• Charles River Laboratories, Inc. v. Seikagaku CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · PGR2025-00023 · APJ Per Curiam · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’629 publication; the claims are not entitled to the 2013 priority date.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSITA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining that “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSITA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSITA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 22; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the trial record, we find a POSITA with respect to the claims of the ’109 patent would have had a two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSITA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes an express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 22–23 (not proposing any constructions); PO Resp. 23 (“Patent Owner agrees that the terms can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.”). However, Patent Owner states that some of Petitioner’s arguments implicitly construe claim 1 in an erroneous manner. PO Resp. 23–28. “For example, Petitioner argues that ‘an adequate written description would have to either disclose representative examples of the possible working cascades of various proteins or some accurate structural feature of the claimed proteins that allow them to function in the claimed assay as a whole.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Pet. 35). Patent Owner argues that, contrary to what Petitioner’s argument allegedly implies, “Claim 1 is directed to a method for producing an endotoxin assay agent” and does not require the use – Owner that claim 1 does not require the use of endotoxin assay agent. However, the claimed endotoxin assay agent must be capable of performing the assay, as counsel for Patent Owner acknowledged. Tr. 83:5–9.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “In this case, to show that the claims of the ’109 patent are unpatentable for lack of written description, Petitioner would have needed to show that the specification as filed (i.e., the ’420 application) fails to reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the July 3, 2023, filing date. Petitioner did not. Pet. 23–24. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant offer testimony that could support such a showing. See Ex. 1003 ¶50 (“I have been asked to provide my opinions as to the state of the art in this field for purposes of determining what the inventors disclosed as their invention as of December 10, 2013.”), ¶51 (“Whenever I offer an opinion in this declaration about the knowledge of a POSA, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the claims of the ’109 patent or its description, the manner in have been led to do based on the prior art, I am referencing the December 10, 2013 timeframe.”). In our Institution Decision, we stated: Although the ’420 application is essentially identical to the ’767 application, the person of ordinary skill in 2013 is not the same as in 2023. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he [written description] test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the information presented in the Petition, which is limited to the perspective of a 2013 POSITA, does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable for lack of written description. Inst. Dec. 12 (alterations in original). During trial, Petitioner did not present any further arguments in support of Ground 1. See generally Pet. Reply. Petitioner has failed to prove that claims 1–9 are unpatentable for failing to meet the written description requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 12

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Although the evidence before us shows that, in 2013, a POSITA knew how to recombinantly express genes in expression systems such as CHO or HEK-293 cell lines, the evidence shows that this was true only for genes whose genetic sequences were known or readily available. See, e.g., Ex. 1069, 34:11–22 (“Q. Okay. So you would agree that the creation of the recombinant protein requires the underlying sequence of, as you said, the original animal? A. Of course.”) Because it is undisputed that, in 2013, the genetic sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C was unknown, or least not publicly available, Falko-Gunter does not support a finding of adequate written description here. See, e.g., Tr. 48:18–19 (“Patent Owner agrees that there had not been, as of 2013, the full length cDNA sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C published.”).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 11,959,109 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,959,109
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Petition relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition also addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claim 1 of the ’679 patent, a limitation we need not construe to resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Owner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard without further analysis. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “RS6000 with Menon, namely because RS6000 provides an overview of the IBM SP2 multiprocessor and Menon teaches the use of “IBM SP2, a modern high performance distributed memory multiprocessor” used in the MultiMATLAB system. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142–145; Ex. 1005, 5–6, 14; Ex. 1007, 1, 11). The Petition also explains why POEref pertains to the field of cluster computing in a parallel operating environment. Id. at 26 (citing Ex.1008, 11 (“PE Software is designed to run on an … RS/6000 network cluster”)); (further citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–149). The Petition contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of POEref with Menon “because Menon suggests the combination by teaching that MultiMATLAB uses ‘POE, IBM's Parallel Operating Environment.’” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 6); (further citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153; Ex. 1005, 14; Ex. 1008, 11, 46). We agree with Petitioner’s analysis. We find the Petition’s argument and evidence of a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references in the manner claimed to be compelling, persuasive, consistent with the disclosures in the references, which include internal cross-references to each other, and supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner argues that Menon teaches away from a combination with Trefethen because “Menon expressly states that Trefethen’s first-generation architecture is inadequate for the objectives that motivated the newer design.” Resp. 35–37. The evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is inconsistent with the strong evidence of a motivation to combine Menon and Trefethen discussed above. Second, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is contrary to the evidence of record for the reasons given in Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 13–15 (e.g., “Menon explicitly cites Trefethen and explains that Menon builds on the teachings of Trefethen.”) (citing Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 1–3; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 47–53). We are further persuaded by Dr. Bajaj’s reply testimony: the “MultiMATLAB teachings in Trefethen. In fact, Menon describes enhancing the system of Trefethen. For example, Menon describes a list of “goals” already achieved by MultiMATLAB and then states that the architecture has been “redesigned to achieve two further goals.” One of these two “further goals” is “extensibility,” which Menon achieves by its description of adding “MEX routines” to the system of Trefethen. Far from showing an “incompatibility” between Menon and Trefethen as the POR argues, Menon’s addition of the “MEX routines” to MultiMATLAB shows that such a modification was within the capabilities of a POSITA, because the authors of the Menon paper actually implemented the modification. Ex. 1163 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1005, 1–3). Dr. Bajaj’s testimony is unrebutted, credible, and supported by the record. We agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning, which is based on direct quotes in Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶¶ 50–52. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine the teachings of Menon and Trefethen. RS6000 and POEref are specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and add operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Such facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away and lack of motivation arguments.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 12,021,679 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,021,679
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref; claims 26 and 29 over those references plus MPIref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “processor,” “multi-core” processor, or “singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’” as Patent Owner contends. Resp. 11–12, 21; see also Ex. 1163 ¶ 22 (“The claim does not recite ‘single chip,’ ‘single package,’ ‘single die,’ or ‘single multi-core microprocessor.’”). Nor do the claims recite a plurality of processing cores “within” a single-chip package or read as “multi-core within a processor” as argued by Patent Owner. Resp. 12–14; Sur-Reply 2; see Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1163 ¶ 23 (“Thus, the phrase ‘with a plurality of processing cores’ identifies the required processing resources associated with the hardware processor; it does not import a packaging limitation.”)). The claims do recite a hardware processor “with” a plurality of processing cores; a critical distinction even Patent Owner reads as open-ended, i.e., as a hardware processor that “comprises” a plurality of processing cores. See Resp. 11 (“the claims require a singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’”). Consequently, the claim language does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” as a single multi-core processor. cores it contains” in reliance on a parsed description in the ’034 patent specification: The specification explains: “Each processor can contain one or more processor cores that are capable of single-threaded execution. Processor cores are generally independent microprocessors, but more than one can be included in a single-chip package.” Id. at 1212 (partially quoting Ex. 1001, 5:11–16); Sur-Reply 2. The quoted description does not support Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” must be limited to a “single multi-core processor” that “locates multiple cores within a ‘single-chip package,’” i.e. limited to a single multi-core microprocessor such as “a Core 2 Duo is one processor package with two cores.” Resp. 12– 13, 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–25). The description quoted above from column 5, moreover, describes a “processor” that “can contain one or more processor cores” each of which can be an independent microprocessor. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:11–16; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 10–14). As Petitioner emphasizes, the specification distinguishes a “processor” from a “microprocessor” and describes a “processor” that “can be one or more general purpose single-core or multi-core microprocessors,” rather than limiting a “processor” to a single multi-core microprocessor. Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:14–36, Fig. 1; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 15–18).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition emphasizes that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition contends that: combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12.)” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A POSITA would have had an especially strong reason to read these references together because they address the same project, the same MATLAB-based parallel-computing problem, and the same MultiMATLAB command environment. Menon expressly identifies Trefethen’s MultiMATLAB work and then describes a redesigned architecture that preserves the same user-level objective––parallel MATLAB computations—while improving implementation details and extensibility. A POSITA therefore would not view the references as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, a POSITA would understand Trefethen as teaching specific MultiMATLAB commands and examples, including Eval, Send, Recv, and the architecture was implemented and improved in a later version. Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 71–72 (emphases added). We find the above reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. Petitioner and Dr. Bajaj demonstrate a sound technical motivation for a POSITA—someone having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing—to combine Menon and Trefethen: to improve MATLAB’s operational performance and extensibility in a parallel operating environment. Menon builds on Trefethen to improve and extend the parallel processing capabilities of MultiMATLAB: “This system will enable users to access high-performance parallel routines from within the MATLAB environment, to extend the environment with new parallel routines, and to use these routines to develop parallel applications with the MATLAB language.” Ex. 1005 Abstract. Menon is intended to be read in conjunction with Trefethen, as would be expected from two references generated by the same research group at the same university addressed to the same technical subject matter about a year apart. Ex. 1005, 1; Ex. 1006, Ex. 1086 ¶¶ 65, 101, 102. The very first citation in Menon is to Trefethen. Ex. 1005, 2, 16.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,570,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034
• Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00430 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–9, 13–15, 18, 19, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Dumais, Rose, and Rose with Bieganski.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 7–8. In its Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 13–14 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 7–8.” slip op. at 8

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther

    “We have not considered any of the evidence Patent Owner moves to exclude in reaching our findings and conclusions set for in this Decision. As a result, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude this evidence is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 55

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that Patent Owner has not carried its temporary burden of production to support its contention that the inventors were reasonably diligent throughout the critical period. See Parus Holdings, 70 F.4th at specifically cite the relevant record evidence combined with an explanation of the significance of the produced material in briefs. See id. at 1372 (explaining that “[t]he burden of production cannot be met without some combination of citing the relevant record evidence with specificity and explaining the significance of the produced material in briefs”). Patent Owner states that it “submitted extensive evidence.” PO Sur-reply 14. But simply submitting dozens of exhibits is not enough. As our reviewing court has admonished, the “burden of production cannot be met simply by throwing mountains of evidence at the Board without explanation or identification of the relevant portions of that evidence.” See Parus Holdings, 70 F.4th at 1371. Instead of citing what specific portions of those exhibits are relevant and why, Patent Owner cites entire exhibits and asserts, without analysis or explanation, that they show diligence. See PO Resp. 49– 50 (citing numerous exhibits without pinpoint citations). Patent Owner’s Sur-reply asserts that Patent Owner’s Response was adequate (PO Sur-reply 17), but an examination of the Response shows that it was not. For example, in its Response, Patent Owner states “numerous documents corroborating [the inventors’] testimony that, during the critical period, they were refining the formulas to implement the BlueSpace relevance model” by citing the entirety of so-called “corroborating documentation” spanning Exhibits 2032 through 2074 as well as the entirety of Justin Marston’s Second Supplemental Declaration (Ex. 2030) and Paul Marston’s Declaration (Ex. 2031). See PO Resp. 49. However, there is not a single pinpoint citation to any particular paragraph, page, or entry for any of those exhibits (a number of which approach 100 pages in length) in Patent Owner’s discussion. See id. Even less helpful, the Response does not inventors actually worked on the claimed invention. See id. That is, the Response does not state exactly what in the “corroborating documentation” actually corroborates the inventors’ testimony or itself shows diligence. If anything, the Response points out that the inventors were engaged in other activities: “Justin Marston had numerous other obligations running the company BlueSpace, and Paul Marston was working a full-time position as a lecturer on statistics.” PO Resp. 49; PO Sur-reply 15–16. We do not fault the Marstons for engaging in other activities, but Patent Owner’s discussion of the Marstons’ other activities and mere conclusory assertions of diligence, without more, do not show that the Marstons were reasonably diligent as to the relevant activities during the critical time period. Simply put, Patent Owner’s Response does not adequately explain exactly how or why the evidence supports its argument that the inventors were reasonably diligent throughout the critical period. We decline the invitation to sift through the hundreds of pages spanning dozens of exhibits in search of evidence and reasons supporting Patent Owner’s assertion of diligence.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “combined Rose and Bieganski. Rose and Bieganski are both concerned with recommending content to a user based on other users’ content preferences. Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1007, code (57). Petitioner, supported by Dr. Fox, adequately shows that Bieganski discloses an improved technique for selecting which other users’ preferences are considered in a recommendation. Pet. 71 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 235–236), 75 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 247–248). We agree that improving Rose’s content ranking system using Bieganski’s content recommendation technique sufficiently motivates the combination. See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. 417 (noting that where “a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious”). Patent Owner’s argument that Bieganski’s approach is not an improvement over Rose because Rose “teach[es] that feedback from all users is valuable” (PO Sur-reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶ 199)) has two faults. First, that argument mischaracterizes Rose. We find no description in Rose which states that feedback from all users is “valuable” such that selecting certain users is not an improvement. Rather, Rose aligns with Bieganski’s selection of relevant users because Rose emphasizes feedback from similar users by adjusting the weight given to feedback from users who are more or less correlated. Ex. 1006, 6:64–7:1, 7:10–34 (“Rjk is the correlation of users i and k, the Vkj is the weight indicating the feedback of user k on document j.”). Second, even if Rose describes an embodiment where feedback from all users is considered, that does not preclude motivating improvement. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting it is not necessary to show that a combination is “the best option, only that it be a suitable option”).” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,716,217
• Illumina, Inc. v. Molecular Loop Biosciences, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2024-01419 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to disclose the claimed correcting step, and Chee was not prior art to claims 1–3 and 9.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “We have considered both parties’ arguments and evidence and determine that Patent Owner has presented sufficient evidence of reasonable the invention to practice every day during the critical period in order to demonstrate reasonable diligence. See Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus America, Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[D]iligence need not be perfectly continuous—only reasonably continuous.” Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., Inc., 919 F.3d 1320, 1331 (2019). The key question is whether, “in light of the evidence as a whole, the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Applying this standard, we determine that Patent Owner sufficiently demonstrates reasonably continuous diligence throughout the critical period.” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “introduced during said workflow by collapsing target:differentiator tag combinations observed more than once into a single count.” Ex. 1001, 131:46–48 (emphasis added). The “determining step” of claim 2 recites “determining a consensus base call for the target nucleic acid molecule sequences,” but performs “collapsing all sequence reads comprising a same differentiator tag into a single read,” before the “determining step.” Id. at 131:49–53. Patent Owner proposes an interpretation of these “collapsing” and “determining” steps recited in claims 1 and 2 and asserts that they should be construed as distinct steps performed in a particular order in which the “collapsing step” is performed before the “determining step.” PO Resp. 42–45. We agree. First, Patent Owner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “collapsing step” of claim 1 is distinct from, and must occur before, the “determining step” of claim 2 based on the plain language of claims 1 and 2. PO Resp. 42–43. Patent Owner argues that the “collapsing step” and the “determining step” are distinct steps because claims 1 and 2 use different terms to describe these distinct steps that are performed sequentially according to the claim language. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 131:47–54; Ex. 2023 ¶ 133; Ex. 2024, 57:11–58:22). More specifically, Patent Owner explains that claim 1 recites a “collapsing step,” followed by claim 2, which depends from claim 1 and refers to “collapsing” before “determining a consensus base call” such that “claim 2 describes determining a consensus base call from collapsed reads, not performing ‘collapsing’ by determining a consensus base call.” Id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 131:47–54). collapsing corrects for skewing, an issue related to over- or under-amplification, which is a separate and distinct problem from the sequence errors that a consensus base call is designed to address.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1001, 27:47–50, 32:29–34). Patent Owner contends further that “‘[c]ollapsing’ is a different step, performed separately from determining any consensus base call, to provide even greater accuracy when subsequently determining a consensus base call” such that “if one were to collapse by determining the consensus base call, errors from amplification bias could still be represented in the consensus base call generated.” Id. at 43–44 (emphasis omitted, citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 134–37). Second, Patent Owner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “collapsing step” of claim 1 is distinct from the “determining step” based on the specification of the ’730 patent. PO Resp. 43–45. For example, Patent Owner explains that the specification states that “[f]or any target:differentiator tag combination observed more than once, all such reads are ‘collapsed’ into a single read before consensus basecalls are determined. This will cancel the effect of bias on consensus basecall accuracy.” Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 72:63– 73:5) (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 133, 138–142).” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We have considered both parties’ arguments and evidence and agree with Patent Owner’s position. As discussed above, we agree with Patent Owner that the “collapsing step” recited in claim 1 and the “determining step” recited in claim 2 are two different steps required by the challenged claims such that “collapsing” does not mean determining a consensus base call or sequence, and must occur before any determining step. As a result, we determine Chee’s step of determining a consensus sequence does not disclose the “collapsing step” recited in claim 1 that requires collapsing “target:differentiator tag combinations.” We are also unpersuaded by Petitioner’s reliance on Chee’s process of correcting for amplification bias as disclosing the claimed collapsing step. As recognized by Patent Owner, the claim language of the “collapsing step” requires “collapsing target:differentiator tag combinations,” rather than collapsing only differentiator tags. In view of this requirement, Chee does not disclose the “collapsing step” because Chee teaches quantifying the starting nucleic acid molecules using their unique identifiers, rather than target:differentiator tag combinations. As Petitioner admits, “Chee’s technique for correcting amplification bias corrects quantitative errors without correcting sequencing errors” (Reply 15), whereas claim 1’s “collapsing step” corrects both quantitative errors and sequencing errors by using target:differentiator tag combinations. See Ex. 1001, 131:47–49 target:differentiator tag combinations).” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Given this claim interpretation requiring collapsing target:differentiator tag combinations, it is undisputed that McCloskey, who uses unique barcodes alone, does not teach this limitation. Petitioner does not rely on Bignell as teaching this collapsing step. Accordingly, we conclude Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Bignell and McCloskey teaches the “collapsing step” recited in claim 1. Because claims 4 through 6 depend from claim 1, they also require the “collapsing step” of claim 1 that is not taught by the combination of Bignell and McCloskey.” slip op. at 54

  Patent outcomesUS 11,840,730 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,840,730
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2024-01498 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the Lesniak- and Native-based grounds; the Squatch and Sturgis ground fails because Squatch was not shown to be a printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Squatch is a printed publication. As described above, Petitioner relies on Squatch as a “website excerpt” placed on its site at the relevant time, but has not produced a screen shot of the website to show that it ever existed. See Ex. 1059. Petitioner provides internal documents that purport to describe what would have been on Dr. Squatch’s website at the relevant time, but falls short of establishing what was on the website for the interested consumer to view. Thus, we determine that this ground fails.” slip op. at 55

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art. See e.g., Exs. 1003, 1004.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a secondary wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Pet. Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1.” slip op. at 25

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claims 1, 16, and 19 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick).” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 11,844,752 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,844,752
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01174 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 and 10–23 are unpatentable: the Board found claims 1–15 anticipated or obvious over the asserted grounds and claims 16–23 obvious over the Native combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “argument that the prior art fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. For this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposal above, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1, 16, and 20 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not provide argument to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick). We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the prior art fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,497,706 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,497,706
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01173 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–13, and 16–19 are unpatentable: claims 16–17 are anticipated by Lesniak, and the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications. See generally PO Resp. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for certain other claim elements, specifically, for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” and “said deodorant stick” having a particular hardness range. PO Resp. 8–9. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 5–8 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 10. We agree.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate a deodorant stick within the parameters of claims 16 and 17. e) Conclusion as to Claims 16 and 17 We agree with Petitioner that “the challenged claims recite nothing more than well-known deodorant ingredients performing their conventional functions.” Pet. Reply 2. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claims 16 and 17.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,905,647 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,905,647
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01105 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3–8, and 11–14 as anticipated by Lesniak; claims 2, 9, 10, and 15 as obvious over the respective asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications. PO Resp. 7– 8. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for certain other claim elements, specifically, for the recitation of “said stick range. PO Resp. 8–10. We agree. Petitioner does not provide argument to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 27 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1. d) Conclusion as to claim 1 Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s analysis that Lesniak discloses all elements of claim 1. We are not persuaded to Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, we determine that Lesniak anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,966,915 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,966,915
• Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01158 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Tateishi, and claims 5, 7, 8, and 15 as obvious over Tateishi.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner has not offered persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the claims in light of the Specification would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “control signal” to be as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. We do not construe the claims such that the “control signal” must be the exclusively controlling factor of a component, as Patent Owner urges. Petitioner’s position, on the other hand, is consistent with the evidence of record. We construe “control signal” as having its plain and ordinary meaning, namely a signal configured to control a circuit component. D. The Asserted Anticipation of Claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 by Tateishi” slip op. at 24

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Tateishi discloses the “control signal” recited in limitations 1B2 and 1D of independent claim 1.” slip op. at 37

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “based on the Tateishi application publication (Ex. 1007), that the Tateishi Patent (Ex. 1005) also anticipates claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18. See Pet. 23–24 (“The Tateishi Patent is also prior art under (pre-AIA) §102(e)”; identifying Ground 1 as anticipation “under §102 by Tateishi and/or the Tateishi Patent”). However, we are unable to locate in the Petition or Petitioner’s Reply a discussion of or citation to the Tateishi Patent other than under the Petitioner’s heading “Identification of Challenge and Relief Requested” on pages 23 and 24 of the Petition. Cf. id. at i–x (Table of Contents identifying a section of the Petition discussing the Tateishi (Application) anticipation ground but not a section discussing a Tateishi Patent anticipation ground). Although the issued patent may be substantively identical to the published application, Petitioner does not assert that, and we decline to compare the documents to determine whether that is the case. In light of Petitioner’s silence on the alternative ground, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tateishi Patent anticipates 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 9,041,377 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,041,377

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.