• Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01599 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kalanick and Kemler, anticipated by Lalancette, or obvious over Lalancette and Kemler.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Prelim. Resp. 5. At the institution stage, we adopted Petitioner’s more general formulation, with one qualification. Inst. Dec. 19. We stated we would also expect a person of ordinary skill to have at least some experience in wireless cellular network protocols, as suggested by Patent Owner. Id. at 19–20. We reasoned that our review of the ’987 patent and the cited prior art did not suggest that specific experience with data privacy policies and protection models would be required, given the focus of the ’987 patent on more general principles of cellular communications and signaling. Id. at 20. However, we observed that our decision would be the same under either formulation. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We also find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Williams, Petitioner’s expert, “acknowledges that Lalancette does not disclose the use of a mobile communication device associated with the driver.” Id. (citing Ex. 2022, 128:14–129:25, 132:1–8). Patent Owner misrepresents Mr. Williams’s testimony. Mr. Williams was not asked whether Lalancette “discloses” a mobile communication device, but rather was asked “You’ll agree that La[l]ancette doesn’t identify the mobile computer as a mobile communication device associated with the driver?” Ex. 2022, 129:10–13. specifically referenced, that description is not in that passage.” Id. at 129:14–16. Notably, Mr. Williams also testified that (i) “[t]he nature of La[l]ancette requires some sort of computing device in the taxi that has the ability to receive and communicate in order to get information, for example, icon information from the central computer”; (ii) “mobile computer . . . has a variety of form factors inclusive of something like a [s]martphone”; and (iii) “[i]n the passage where [Lalancette] references mobile computer, it doesn’t have a specific form factor discussion such as referencing [s]martphones.” Id. at 125:17–22, 129:20–25, 132:5–8.” slip op. at 38

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. “indicator” In our Institution Decision, we construed the term “indicator” as a “code (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier, for display to enable a match between a user/rider and a driver.” Inst. Dec. 22. We determined this construction was consistent with the description of an indicator in the specification of the ’987 patent. Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:9–13). Neither party challenges this construction, which we maintain for this Final Written Decision. See PO Resp. 6; Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Because the specification and prosecution history do not explicitly provide a definition for the term “generate,” we looked to extrinsic sources to determine its plain meaning. Inst. Dec. 24. The Federal Circuit has approved the use of dictionaries for guidance in claim construction, “so long as the extrinsic evidence does not contradict the meaning otherwise apparent from the intrinsic record.” Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving of “consult[ing] a general dictionary definition of [a] word for guidance” in determining ordinary meaning); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. general dictionary definitions as an aid to claim construction.”) (citation omitted). One dictionary definition of “generate” is “to bring into existence: such as: . . . to originate by a vital, chemical, or physical process: PRODUCE.” See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generate. We therefore construed the term “generate” as it relates to the controller in reference to a signal in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to originate or produce the signal.” Inst. Dec. 24–25.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 10,169,987 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,169,987
• Google LLC v. Nobots LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00940 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution

  Instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including the Willner grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 6

  • Other 314aDenied

    “grounds” are necessary. Id. Although there is some overlap among the five numbered grounds in the Petition, such overlap is, in our view, neither excessive nor unexplained and does not rise to the level for which discretionary denial might be warranted. In that respect, Petitioner adequately explains what references it is relying for each claim limitation as a part of the various grounds.” slip op. at 32

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “3. On this record, Patent Owner does not adequately connect its arguments to the plain language of claim 1 or suitably account for Willner’s disclosure. In particular, we note that claim 1 simply requires that a server issue data to a client computing device and that model data either relate to or be in response to that data that the server issued (i.e., “the issued data”). The ’008 patent also explains that the issued data is data provided from a server to a different computing device for which the user status assessment is performed. See Ex. 1001, 3:33–37. Willner clearly discloses that a given website encompassing a server includes stored data indicative of vector patterns that are related to, or in response to, human interaction, and that such data is issued or provided to a different computing device where it is used as an assessment as to the presence of a human operator or bot. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 37–38. At this time, we cannot discern why Willner’s disclosure in that respect does not account adequately for the pertinent requirements of claim 1, even if some of the involved model data may come from more than a single webpage. On this record, we conclude Petitioner’s contentions as to Willner’s disclosure in connection with step 1d) are persuasive. Further, at this time, we credit the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Lopresti (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–83), over that of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Russ (see, e.g., Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 93–99), as we conclude that Dr. Lopresti’s testimony is predicated on a better assessment of what claim 1 requires and of what Willner discloses.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “viability of combining Willner’s teachings with those of Kitts, but do not find that any of them warrant denial of institution of trial. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art has considerable education and experience in the areas of computer science and computer security. See Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 12. The record reflects that Kitts’s express teachings would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art involved in computer science and security that “passive data” can be useful as an “important tool” in the realm of evaluating the possibility that click fraud is occurring. See, e.g., Ex. 1009 ¶ 47; see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 118. Furthermore, a person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. It follows reasonably from Kitts’s teachings that one of ordinary skill and creativity would have appreciated that passive data would have had recognized benefits in detecting click fraud in the type of system conveyed in Willner (see Ex. 1009 ¶ 47; see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 118), even if harnessing those benefits in such a system would require addressing issues of “complexity” as urged by Patent Owner. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 49. That is reasonably so even if Willner expresses praise for its own system’s effectiveness in detecting bots engaging in click fraud. There is no plausible indication on the record at hand that employing a particular type of data, i.e., passive data, in a click fraud detection system would have been beyond the skill of a skilled artisan so as to suggest non-obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). On this record, we find credible, and adequately supported by record evidence, Dr. Lopresti’s testimony that use of passive data was well known “to help differentiate humans from bots.” See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 118. We further credit Dr. Lopresti’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had adequate motivation to combine Willner’s and Kitts teachings (see, e.g., id.), and also conclude, at this time, that that the record reasonably conveys that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Accordingly, we conclude that institution of an inter partes review based on the ground involving the combined teachings of Willner and Kitts is warranted.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,595,008
• Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2022 · IPR2021-01599 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Kalanick/Kemler obviousness and Lalancette anticipation challenges.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “discovery.” Pet. 17. We agree with Petitioner that although some time has been invested in the case by the parties and the district court on preliminary matters, the fact discovery, expert discovery, and dispositive motion deadlines have not yet passed, not to mention the deadlines for pre-trial submissions and trial. See Ex. 2005, 3–11 (Scheduling Order). Moreover, we do not give weight to the work done on the issue of patent eligibility under Section 101, as that issue cannot be raised in this inter partes review and therefore does not result in any duplication of work done by the district court.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

    “At the outset, we note that Kemler was not cited during prosecution of the ’987 patent application. See Pet. 20. Thus, for two of the three grounds in the Petition, namely, those relying on Kemler in combination with Kalanick or Kemler, the combination of references before us in this proceeding was not before the examiner. Petitioner points out that neither Kalanick nor Lalancette was used, either alone or in combination with other references, as a basis for a rejection during prosecution. Pet. 21. In fact, neither reference was discussed by the patent owner or the examiner during the prosecution, nor did the examiner make any prior art rejections before allowing the application to issue. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that Becton, Dickinson factor (c), which considers the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, points us in the direction of declining to exercise our discretion to deny institution. See Pet. 21. As we will discuss in more detail infra, the Petition analyzes the challenged claims of the ’987 patent in light of the teachings of Kalanick and Lalancette, as well as Kemler, and demonstrates that Kalanick and Lalancette disclose aspects of the claims relied on by the examiner in his reasons for allowance. See Sections IV.F (Kalanick), IV.G (Lalancette).4 This analysis further demonstrates error on the part of the examiner in overlooking teachings of those references material to patentability of the challenged claims. Thus, Becton, Dickinson factor (e), which asks whether petitioner has demonstrated material error on the part of the examiner, weighs against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “In sum, we determine that for the reasons given Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this challenge to claim 1.” slip op. at 39

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Prelim. Resp. 5. At this stage, we adopt Petitioner’s more general formulation, with the following qualification. We would also expect a person of ordinary skill to also have at least some experience in wireless cellular network protocols, as suggested by Patent Owner. Our review of the ’987 patent and the cited prior art does not suggest that specific experience with data privacy policies and protection models would be required, given the focus of the ’987 patent on more general principles of cellular communications and signaling. However, at this stage, the arguments presented by the parties do not depend on the definition of the person or ordinary skill, and therefore, our decision would be the same under either formulation.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,169,987
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Led Wafer Solutions, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01491 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–17 obvious, including failing to establish motivation to combine Sugizaki and Camras or adequate AAPA.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-Reply and the evidence of record, we do not institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’405 patent on the grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Pet. 15–18 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Liberally interpreting these passages, Petitioner contends that a motivation to combine the relevant teachings of the cited references is established because: (1) Sugizaki and Camras “are references in the same field that disclose LED devices with many common features;” (2) “an intrinsic layer for the light emitting LED as disclosed in Sugizaki . . . is one of a limited number of alternatives disclosed by Camras;” and (3) “Camras discloses such an intrinsic layer in a device very similar to that of Sugizaki.” Id. Even accepting these statements as accurate and proven, Petitioner still fails to provide any rationale or reasoning as to why a skilled artisan would have chosen to use the undoped layer of Camras in the light emitting device of Sugizaki. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns not only whether a skilled artisan could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”). To the extent that Petitioner relies on the allegation that the use of an intrinsic (undoped or not-doped) light emitting layer in an LED was well-known technology or “well known in the art,” Petitioner fails to support such an allegation. We determine that the Petition fails to establish that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the cited references to arrive at the invention recited in the challenged claims of the ’405 patent, which includes an intrinsic region or layer.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artDecided for patent owner

    “12 In its recent opinion in Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., 24 F.4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) does not permit AAPA to form the “basis” of a ground in an inter partes review but that other uses of AAPA in an inter partes review may be permissible. Qualcomm, 24 F.4th at 1373–1377. Here, Petitioner does not establish that the cited disclosure in the challenged patent is in fact AAPA, so we need not reach the issue of whether Qualcomm precludes its use in this proceeding. In these depicted annotated versions of Figures 1 and 2 in the Petition, “Figures 1 and 2 of the ’405 patent, both of which are labeled ‘Prior Art,’ are annotated . . . to show the doped and intrinsic layers that the ’405 patent describes as being present in prior art LED devices.” Id. at 88. These annotated versions of Figures 1 and 2 are not fair or accurate reproductions of Figures 1 and 2 of the ’405 patent which are reproduced below.” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no terms require express construction for purposes of determining whether to institute a trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this Decision, we give the claim terms their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,952,405
• Square, Inc. v. Electronic Receipts Delivery Systems, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · CBM2020-00015 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 101 and the asserted Moran-based anticipation and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “been “charged with infringement,” Pet. 10, but that statement does not foreclose reading that allegation as a charge of infringement against Petitioner. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a), “[c]harged with infringement means a real and substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal court.” “[W]here a patent holder accuses customers of direct infringement based on the sale or use of a supplier’s equipment, the supplier has standing to commence a declaratory judgment action if,” for instance, “there is a controversy between the patentee and the supplier as to the supplier’s liability for induced or contributory infringement based on acts of direct infringement by its customers.” Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also ABB Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over claim for declaratory judgment of noninfringement where the plaintiff “had an interest in determining whether it would be liable for indemnification, which turned on whether [its contractor] would be liable for infringement”). Further, an allegation of direct infringement of a U.S. patent against the manufacturer’s customers may amount to an implicit allegation of indirect infringement against the manufacturer. Arris Group, 638 F.3d at 1375–76. Petitioner has shown persuasively that it sought to intervene in the district court litigation against its customers to “seek a declaratory judgement that [the] Square Register and Square’s other products and services do not infringe any valid claim of the ’551 [p]atent.” Ex. 1034, 3; Reply 1011. Patent Owner, the plaintiff in that suit, consented to the motion. Ex. 1034, 7; Reply 11. The district court granted Petitioner’s motion to intervene and Petitioner filed its Complaint in Intervention in district court, deeming Petitioner the “true defendant” in the dispute. See Reply 6; Ex. 1018. There is no question that the underlying district court litigation in which Petitioner seeks to assert non-infringement of the ’551 patent stems from Patent Owner’s allegations that Petitioner’s products directly or indirectly infringe the ’551 patent. These facts prove that Petitioner’s involvement in the district court litigation as an intervenor, together with Patent Owner’s accusation of infringement in its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, show a real and substantial controversy between Patent Owner and Petitioner. And the record shows that a federal court indeed has exercised jurisdiction over Patent Owner’s claim of infringement against Petitioner as intervenor, with Petitioner actually defending such a claim. This is sufficient to conclude that at the time of the filing of the Petition, Petitioner had been charged with infringement, and, therefore, had standing to file the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not identify claim constructions necessary for the Board to resolve the issues in this proceeding. Pet. 12; see generally Prelim. Resp.; PO Resp. We determine that it is unnecessary to expressly construe any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms in controversy must be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelOther

    “Petitioner proffers that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Data Science or Electrical Engineering or any undergraduate degree plus three to five years of professional experience in software development, computer programming, or network engineering or equivalent additional formal education such as graduate studies, or work experience to replace formal education. Pet. 13 (citing Hochman Decl. ¶¶ 16–22). There is no dispute as to whether Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art is appropriate in this case. We do not find it necessary to define the level of skill with specificity save to note that the level of ordinary skill is evidenced by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown).” slip op. at 23

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “components “implemented in a generic computer environment” for performing that abstract idea. Pet. 68. Petitioner further annotates claim 1 to provide identifiers for each limitation. Id. For this part of the analysis, we address specifically limitation [vi], which recites “automatically transmitting a digital receipt for the transaction to the destination associated with the first customer without input from the first customer.” Limitation [vi] recites transmission of a credit card receipt according to instructions previously provided by the credit card user, which constitutes a fundamental economic practice, one of the certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Guidance as a judicial exception. See Pet. 74 (arguing that issuing receipts for a purchase transaction is “nothing more than the organization of a fundamental and economic activity”). The claim’s recitation of an “automatic[]” transmission does not alter the fundamental business transaction recited in the claim: providing a customer a receipt for a credit card charge. The limitation provides no technological detail of how to automate the transmission of such a receipt or how to effectuate the delivery to a “destination.” See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“At best, the claims describe the automation of the fundamental economic concept of offer-based price optimization through the use of generic-computer functions.”). The recitation of a “digital” receipt does not alter our analysis either. The modifier adds only that the receipt is in electronic form. The claim language, however, is silent as to how such a receipt is generated or otherwise prepared for transmission to the credit card user. There is no technological detail that would place the “digital” receipt outside of an abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice of providing a credit card receipt to a customer. The other recited limitations also support our determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice. For instance, in its simplest form the claimed process includes three basic steps: registering a customer e-mail address for receiving credit card digital receipts (steps [i]—[ii]), initiating a credit card transaction for a sales transaction of the customer (steps [iii]—[v]), and transmitting the digital receipt in accordance with the information received and stored in steps [i] and [ii]. Thus, the claim explains the basic concept of providing a credit card receipt to a customer. These recited steps place no meaningful limit on the claim scope, as the claim lacks specificity as to how any computer or database is specially programmed to perform the claimed steps. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible.”). Each of claims 11 and 16 also recites the automatic transmission of a digital receipt for a credit card transaction to a user. Petitioner provides an explanation accounting for those claims, see id. at 93–94, and our analysis of claim 1 concerning the determination of an abstract idea equally applies to those claims. We determine that Petitioner has shown that claims 1, 11, and 16 recite a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Guidance as a judicially excepted abstract idea.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,534,551 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,534,551
• SAP SE v. Teradata US Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2021 · IPR2021-00861 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the present record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed construction supported by the intrinsic evidence. The ordinary meaning of “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” does not require limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage, and Patent Owner does not argue to the contrary. Turning to the language of the other claims, we note that claim 5, which depends from claim 1, specifically includes additional language stating that the data is stored “only in one of two portions of the volatile storage,” but claim 1 does not include such language. The use of this additional limitation in dependent claim 5 suggests that the inventors did not intend it to be included within claim 1’s broader language reciting “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim”). Turning to the ’923 patent specification, the portions of the specification Patent Owner relies on appear to discuss a preferred embodiment of the invention, rather than limiting the invention itself. The portions of columns 14 and 15 upon which Patent Owner relies discuss Figure 3 which, the specification explains, “depicts a volatile storage 300 that uses a persistent temperature-based storage management technique as well as a conventional storage management technique in accordance with one embodiment.” Ex. 1001, 14:48–51 (emphasis added); see id. at 5:5–8 (also describing Figure 3 as being “in accordance with one embodiment” of the invention). Interpreting claim 1 to require maintaining only a single copy of a data portion in either the first portion or second portion, where that language does not exist in claim 1, would be tantamount to reading a limitation from a preferred embodiment into the claims, which would be improper. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). Patent Owner does not identify any portions of the specification suggesting that limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage is a necessary part of the invention, or that the inventors intended to expressly or impliedly define “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” to include this requirement. Consequently, at this stage of the proceeding, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring that “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” requires “coordinating placement of data into and out of the volatile storage so as to limit the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage.” The parties may further address the meaning of this claim phrase during the trial, if appropriate.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “3. Other Terms We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science and two years of industry experience or research working 2 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. with database and related storage management technologies,” and that “[a]dditional education, such as an M.S. in computer science, could substitute for the industry experience as it typically involves at least two years of additional study focused exclusively on computer science, as well as a thesis or project spanning several terms to implement a substantial project.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). According to Petitioner, the person of ordinary skill would have “understood the advantages of partitioning a volatile memory into multiple different sections (e.g., buffer pools) and applying multiple different storage management (e.g., cache replacement) policies to those different sections, and known how to implement such designs.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 14. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’923 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Lee discloses this claim element. Paragraph 17 of Lee discloses the use of a temperature-based storage management technique and a non-temperature-based storage management technique (the LRU replacement policy), and that both “may be used to manage a cache.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Based on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Lee’s disclosure of using these techniques “to manage a cache” involves “manag[ing] the storage of data in” the cache, because both techniques operate in order to control what data is stored in the cache. We do not find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive because it is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” to require “limit[ing] the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage,” which we do not adopt. See § II.A.2, supra. Consequently, we determine that, on the record before us, Petitioner’s cited evidence sufficiently supports its contentions regarding this limitation.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,851,923
• Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2020 · IPR2019-00837 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 14–19, 26, and 36–44 are unpatentable as obvious over Kiss and FIPA97, with some claims also challenged over Cohen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We begin our analysis by addressing the level of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Lieberman, opines that a person of ordinary been someone familiar with the principles and conventions of computer science and computer networking, and also with multi-agent systems and inter-agent communication languages as documented in agent-centered literature by 1999. Ex. 1050 ¶ 32; see Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1050 ¶ 32). Dr. Lieberman also testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art may have been a graduate student in mathematics, engineering, or computer science, and may have had an advanced degree in one of these disciplines, and would also have had at least two years of experience working in the field of computer science, or a related field, and may have worked in academia, either as a professor or a graduate student, for a technology company, or for a government. Ex. 1050 ¶ 32. Citing the testimony of its declarant, Dr. Medvidovic, Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’560 patent’s effective filing date would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or equivalent field and at least two years of work experience in design and development of distributed systems, software specification languages, or a related area.” PO Resp. 28 (citing Ex. 2032 ¶ 41). Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as being “vague and uncertain” due to Petitioner’s and Dr. Lieberman’s use of the word “may” in their proposed definition. Id. at 28–29. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposed definition “leav[es] every aspect of the level of skill ‘fluid,’” which is “particularly problematic here, where Petitioner claims that it would have been obvious to create an agent system that is very complex and advanced in its facilitation, goal processing, and inter-agent communication capacities.” Id. at 29 (citing Ex. 2032 ¶ 44). alternatives—i.e., that a Skilled Artisan would have been at least a graduate student in several relevant fields, and would have had at least two years of work experience in those fields.” Pet. Reply 12; see Pet. 5. Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner does not articulate how any differences between the parties’ proposals that would alter or even affect the outcome of this proceeding. Pet. Reply 12. Patent Owner asserts that it has “identified how the difference between the proposals would affect this proceeding” because Patent Owner has pointed out that “it is Petitioner’s burden under the law to address each Graham factor and Petitioner has failed to proffer a coherent level of ordinary skill in the art, [and] Petitioner’s obviousness assertion fails for that reason alone.” PO Sur-reply 16–17 (citing PO Resp. 29).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for petitioner

    “1. “goal satisfaction plan” The claim term “goal satisfaction plan” is recited in challenged independent claims 1 and 26 of the ’560 patent. Ex. 1001, 30:7–15 (claim 1), 32:43–51 (claim 26). It is also recited in independent claim 50 of the ’560 patent, not challenged in this proceeding. Id. at 35:1–10. Petitioner contends that a “goal satisfaction plan” is a “procedure for sending one or more requests for service to one or more agents in order to satisfy a goal.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner disagrees and asserts that the claim term “goal a complex goal expression in an optimal or near-optimal manner that is consistent with any advice parameters or constraints.” PO Resp. 32. a. Claim Language We begin our claim construction analysis by considering the language of the claims themselves. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Addressing the claim language of the disputed term, we note that the claim language “a goal satisfaction plan” indicates that the term’s plain meaning is “a plan for satisfying a goal.” In independent claims 1 and 26, the recited “goal satisfaction plan” is further constrained by specific limitations recited in the claims. Claim 1 recites: a facilitating engine . . . further operable for generating a goal satisfaction plan associated with the base goal, wherein the goal satisfaction plan involves: using reasoning to determine sub-goal requests based on non-syntactic decomposition of the base goal and using said reasoning to co-ordinate and schedule efforts by the service-providing electronic agents for fulfilling the sub-goal requests in a cooperative completion of the base goal.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “relevant public, exercising reasonable diligence, could have located FIPA 97 Version 1.0 in late 1997 on the FIPA website, housed at the time at http://drogo.cselt.stet.it/fipa. FIPA published FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on its website at the conclusion of the Munich meeting on October 10, 1997, or shortly thereafter. See Ex. 1049 ¶ 20. In the several months leading up to the Munich meeting, persons of ordinary skill in the art would have known about the FIPA website through the widely distributed AgentWeb newsletters and the Software Agents mailing list, which provided website information or direct links to drafts of the specification and meeting announcements and reports. See Ex. 1091, 1–2; Ex. 1092, 3; Ex. 1093, 2; Ex. 1094; Ex. 1082, 1; Ex. 1083, 1. Therefore, people working in the field would have been sufficiently familiar with FIPA’s activities and its website to look for FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on the FIPA website when it was posted after the Munich meeting. Indeed, both Dr. Finin, who was affiliated with FIPA, and Dr. Lieberman, who worked in the software agent field, testify that they accessed FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on the FIPA website in late 1997. Ex. 1049 ¶ 21; Ex. 1050 ¶ 146.” slip op. at 50

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “skill in the relevant field to combine the prior art teachings, Petitioner “must show some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. A reason to combine teachings from the prior art “may be found in explicit or implicit teachings within the references themselves, from the ordinary knowledge of those skilled in the art, or from the nature of the problem to be solved.” WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 7,069,560 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,069,560
• Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2020 · IPR2019-00813 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 11, and 48–60 are unpatentable as obvious over Kiss and FIPA97; Patent Owner’s motion to exclude is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “question is “vague, ambiguous, confusing, lacks foundation and calls for a legal conclusion.” Paper 35, 1. Patent Owner, however, does not explain adequately how the question is vague, ambiguous or confusing, other than to state that “Dr. Medvidovic[’s] testimony highlights the vague, ambiguous, and confusing nature of Microsoft’s question.” Id. at 2. Nor does Patent Owner explain adequately how the question lacks foundation or calls for a legal conclusion aside from pointing to Dr. Medvidovic’s response that “[t]his is a legal thing, not a technical thing” in reference to the term “preferred embodiment.” Id.” slip op. at 166

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “description of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. That is, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or equivalent field and at least two years of work experience in design and development of distributed systems, software specification languages, or a related area.” Our analysis and conclusions in this Final Written Decision would be the same regardless of whether Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). As discussed above, the challenged independent claims 1 and 29 do not recite all of the limiting features required by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “goal satisfaction plan.” Thus, unless one of the established exceptions, such as lexicography or disavowal, applies, the challenged claims are not restricted as Patent Owner contends. See, e.g., GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“the specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal”) (citation omitted). Here, Patent Owner does not argue lexicography or disavowal. Nor does Patent Owner explain any other reason why the Specification limits “goal satisfaction plan” as it contends. Thus, claim construction in this case is governed by the general principle that “a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875; see also WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is well established that claims are not limited to preferred embodiments, unless the specification clearly indicates otherwise.” (citing Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court has repeatedly cautioned against limiting claims to a preferred embodiment.”))). Accordingly, none of the embodiments in the Specification cited by Patent Owner limits “goal satisfaction plan” as Patent Owner contends.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “http://drogo.cselt.stet.it/fipa. FIPA published FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on its website at the conclusion of the Munich meeting on October 10, 1997, or shortly thereafter. See Ex. 1049 ¶ 20. In the several months leading up to the Munich meeting, persons of ordinary skill in the art would have known about the FIPA website through the widely distributed AgentWeb newsletters and the Software Agents mailing list, which provided website information or direct links to drafts of the specification and meeting announcements and reports. See Ex. 1091, 1–2; Ex. 1092, 3; Ex. 1093, 2; Ex. 1094; Ex. 1082, 1; Ex. 1083, 1. Therefore, people working in the field would have been sufficiently familiar with FIPA’s activities and its website to look for FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on the FIPA website when it was posted after the Munich meeting. Indeed, both Dr. Finin, who was affiliated with FIPA, and Dr. Lieberman, who worked in the software agent field, testify that they accessed FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on the FIPA website in late 1997. Id. ¶ 21; Ex. 1050 ¶ 146.” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 6,851,115 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,851,115
• Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2020 · IPR2019-00812 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 15, and 17–25 are unpatentable as obvious over Kiss and FIPA97, or over Kiss, FIPA97, and Cohen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). As discussed above, the challenged independent claims 1 and 29 do not recite all of the limiting features required by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “goal satisfaction plan.” Thus, unless one of the established exceptions, such as lexicography or disavowal, applies, the challenged claims are not restricted as Patent Owner contends. See, e.g., GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“the specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal”) (citation omitted). Here, Patent Owner does not argue lexicography or disavowal. Nor does Patent Owner explain any other reason why the Specification limits “goal satisfaction plan” as it contends. Thus, claim construction in this case is governed by the general principle that “a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875; see also WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is well established that claims are not limited to preferred embodiments, unless the specification clearly indicates otherwise.” (citing Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court has repeatedly cautioned against limiting claims to a preferred embodiment.”))). Accordingly, none of the embodiments in the Specification cited by Patent Owner limits “goal satisfaction plan” as Patent Owner contends.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “http://drogo.cselt.stet.it/fipa. FIPA published FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on its website at the conclusion of the Munich meeting on October 10, 1997, or shortly thereafter. See Ex. 1049 ¶ 20. In the several months leading up to the Munich meeting, persons of ordinary skill in the art would have known about the FIPA website through the widely distributed AgentWeb newsletters and the Software Agents mailing list, which provided website information or direct links to drafts of the specification and meeting announcements and reports. See Ex. 1091, 1–2; Ex. 1092, 3; Ex. 1093, 2; Ex. 1094; Ex. 1082, 1; Ex. 1083, 1. Therefore, people working in the field would have been sufficiently familiar with FIPA’s activities and its website to look for FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on the FIPA website when it was posted after the Munich meeting. Indeed, both Dr. Finin, who was affiliated with FIPA, and Dr. Lieberman, who worked in the software agent field, testify that they accessed FIPA 97 Version 1.0 on the FIPA website in late 1997. Id. ¶ 21; Ex. 1050 ¶ 146.” slip op. at 47

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “we consider any relevant evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, the totality of the evidence submitted, including objective evidence of non-obviousness, may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Patent Owner presents evidence of two such considerations: (1) industry praise (Resp. 120–141) and (2) long-felt but unresolved need (id. at 141–145), both involving the software product called “Siri” from Apple Inc. For the reasons explained below, we determine that Patent Owner’s proffered evidence of secondary considerations is not entitled much weight because Patent Owner does not establish a sufficient nexus between the evidence of non-obviousness and the challenged claims of the ’115 patent.” slip op. at 73

  Patent outcomesUS 6,851,115 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,851,115
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Ibex PT Holdings Co., Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 27, 2020 · IPR2018-00011 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–5 unpatentable over WD5 and Lin under § 103(a).

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “evidence because it did not establish that enough interested and ordinarily skilled artisans actually obtained the WD4 reference was . . . erroneous.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained that “the standard for public accessibility is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could, after exercising reasonable diligence, access a reference” and that the Board “departed from this well- 6 Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00099, Paper 32 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018), and Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00100, Paper 30 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018). 7 Cited by the Federal Circuit as “Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 19040480 at *9.” established principle by repeatedly faulting Samsung for not proving that the WD4 reference was ‘generally’ or ‘widely’ disseminated.” Id. Rather than requiring Samsung to prove that persons of ordinary skill actually received the listserv email, the Federal Circuit stated the Board should have considered whether Samsung’s evidence established that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have accessed the WD4 reference, after exercising reasonable diligence, based on the listserv email. See id. at 1374–75.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s 8 Although Patent Owner did object to the admissibility of Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration (Ex. 1106) under Fed. R. Evid. 602 (see Paper 16, 1– 3), Patent Owner did not seek to exclude Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c), which provides that a “motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection” to the admissibility of the evidence. own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. We credit Mr. Bross’s testimony that he has “personal knowledge and recollection that people subscribed to that list from academia, from companies have been approved by the moderator.” Dec. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2008, 83:53–84:3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 184; Ex. 1058, 2). Mr. Bross testified that, as co-chair and lead author of the Working Drafts of the JCT-VC, he was familiar with the procedures for making JCT-VC documents publicly available, including through the JCT-VC reflector listserv (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 177) and that based on his knowledge and recollection, all communications between members related to the development of the HEVC standard were to be conducted via the JCT-VC reflector (jct-vc@lists.rwth-aachen.de) (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 184). See also Ex. 1058, 2 (stating the JCT-VC “reflector [is] to be used for discussions by the JCT-VC and all its AHGs [Ad Hoc Groups]”); id. at 228–229. slip op. at 17

  § 102 anticipationcites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,654,855

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.