- PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00762 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 and 8–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Koskinen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.6 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Additionally, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known and been familiar with information elements (IEs) that specified an RLC reordering timer value based on (1) general knowledge that IEs carried information in RRC messages and (2) that 3GPP TSs describe an IE carrying recording timer duration information for the RLC layer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 151; Ex. 1014, 219–20. Accordingly, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art “that the PDCP timer information, which used similar variables as its RLC counterpart (Koskinen, ¶¶37-38), would also be carried in a PDCP configuration IE.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 151.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,863,573 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Douglas and Mark.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A claim is unpatentable under § 103 “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103; see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21); Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision. Only Petitioner’s proposed level is supported by testimonial evidence on the preliminary record, and it appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“CLAIM CONSTRUCTION B. In an IPR, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). This generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; Prelim. Resp. 9. However, the parties’ positions depend on interpreting the claim language in a particular way, and we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“At this stage, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner appears to equate a “fabrication profile” with a toolpath description, but nothing in the plain language of claim 1 supports that narrow interpretation. The ’774 patent describes a “fabrication profile” broadly and states that the profile can simply “include the dictionary [of configuration information],” or be “used to determine which machineready representation is available or suitable for a target printer.” Ex. 1001, 23:49–52. The preliminary evidence suggests that Douglas’s “operational parameters” would count as a “fabrication profile” because it is “the basis for generation of a machine-ready representation of the three-dimensional model that is executable on the target printer.” Id. at 23:37–39; see infra Section III.C.8. We also disagree that Petitioner’s argument is impermissible hindsight, because it is based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a sufficiently persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”). Finally, Petitioner appears to rely on Mark for providing a particular example of a fabrication profile, not to replace Douglas’s overall system in which the 3D printer can receive “operational parameters” rather than just G-code. See Pet. 8–10, 17–23; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 41 (the print queue, which stores tool instructions, may be maintained locally on printers 204 or on print servers 208); see In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))).” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00531 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on all grounds; found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 8–15 are obvious over Warren.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“limitations set forth in claim 1. Pet. 16–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7–14, 58–63, 93, 230–324, 390–446, Figs. 18, 22A, 23A; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–92). Patent Owner counters that “Warren does not teach one or more sensors configured to detect a current contact force.” Prelim. Resp. 25. The “current contact force” is detected by “one or more sensors” as recited in limitation 1b and limitation 1c requires “detecting the current contact force based on a sensor signal from the one or more sensors.” Ex. 1001, 12:40–45. Patent Owner does not currently contest Petitioner’s showing relating to Warren’s teaching of the other limitations recited in the method of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 25–27.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner cites portions of Warren and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to support these reasons. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 93, 226–252, 283–318, 331, 332; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–71). Patent Owner has yet to submit expert testimony, so Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relating to the motivations of an ordinarily skilled artisan is largely unrebutted.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“available because Petitioner’s showing impermissibly incorporates argument by reference. Id. at 29–30. Although Petitioner’s showing is somewhat brief, see Pet. 2, we have no concerns about the sufficiency of that showing, which is based on direct testimony from a witness with undeniable personal knowledge of the history of the RepRap online forum in which RepRap20208 appears, Adrian Bowyer. Nor do we find it necessary to “piece together” arguments based on Mr. Bowyer’s testimony, which we find to be clear, concise, and probative on the nature of the RepRap forum and who frequented that forum during the relevant time period. Patent Owner is entitled to test the probative value of Mr. Bowyer’s testimony at trial if it desires.” slip op. at 13
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,168,698 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00532 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, 1–16, and all asserted grounds; it found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 9–16 are obvious over Warren.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner identifies four motives for adding a transducer 3740 and vibration sensor 3730 used in connection with Warren’s vibro-capillary dispenser 3700 to Warren’s through-nozzle dispenser 100. Pet. 11–14. Petitioner cites portions of Warren and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to support these reasons. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 93, 226–252, 283–318, 331, 332; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–72). Patent Owner has yet to submit expert testimony, so Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relating to the motivations of an ordinarily skilled artisan is largely unrebutted.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“First, that Petitioner fails to establish that RepRap20208 was publicly available because Petitioner’s showing impermissibly incorporates argument by reference. Id. at 27–28. Although Petitioner’s showing is somewhat brief, see Pet. 2, we have no concerns about the sufficiency of that showing, which is based on direct testimony from a witness with undeniable personal knowledge of the history of the RepRap online forum in which RepRap20208 appears, Adrian Bowyer. Nor do we find it necessary to “piece together” arguments based on Mr. Bowyer’s testimony, which we find to be clear, concise, and probative on the nature of the RepRap forum and who frequented that forum during the relevant time period. Patent Owner is entitled to test the probative value of Mr. Bowyer’s testimony at trial if it desires.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelOther
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,556,381 - PTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the patentability of at least one claim of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–17 of the ’562 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Neither party proposes any explicit construction of any term. See Pet. 7 (“For the purposes of this IPR, the plain meaning of each term can be applied.”). We do not expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that Usui discloses all of the limitations of claim 1. Usui discloses that aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15 is in electrical contact with titanium underlayer 13, and titanium nitride layer 14 is located “intermediate the [titanium underlayer] 13 and the aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15” to prevent “reaction between the aluminum layer 15 and underlayer 13.” Ex. 1004, 3:27–29, 3:38–41, 3:58–63. Usui further discloses that “a capping layer is provided above layer 15,” and that “[p]referred capping layers are titanium nitride and combinations of as layer 18 of a group IVA metal, preferably titanium with a titanium nitride layer 19.” Id. at 3:67–4:6. Usui teaches that titanium nitride layer 19 is about 150 to 800 Å thick, and that the thickness of titanium underlayer 13 is between about 90 to 110 Å. Id. at 3:31–33, 4:6–8. Usui also teaches that the interconnect metallurgy structures described therein “exhibit[] enhanced electromigration characteristics” and “are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.” Id. at 1:8–14. Usui’s description of a plurality of metal layers (layers 13–18) and a capping layer formed over the plurality of metal layers (layer 19), along with its description of the structure’s usefulness for forming electrical connections in an integrated circuit structure, is sufficient, on this record, to establish that Usui discloses “an electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. Usui’s teaching that the capping layer is a refractory metal nitride (titanium nitride) that has a thickness (150–800 Å) greater than the bottommost layer of the plurality of metal layers (layer 13, 90–110 Å), sufficiently establishes, on this record, that Usui discloses the “said capping layer consisting only of a refractory metal nitride, said refractory metal nitride forming a top of said electrical contact and having a thickness greater than that of a bottommost layer of said plurality of metal layers” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,686,562 - PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Boyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“approximately two weeks before the statutory deadline for a final written decision, but the most recent median time-to-trial statistics for Judge Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas indicate that the actual trial date will likely be in July 2026, which is later than the statutory deadline to issue a final written decision in this proceeding in mid-June 2026. See Ex. 2001, 7 (median time from filing to trial of 23.2 months); Prelim. Resp. 10. Thus, we find this factor is neutral or weighs slightly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’713 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“We note that, as discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’713 patent without expressly construing the term “from multiple print heads or deposition lines.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As for Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner has failed to carry its burden to identify how the claims are to be construed, we disagree on the present record. Although Petitioner does not provide a preferred construction for the single term it proposes requires construction, Petitioner does identify which of its two alternative constructions applies to each of its asserted grounds of unpatentability. Pet. 6 (“Under the first construction, [the obviousness grounds] are applicable, and [the anticipation ground] would be excluded from the claim scope. Under the alternative construction, all of [the asserted grounds] are applicable.”). In our view, this approach does not fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden under 37 U.S.C. § 42.104(b)(3).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,421,713 - PTAB · Mar 20, 2025 · IPR2024-01406 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3, 4, 8–13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Takeuchi anticipates those claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’202 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 4, 8–13, and 15 of the ’202 patent. A. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“or “POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and three to four years of experience, or a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and one to two years of experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13). Petitioner further contends that “[s]uch experience would include a familiarity with thermal fluid delivery devices and/or the components and underlying technology used therein, and a higher level of 1 US 5,249,586, issued Oct. 5, 1993 (Ex. 1004, “Morgan”). 2 EP 0 845 220 B1, published Jan. 26, 1998 (Ex. 1006, “Susa”). 3 US 2005/0205084 A1, published Sept. 22, 2005 (Ex. 1007, “Gupta”). 4 US 6,155,268, issued Dec. 5, 2000 (Ex. 1009, “Takeuchi”). at 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13). Patent Owner states that, for purposes of the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner maintains that Petitioners’ arguments fail even under Petitioners’ POSA definition.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record, we preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’202 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“term “wicked into contact” that the Board adopted in a prior inter partes review proceeding that addressed the same term in an earlier, related patent. Pet. 7 (citing IPR2020-01602, Paper 32 at 8–15 (PTAB March 30, 2022)). ‘wicked into contact’ to mean: ‘wicked into contact (1) with the heater, or (2) with an area in close proximity to, and exposed [to] the heat produced by, the heater,’” and “[t]he present Petition adopts this formal construction for purposes of this IPR proceeding.” Id. (citing IPR2020-01602, Paper 32 at 15). Patent Owner also “adopts this construction for purposes of” the Preliminary Response, and argues that “Petitioner’s grounds fail even under its proposed construction of ‘wicked into contact.’” Prelim. Resp. 13. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Board’s prior construction of “wicked into contact,” namely, “wicked into contact (1) with the heater, or (2) with an area in close proximity to, and exposed to the heat produced by, the heater,” which is undisputed on this record. See Philip Morris Products, S.A. v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2020-01602, Paper 32 at 8–15 (PTAB March 30, 2022). C. Asserted Anticipation by Morgan” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot reached
“To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “A reference may anticipate inherently if a claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed is ‘necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.’” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that Morgan discloses “a storage compartment . . . being arranged such that the liquid aerosol-forming material can be wicked into contact with the electrical resistance heater to volatilize the liquid aerosol-forming material” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,925,202 - PTAB · Feb 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all grounds for claims 1–5 and 8–13, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 8 is anticipated by Fukui and claims 1 and 8 are obvious over Fukui-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“Patent Owner contends that we should deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) “because the Petition presents ‘the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously . . . presented to the Office.’” Prelim. Resp. 25–31 (alteration in original). Specifically, Patent Owner explains, the Office previously considered Sedor during the ’542 patent’s prosecution, and Sauter was made of record but not considered during prosecution. Id. Patent Owner, however, states that it “recognizes that this argument only reaches Sauter-based grounds, not Fukui-based grounds. This argument thus only needs to be addressed after the Board confirms the fundamental deficiencies in Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds.” Id. at 25 n.3. Because, as set forth below, we do not, on the present record, find any “fundamental deficiencies in Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds” that inhibit institution of trial, we regard Patent Owner’s § 325 request as moot, and we need not consider it further.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have [had] a B.S. degree or equivalent in mechanical or electrical engineering or similar fields, in addition to a minimum of two years of professional experience with or graduate studies involving design, development, and/or utilization of optical communication systems.” Pet. 26. On the present record, Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 1–31. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’542 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“enough to resolve . . . the lead Fukui ground” but that “[t]here are two disputes relevant to the alternative Sauter ground.” Pet. 22. With respect to the first of these “disputes,” Petitioner presents two claim constructions for the claim term or phrase “cassette width as measured between outer side edges thereof of one of one, two, three, four and six standard width units.” Id. at 23. The constructions are said to be from “the co-pending litigation,” with one characterized as “Patent Owner’s proposed construction”6 and the other as “CommScope’s proposed construction.”7 Of note is Petitioner’s 6 The claim construction attributed to Patent Owner is: “cassette width as measured between the outer side edges thereof that accommodates one of one, two, three, four, or six receptable modules.” Pet. 23. 7 Petitioner’s construction is: “The cassette width as measured between the outer side edges thereof equals one, two, three, four, or six times the contention that “[Patent Owner]’s construction cannot be correct,” and accompanying explanation in that respect. Id. at 22–23, 24. Patent Owner acknowledges that there is a dispute between the parties as to the noted claim construction but urges that “[t]he Board, however, need not fully resolve this claim construction dispute,” as, in Patent Owner’s view, the grounds based on Sauter are deficient based on either construction. Prelim. Resp. 21–22. We are mindful of Petitioner’s view that Patent Owner’s litigation construction is not correct. We also question whether that construction adds clarity in substituting “width that accommodates” for “width of,” and replacing “standard width units” with “receptable modules,” without, on this record, support for such word variations. Nevertheless, our determination whether to institute trial does not require resolution of any claim construction dispute, nor does it necessitate that we adopt any particular construction for the pertinent claim term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We invite the parties to develop the record more fully on this claim- construction issue during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,435,542 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00887 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 7–10, 12, 13, and 15–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 12 is anticipated by LithoRec.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with 1 In the Introduction and section headings of the Petition, Petitioner identifies claims 1–3, 7–9, 12, 13, and 15–19 as the challenged claims. Pet. i–ii. In the substantive content of the Petition, however, Petitioner includes claim 10 as a challenged claim as well. Id. at 34–35. respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, materials science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry [experience] in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries.” Pet. 14. On the present record, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 19. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’097 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[n]o claim construction is needed,” because “[t]he claims are unpatentable under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 15. That said, Petitioner directs us to alleged definitions of several terms in the specification or prosecution history of the ’097 patent. Id. at 15–17. Patent Owner argues that “[c]laim construction is not required to deny the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 26. Based on the present record, we agree with both parties that we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time.6 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“In order to anticipate a claimed invention, a prior art reference must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In addition, “[a]n anticipatory reference need only enable subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at issue, nothing more.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,050,097
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.