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  • PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00906 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over 3GPP-38.213, 3GPP-38.213-CR, and 3GPP-38.212-CR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “2019),2 a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology,” where “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice versa).” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–42). Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art” for its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’434 patent and the types of 2 Petitioner states that it “assumes for purposes of [its Petition] that the claims are entitled to the earliest claimed priority date—November 5, 2019.” Pet. 14; see Ex. 1001, code (60). problems and solutions described in the ’434 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that “no claim terms need be construed.” Pet. 10. Patent Owner does not propose interpretations of any claim terms in its Preliminary Response. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding, but encourage the parties to address various claim interpretation issues identified below during trial. See infra Section II.D.5; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “Assessing the evidence of record collectively, however, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that 3GPP-38.213-CR was publicly accessible from the ETSI email archive before November 5, 2019. Given his many years of experience with ETSI, in particular his responsibilities pertaining to management of documents like change requests, and as the “list owner” “responsible for managing and administrating” several email exploder lists, Mr. Rodermund appears to be well-qualified to testify to the matters in his declaration. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 7, 10–15, 49. He explains in detail how, based on his experience, emails sent to a 3GPP email exploder were accessible on the email archive immediately after being sent. Id. ¶¶ 44–60, 72–80. That explanation is supported by screenshots from various websites and other corroborating evidence. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 44–60, 72–80. The November 3, 2019, email with 3GPP-38.213-CR as an attachment is currently available to the public via the email archive, with no login, password, or membership required to access it. Id. ¶¶ 44, 74; see Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1351 (“[ETSI] specifications themselves were visible to any member of the interested public without requesting them from an ETSI member. Further, ETSI did not impose restrictions on ETSI members to prevent them from disseminating information about the standard to non-members.”). The metadata for the file indicates that it was created and last modified one day before the email was sent. Ex. 1008 ¶ 76. And Mr. Rodermund discusses one example where a listserv email was uploaded to the archive just minutes after being sent. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. Although that example is from 2025 rather than 2019, it provides some support for his opinion that the same “near contemporaneous” timing would have been the case in 2019 as well. See id. ¶ 52. Immediately making emails like the one with the 3GPP-38.213-CR change request available on the email archive is consistent with 3GPP’s overall purpose of making standards documents available “so that engineers and other individuals would have ready access to them when developing and implementing cellular networks and devices.” See id. ¶ 35; Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1351 (finding that the “primary purpose of the [standard at issue] was to develop a system interoperable across national borders,” which “made it crucial to grant access to any interested parties”); Cradlepoint, Inc. v. Sisvel Int’l S.A., IPR2020-01103, Paper 46 at 13–14 (PTAB Jan. 18, 2022) (finding, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that “testimony concerning [a 3GPP] email exploder and listserv provide further support for a conclusion of public accessibility because it tends to show that 3GPP was known beyond its members, that the meetings were widely publicized, and that 3GPP documents were, in general, widely available”). Finally, Mr. Rodermund explains in detail how a person of ordinary skill in the art could have accessed the email with 3GPP-38.213-CR, using the indexing of the email archive. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 49, 53–60. We are persuaded that Mr. Rodermund’s testimony and supporting evidence are sufficient at this stage. Patent Owner will have the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Rodermund and explore the bases for his statements. And our ultimate determination of the weight to be given to his testimony will be based on the complete record at the end of trial. Based on the totality of the evidence currently in the record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that 3GPP-38.213-CR is a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).” slip op. at 20

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “is that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that 3GPP-38.213-CR and 3GPP-38.212-CR are prior art printed publications. Prelim. Resp. 2–10. We disagree on this record for the reasons explained above. See supra Section II.D.4. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s arguments regarding the limitations of claim 1 or Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the references. See Prelim. Resp. 2–10. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the testimony of Dr. Mandayam and are persuasive based on the current record. See Pet. 14–48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–67, 81–113. Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over 3GPP-38.213, 3GPP-38.213-CR, and 3GPP-38.212-CR. Accordingly, we institute review “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 28

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,965,434
  • PTAB · Nov 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00907 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over the three 3GPP references.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–20 of the ’944 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’944 patent (November 2019),2 a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology,” where “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice versa).” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art” for its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’944 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’944 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that “no claim terms need be construed.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not propose interpretations of any claim terms in its Preliminary Response. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding, but encourage the parties to address various claim interpretation issues identified below during trial. See infra Section II.D.5; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “Patent Owner responds that Petitioner fails to show that the 3GPP-38.213-CR “document sent to [the] 3GPP email list on November 3 was available to non-3GPP members by November 5, 2019” (the alleged critical date for the ’944 patent). Prelim. Resp. 3 (emphasis omitted); see Pet. 10. According to Patent Owner, the listserv archive of emails cited by Mr. Rodermund “only shows that the November 3, 2019 email is available now—not that it was uploaded within a day of when the original email was sent”—and Mr. Rodermund provides only his uncorroborated opinion that uploads were “automatic” and “immediate.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 43–63, 72–80). Patent Owner also contends that the November 2, 2019, metadata only relates to creation of 3GPP-38.213-CR and does not support Petitioner’s contention that the email was immediately uploaded. Id. at 6. Finally, Patent Owner argues that whether the subject matter of 3GPP-38.213-CR was discussed at the 3GPP meeting in October 2019 is “irrelevant,” given the date of the metadata, and has no bearing on whether the document itself was later publicly accessible. Id. at 6–7. Assessing the evidence of record collectively, however, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that 3GPP-38.213-CR was publicly accessible from the ETSI email archive before November 5, 2019. Given his many years of experience with ETSI, in particular his responsibilities pertaining to management of documents like change requests, and as the “list owner” “responsible for managing and administrating” several email exploder lists, Mr. Rodermund appears to be well-qualified to testify to the matters in his declaration. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 7, 10–15, 47. He explains in detail how, based on his experience, emails sent” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,139,944
  • PTAB · Oct 31, 2025 · IPR2025-00900 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1– 20 of the ’727 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relating to the subject matter of the ’727 Patent as of [November 1, 2016] would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology. APPLE-1003, Section V. Additional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background. Id. Pet. 3–4. Patent Owner at this stage utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 5. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “On this record, we agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner, in contending that Park’s hybrid CSI signal does not describe two signalings, does not address Petitioner’s mapping of the claimed “first signaling” and the claimed “second signaling.” Petitioner persuasively maps the claimed “first signaling” to Park’s hybrid CSI signal (Pet. 21), and persuasively maps the claimed “second signaling” to Park’s DCI format signal (Pet. 30). Patent Owner does not explain why Park’s DCI format signal does not describe the claimed “second signaling.” On this record, we are sufficiently persuaded by Petitioner and Dr. Akl that Park’s DCI format signal, which triggers the UE to perform aperiodic CSI reporting, describes a “second signaling . . . used to determine the Q2 antenna port(s)” as recited in limitation 1.6. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–142; Ex. 1005, 38:20–36.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “include Shin’s CSI request field provides the benefit of allowing the network to directly configure the CSI report behavior of a UE, such that the base station can obtain channel state information regarding specific channels used by the UE and the base station in order to exchange data as taught by Shin. Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71). Petitioner also contends that adding Shin’s CSI request field to the DCI format signal of Park is the combination of familiar elements according to known methods that yields a predictable result, and that the combination uses Shin’s known technique of including a CSI request field in a DCI format signal to improve Park’s DCI format signal in the same way. Id. at 58 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–421 (2007)).” slip op. at 9

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,063,727
  • PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–11 because Petitioners showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim unpatentable across the asserted grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioners meet the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–11 of the ’847 patent based upon Petitioners’ asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related field and three years of work experience in semiconductor manufacturing, such as, for example, in integrated circuit device (or transistor) design and/or manufacturing,” and “[a]dditional relevant education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience or training could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’847 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions, except to explain that the claim 7 limitation “the spacer further comprises an offset spacer, positioned between the gate and the spacer,” is “satisfied if one layer (an ‘offset spacer’) of the claimed ‘spacer’ lies between another layer of the ‘spacer’ and the gate.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions or offer any claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because resolution of Petitioner’s proposed construction is unnecessary to our analyses for purposes of this decision, we do not address the proposal here. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not discern a need to construe any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “a. Claim 1 Petitioner contends that claim 1 is anticipated by Lan or, alternatively, obvious in view of Lan. Pet. 18–26. Petitioner explains how Lan teaches or suggests each recitation of claim 1, and Petitioner’s position is supported by adequate evidence for institution. Id. (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–125). Petitioner, for example, persuasively compares the structure of Figure 12 of Lan to each limitation of claim 1. Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions except to argue that Lan (and the Petition’s other asserted references) “Do Not Mention, Describe, or Concern ‘Raised Epitaxial Layers.’” Prelim. Resp. 22–24. Patent Owner does not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,745,847
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Douglas and Mark.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “A claim is unpatentable under § 103 “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103; see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21); Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision. Only Petitioner’s proposed level is supported by testimonial evidence on the preliminary record, and it appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “CLAIM CONSTRUCTION B. In an IPR, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). This generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; Prelim. Resp. 9. However, the parties’ positions depend on interpreting the claim language in a particular way, and we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “At this stage, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner appears to equate a “fabrication profile” with a toolpath description, but nothing in the plain language of claim 1 supports that narrow interpretation. The ’774 patent describes a “fabrication profile” broadly and states that the profile can simply “include the dictionary [of configuration information],” or be “used to determine which machineready representation is available or suitable for a target printer.” Ex. 1001, 23:49–52. The preliminary evidence suggests that Douglas’s “operational parameters” would count as a “fabrication profile” because it is “the basis for generation of a machine-ready representation of the three-dimensional model that is executable on the target printer.” Id. at 23:37–39; see infra Section III.C.8. We also disagree that Petitioner’s argument is impermissible hindsight, because it is based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a sufficiently persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”). Finally, Petitioner appears to rely on Mark for providing a particular example of a fabrication profile, not to replace Douglas’s overall system in which the 3D printer can receive “operational parameters” rather than just G-code. See Pet. 8–10, 17–23; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 41 (the print queue, which stores tool instructions, may be maintained locally on printers 204 or on print servers 208); see In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))).” slip op. at 19

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
  • PTAB · Apr 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01391 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 16–23 and 26–28 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”). A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, and further based on the analysis in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at the time of the alleged invention would have had a master’s degree in Aerospace or Naval Engineering, or equivalent experience, and one to two years of experience in the field of watercraft design and construction.” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 20). Dr. Brizzolara’s cited testimony is somewhat different than what is asserted by Petitioner. Dr. Brizzolara’s testimony adds that the “one or two years of experience in watercraft design and construction” would have been “particularly as that design and construction is related to personal watercraft design and construction and/or hydrofoil design and construction.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 20. Dr. Brizzolara also testifies: This level of skill in the art is appropriate because concepts of hydrofoil design and construction along with appropriate fluid dynamics to teach the skills necessary to design and construct hydrofoil-based watercraft are taught in master’s level courses. These concepts that would be understood would include academic teaching of flight dynamics utilizing well known texts (such as Etkin, B., & Reid, L. D. (1995) Dynamics of Flight: Stability and Control. John Wiley & Sons). Moreover, an additional one to two years of experience in the industry would give one o[f] ordinary skill in the art experience with how such systems are implemented in the real world.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner states “that no terms need to be construed to resolve the issues raised in this Petition because the prior art discloses all limitations under any plausible construction. Pet. 16. At this initial stage of the proceeding, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 16

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Thus, we address this issue presented by Petitioner. The determination of whether a document is a “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102 “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication.’” Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The Federal Circuit has “interpreted § 102 broadly, finding that even relatively obscure documents qualify as prior art so long as the relevant public has a means of accessing them.” GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, 908 F.3d 690, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Moreover, “[i]f accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show that particular members of the public actually received the information.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[O]nce accessibility is shown, it is unnecessary to show that anyone actually inspected the reference.”).” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,586,659
  • PTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution

    The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther

      “On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
  • PTAB · Mar 20, 2025 · IPR2024-01406 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3, 4, 8–13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Takeuchi anticipates those claims.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’202 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 4, 8–13, and 15 of the ’202 patent. A. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “or “POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and three to four years of experience, or a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and one to two years of experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13). Petitioner further contends that “[s]uch experience would include a familiarity with thermal fluid delivery devices and/or the components and underlying technology used therein, and a higher level of 1 US 5,249,586, issued Oct. 5, 1993 (Ex. 1004, “Morgan”). 2 EP 0 845 220 B1, published Jan. 26, 1998 (Ex. 1006, “Susa”). 3 US 2005/0205084 A1, published Sept. 22, 2005 (Ex. 1007, “Gupta”). 4 US 6,155,268, issued Dec. 5, 2000 (Ex. 1009, “Takeuchi”). at 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13). Patent Owner states that, for purposes of the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner maintains that Petitioners’ arguments fail even under Petitioners’ POSA definition.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record, we preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’202 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “term “wicked into contact” that the Board adopted in a prior inter partes review proceeding that addressed the same term in an earlier, related patent. Pet. 7 (citing IPR2020-01602, Paper 32 at 8–15 (PTAB March 30, 2022)). ‘wicked into contact’ to mean: ‘wicked into contact (1) with the heater, or (2) with an area in close proximity to, and exposed [to] the heat produced by, the heater,’” and “[t]he present Petition adopts this formal construction for purposes of this IPR proceeding.” Id. (citing IPR2020-01602, Paper 32 at 15). Patent Owner also “adopts this construction for purposes of” the Preliminary Response, and argues that “Petitioner’s grounds fail even under its proposed construction of ‘wicked into contact.’” Prelim. Resp. 13. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Board’s prior construction of “wicked into contact,” namely, “wicked into contact (1) with the heater, or (2) with an area in close proximity to, and exposed to the heat produced by, the heater,” which is undisputed on this record. See Philip Morris Products, S.A. v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2020-01602, Paper 32 at 8–15 (PTAB March 30, 2022). C. Asserted Anticipation by Morgan” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot reached

      “To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “A reference may anticipate inherently if a claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed is ‘necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.’” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that Morgan discloses “a storage compartment . . . being arranged such that the liquid aerosol-forming material can be wicked into contact with the electrical resistance heater to volatilize the liquid aerosol-forming material” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,925,202
  • PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01377 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success, including that GMW14400 likely qualifies as prior art.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–25 of the ’227 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv at 6. Here, Fintiv factors one and five are neutral, factors two and three favor discretionary denial, factor four strongly weighs against discretionary denial, and favor six weighs against discretionary denial. The integrity of the system will benefit from institution because of the strong merits the Petition presents (factor six), and the ITC Investigation will not resolve these merits (factor four). This outweighs any potential inefficiency as indicated by factors two and three. We further note that any inefficiency in resolving the grounds the Petition presents is mitigated by the stay of the district court action (factor one). We, thus, decline to exercise discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 17

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “After considering the record as a whole, we determine that Petitioner has adequately demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. As we explain in Section III(G), infra, Petitioner’s challenges to the ’227 patent appear strong based on the current record, and Patent Owner’s present arguments to the contrary are weak. Given the strength of Petitioner’s challenges on the present record, this is not a situation where we would say that “reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art,” and we therefore determine that the Examiner erred by not considering the art in substantially the combination Petitioner proposes. Where Patent Owner states that “evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination” is lacking (PO Sur-Reply 5), we disagree. If the Examiner considered these references in combination, the Examiner would have, given the apparent strength of Petitioner’s position on the merits on this record, issued a rejection. The lack of a rejection based on the combination proposed in the Petition provides some evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination (because the lack of such a rejection raises the likelihood that the Examiner did not make such a consideration). 3. Conclusion Because Petitioner adequately made a showing of material error, we decline to exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–9.” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For purposes of this Decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,326,227
  • PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01376 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–30 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success, including that GMW14400 likely qualifies as prior art.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenged claims 1–30 of the ’602 patent. At this juncture in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, or with respect to claim construction. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–30 of the ’602 patent is hereby instituted with respect to all grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 36

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

      “efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv at 6. Here, Fintiv factors one and five are neutral, factors two and three favor discretionary denial, factor four strongly weighs against discretionary denial, and favor six weighs against discretionary denial. The integrity of the system will benefit from institution because of the strong merits the Petition presents (factor six), and the ITC Investigation will not resolve these merits (factor four). This outweighs any potential inefficiency as indicated by factors two and three. We further note that any inefficiency in resolving the grounds the Petition presents is mitigated by the stay of the district court action (factor one). We, thus, decline to exercise discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 17

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “After considering the record as a whole, we determine that Petitioner has adequately demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. As we explain in Section III(G), infra, Petitioner’s challenges to the ’602 patent appear strong based on the current record, and Patent Owner’s present arguments to the contrary are weak. Given the strength of Petitioner’s challenges on the present record, this is not a situation where we would say that “reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art,” and we therefore determine that the Examiner erred by not considering the art in substantially the combination Petitioner proposes. Where Patent Owner states that “evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination” is lacking (PO Sur-Reply 5), we disagree. If the Examiner considered these references in combination, the Examiner would have, given the apparent strength of Petitioner’s position on the merits on this record, issued a rejection. The lack of a rejection based on the combination proposed in the Petition provides some evidence that the Examiner did not consider these references in combination (because the lack of such a rejection raises the likelihood that the Examiner did not make such a consideration). 3. Conclusion Because Petitioner adequately made a showing of material error, we decline to exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–9.” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For purposes of this Decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,961,602
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