- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01469 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not determined unpatentable under the asserted prior-art grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelOther
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the ’336 patent’s effective filing date would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optics, or physics with at least three years of experience working in the design of LED lights or lighting fixtures; a master’s degree in one of the above disciplines with at least two years of experience; or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–29). Dr. Eden’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–28. Patent Owner “adopts for purposes of this proceeding only” Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 14). We adopt Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’336 patent as” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) General Principles Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, “its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Roku, Inc., 140 F.4th 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that the Board did not err by requiring “a nexus to the challenged claims as opposed to the patent as a whole”). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The presumption analysis should consider the unclaimed features in the product tied to the objective evidence to assess their significance and impact on the correspondence between the patented invention and the product. Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2022). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence, there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by” slip op. at 76
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00402 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted Patent Owner’s revised non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–4 and substituting claims 7 and 8, which Petitioner did not prove unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). A “patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion to amend complies” with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(d)(1). Specifically, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent; and (4) the amendment does not introduce new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)–(b). For the reasons explained below, Patent Owner satisfies its burden of persuasion to show that the amendments comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Both parties rely on expert testimony for their respective positions relating to the number of years of experience needed to attain ordinary skill, but neither expert cites supporting evidence for their testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 2002 ¶ 15. Our decision is the same regardless of whether the length of experience is two years or three. We find Patent Owner’s proposed “wireless communications” is more consistent with the ’958 patent than Petitioner’s proposed “telecommunication,” which encompasses a variety of technologies including, e.g., landline and wireless telephones, cable, and satellite. See Ex. 1001, 1:11–62 (describing the invention in terms of wireless communications). Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, substituting “wireless communications” for “telecommunication.” Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the recited second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. The plain meaning of “first type” and “second type” indicates that the first type and second type are different in kind. RMTA 22 (App. A). Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which explains that second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. As Patent Owner points out, the ’958 patent discloses “first type of system information (1TYP SIB) is . . . essential . . . for initial system access” and “second type of system information (2TYP SIB) is nonessential system information . . . defined as all other types of information, and thus excludes the [] information required for initial access.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:34– 46); see also Ex. 1001, Abstract (interchangeably using the terms second type and non-essential). Despite Petitioner’s argument that this disclosure is non-limiting and directed to a disclaimed example embodiment (Opp. 8–9), Petitioner could not identify any embodiment, among the approximately forty disclosed embodiments, describing something other than the first type SIB being essential information and the second type SIB being non-essential information. Tr. 22:18–26. Even the Petition acknowledges that “the ’958 Patent further classifies a second type of system information, the ‘non-essential’ SI, which is defined as all other types of information excluding that first type of information required for initial access.” Pet. 5. Furthermore, the prior art of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill would have understood second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 48 (describing two categories of system information, “essential SI” and “Other SI”). Patent Owner’s expert also understood the recited first and second type SIBs as being mutually exclusive. See Ex. 1011, 49:10–13. For the above reasons, we do not agree with Petitioner that the recited second type SIB lacks any requirements, nor do we interpret claims 7 and 8 such that the first type SIB could be a second type SIB.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“(d) Limitation 7h: Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation 7h are insufficient because they fail to address the limitation as written and improperly incorporate previous arguments by reference. For example, Petitioner did not map the recited “group identifier” when opposing Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. See Opp. 16–17. In its Sur-reply, Petitioner contends that limitation 7h’s requirement of transmitting the group identifier was previously “set out in Patent Owner’s prior papers,” but does not refer to any specific papers or exhibits. Pet. Surreply 11–12. We decline to search for and piece together Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to develop a persuasive theory of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. section 42.6(a)(3). Petitioner similarly failed to address adequately where Lee discloses or suggests the recited “compressed format” and “plural parameters.” See Opp. 16–17. Aside from the above concerns, we also do not see sufficient explanation with respect to limitation 7h’s requirement that the transmitting by broadcast be based on a comparison of the value tag. Petitioner argues that, because Patent Owner does not dispute limitation 7g, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use the same value tag[] to determine the system information broadcast in Lee’s compressed format embodiment.” Pet. Sur-reply 12. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citations to evidence and was improperly introduced in the Sur-reply. Moreover, whether it was obvious to determine what system information is broadcast is not commensurate with the claim scope because limitation 7h requires that the broadcasting (not the broadcast content) be based on a comparison of the value tag. See supra III.B.4 and IV.B. Further, we are not persuaded that Lee’s transmitting by broadcast is” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,841,958 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,841,958 - PTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the patentability of at least one claim of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–17 of the ’562 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Neither party proposes any explicit construction of any term. See Pet. 7 (“For the purposes of this IPR, the plain meaning of each term can be applied.”). We do not expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that Usui discloses all of the limitations of claim 1. Usui discloses that aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15 is in electrical contact with titanium underlayer 13, and titanium nitride layer 14 is located “intermediate the [titanium underlayer] 13 and the aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15” to prevent “reaction between the aluminum layer 15 and underlayer 13.” Ex. 1004, 3:27–29, 3:38–41, 3:58–63. Usui further discloses that “a capping layer is provided above layer 15,” and that “[p]referred capping layers are titanium nitride and combinations of as layer 18 of a group IVA metal, preferably titanium with a titanium nitride layer 19.” Id. at 3:67–4:6. Usui teaches that titanium nitride layer 19 is about 150 to 800 Å thick, and that the thickness of titanium underlayer 13 is between about 90 to 110 Å. Id. at 3:31–33, 4:6–8. Usui also teaches that the interconnect metallurgy structures described therein “exhibit[] enhanced electromigration characteristics” and “are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.” Id. at 1:8–14. Usui’s description of a plurality of metal layers (layers 13–18) and a capping layer formed over the plurality of metal layers (layer 19), along with its description of the structure’s usefulness for forming electrical connections in an integrated circuit structure, is sufficient, on this record, to establish that Usui discloses “an electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. Usui’s teaching that the capping layer is a refractory metal nitride (titanium nitride) that has a thickness (150–800 Å) greater than the bottommost layer of the plurality of metal layers (layer 13, 90–110 Å), sufficiently establishes, on this record, that Usui discloses the “said capping layer consisting only of a refractory metal nitride, said refractory metal nitride forming a top of said electrical contact and having a thickness greater than that of a bottommost layer of said plurality of metal layers” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,686,562 - Lam Research Corp. v. Inpria Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00033 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’888 Publication; Patent Owner’s motion to add substitute claims 13–23 is granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“priority issue are based on the cited disclosures of the ’867 application discussed above. Ex. 2009 ¶ 29. For the reasons discussed above, we do not view the cited disclosures as sufficiently supporting Dr. Banerjee’s conclusion that the ’867 application provides support for claim 1’s average thickness range (id.) and, therefore, give this testimony little weight. Stated somewhat differently, Dr. Banerjee’s advances an opinion (really a legal one) that is not supported by the facts and not in line with the caselaw discussed in this section (such as RAI).” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“priority issue are based on the cited disclosures of the ’867 application discussed above. Ex. 2009 ¶ 29. For the reasons discussed above, we do not view the cited disclosures as sufficiently supporting Dr. Banerjee’s conclusion that the ’867 application provides support for claim 1’s average thickness range (id.) and, therefore, give this testimony little weight. Stated somewhat differently, Dr. Banerjee’s advances an opinion (really a legal one) that is not supported by the facts and not in line with the caselaw discussed in this section (such as RAI).” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a” slip op. at 30
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“For these reasons, Patent Owner has met its burden to show by a” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 9,823,564 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 9,823,564 - PTAB · Sep 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00101 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar institution. Id. Additionally, the Director declined to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in view of the Wisconsin case because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. Id.; see Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)1 at 3, 7–8 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Further, the Director remanded the case to the panel and instructed the panel “to determine whether the Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and to determine whether to institute inter partes review accordingly.” Paper 12, 5–6. As noted above and explained in the patentability analysis below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. See supra § I; infra §§ III.E–III.H.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar institution. Id. Additionally, the Director declined to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in view of the Wisconsin case because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. Id.; see Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)1 at 3, 7–8 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherDecided for petitioner
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar institution. Id. Additionally, the Director declined to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in view of the Wisconsin case because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. Id.; see Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)1 at 3, 7–8 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)).” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting et al. v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 21, 22, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–36, 40, 42–44, 47–49, 52, 53, 56–59, 62, 63, 65–68, 71–73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 88–91 are unpatentable over Begemann, Krames, and Allen; claim 41 is …
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive because the Krames declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 21 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “at least one semiconductor chip” (id. at 10:1) where the “at least one semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Id. at EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as meaning “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 54 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 21 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’961 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 19. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in the art would need to be “familiar with thermal issues.” Ex. 2015, 26:15– 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’961 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“particularly relevant.” Resp. 14–15. First, Patent Owner argues that “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” means “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater 9 Petitioner states that “Patent Owner thus contends the recited ‘reflective layers’ can include transparent or semi-transparent layers that exhibit some reflectivity (e.g., SiO2) or an interface between two layers (e.g., the buffer and substrate layers) that exhibit differing indices of refraction.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner frames this as being Petitioner’s “novel construction” (Resp. 16), but Petitioner does not expressly endorse this Patent Owner contention. than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner notes that a district court already adopted this construction and notes that the “LED chip” includes LEDs, LED modules, and LED arrays but excludes laser chips, laser modules, and VCSEL chips. Id. (citing Ex. 2003, 15–18). Petitioner argues that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1–2. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is well supported by the record including the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 2003, 15–18. slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“It is unnecessary to construe any other claim terms in this Decision because none of the parties’ disputes turn on the meaning of other claim terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 6,465,961 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,465,961 - Liquidia Technologies, Inc. v. United Therapeutics CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 19, 2022 · IPR2021-00406 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over the ’212 patent, Voswinckel JESC, and Voswinckel JAHA; the Board did not reach the other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner is permitted a “limited opportunit[y]” to present new evidence in or with its Reply, as long as that new evidence is “responsive to the prior briefing” and does not constitute “changing theories after filing [the] petition.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29, at 14–15 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Here, both of the arguments that Patent Owner alleges are new—the argument that Voswinckel JESC and Voswinckel JAHA were presented publicly and the argument that these references were cited in other publicly available references—respond to Patent Owner’s argument in the Patent Owner Response that Voswinckel JESC and Voswinckel JAHA were not publicly accessible. PO Resp. 11–18. The argument that Voswinckel JESC was publicly presented is not a change in theory from the Petition, because Petitioner presented this argument in the Petition. Pet. 22. As to both Voswinckel JESC and Voswinckel JAHA, Petitioner’s Reply evidence showing citation to the references in other publicly accessible documents is merely additional evidence supporting Petitioner’s original theory that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have located the references. Accordingly, we find that the following arguments made by Petitioner are not untimely: (1) that Voswinckel JESC was presented publicly, (2) that Voswinckel JESC was referenced in a publicly accessible document, and (3) that Voswinckel JAHA was referenced in a publicly accessible document.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Voswinckel JESC and Voswinckel JAHA were publicly accessible. “[T]he presence of a ‘research aid’ can . . . establish public accessibility” of a reference if that research aid “provide[s] a skilled artisan with a sufficiently definite roadmap leading to” the reference by “provid[ing] enough details [to] determine that an interested party is reasonably certain to arrive at the destination: the potentially invalidating reference.” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, Petitioner directs us to research aids for finding both Voswinckel JESC and Voswinckel JAHA: a “June 2005 Ghofrani article in the journal Herz” for the former, and “a March 2005 article authored by Roxana Sulica et al. in the Expert Review of Cardiovascular Therapy” for the latter. Reply 3, 7 (citing Ex. 1010, 298, 301; Ex. 1104, 359). The Ghofrani article cites Voswinckel JESC as providing a solution to patients experiencing “pain at the injection site” by replacing injected treprostinil for “pulmonary arterial hypertension” with “inhaled treprostinil.” Ex. 1010, 298 (citing reference 6), 301 (defining reference 6 as Voswinckel JESC). The Ghofrani article also discusses the study reported in Voswinckel JESC, summarizing both the “major reduction in pulmonary selective pressure and resistance” and the lack of “adverse effects” described in Voswinckel JESC. Id. The Sulica article cites to Voswinckel JAHA, explaining that the reference reports that “inhaled treprostinil demonstrated substantial pulmonary vasodilatory efficacy in acute administration, as well as symptomatic and functional benefit in chronic use in a small number of PAH patients.” Ex. 1104, 351, 359. Thus, both the Ghofrani article and the Sulica article provide roadmaps directing a person of ordinary skill in the art looking for successful studies discussing the use of inhaled treprostinil in pulmonary arterial hypertension straight to Voswinckel JESC or Voswinckel JAHA. Because these articles provide these roadmaps, they are “research aid[s]” that “establish [the] public accessibility” of Voswinckel JESC and Voswinckel JAHA. Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d at 1350.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“The preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s position. Patent Owner is correct that Voswinckel JESC notes that side effects could occur more frequently at higher doses than at lower doses. Ex. 1007, 7. But there is considerable evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have avoided increasing Voswinckel JESC’s dose due to the side effects reported in Voswinckel JESC. First, Dr. Hill testifies that “[p]otential side effects are always weighed against potential clinical benefit, and pulmonary arterial hypertension is a serious, life-threatening disease where physicians and patients are more willing to tolerate side effects . . . to obtain clinical benefit.” Ex. 1106 ¶ 74. Second, Dr. Waxman testifies that “[u]sually the headache goes away” and “there are things that can be done to help ameliorate the cough so in general we are able to get over that issue.” Ex. 1108, 101:19–102:10. Together with Voswinckel JESC’s description of potential side effects as “mild and transient,” this evidence supports a finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been deterred from pursuing the course that is supported by the evidence to which Petitioner directs us. With respect to reasonable expectation of success, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of the ’212 patent, Voswinckel JESC, and Voswinckel JAHA because Voswinckel JAHA teaches that “[t]olerability is excellent” for its short-duration, high-concentration treprostinil inhalation therapy. Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1008, 3). Other than the argument discussed above about side effects reported in Voswinckel JESC, Patent Owner does not raise any timely counter to this argument.8 PO Resp. 10–40. The record supports Petitioner’s argument. Ex. 1008, 3. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of the ’212 patent, Voswinckel JESC, and Voswinckel JAHA and that they reasonably would have expected to succeed in doing so.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Unexpected resultsDecided for petitioner
“[U]nexpected results must establish . . . a difference between the results obtained and those of the closest prior art.” Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Teva Pharms. USA, 752 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Petitioner argues that the prior art over which Patent Owner argues the challenged claims showed unexpected results is not the closest prior art. Reply 24. We agree. As noted above, Patent Owner argues that the challenged claims show unexpected results over inhaled iloprost, intravenous epoprostenol, and intravenous treprostinil. PO Resp. 55–57. But the challenged claims recite inhaled treprostinil, and, as discussed above, inhaled treprostinil is taught by each of the ’212 patent, Voswinckel JESC, and Voswinckel JAHA. Ex. 1001, 18:22–44; Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1007, 7; Ex. 1008, 3; Ex. 1035, 582. Patent Owner does not even allege that the results of the challenged claims are unexpected over these references.9 Accordingly, we find that the evidence of record does not establish that the challenged claims produced a result that was unexpected over the closest prior art. slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,716,793 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,716,793 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Nanoco Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2022 · IPR2021-00184 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 and 21–25 were not shown unpatentable because Banin’s gold clusters were not shown to be molecular cluster compounds, and the Zaban combinations lacked motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a Ph.D. in chemistry, physics, chemical engineering, material science, or equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, with knowledge regarding nanoparticles and methods of synthesizing them” and “[a]dditional education might supplement practical experience and vice-versa.” Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 70). Patent Owner neither addresses Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art nor provides its own description. See PO Response. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as we find it is unopposed and consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“suggested formula” assigned to them is “based on a calculation that relied on the average of a wide distribution of particle sizes reported in the literature by Hutchison.” Ex. 2030 ¶ 103(citing Ex. 2017, 12891). We assign persuasive weight to her testimony because it is based upon the disclosures in Hutchison, which Banin explicitly identifies as the published procedures by which it synthesized its clusters. In particular, Dr. Cossairt’s testimony is supported by the following discussion in Hutchison: To calculate an average molecular formula for 1 it is necessary to know the number of gold atoms in the metal core. Given the average particle size (1.5 nm) this number is estimated to be ~101 by the method of Whetten et al. and leads to an estimated formula of Au101(PPh3)21Cl5. Ex. 2017, 12891. In other words, Hutchison explains that it calculated an average molecular formula for its synthesized nanoparticles by estimating the number of gold atoms in the metal core based upon the average particle size of 1.5 nm. Id. Indeed, as Dr. Cossairt has recognized, Banin’s “suggested formula” is exactly the same molecular formula that Hutchison discloses as the “average molecular formula” for its nanoparticles. Thus, we determine that the record as a whole supports finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Banin’s “suggested formula” represents an average molecular formula for a disperse mixture of gold clusters that are not identical and do not have sufficiently well-defined chemical structure such that all molecules of the cluster compound possess the same relative molecular formula, as required for MCCs. slip op. at 23
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Specification expressly defines the term “molecular cluster” in a manner that refers to the cluster compound. According to the Specification, “Molecular cluster” is a term which is widely understood in the relevant technical field but for the sake of clarity should be understood herein to relate to clusters of 3 or more metal or nonmetal atoms and their associated ligands of sufficiently well defined chemical structure such that all molecules of the cluster compound possess the same relative molecular mass. Ex. 1001, 5:3–9. We note that the District Court determined that “the term ‘molecular formula’ as opposed to ‘molecular mass’ is most appropriate. By necessity, a compound with the same molecular formula will necessarily have the same molecular mass.” Ex. 1091, 16. The District Court explained also, “it appears that the difference between a molecular formula and a molecular mass, at least for purposes of this claim construction, in inconsequential.” Id. We agree and do not find any dispute on the current record from the parties on this matter. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we agree with the District Court that the term “molecular cluster compound” means “clusters of 3 or more metal atoms and their associated ligands of sufficiently well-defined chemical structure such that all molecules of the cluster compound possess the same relative molecular formula.” Id. at 18.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that Petitioner has not shown persuasively that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered Banin’s small Au clusters to be MCCs. According to Petitioner and Dr. Green, Banin’s gold clusters are MCCs because they are clusters of three or more metal atoms with their associated ligands and “each cluster is ‘identical to one another.’” Ex. 1002 ¶ 90; Pet. 23. To begin, we do not find that the record supports Petitioner’s contention or Dr. Green’s opinion that “each cluster is ‘identical to one another.’” Ex. 1002 ¶ 90; Pet. 23. Petitioner and Dr. Green do not identify any disclosure in Banin describing the clusters as being identical. Instead, they refer to Banin’s disclosure that the Au clusters have “the suggested formula Au101(PPh3)21Cl5” and are “1.4 nm in mean diameter.” In doing so, Petitioner and Dr. Green do not meaningfully address or adequately explain how Banin derived its “suggested” molecular formula for the gold clusters or why Banin reported a “mean” diameter for those clusters. To that end, Petitioner and Dr. Green have failed to provide any reason why a skilled artisan would have understood Banin’s disclosures of a “suggested formula” and a “mean diameter” to convey that the Au clusters are identical.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 7,803,423 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,803,423 - Lenovo Holding Company, Inc. / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Interdigital Technology CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01494 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10–12, 21–24, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious over Li and Tiedemann, with or without ETSI1997; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In its Response, InterDigital does not contest Dr. Acampora’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, except that “InterDigital applies Petitioners’ alleged baseline level of ordinary skill without the phrase ‘at least.’” PO Resp. 3. We agree with InterDigital that the term at least arguably “creates unnecessary ambiguity.” Id. (citing Inst. Dec. 9–10). But we find that Petitioner’s articulation, after deleting the phrase at least, is reasonable in light of the subject matter involved in the ’449 patent, and we adopt it for our decision.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent that text was copied and pasted in either direction between the Petition and Dr. Acampora’s declaration, we disagree that this mere fact indicates that we should give Dr. Acampora’s testimony less weight. Patent Owner does not argue that Dr. Acampora was uninvolved with the preparation of his declaration, which he signed, under penalty of perjury, and presented as reflecting his own opinions. That typographical errors may, for example, have been propagated from his declaration to the Petition is by itself of little consequence. The cited Wowza decision does not suggest otherwise. In that case, the Board assigned little weight to the expert declaration, not because of its similarity to the petition, but because the declaration did not disclose the underlying facts or data on which its opinion testimony was based. See IPR2013-00054, Paper 16 at 4–5. As Petitioner correctly argues in its Reply, InterDigital does not “identif[y] where Dr. Acampora fails to provide sufficient facts underlying his opinions.” Pet. Reply 1 n.1.” slip op. at 20
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. “channel quality” InterDigital states that the court in the parallel district court litigation adopted the parties’ agreed construction of “channel quality” as meaning “a value/values quantifying how efficiently downlink resources of a channel can communicate information.” PO Resp. 3–4 (citing Ex. 2008, 1; Ex. 2009, 18). InterDigital contends that the ’449 patent suggests this construction, and that both sides’ experts agree with it. Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:36–61; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–35; Ex. 2002, 21:14–22; Ex. 2007, 26:12–17). Because the meaning of this term is uncontested, and it is consistent with the evidence of record, we adopt the parties’ agreed construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that a channel quality of the plurality of downlink resources and the related term a first channel quality indication for the plurality of downlink resources mean “a channel quality value related to the ‘plurality of downlink resources’ as a whole.” Pet. 11–13. We also determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that both alternatives 8 and 9 reflect embodiments of this term, which is consistent with the district court’s construction that provides “a mean or reference value related to the plurality” as examples of a channel quality value related to the plurality of downlink resources as a whole, explicitly referencing alternative 9 in its analysis. See Ex. 2009, 12– 13.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 9,456,449 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,456,449
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.