing] the time required for library staff to process multiple items.”)) (alterations in original). Petitioner argues that “Andersen is also analogous because it teaches ‘a system for tracking inventory having RFID components” and is designed to remedy the deficiencies of prior art inventory tracking systems using bar codes, which can be torn, destroyed, or hidden from view. Id. at 50–51 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:8–10, 1:58–2:2, 2:4–5). Additionally, according to Petitioner, Andersen is intended to address multipath errors and teaches that one way to refine radio signals received by RFID tags is by using a Kalman filter. Id. at 51 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:25–28, 11:32–36). Petitioner also argus that Andersen “provides ample motivation to add a Kalman filter to Garber’s hand-held device” to provide “correction of multi scanned signal / multipath errors.” Pet. 51 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:25–28, 11:32–36, 12:39–41). “As such,” Petitioner asserts, one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious “to modify Garber’s handheld device, which is used inside a library where shelves and other obstacles can result in multipath errors, to use Andersen’s Kalman filter to address these errors.” Id. Additionally, according to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill “could have combined Andersen’s Kalman Filter with Garber’s hand-held device using known methods, and such a filter would merely perform the same function—resolving errors to improve detection accuracy, which is entirely predictable.” Id. at 51–52. Finally, Petitioner contends, one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because “[t]he interrogator components described in Garber and Andersen were well-known at the time,” and the modification of Garber’s interrogator to include Andersen’s Kalman filter would have been straightforward for a person of ordinary skill. Id. at 52. Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s motivation to combine Garber and Andersen is insufficient. PO Resp. 29–32; PO Sur-reply 23. First, Patent Owner argues that the combination is based on impermissible hindsight because Petitioner did not explain why one of ordinary skill would have combined Garber and Andersen “to teach a control and processing unit employing an adaptive integrated filter or multiscan, coherent signal processing.” PO Resp. 31. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Garber and Andersen because “Andersen teaches the use of filters to correct multipath signal errors arising from the transmission of a single signal,” while the ’293 patent “teaches the use of filters to process multiple diverse inputs with a signal representing an RFID object to discern the presence of that object and teaches multiscan, coherent signal processing to coordinate the processing of a plurality of signals.” Id. “In either case,” Patent Owner contends, “the problems solved by the ’293 Patent involve multiple signals and not the single signal problem addressed by Andersen.” Id.” slip op. at 68
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“5. Objective Indicia of Non-Obviousness Patent Owner asserts that there is evidence of long felt but unresolved need that constitutes objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 32–33; see PO Sur-reply 24 (“others in the field had attempted and failed to solve the problems addressed by the ‘293 Patent”). Patent Owner also makes certain assertions regarding the adoption and possible acquisition of its technology. PO Resp. 34; see also PO Sur-reply 24 (referring to “industry acceptance of Lone Star’s inventions”). Petitioner characterizes these latter assertions as allegations of industry praise and commercial success. Pet. Reply 24. In support of its objective indicia arguments, Patent Owner relies solely on the declaration of named-inventor John Volpi (Ex. 2018). See PO Resp. 32. Petitioner argues that there is no nexus to the claimed invention because Patent Owner “has not identified the merits of the claimed invention or any product that embodies the claimed features or is coextensive with them.” Pet. Reply 23–24. Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner “has not established industry praise or commercial success, let alone a nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Id. at 24. As the Federal Circuit has explained: For objective evidence of secondary considerations to be relevant, there must be a nexus between the merits of the claimed invention and the objective evidence. See In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A showing of nexus can be made in two ways: (1) via a presumption of nexus, or (2) via a showing that the evidence is a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention. A patent owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus when it shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product that “embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). . . . However, even absent a presumption of nexus, “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).” slip op. at 72
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“exhibits for use at oral argument. Paper 31 (Petitioner’s objections); Paper 33 (Patent Owner’s objections). Petitioner contends that certain of Patent Owner’s demonstrative exhibit slides contain new argument not previously made in any paper and evidence not previously asserted or relied on in any paper. See Paper 31. Patent Owner similarly contends that certain of Petitioner’s demonstrative exhibit slides contain new argument and evidence not previously referenced or relied on. See Paper 33. The parties’ demonstrative exhibits are not evidence and we do not rely on them herein. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 84 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf (explaining that demonstratives exhibits are merely “aids to oral argument and not evidence” and therefore “the Board has not found that such objections are helpful in many cases”). Accordingly, we do not sustain the parties’ objections.” slip op. at 79
Patent outcomesUS 10,482,293 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,482,293 - Zebra Technologies Corporation v. Lone Star SCM Systems, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2022-01376 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–20 are unpatentable: the Board found the asserted Garber-based anticipation and obviousness grounds established, while not reaching three alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Examiner’s prior art references, in order to read an RFID tag, required each tag to be isolated from others, either by distance or through the use of a strategically placed RF shield. The applicant distinguished the claimed subject matter over those relatively unsophisticated RFID readers (that could only read one tag at a time) by amending the claims to recite, by the inclusion of “close proximity” and “unshielded,” a more sophisticated interrogator that did not need to use spacing or shielding. This is consistent with the background section of the ’717 patent stating that RFID systems at the time of the patent were better than relatively unsophisticated bar code systems. See Ex. 1001, 4:6–22; see also PO Resp. 17–18 (Patent Owner quoting the same after re-stating the Board’s preliminary construction and conceding that “[t]he Board conclusion here is supported by the plain language of the ‘717 Patent.”). Specifically, the ’717 patent explains that “[a]n important attribute of RFID interrogation systems is that a number of tags can be interrogated simultaneously stemming from the signal processing,” and that “[a] related and desirable attribute is that there is not typically a minimum separation required between the tags.” Ex. 1001, 4:6– 12. “Most other identification systems, such as systems employing bar codes, usually impose that each device be interrogated separately.” Id. at 4:17–19.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner
“means-plus-function limitation governed by 35 U.S.C. §112 ¶ 6 and, accordingly, is limited to corresponding structure (and equivalents) disclosed” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“3. The Alleged Anticipation and Obviousness of Claim 1” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“4. Motivation to Combine Garber and Andersen Relying on the testimony of Dr. Sharony, Petitioner argues that one of” slip op. at 84
Patent outcomesUS 9,996,717 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,996,717 - Zebra Technologies Corp. v. Lone Star SCM Systems, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2022-01375 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–4, 6–7, 10–19, 21, and 22 unpatentable, finding the asserted Garber grounds proven and not reaching the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“4. Motivation to Combine Garber and Andersen Relying on the testimony of Dr. Sharony, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Garber and Andersen for several reasons. Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 244–254). First, Petitioner argues that “Garber and Andersen are analogous art to the ’182 patent because they are in the same field of endeavor—namely, interrogation systems.” Id. Specifically, Petitioner relies on its arguments in Ground 2 that “Garber is analogous to the ’182 patent because it is reasonably pertinent to the technical problem allegedly addressed by the claimed invention.” Id. at 60–61; see id. at 52–53. Petitioner argues that “Andersen is also analogous because it teaches ‘a system for tracking inventory having RFID components” and is designed to remedy the deficiencies of prior art inventory tracking systems using bar codes, which can be torn, destroyed, or hidden from view. Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:8–10, 1:58–2:2, 2:4–5). Additionally, according to Petitioner, Andersen is intended to address multipath errors and teaches that one way to refine radio signals received by RFID tags is by using a Kalman filter. Id. (citing Ex. 1007, 11:25–28, 11:32–36). Petitioner also argus that Andersen “provides ample motivation to add a Kalman filter to Garber’s hand-held device” to provide “correction of multi scanned signal / multipath errors.” Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:25–28, 11:32–36, 12:39–41). “As such,” Petitioner asserts, one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious “to modify Garber’s handheld device, which is used inside a library where shelves and other obstacles can result in multipath errors, to use Andersen’s Kalman filter to address these errors.” Id. at 62. Additionally, according to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill “could have combined Andersen’s Kalman filter with Garber’s hand- held device using known methods, and such a filter would merely perform the same function—resolving errors to improve detection accuracy, which is entirely predictable.” Id. Finally, Petitioner contends, one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because “[t]he interrogator components described in Garber and Andersen were well-known at the time,” and the modification of Garber’s interrogator to include Andersen’s Kalman filter would have been straightforward for a person of ordinary skill. Id. Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s motivation to combine Garber and Andersen is insufficient. PO Resp. 46–49; PO Sur-reply 27. First, Patent Owner argues that the combination is based on impermissible hindsight because Petitioner did not explain why one of ordinary skill would have combined Garber and Andersen “to teach a control and processing unit employing an adaptive integrated filter or multiscan, coherent signal processing.” PO Resp. 48. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Garber and Andersen because “Andersen teaches the use of filters to correct multipath signal errors arising from the transmission of a single signal,” while the ’182 patent “teaches the use of filters to process multiple diverse inputs with a signal representing an RFID object to discern the presence of that object and teaches multiscan, coherent signal processing to coordinate the processing of a plurality of signals.” Id. “In either case,” Patent Owner contends, “the problems solved by the ’182 [p]atent involve multiple signals, not the single signal problem addressed by Andersen.” Id. Petitioner responds that the references themselves provide explicit” slip op. at 83
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“3. Analysis of Independent Claim 1 a) 1[pre]: “[an] interrogator, comprising:” Petitioner argues that, to the extent the preamble is limiting, Garber discloses it. Pet. 16. Petitioner points to Garber’s disclosure that “[a] handheld RFID device can interrogate and identify RFID-tagged items,” and that the hand-held RFID device “preferably includes an RFID reader and writer.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 14:49–62, 15:63–65) (emphasis omitted). “Furthermore,” Petitioner contends, “Figure 4 of Garber discloses ‘a block diagram of an RFID interrogation system interacting with an RFID tag,’” and RFID tags “respond to requests for information by the interrogator.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 3:46–47, 5:44–45). Patent Owner does not present arguments specifically directed to the preamble of claim 1. See PO Resp. Based on the full trial record, we find that Petitioner’s cited evidence sufficiently supports its contentions regarding the preamble.8” slip op. at 38
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“4. Motivation to Combine Garber and Andersen Relying on the testimony of Dr. Sharony, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Garber and Andersen for several reasons. Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 244–254). First, Petitioner argues that “Garber and Andersen are analogous art to the ’182 patent because they are in the same field of endeavor—namely, interrogation systems.” Id. Specifically, Petitioner relies on its arguments in Ground 2 that “Garber is analogous to the ’182 patent because it is reasonably pertinent to the technical problem allegedly addressed by the claimed invention.” Id. at 60–61; see id. at 52–53. Petitioner argues that “Andersen is also analogous because it teaches ‘a system for tracking inventory having RFID components” and is designed to remedy the deficiencies of prior art inventory tracking systems using bar codes, which can be torn, destroyed, or hidden from view. Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:8–10, 1:58–2:2, 2:4–5). Additionally, according to Petitioner, Andersen is intended to address multipath errors and teaches that one way to refine radio signals received by RFID tags is by using a Kalman filter. Id. (citing Ex. 1007, 11:25–28, 11:32–36). Petitioner also argus that Andersen “provides ample motivation to add a Kalman filter to Garber’s hand-held device” to provide “correction of multi scanned signal / multipath errors.” Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:25–28, 11:32–36, 12:39–41). “As such,” Petitioner asserts, one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious “to modify Garber’s handheld device, which is used inside a library where shelves and other obstacles can result in multipath errors, to use Andersen’s Kalman filter to address these errors.” Id. at 62. Additionally, according to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill “could have combined Andersen’s Kalman filter with Garber’s hand- held device using known methods, and such a filter would merely perform the same function—resolving errors to improve detection accuracy, which is entirely predictable.” Id. Finally, Petitioner contends, one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because “[t]he interrogator components described in Garber and Andersen were well-known at the time,” and the modification of Garber’s interrogator to include Andersen’s Kalman filter would have been straightforward for a person of ordinary skill. Id. Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s motivation to combine Garber and Andersen is insufficient. PO Resp. 46–49; PO Sur-reply 27. First, Patent Owner argues that the combination is based on impermissible hindsight because Petitioner did not explain why one of ordinary skill would have combined Garber and Andersen “to teach a control and processing unit employing an adaptive integrated filter or multiscan, coherent signal processing.” PO Resp. 48. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Garber and Andersen because “Andersen teaches the use of filters to correct multipath signal errors arising from the transmission of a single signal,” while the ’182 patent “teaches the use of filters to process multiple diverse inputs with a signal representing an RFID object to discern the presence of that object and teaches multiscan, coherent signal processing to coordinate the processing of a plurality of signals.” Id. “In either case,” Patent Owner contends, “the problems solved by the ’182 [p]atent involve multiple signals, not the single signal problem addressed by Andersen.” Id. Petitioner responds that the references themselves provide explicit” slip op. at 83
- ExcludeDenied
“rely on them herein. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 84 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf (explaining that demonstratives exhibits are merely “aids to oral argument and not evidence” and therefore “the Board has not found that such objections are helpful in many cases”). Accordingly, we do not sustain the parties’ objections.” slip op. at 88
Patent outcomesUS 9,646,182 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,646,182 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01210 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 15, 18, 41, and 52 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition. Our factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. This is not a final decision as to patentability of the challenged claims. Any final decision will be based on the full trial record, including any response to the Petition timely filed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“7. Conclusion We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of the Fintiv factors. Because our analysis is fact-driven, no single factor is determinative of whether we exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). We take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11, 6. Evaluating all of the factors on this record, we determine that weight of factors 1, 2, and 4 outweigh the remaining factors. Thus, based on our assessment of the Fintiv factors, we decline to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny inter partes review.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been someone knowledgeable in wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems, having at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, with a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology as well as approximately two years of industry experience working on radio communication and/or navigation systems. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 30). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 30. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The first four of Petitioner’s proposed constructions are consistent with the clam constructions issued by the district court in the Google Action—the only difference being that although the district court found the corresponding structure for “positioning determining equipment” indefinite, Petitioner applies the corresponding structure proposed by Patent Owner in the Google Action. Ex. 1028, 8, 10–16, 20; Pet. 16. Petitioner cites Exhibit 1024 as supporting its contention that the parties have stipulated as to the order of the “collecting,” “modifying,” and “comparing” steps in claim 1, but this Exhibit does not appear to support the stipulation. See Ex. 1024. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s statement on claim construction for the purposes of [the] Preliminary Response” and “reserves the right to present arguments on the constructions should the Petition be instituted.”7 Prelim. Resp. 31. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the undisputed claim constructions that Petitioner proposes. These constructions are consistent 7 In other sections of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner appears to argue in favor of a modified construction of “grid point.” Prelim. Resp. 18– 25; see also id. at 32 (“As further explained above in Section III, the district court concluded that ‘grid point,’ as used in the ’358 Patent, specifically refers to ‘a point associated with representative calibration data for an area’ that is generated based on analysis of calibration data.”). We disagree with these arguments for the reasons discussed below. with the claim language and the specification of the ’358 patent and are further supported by the reasoning provided by the district court’s claim construction order. See Ex. 1028. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,400,358 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01209 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3 and 11 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Google would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“is finality as that relates to Fintiv issues. In a similar instance in Volvo, where a district court’s § 101 determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Director determined that the Board had the authority to institute an inter partes review and a Fintiv analysis should be performed. See Volvo, Paper 15 at 1–8. The Director has additionally distinguished a Fintiv analysis under similar circumstances to those here, where “the district court’s judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a statutory ground that could not have been raised before the Board, does not raise concerns of inefficient duplication of efforts or potentially inconsistent results between the Board and the district court.” AviaGames, Inc., Paper 14 at 3. Further, the Director determined that, “the challenged claims have not yet been cancelled and remain in force until the opportunity to appeal has been exhausted,” noting that “[b]y the time an appeal will have concluded, Petitioner will be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from bringing a new challenge in an IPR petition.” Id. at 3–4. Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. We also agree with Petitioner that the timing of the progress of the appeal and any potential remand to the district court is uncertain. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been someone knowledgeable in wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems, having at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, with a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology as well as approximately two years of industry experience working on radio communication and/or navigation systems. Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 31. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther
“The first four of Petitioner’s proposed constructions are consistent with the clam constructions issued by the district court in the Google Action (see Ex. 1028, 8, 10, 20) or a position taken by Patent Owner in the Google Action (see Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 108–109). Petitioner cites Exhibit 1024 as supporting its contention that the parties have stipulated as to the order of the “collecting,” “modifying,” and “comparing” steps in claim 1, but this Exhibit does not appear to support the stipulation. See Ex. 1024. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s statement on claim construction for the purposes of [the] Preliminary Response” and “reserves the right to present arguments on the constructions should the Petition be instituted.”8 Prelim. Resp. 31. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the undisputed claim constructions that Petitioner proposes. These constructions are consistent with the claim language and the specification of the ’104 patent and are further supported by the reasoning provided by the district court’s claim construction order. See Ex. 1028. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,561,104 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01212 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on anticipation by Spain and obviousness over Spain as evidenced by Agiwal.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. We also agree with Petitioner that the timing of the progress of the appeal and any potential remand to the district court is uncertain. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.6 Thus, we determine that this factor weighs against the exercise of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“As Petitioner asserts, in the prosecution history, Dressler is only referred to for the rejection of dependent claims for limitations not found in the challenged claims. Ex. 1002, 56; see also Pet. 45–46; PO Resp. 9–10. Further, Petitioner points out that the Examiner’s reliance on Dressler was for a disclosure that is common to Spain, but is not relied upon in the Petition. Pet. 45–46, Ex. 1006 ¶ 53. As such, there is no evidence in the prosecution history that the Examiner’s reliance on Dressler is related to any issue in the challenges here. Moreover, while the Examiner’s reference to Dressler infers that the Examiner performed some evaluation of that reference, Spain contains additional disclosures that are not in Dressler. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 64–65, 67, 82–84, 70–72, 80, Fig. 15; Ex. 1016. Accordingly, any evaluation of Dressler does not reflect a full evaluation of Spain. There is no support in the prosecution history of an evaluation of Spain, except for the Examiner’s initialization of an Information Disclosure Statement, which is not indicative of a substantive evaluation. Similarly, the references to the prior art disclosures alleged by Patent Owner to be the same as Spain were only initialed on Information Disclosure Statements. See Prelim. Resp. 12. Accordingly, the record does not provide support that Spain was substantively evaluated by the Examiner during prosecution.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“viii. Conclusion Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by Spain. b. Claim 32 Claim 32 is a system claim that recites similar limitations to the limitations of method claim 1. Petitioner relies on similar evidence and argument to that presented for claim 1 in support of Spain’s disclosures of the claim 32 limitations. Pet. 35–38. Patent Owner presents no additional arguments specifically directed to claim 32 that we have not already addressed. See generally Prelim. Resp. We have reviewed the Petition’s showing for this claim and find that sufficient evidence has been provided in support of the anticipation challenge at this stage of the proceeding. Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claim 32 is anticipated by Spain.” slip op. at 34
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The district court issued claim constructions in the Google action for all disputed terms of the ’753 patent claims at issue. Ex. 1028. Petitioner uses the district court’s construction for the terms: “calibration data,” “calibration points,” “grid point,” “network measurement report,” and the order of the “providing,” “generating,” “evaluating,” and “selecting” steps of claim 1. Pet. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 54; Ex. 1024, 1, 2; Ex. 1028, 8, 18, 20). Petitioner proposes that any other claim terms not addressed by the district court should be interpreted consistent with the Phillips standard. Id. at 19. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s statement on claim construction for the purposes of [the] Preliminary Response” and “reserves the right to present arguments on the constructions should the Petition be instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 39. For the purposes of this Decision, we will use the district court’s claim constructions, which have been agreed to by the parties at this juncture. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this juncture. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,406,753
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.