• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00532 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over Warren, Warren and Dunn, Calderon and RepRap20208, and Calderon, RepRap20208, and Dunn.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “of ordinary skill in the art would have made the proposed combination in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success. Weighing our underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence persuades us that claim 7 of the ’381 patent is unpatentable over Calderon, RepRap20208, and Dunn. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 108

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Whether a document qualifies as a printed publication is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations. Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). slip op. at 69

  Patent outcomesUS 10,556,381 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,556,381
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Petition relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition also addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claim 1 of the ’679 patent, a limitation we need not construe to resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Owner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard without further analysis. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “RS6000 with Menon, namely because RS6000 provides an overview of the IBM SP2 multiprocessor and Menon teaches the use of “IBM SP2, a modern high performance distributed memory multiprocessor” used in the MultiMATLAB system. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142–145; Ex. 1005, 5–6, 14; Ex. 1007, 1, 11). The Petition also explains why POEref pertains to the field of cluster computing in a parallel operating environment. Id. at 26 (citing Ex.1008, 11 (“PE Software is designed to run on an … RS/6000 network cluster”)); (further citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–149). The Petition contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of POEref with Menon “because Menon suggests the combination by teaching that MultiMATLAB uses ‘POE, IBM's Parallel Operating Environment.’” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 6); (further citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153; Ex. 1005, 14; Ex. 1008, 11, 46). We agree with Petitioner’s analysis. We find the Petition’s argument and evidence of a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references in the manner claimed to be compelling, persuasive, consistent with the disclosures in the references, which include internal cross-references to each other, and supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner argues that Menon teaches away from a combination with Trefethen because “Menon expressly states that Trefethen’s first-generation architecture is inadequate for the objectives that motivated the newer design.” Resp. 35–37. The evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is inconsistent with the strong evidence of a motivation to combine Menon and Trefethen discussed above. Second, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is contrary to the evidence of record for the reasons given in Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 13–15 (e.g., “Menon explicitly cites Trefethen and explains that Menon builds on the teachings of Trefethen.”) (citing Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 1–3; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 47–53). We are further persuaded by Dr. Bajaj’s reply testimony: the “MultiMATLAB teachings in Trefethen. In fact, Menon describes enhancing the system of Trefethen. For example, Menon describes a list of “goals” already achieved by MultiMATLAB and then states that the architecture has been “redesigned to achieve two further goals.” One of these two “further goals” is “extensibility,” which Menon achieves by its description of adding “MEX routines” to the system of Trefethen. Far from showing an “incompatibility” between Menon and Trefethen as the POR argues, Menon’s addition of the “MEX routines” to MultiMATLAB shows that such a modification was within the capabilities of a POSITA, because the authors of the Menon paper actually implemented the modification. Ex. 1163 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1005, 1–3). Dr. Bajaj’s testimony is unrebutted, credible, and supported by the record. We agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning, which is based on direct quotes in Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶¶ 50–52. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine the teachings of Menon and Trefethen. RS6000 and POEref are specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and add operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Such facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away and lack of motivation arguments.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 12,021,679 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,021,679
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref; claims 26 and 29 over those references plus MPIref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “processor,” “multi-core” processor, or “singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’” as Patent Owner contends. Resp. 11–12, 21; see also Ex. 1163 ¶ 22 (“The claim does not recite ‘single chip,’ ‘single package,’ ‘single die,’ or ‘single multi-core microprocessor.’”). Nor do the claims recite a plurality of processing cores “within” a single-chip package or read as “multi-core within a processor” as argued by Patent Owner. Resp. 12–14; Sur-Reply 2; see Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1163 ¶ 23 (“Thus, the phrase ‘with a plurality of processing cores’ identifies the required processing resources associated with the hardware processor; it does not import a packaging limitation.”)). The claims do recite a hardware processor “with” a plurality of processing cores; a critical distinction even Patent Owner reads as open-ended, i.e., as a hardware processor that “comprises” a plurality of processing cores. See Resp. 11 (“the claims require a singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’”). Consequently, the claim language does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” as a single multi-core processor. cores it contains” in reliance on a parsed description in the ’034 patent specification: The specification explains: “Each processor can contain one or more processor cores that are capable of single-threaded execution. Processor cores are generally independent microprocessors, but more than one can be included in a single-chip package.” Id. at 1212 (partially quoting Ex. 1001, 5:11–16); Sur-Reply 2. The quoted description does not support Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” must be limited to a “single multi-core processor” that “locates multiple cores within a ‘single-chip package,’” i.e. limited to a single multi-core microprocessor such as “a Core 2 Duo is one processor package with two cores.” Resp. 12– 13, 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–25). The description quoted above from column 5, moreover, describes a “processor” that “can contain one or more processor cores” each of which can be an independent microprocessor. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:11–16; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 10–14). As Petitioner emphasizes, the specification distinguishes a “processor” from a “microprocessor” and describes a “processor” that “can be one or more general purpose single-core or multi-core microprocessors,” rather than limiting a “processor” to a single multi-core microprocessor. Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:14–36, Fig. 1; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 15–18).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition emphasizes that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition contends that: combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12.)” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A POSITA would have had an especially strong reason to read these references together because they address the same project, the same MATLAB-based parallel-computing problem, and the same MultiMATLAB command environment. Menon expressly identifies Trefethen’s MultiMATLAB work and then describes a redesigned architecture that preserves the same user-level objective––parallel MATLAB computations—while improving implementation details and extensibility. A POSITA therefore would not view the references as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, a POSITA would understand Trefethen as teaching specific MultiMATLAB commands and examples, including Eval, Send, Recv, and the architecture was implemented and improved in a later version. Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 71–72 (emphases added). We find the above reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. Petitioner and Dr. Bajaj demonstrate a sound technical motivation for a POSITA—someone having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing—to combine Menon and Trefethen: to improve MATLAB’s operational performance and extensibility in a parallel operating environment. Menon builds on Trefethen to improve and extend the parallel processing capabilities of MultiMATLAB: “This system will enable users to access high-performance parallel routines from within the MATLAB environment, to extend the environment with new parallel routines, and to use these routines to develop parallel applications with the MATLAB language.” Ex. 1005 Abstract. Menon is intended to be read in conjunction with Trefethen, as would be expected from two references generated by the same research group at the same university addressed to the same technical subject matter about a year apart. Ex. 1005, 1; Ex. 1006, Ex. 1086 ¶¶ 65, 101, 102. The very first citation in Menon is to Trefethen. Ex. 1005, 2, 16.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,570,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00349 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not disclose the claimed sequence of screen captures used to assemble a media stream.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not dispute the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. No express finding is necessary. The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 14–15; PO Resp. 22. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “c. Analysis “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan does not anticipate claim 1 because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 26–29. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. Sur-reply 21. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 26–29; Sur-reply 21.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “All other challenged claims require the “generating” and “assembling” operations because they depend from claims 1, 12, or 17. Petitioner does not allege that the additional references—Durante, Ma, Suzuki, Wanamaker, Heikens, Matthews, or Wilsher—teach or suggest the “temporal sequence of screen captures” recited in claim 1. Rather, Petitioner’s reasoning in the challenges to the dependent claims pertaining to the screen captures mirror the rationale presented in the independent claim. See, e.g., Pet. 25 (arguing that Avellan’s screen captures correspond to the video content in the challenge to claim 2), 26–27 (arguing that Avellan obtains screen captures from a playback of a video on the webpage in the challenge to claim 4). Petitioner’s argument that Avellan teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depend on the reasoning and insufficiently supported characterizations of Avellan in the challenges based on 35 U.S.C. § 102, as discussed above. See Pet. 40–60. grounds based on anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that any challenged claim is unpatentable as anticipated by Avellan or obvious over any of the combinations of Avellan and the other cited references.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,123,074 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,123,074
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations; claims 10–26 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan does not teach limitations [10d]–[10f].

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). The Petition further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of delivering multimedia content. Resp. 18. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions. slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 11; Resp. 18–19; Reply 5. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “‘Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). Reasonable inferences of a POSITA may suffice to establish inherent disclosure in a prior art reference such as Farber. See Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–1075 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is disclosed in that reference.”). Here, however, we find the Petition’s argument and evidence insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Farber inherently discloses limitation [1b].” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,140,441 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,140,441
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00038 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Chin; the Board did not find them anticipated by Chin or Whitehorn.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . (‘POSITA’) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus at least two years of work or post-graduate experience in image capture, image processing, image display, user interfaces, or a related field. Additional education could offset a lesser amount of experience and vice versa. Pet. 16. Patent Owner accepts Petitioner’s definition. See PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’842 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Petitioner that claim construction is unnecessary. As demonstrated in the analysis provided below addressing this claim limitation in view of the prior art, we need not explicitly construe “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Similarly, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy between the parties.” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments relying on Kennametal are belated. A “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)6 at II.I. Thus, we need not consider Petitioner’s belated argument raised for the first time in the Reply. In any event, we agree that Kenneametal is inapplicable for the purpose of supplying a claim limitation missing from Chin’s disclosure. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Kennametal does not stand for the proposition that a reference missing a limitation can anticipate a claim if a skilled artisan viewing the reference would ‘at once envisage’ the missing limitation.”). Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not 6 Available at www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trial-practice-guide. displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See generally Ex. 1004.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the theory of inherency was not raised in the Petition and is therefore waived. Compare Pet. 29–33, with Pet. Reply 11–15. In any event, we also agree that Petitioner’s speculation regarding the disclosure of Chin is insufficient to support a theory of inherency. See Pet. Reply 11–15. As explained above, Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See Ex. 1004. Speculation regarding the possibilities and probabilities of what is displayed on first display 51 in self-photographing mode, and what is displayed on second display 52 in outward-facing mode are insufficient to establish inherency. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d at 745. For the forgoing reasons and based on the entire record developed during trial, the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin discloses “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” Accordingly, based on the entire record developed during trial the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,836,842 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,836,842
• Google LLC / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00060 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 12–16, and 20 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 12, 13, and 20 as anticipated by Ogawa, and claims 4–9 and 14–16 as obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1 also recites “wherein the first and second states comprise an open application state.” Given the usage of “comprise” in this clause, we determine that the possible first and second states must include an open application state but the states are not limited to an open application state. Claim 12 similarly recites a processor that is operable to “displaying an icon associated with the application in at least one of the first display and the second display, wherein the icon indicates that the application is in one of two or more states associated with a display status of the application” and “wherein the first and second states comprise an open application state.” Ex. 1001, 16:12–19. Given the usage of “comprise” in these clauses, we determine that the first and second states must include an open application state but are not limited to an open application state that is being displayed in the corresponding display status as argued by Patent Owner. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which requires the application to be “open and being displayed in the corresponding display condition/status,” further narrows the wherein clauses of claims 1 and 12 which do not require the application to be open and displayed. In fact, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Surati, testified that the applications have multiple states and are not limited to open application states. Ex. 1016, 50:4–51:4. Patent Owner does not cite to an any portion of the Specification or prosecution history in support of its construction. PO Resp. 7–9.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of user interface technologies, including e.g., graphical interface technologies, or a related field. . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–21). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10. We apply Petitioner’s uncontested definition because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’080 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “For the following reasons, we find that Petitioner establishes that Ogawa discloses this limitation. Patent Owner’s contentions are not responsive to Petitioner’s mapping of Ogawa to claim limitation [1.f]. This claim limitation recites that “the morphing comprising changing the shape and size of the icon.” Ex. 1001, 15:4–7. Petitioner relies on the size and shape of access bar 42 changing as shown by a comparison of Ogawa’s Figure 4(B) and Figure 4(C). Pet. 24– 25. Patent Owner does not dispute that the size and shape of access bar 42 changes from Figure 4(B) to Figure 4(C). See PO Resp. 10–16. Patent Owner focuses on the color of access bar 42 shown as cross- hatching in Figure 4 to argue that the icon does not represent the state of the application. PO Resp. 12–14. However, the color of access bar 42 and the size and shape of access bar 42 are set independently of each other by different functions. Ogawa explains that: [t]he splitting position of the screen is indicated by a pointer 44. When the pointer 44 is designated with the pen 12 and the pen is moved left or right (along the access bar 42), the splitting ratio (horizontal size ratio) of the two screens 13A, 13B changes as depicted in FIG. 4(C). Ex. 1005 ¶ 19.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner next contends that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to modify “Ogawa’s display control method using Yook’s technique such that Ogawa’s method would have included first displaying a program across both logically divided displays of display input surface 13 . . . to increase the viewing area for the program as shown and described [in] Yook’s figures 4b and 4d.” Pet. 54–55 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 137). Petitioner further contends that the modification would “include[] minimizing the program to occupy only one of the first and second parts of display input surface 13 . . . as also shown and described with reference to Yook’s figures 4b and 4d.” Id. at 55. Petitioner then provides an example of the modification. Id. Namely, Ogawa’s operation would have been modified so that “when a user elects to split a screen in figure 4(A) using the split screen menu 41, the program is first displayed like in figure 4(C) . . . across two displays and then, based on user input to minimize the program size” resulting in the program displayed on one display. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 137; Ex. 1005, Figs. 4(A)–4(C)). Petitioner next contends that the modification of Ogawa with Yook “would have involved the substitution of one known way of displaying a program” as shown in Ogawa “with another known display method” as shown in Yook, “and thus would yield a predictable result.” Pet. 56–57 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 139). Patent Owner does not address claim 4. See PO Resp. 10–18. We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument and find that Petitioner has shown that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Ogawa and Yook as a simple substitution of one known way of displaying a program for another with a predictable result. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139. Further, Petitioner has also shown that the combination of Ogawa and Yook teaches the limitations of claim 4. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,842,080 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,842,080
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00954 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3 and 8–19 are unpatentable: claim 3 is anticipated by Yu and obvious over Okashita, Okashita and Yu, and Burgener and Okashita; claims 8–19 are obvious over Burgener and Okashita, with or without Yu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “ORDER For the foregoing reasons, ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Unopposed Motion to Amend (Paper 19) is granted, and claims 1, 2, and 4–7 are canceled;” slip op. at 37

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of ordinary skill, arguing that a bachelor’s degree, not a master’s degree, is all that is required because that is the “target audience for the ’886 Patent.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner does not otherwise dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Id. We used Petitioner’s proposed definition in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 13. Neither party argues any issue as dependent on the level of ordinary skill or the differences between the proposals. Accordingly, the issues here are not dependent on the level of ordinary skill and the result is the same regardless of which definition is adopted. On this record, there is no reason to change from Petitioner’s definition used in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “transistors” as a term that might require construction during trial. Inst. Dec. 17–18. At the hearing, the Petitioner argued that “cascaded transistors” means “[ar]ranged in a series of or in succession of stages so that each stage derives from or acts upon the product of the preceding [transistor]” and that there is no dispute that the limitation is taught by the prior art. Tr. 9:15–22. Patent Owner takes no position as to whether or not the prior art discloses “cascaded transistors.” Id. at 33:13–21 (“For the remainder of this proceeding, post institution, we have not taken any position regarding the scope of the cascaded transistors or the disclosure of the cascaded transistors in any of the prior art. We have not disputed that.”). Because Patent Owner takes no position on the issue, there is no dispute that “cascaded transistors” are shown in the prior art, construction is not necessary. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. original)). 2. “isolated island” Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contention that the prior art teaches or suggests claim 3’s recitation of “said plurality of cascaded transistors is situated within an isolated island.” Pet. 35–36; PO Resp. 16–17. Although the parties dispute whether an “isolated island” is shown in the prior art, neither party proposes a construction for the term “isolated island.” We agree that the arguments presented do not require construction of “isolated island.” The issues can be determined on the plain meaning of the term in view of the arguments made. See Section II.D below.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown Yu is analogous art to Okashita. Both references are directed to the manufacture of semiconductors, which we find to be the field of endeavor. Ex. 1004, 1:47– 58; Ex. 1005, 1:16–26. More specifically, we agree with Petitioner and find that both references are in the same field of endeavor because they relate to SOI configuration. Pet. Reply 6 (citing Pet. 7–8, 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–80, 90–91). Because we find the references relied upon are in the same field of endeavor, we need not reach whether they are reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,745,886 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,745,886

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.