- Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00042 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Remand
Claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doo and Amira; claims 12–19 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted tissue properties were not shown in Amira.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp., No. 2024-1794, 2026 WL 587294 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (“Medivis”) (Paper 40),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, and remanding our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our “determination of no motivation to combine Doo and Amira” and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether claims 1–6 and 11–20 (“the Remanded Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 11,004,271 B2 (“the ’271 patent,” Ex. 1001) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s obviousness challenge over Doo and Amira. Medivis, slip op. at 9–10. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Medivis, Inc. (“Petitioner”) and Novarad Corp. (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Medivis, we hold that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable; however, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 12–19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, except that we excise part of Petitioner’s definition to produce the following modified version: 4 Throughout this decision, we eliminate the parties’ italicization of reference names from quotations without noting “emphasis omitted.” 5 Doo, WO 2015/164402 A1, published October 29, 2015 (Ex. 1008). 6 Excerpt of Amira 5 User’s Guide, title through Chapter 2 (Visual Imaging 2009) (Ex. 1005). engineering, or a related field with several years of experience in the design, development, and study of augmented reality devices and . . . familiarity with conventional medical imaging data and visualization of data for medical procedures . . . . Our edit removes the alternative of “working with a team including someone with such familiarity” because one’s role in a team may be tangential to their personal experience with medical imaging. Regardless, had we adopted Petitioner’s original definition, our decision would not have changed.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the term “3D slices” has no apparent connection to the phrase “direct volume rendering.” Patent Owner’s argument appears to be that DVR “requires an image of the entire anatomical volume that is neither feature-specific nor segmented, [which] would seemingly require that all inner layers be displayed.” Reply 4; see Sur-reply 6–10 (not disputing Petitioner’s characterization). But, as Petitioner notes, the specification directly undermines this by teaching “display [of] a slice of the 3D data instead of a volume of the 3D data.” See Reply 4 n.2 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:34–35). In other words, to the extent DVR would depict an image of the entire anatomical volume, displaying 3D slices “instead of a volume of the 3D data” implies the opposite of DVR. Even if “3D slices” somehow implied DVR, Patent Owner’s position is still untenable. Claim 1 does not recite “3D slices.” Instead, claim 1 recites “3D data” and “inner layers.” Ex. 1001, 18:54–65. Patent Owner fails to clarify the relationship between “slices,” “3D data,” and “layers,” and its expert even admits that slices and layers are two different things. See PO Resp. 13; Ex. 1022, 32:7–16 (agreeing that the words “slice” and “layer” are not “synonyms”), cited in Reply 4. We also agree with Petitioner that dependent claim 3 distinguishes slices and layers by reciting “slices of the projected inner layer.” Reply 4 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:3–10). Thus, even if 3D slices somehow implied DVR, the language of claim 1 does not support limiting the claim this way.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“The determination of whether a document was publicly accessible “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For instance, courts routinely rely on the Wayback Machine to determine when a reference was first made available to the public. Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“District courts have taken judicial notice of the contents of webpages available through the Wayback Machine ‘as facts that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’”). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “Medivis cannot rely on additional prior art”—Exhibits 1023 and 1024—“that was submitted after its Petition to carry its burden without leave from the Board.” Sur-reply 4. As Patent Owner did not file a motion to exclude these exhibits, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to disregard them. We also find Petitioner’s Reply argument proper because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner did not prove the public accessibility of Amira. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d, 919, 925 on issues previously raised.”). Petitioner’s Reply argument appropriately elaborates on the Petition’s contention that Amira was publicly accessible. Patent Owner also does not dispute the substance of Petitioner’s evidence. For example, Patent Owner does not address the substance of Mr. Frank-White’s declaration. We find that this evidence, including Mr. Frank- White’s declaration testimony, persuasively supports the public availability of Amira as of the date shown in the Wayback Machine URL. See Ex. 1024.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,004,271 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,004,271 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,961,422 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious over Komata; the Board did not reach the Tsuji or Rosenberg grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user. . . . Also, a person could have qualified as a [POSITA] with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 17). Although these level of skill definitions are not the same, the differences are minor, and Patent Owner does not argue that its level of skill definition is dispositive. To the contrary, Patent Owner asserts that “[i]n any event, the challenged claims of the ’260 Patent are patentable under either . . . definition.” Id. at 18. We apply Petitioner’s level of skill but would have reached the same result had we applied Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“As we explained in our Institution Decision, we disagreed then, and still disagree, “that the second pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected (or that the third pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected) simply because the second pressure is greater than the first pressure (and the third pressure is greater than the second pressure).” Dec. 27. As we explained there, “[t]he claimed relative magnitudes of the first, second, and third pressures do not define any temporal relationships regarding the detection of the pressures.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 recites quantitative relationships for the pressures, not temporal relationships. Reply 4. For example, claim 1 requires “the second pressure greater than the first pressure” but says nothing about when the second pressure must be greater than the first pressure. A key misconception undergirding Patent Owner’s argument is its statement that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” PO Resp. 27 (emphasis added). The claim does not require detecting that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure. Limitation [1c] simply says, “detect a second pressure on the first input device, the second pressure greater than the first pressure.” In other words, all the detection that this limitation requires is detecting a second pressure. The claim then observes that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure but does not require detecting this. Limitation [1e] similarly detects pressure but not the comparison: “detect a third pressure on the first input device, the third pressure greater than the second pressure.” Thus, it does not follow that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” See id. Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner’s analysis of the claim language is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Our decision here does not depend on the meaning of this term. Patent Owner only argues the phrase “tactile sensation” for Petitioner’s challenge over Rosenberg, which we do not reach because Petitioner’s challenge over Komata is dispositive. See PO Resp. 63–66. Accordingly, we do not construe this term.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Instead, Patent Owner disputes that Komata discloses the order of all the steps of claim 1, based on its construction requiring the steps to be performed in order. PO Resp. 50–54; Reply 17 (observing that Patent Owner “does not dispute that Ground 1 demonstrates how Komata anticipates or renders obvious claims 1–7 if [Patent Owner’s] ordered-steps argument is rejected”); Sur-reply 12–14 (not disputing the Reply’s observation). As Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction we have not adopted, Patent Owner fails to undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing.7 To the extent, as we note above, that the claims may require a partial ordering (i.e., limitation [1a] preceding limitation [1b] and limitation [1c] preceding limitation [1d], see supra Section I.A.1.a), Petitioner has persuasively shown that Komata discloses such ordering. a. Summary as to Claim 1 For the above reasons, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata. 3. Dependent Claims 2–7 Petitioner also contends that claims 2–7 would have been obvious over Komata. Pet. 28–35. Patent Owner does not dispute these dependent claims. Petitioner provides detailed explanations indicating where Komata teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 2–7, supported by Mr. Ward’s testimony. Id. We determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2–7 are anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,336,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,260 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable because Petitioner proved that Rosenberg I anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” PO Resp. 28; Sur-reply 3. Petitioner “does not explicitly disagree” that a virtual detent is “vibrotactile feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” Reply 2. Petitioner asserts that “[i]f there is a dispute, it is whether Rosenberg I’s vibrotactile feedback ‘simulates a mechanical detent’ because [Patent Owner] says such simulation requires a sense of mechanical resistance and Rosenberg I allegedly lacks such simulated resistance.” Id. (citing PO Resp. 58–59).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner urges us to require virtual detents to vary on a system or application basis, we do not find this interpretation required by the claims or specification either. Although the claims refer to “a plurality of systems,” they do not recite different detent profiles for each of those systems. Claim 1, for example, recites “receiving a detent profile associated with one of the systems.” The other claims are similar. Patent Owner’s reliance on non-limiting specification language is also unavailing. E.g., Ex. 1001, 8:38–46 (“can” and “may”), 4:30–44 (“embodiment” and “may”).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“supports its proposed construction. See PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that claim 15 recites a “system comprising” “an input device configured to control one of a plurality of systems,” and hence “the recited plurality of systems are subsystems in addition to the containing system.” Id. We question how this point supports Patent Owner’s proposal because this does not address why each system must “provide[] context for virtual detents.” But regardless, we find it unpersuasive because claim 15’s preamble is not limiting (merely reciting “A system comprising”). See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.”); see also Tr. 80:4– 8 (Patent Owner conceding that the preamble is non-limiting). Nor is there any explicit language in claim 15 that would exclude any particular system, such as the system recited in the preamble, from the recited “plurality of systems.”” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 9,430,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,430,042 - Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00140 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 7–10, 12–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable over the stated grounds; claims 4–6 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed multi-coil alignment lacked prior-art support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had . . . a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, microelectronics, or equivalent and . . . two to three years of industry or research experience in the field of wireless energy transfer,” and that “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner does not contest this. See PO Resp. Petitioner’s proposed articulation is supported by testimonial evidence and appears to be consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’654 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–28. We adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We agree with Petitioner that the evidence does not suggest (and Patent Owner does not explicitly argue) that the terms “transmitting antenna” and “receiving” antenna depart from the ordinary and customary meanings of those terms. Pet. 1–2. However, for the reasons discussed below, the outcome of our decision would be the same whether we adopted Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Thus, we need not adopt either party’s proposed construction for this decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“spaced configuration are not confined to ferrite cores 32 and 3, and that at least a component of the flux lines will escape the cores. See Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 48–52; Ex. 1038 ¶ 54 Fig. 2. Indeed, the evidence suggests (and Dr. Horenstein acknowledges in his first declaration) that at least a component of flux will escape the core of even a traditional transformer. See Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 45–47; Ex. 1044, 6; Ex. 2001 ¶ 27. In his second declaration, Dr. Horenstein provides contrary testimony that in Odachi’s open configuration during alignment, cores 32 and 3 “act to confine or guide the magnetic flux lines, rather than radiate them into free space,” and “the flux lines would [not] leave the gap area and enter into the space distal to the magnetic circuit.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 69. But in view of Dr. Horenstein’s contrary position in his first declaration, and the lack of supporting evidence in his second, we do not find it credible. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (2022) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Apple Inc. v. MPH Techs. Oy, 28 F.4th 254 (Fed. Cir. 2022).” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“(4) Analysis We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that during the alignment process in Odachi corresponding to claim 13, there is a “spaced distance between the primary inductive coupler [230] and the secondary inductive receptacle 2” which is “reduced gradually and electromagnetic induction occurs between the coupler to the receptacle when the former coupler comes close to the latter receptacle.” Ex. 1005, 6:1–6. Thus, prior to any contact or precise alignment between the two cores, “an electromotive force is induced in the secondary coil 4 and this induced force is increased with the decrease in the spaced distance.” Id. at 6:6–8. At least in that spaced configuration, the evidence of record suggests that primary coil 31 produces a near-field component of flux into free space (the air space between the coils where there is no intervening core material) that is intercepted by secondary coil 4 to effect resonant inductive coupling, and that secondary coil 4 intercepts and receives the near-field component of flux in free space that is generated by primary coil 31 to effect resonant inductive coupling. See Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 48–52, 55. Thus, we find that Odachi discloses a “transmitting antenna” (coil 31) and a “receiving antenna” (coil 4) under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. We would reach the same finding under Petitioner’s proposed broader construction because the evidence suggests that Odachi’s coils 31 and 4 would have been considered “antennas” under the parties’ uncontested definition of that term, which is “a device that radiates and/or receives radio waves.” See id. ¶¶ 43–47, 53–54; Ex. 1032 ¶ 15 (Dr. Allen agreeing with this definition of “antenna”); Ex. 2001 ¶ 25 (Dr. Horenstein agreeing with this definition of “antenna”)). In addition, Petitioner persuasively shows that the free space between Odachi’s coils in the spaced configuration includes the “near-field region,” which includes the induction field around primary coil 31. See Ex. 2006, 498; Ex. 1045, 5:4–7; Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 53–54). Dr. Horenstein’s testimony does not contradict this. Although he points out that there are separate terms for inductive, near, and far fields, he also acknowledges that “[t]he region of space closer to the antenna than the far field is the near-field region.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 37 (citing Ex. 2006, 275).8” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 8,466,654 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,466,654 - Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00625 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand
Claims 13, 14, and 17–27 were not shown unpatentable because Tennant did not establish that Wikey or Davies inherently disclosed the claimed microbubbles and nanobubbles.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11. On September 19, 2024, we authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing, stating also that the “parties are not authorized to present new factual assertions, provide additional exhibits, or raise new arguments beyond those directed to the issues raised in the remand.” Ex. 3001. Pursuant to this authorization, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 61; “Pet. Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Patent Owner filed a Lead Brief on Remand (Paper 62; “PO Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 66; “Pet. Reply Br. Rem.”). Patent Owner filed a Responsive Brief on Remand (Paper 65; “PO Resp. Br. Rem.”).” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Accordingly, and in line with our previous determination that “Wikey appears to disclose each limitation of claim 13 except ‘microbubbles and nanobubbles having a bubble diameter of less than 50 microns’” (Final Dec. 20), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey inherently discloses microbubbles or nanobubbles. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey discloses every limitation of claim 13.” slip op. at 56
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS RE45,415 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 13, 2025 · IPR2023-01182 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 16 was cancelled on Patent Owner’s motion; claim 17 was held unpatentable as obvious over Cook ’554 and over Lee and Cook ’523.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent) and at least two to three years of industry or equivalent research experience in the field of wireless energy transfer.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Based on the effective filing date of the ’719 patent, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Mark Allen. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37– 41. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 14. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“[i]t will be appreciated that a network of capacitors, as used herein, may in general refer to any circuit topology including one or more capacitors, including without limitation any of the circuits specifically disclosed herein using capacitors, or any other equivalent or different circuit structure(s), unless another meaning is explicitly provided or otherwise clear from the context. Id. at 52:32–38 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’719 patent expressly defines the phrase “a network of capacitors” as any circuit topology including one or more capacitors. Id.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. Even if Patent Owner is correct that elements E and F in Figure 4-12 of the Cook Provisional only represent the delivered power level (not the received power level), other portions of the Cook Provisional disclose tuning the resonant frequency of the resonant circuit based on the received power level. See Pet. Reply 5–6. In particular, the Cook Provisional states that “[t]he control system of the receiver is in charge of . . . antenna tuning control.” Ex. 1006, 31. The Cook Provisional also states that “[t]he receiver[’]s control system may determine the model parameters using specific measurements (e.g. antenna current and voltage, input power, etc.) and calibration routines.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Cook Provisional discloses tuning the resonant frequency based on input power. Id.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“D. Motion to Amend Patent Owner’s non-contingent Motion to Amend requests that we cancel claim 16. Mot. Amend 1. Petitioner does not oppose Patent Owner’s request. Id. We grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request to cancel claim 16, and, as a result, we do not reach the asserted grounds for claim 16.” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 8,461,719 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,461,719 - PTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00702 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 and 8–16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Nair and Forsberg combination renders at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The Board has authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’817 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, citing Dr. Bims’s declaration, asserts that, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the subject matter of the ’817 patent would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, or equivalent and at least three years of experience in the field of telecommunications or wireless systems,” and that “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 22). Patent Owner asserts that one of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science with (1) at least three years of experience in the field of telecommunications or wireless systems; and/or (2) an advanced degree in field of telecommunications or wireless systems.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We do not discern a meaningful difference between the two parties proposals. Petitioner’s proposal appears consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’817 patent and prior art of record and is supported by expert testimony. We note, however, that the open-ended language “at least” expands the range of experience indefinitely with no upper bound. Upon this preliminary record and for the purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill with the exception that we delete the words “at least.”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither party makes a claim construction proposal or indicates that any claim requires construction. Pet. 11; see generally Prelim. Resp. We note that an argument was raised that presents an implicit construction question regarding whether a flag which “only identifies if encryption [is] ‘on’ or ‘off’” (Prelim. Resp. 24) teaches or suggests “an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by the UE to encrypt the subscription identifier in the SUCI” (as recited in limitation 1d of claim 1 and identically in claims 9, 10, and 15). We address that argument below, in Sections II.D.3.c.ii and iii of this Decision. With that exception, we do not discern that any claim terms require construction at this point in the proceeding for the purpose of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“i. Nair Provisional’s Support for a Claim in Nair Patent Owner argues that the Petition is deficient because it does not show that the disclosure in the Nair Provisional supports at least one claim in Nair, even though Nair is subject to the AIA and Patent Owner concedes that the Board’s precedential opinion in Penumbra concludes we do not need to make such a determination regarding support for at least one claim to reach a prior art determination under the AIA. Prelim. Resp. 23–24 n.6; Penumbra, 2023) (precedential). Following that precedent, we decline to require a showing of support in the Nair Provisional for at least one claim in Nair and instead only require that the ministerial requirements for claiming priority were met. See Penumbra, Paper 34 at 32–33. Petitioner argues that the “ministerial requirements” described in Penumbra have been met. Pet. 4–5 (noting that Nair contains a priority claim to the Nair Provisional, was filed within 12 months of the Nair Provisional, and includes a common inventor). Patent Owner does not contest that these requirements have been met, and upon our examination, we agree that they appear to have been met. Ex. 1004, codes (22), (60), (72); Ex. 1008, 1, 4, 38. Thus, on the present record and for the purposes of institution, the disclosures of Nair are prior art, to the extent that the relied-upon disclosures are included in the Nair Provisional. ii. Nair Provisional’s Date for Cited Portions of Nair Patent Owner also argues that the Petition relies on material in Nair that was added after the filing of the Nair Provisional, and that this material cannot be properly relied on as prior art. Prelim. Resp. 19–23. We address these specific arguments regarding material Petitioner references from Nair (and the Nair Provisional) below, in our analysis with respect to the respective limitations of claim 1 these citations relate to.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,425,817 - Microsoft Corporation / Affirmed Networks, Inc. v. Lemko CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 10, 2024 · IPR2023-00531 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–9, and 20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Flore under § 102.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To show anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every claim element, arranged as in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The prior art need not, however, use the same words as the claims. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The anticipation inquiry takes into account the literal teachings of the prior art reference and inferences the ordinarily skilled person would draw from it. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Los Angeles Biomedical Res. Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner defines the person of ordinary skill in the art as follows: “As of 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art [POSA or POSITA] . . . of the ’988 patent’s field would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering or an equivalent, as well as two years of industry experience related to telecommunications networks.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education . . . could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner “applies this definition of a POSITA for its analysis.” PO Resp. 18. Based on the complete record now before us, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art and the ’988 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also does not persuasively explain why we should disregard the ’988 patent’s exception to peer-to-peer connections, that is, “in not all cases will the DMA servers 406 be able to participate as peers in an IP network.” Id. at 9:12–13. Patent Owner’s assertions that when “DMA servers are able to connect as peers with an existing DMA network, they do so,” and that the “new DMA server is just the initial node in a new peer-to-peer network,” do not find support in the specification. See PO Resp. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:9–24, Fig. 6). Instead, Patent Owner cites a portion of the specification that explains “in not all cases will the DMA servers 406 be able to participate as peers,” such as in rural areas, in which case “DMA gateways . . . enable DMA servers to communicate with one another when one or more of the DMA serves cannot participate directly in the IP network.” Ex. 1001, 9:12–21. Nothing in this passage suggests that a DMA server not acting as a peer would merely be a temporary condition and that once able to connect as a peer, it would do so. Such reasoning is gloss added by Patent Owner and Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, whose testimony on this point mirrors the Response. Ex. 2021 ¶ 69. We do not find Dr. Cooklev’s testimony credible on this point because the testimony does not align with the ’988 patent specification.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Our reviewing court “has repeatedly cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Absent disclaimer or lexicography, the plain meaning of the claim controls.” Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012). There is no disclaimer or lexicography in the specification that requires us to limit the claims as Patent Owner wishes. We agree with Petitioner that the passages upon which Patent Owner relies use non-limiting, exemplary language. See Reply 6. For example, Patent Owner relies heavily on Figure 4 and its accompanying description, but Figure 4 “illustrates a non-limiting, exemplary embodiment.” PO Resp. 19–25; Ex. 1001, 6:31. Thus, Figure 4’s references to a “peer-to-peer connection,” “switch and route call[]” functionality, that “controlling logic can be distributed,” and “self-healing and redundant” wireless coverage, for example, do not limit the claim. See Ex. 1001, 6:48, 52, 64, 66 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 7,855,988 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,855,988 - Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · PGR2023-00016 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12, 14–17, and 19 are unpatentable based on lack of written description, indefiniteness, anticipation, and obviousness.
RulingsFinal written decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable
“B. Claims 1–20 of the ’705 Patent Petitioner argues that claims 1–20 of the ’705 patent have an effective” slip op. at 19
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteUnpatentable
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
Patent outcomesUS 11,297,705 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,297,705
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.