• Clearwater Paper Corporation v. Graphic Packaging International LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland and obvious over Nakagawa and over Nakagawa combined with Tanner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering, materials science, polymer science, or equivalent coursework, at least a year of experience developing paper-based laminates involving the application of polymer coatings to a substrate, and the appropriate industry familiarity with biodegradability standards and degradability techniques [and] . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 50). Clearwater’s definition is uncontested, and we apply that definition here, as it accords with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the problems addressed in the specification of the ’126 patent. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We have reviewed the cited testimony of Clearwater’s expert, including their calculations for arriving at a coat weight in Nakagawa that falls within the claimed range. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–33. We find that testimony, which is unrebutted, both credible and supported by the evidence of record. Thus, in light of Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the unrebutted testimony of Clearwater’s expert, we are persuaded that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each and every element of claim 1. See Pet. 45–54, 60–64. Clearwater also persuades us that Cleveland discloses the additional subject matter of dependent claims 2, 3, and 11. See Pet. 64–66. Thus, we determine that Clearwater demonstrates that claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. F. Ground 3—Obviousness Over Nakagawa and Tanner” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Inst. Dec. 4 n.5. We were persuaded by Clearwater’s proof that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (Ex. 1005) and that the provisional provides written description support for at least claim 1 of Cleveland. See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1006, 2–6, 9). We were also persuaded by Clearwater’s showing that the provisional provides written support for the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland. Id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–9). We are still persuaded by Clearwater’s showing. Thus, we see no reason to disturb our earlier finding that Cleveland is prior art to the ’126 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “protectant layers has “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2.” As noted by Clearwater, Cleveland discloses a total coat weight for layers 14 and 16 as falling within the claimed range. Pet. 32–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 32). In particular, Cleveland discloses that “the coextruded layer of copolyester (irrespective of which side of the substrate the layer is disposed) is of a total coat weight of between about 10 and about 40 lb/3000 ft2 in any combination of between about 80/20 to 20/80 parts by weight of Ecoflex to Biomax,” of which “a total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 is preferred.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 32. As disclosed, Cleveland’s total coat weight range of 10–40 lb/3000 ft2 falls almost entirely within the claimed range, and the preferred total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 falls squarely within the claimed range. Thus, Cleveland satisfies claim elements [1.3.2] and [1.5.2]. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art.”) (citation omitted). As such, we find that Clearwater adequately demonstrates that Cleveland discloses all the elements of claim 1. 4. Dependent Claims” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,637,126 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,637,126
• Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Abtis Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00283 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board cancelled claim 11 and granted substitute claims 14–16, finding Petitioner had not shown those claims unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “must determine whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4. In that regard, Patent Owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter;” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In this case, Patent Owner’s expert “Dr. Zhou signed the second declaration, stood behind its contents, and was available for cross-examination.” Paper 35, 4. Petitioner does not dispute this statement. Paper 39, 1. Petitioner does not identify any specific undue prejudice caused by Exhibit 2008. For example, Petitioner argues that “the failure to impress upon a witness that a statement is under oath goes to the heart of its reliability as evidence” and that “as the Board has recognized, hearsay is inherently unreliable” without specifying what statement in Exhibit 2008 lacks reliability. Paper 39, 4. Because Petitioner does not provide specific evidence of undue prejudice, we find Petitioner has suffered no such undue prejudice in this case. See Liquidia, 2021 WL 4860773 at *25. We therefore deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of lack of authenticity. With regard to the assertion that Exhibit 2008 is hearsay, Petitioner objects to the exhibit because the testimony is based “on other informal and unpublished documents that are hearsay under FRE 802.” Paper 29, 1. Petitioner does not specify what such “informal and unpublished documents” are. See id. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 expressly states, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on fact or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” The facts or data “need not be deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of hearsay.” slip op. at 50

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Paragraph 59 of the ’503 application describes formula 8-1 but does not support Petitioner’s argument that other unknown formulas may be included in the recited modified heavy chains. Ex. 2003 ¶ 59. Petitioner’s hypothesis that the recited heavy chains may (or may not) encompass unknown formulas is also inapposite to the written description inquiry before us — that is, whether the inventor was in possession of the subject matter recited in claims 14–16 based on the disclosure including formulas 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable

    “These arguments in the Sur-Reply are unpersuasive to show a lack of enablement first and foremost because the arguments do not specifically provide evidence showing that any purported experimentation is undue. See Sur-Reply 2–8 (asserting, but without providing evidence under any specific Wands factors, that the examples and guidance in the specification do not extend to the broad scope of all antibodies); see Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. We again emphasize that the analysis of undue experimentation does not necessarily require every Wands factor to be explicitly addressed but the analysis must be based on “weighing many factual considerations” depending on the nature of the invention and underlying art. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The assertion that the claim scope is broad alone does not suffice to show a lack of enablement based on the record before us. Moreover, as we note supra, Petitioner’s claim scope argument is based on the false premise that the scope of claims 14–16 is as broad as the claim term “antibody” without taking into account all other claim elements. For example, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner’s statement that “[t]he ’675 Patent’s specification discloses the structural modification site, the chemistry used to modify that residue, and working examples demonstrating the modification” (Reply 2), but asserts only that “[t]he disclosure of SSFI that only binds to IgG1 Fc domains (SEQ ID NO:1) is . . . . inconsistent with the expansive scope of the claims.” Sur-Reply 5. Petitioner’s argument that the claims encompass proteins that lack a lysine reside at a 248 position improperly excludes from the claim language the “lysine residue at 248 position . . . [as] determined by the EU numbering system” that claims 14–16 require. As Dr. Zhou testifies, “each proposed lysine residue at position 248 (EU numbering) is covalently modified with a specific attachment with a terminal bio-orthogonal click-chemistry functional group. The specification describes targeted transfer of a chemical functional group to lysine 248” and when claims 14–16 are considered in their entirety, which includes all claim elements, “[a] POSA would understand the claim itself to limit the modified antibodies to those with lysine at position 248.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 47. We also note that Patent Owner states “a POSA would understand that the phrase ‘one or more modified heavy chain’ encompasses antibodies within typical DAR distributions (i.e., fractional numbers) rather than requiring a distinct process for producing antibodies bearing modified heavy chains in exact integers.” Reply 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner states that PepTalk Presentation demonstrates that “a POSA would understand antibody conjugation products to exist as mixtures rather than discrete whole number species” because PepTalk Presentation “presents DAR values as non-integer measurements, i.e. DARs of 1.8 and 1.9 reflecting such distributions.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1007, 28). According to Patent Owner, “preparations having an average DAR of approximately 1.8 (commonly referred to in practice as ‘DAR2’) may reflect typical reaction distributions in which some antibodies contain two modified heavy chains while others contain fewer.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 46). Petitioner does not rebut these statements. See Sur-Reply 2–8. Based on the foregoing, the evidence before us does not show any” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,896,675 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,896,675
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–11, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Dong did not disclose the claimed vertical wordline arrangement, and the proposed 3D NAND combination lacked support for motivation and reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “understanding that the claim term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end, as asserted by Petitioner. Inst. Dec. 17. In other words, the claim terms describing the first and second portions having word lines “from top to bottom” refer to the relative vertical location of the word lines within the memory portions and not to location of the word lines relative to the source or drain. Our construction is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the express language of the independent claims, which states that the second memory portion is formed either above or below the first memory portion. The forming of one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a top and bottom in relation to those portions. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion is on top relative to the first portion. Similarly, claims 1 and 1 and 11, which recite a memory having a second portion formed below a first portion, establish that the second portion is on the bottom relative to the first portion. Thus, the claim language itself establishes the vertical locations of the memory portions relative to each other (e.g., a second memory portion that is above the first portion is on top, relative to the first portion). It follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “In our Decision, we treated the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting, noting that these preambles provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim. Dec. 14–15, 8. Neither party disputes that the preambles of claims 5 and 11 are limiting. See PO Resp. 34–35 (agreeing that the preambles are limiting); see generally Reply 1–6 (not disputing that the preambles are limiting). We maintain our construction of the preambles in this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (discussing pre-AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner, which Patent Owner did not contest. Inst. Dec. 13. Following institution, Patent Owner stated it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9 (citing Khatri Dec. ¶¶ 42–47). Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the ’941 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “We disagree and find that Dong’s Figure 5a does not depict wordlines in a physical vertical orientation, but rather depicts voltage diagrams. We agree with Patent Owner’s argument, supported by persuasive testimony by Dr. Khatri, that a POSITA would have understood that Dong’s voltage charts (e.g., Fig. 5a) simply represent which voltages are applied to which word lines and do not depict the physical orientation of the wordlines. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 171 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 52–54). As Dr. Khatri explains, Dong Figures 5a–5h depict different examples of self-boosting modes showing voltages applied differently to the wordlines and are not intended to depict the physical orientation of these word lines. Ex. 2028 ¶ 171; see also Sur-reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 65, 63–67; Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 177–186). We agree with Dr. Kahtri’s persuasive testimony that a POSITA would understand that Figures 5a–5h are illustrated vertically, but do not represent the actual physical arrangement of the word lines in memory, which are shown to be horizontal in Dong’s Figure 4. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 172 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 45, 47, 87).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,568,941 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,568,941
• Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish that Usui’s interconnect structure or Yu’s metal gate stacks satisfy the construed “electrode stack” limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 6–7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’562 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “comprises the recited metals and has the recited thickness, which forms an electrical contact for use on a semiconductor device generally or a group III- V semiconductor in particular. This is consistent with our determination that “electrode stack” is a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device We disagree with Patent Owner that “electrode stack” as used in the challenged claims should be limited to the specific electrodes shown in the embodiments described in the Specification. See PO Resp. 4–9. Although the Specification describes embodiments using source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes as electrical contacts, we see no reason to construe the term “electrode stack” itself to be limited to these components as Patent Owner proposes. Claims 1 and 13 expressly recite that electrode stacks comprise the claimed “electrical contact,” without expressly including or precluding any specific type of electrode. Ex. 1001, 5:54–63, 6:37–47. The Federal Circuit advises that the Specification “is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language. ‘Specifications teach. Claims claim.’” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). The Specification does teach electrical contacts that include source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes, but claims 1 and 13 are directed to electrical contacts that are not expressly so limited. Patent Owner’s proposed construction would effectively rewrite the claim by adding limitations, which we decline to do under the guise of claim construction. See id. (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the claim term “electrode stack” to mean “a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.”” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Piner testifies, with evidentiary support, that interconnects (such as Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure) and electrical contacts (such as that claimed in the ’562 patent) are not the same thing. See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 63–70. For example, Dr. Piner explains: In other words, not all metals in a semiconductor device have the same purpose and could not be said to be interchangeable. By August 2009 it was well known to a POSA how to discern if a metal component in a transistor is an interconnect or serves as an electrical contact such as a gate contact or ohmic contact, based on the structure and functionality of the metal component. For example, interconnects are made up of metal strips and are deposited on insulators. EX-1011 (Mishra) at 216. Interconnects are low resistance conductors that can carry very high current densities. Id., 216, 217. Unlike Schottky contacts and ohmic contacts, interconnects do not provide non-linear IV response like Schottky contacts nor inject electrons and holes into semiconductors like ohmic contacts. Id., 218. As many of the references cited by Dr. Zhao illustrate, electrical contacts had their own highly complex design challenges. EX-1008 (Pearton), 41-59 (Pages 53-71 of 383) (discussing electrical contacts); EX-1017 (Kramer), 11-126 (Pages 18-130 of 151) (same). And while Dr. Zhao cites these as supporting a POSA’s knowledge of an electrical contact, none of these references describe electrical contacts as interconnects. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Piner further testifies that Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure is an interconnect, and not an electrical contact, because “Usui states that ‘[t]he structures fabricated by the process of the present invention are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.’” Id. ¶ 148 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:11–14) (alteration in original); see also id. ¶¶ 150– 151 (Dr. Piner testifying that Usui’s interconnect metallization structure is not an “electrode stack” under a broad definition of electrode). Dr. Piner’s testimony in this regard rebuts Petitioner’s and Dr. Zhao’s conclusory assertions to the contrary.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.” Thus, Petitioner must show that Usui’s layers 13–15, 18, and 19 provide a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. After reviewing the complete trial record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has done so. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Zhao to support its contention that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,686,562 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,686,562
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01203 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 12 was not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish that Froitzheim’s silver contact was formed over silicon dioxide.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (i) an advanced degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related discipline and (ii) at least one year of experience 7 Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner raises issues of objective indicia of nonobviousness. designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies. Alternatively, a POSITA [i.e., a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree in the aforementioned disciplines and (ii) at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable expectation of success in the combination of Froitzheim and Gan. Petitioner explains that the combination of Froitzheim and Gan simply replaces one emitter, i.e., Froitzheim’s diffused emitter, with the polysilicon emitter of Gan. Pet. 36. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also readily understood how to replace a diffused emitter with a polysilicon emitter and oxide layer [and] would have understood that instead of diffusing boron into the substrate’s back side as taught by Froitzheim, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would instead follow the manufacturing technique taught by Gan. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1005, 246). Petitioner explains that the Gan processes are well-known and routine, and Dr. Holman states that “modifying Froitzheim in view of Gan simply involves using Gan’s known technique of a polysilicon emitter and oxide layer with Froitzheim’s known solar cell to improve Froitzheim’s solar cell in a similar way.” Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 144). For example, Petitioner directs our attention to “multiple instances” in which oxide layers and polysilicon emitters have been implemented successfully in the art. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1005, 246; Ex. 1006 ¶ 22; Ex. 1046, Abstr., 1121; Ex. 1003 ¶ 145). Furthermore, Gan’s statement that “cell performance can be improved if the diffused-emitter is replaced with the polysilicon emitter” and “polysilicon emitters with low J0 and ρc can be obtained with a very small fraction of interfacial oxide breakup” indicate a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1005, 245, 249. Gan also states that “polysilicon emitters with these qualities can be quite useful for silicon concentrator solar cells.” Ex. 1005, 249. Thus, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Froitzheim and Gan.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded the record evidence rises to the level of a teaching away. “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). And “teaching away” requires more than the mere expression of a general preference.” Galderma Labs., L.P., v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Notably, our reviewing court has determined that a reference can distinguish prior art in order to show the novelty of an invention without teaching away from combining the prior art with the invention disclosed in the reference. See Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Li prefers a “heterogeneous PN junction” and states that “a PN junction is prepared by a low-temperature deposition method, which avoids a conventional diffusion process at 800–1000°C. Such high-temperature process will cause more defects or contamination in silicon material, which will affect the improvement of cell efficiency.” Ex. 1008, 4. But, Li’s preference for lower temperature diffusion processes does not amount to a teaching away from the broader disclosure. In fact, Li acknowledges that “[t]he silicon thin film can be prepared by any deposition method,” including conventional processes at higher temperatures. Ex. 1008, 4 (emphasis added). And, while Patent Owner asserts that “[d]eposition methods are not relevant to the parties’ dispute, which is over deposition temperature” (Sur-reply 17), the deposition method employed includes its deposition temperature. See Ex. 1008, 4 (Li describing “conventional” diffusion processes at temperatures of 800–1000° C). Thus, just because Li teaches one way of depositing its silicon thin film using a low-temperature deposition method does not mean that Li teaches away from high-temperature processes. Li’s teachings do not discredit or discourage high-temperature processes in a manner that may be said to teach away.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 8,222,516 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,222,516
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01174 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 and 10–23 are unpatentable: the Board found claims 1–15 anticipated or obvious over the asserted grounds and claims 16–23 obvious over the Native combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “argument that the prior art fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. For this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposal above, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1, 16, and 20 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not provide argument to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick). We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the prior art fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,497,706 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,497,706
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01173 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–13, and 16–19 are unpatentable: claims 16–17 are anticipated by Lesniak, and the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications. See generally PO Resp. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for certain other claim elements, specifically, for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” and “said deodorant stick” having a particular hardness range. PO Resp. 8–9. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 5–8 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 10. We agree.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate a deodorant stick within the parameters of claims 16 and 17. e) Conclusion as to Claims 16 and 17 We agree with Petitioner that “the challenged claims recite nothing more than well-known deodorant ingredients performing their conventional functions.” Pet. Reply 2. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claims 16 and 17.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,905,647 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,905,647
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01105 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3–8, and 11–14 as anticipated by Lesniak; claims 2, 9, 10, and 15 as obvious over the respective asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications. PO Resp. 7– 8. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for certain other claim elements, specifically, for the recitation of “said stick range. PO Resp. 8–10. We agree. Petitioner does not provide argument to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 27 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1. d) Conclusion as to claim 1 Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s analysis that Lesniak discloses all elements of claim 1. We are not persuaded to Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, we determine that Lesniak anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,966,915 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,966,915
• Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00959 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1–8 as obvious and claim 9 as anticipated and obvious over the stated prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute the level of [ordinary] skill . . . set forth in the Petition.” PO Resp. 14; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 20–21. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed assessment of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the ’082 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We discuss the scope of the term “specification data” in claim 1 below in Section III.D.3(b)(v) when comparing the claim with Fisher. We construe the term “image processing control data” in claim 1 below in Section III.E.2(e)(i) when comparing the claim with Ohga. Otherwise, based on the arguments and evidence presented, we determine no explicit construction is needed to resolve the parties’ controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Papanikolopoulos’s testimony that Kuwata teaches away from modifying its camera 22 to access an external server (such as Fisher’s Internet-enabled external data source) by stressing advantages of a self-contained camera-printer pair without external dependencies. See PO Resp. 15–16, 26–28 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75, 77); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 61–64. The cited disclosures in Kuwata simply do not discuss any advantages arising from a self-contained camera-printer pair without external dependencies, or any disadvantages arising from connecting camera 22 to an Internet server. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75, 77. The cited disclosures instead tout the advantages arising from a camera manufacturer (rather than an end user photographer) specifying the image output control information CI for a specific camera-printer pairing, to reduce differences between an image as confirmed by the end user on the camera’s display and the image outputted by the printer. See id. That advantage, however, has nothing to do with whether camera 22 may or may not communicate with an Internet server. Indeed, rather than being self-contained as Patent Owner and Dr. Papanikolopoulos would have it, we find Kuwata’s camera 22 includes an I/O port for wired or wireless communication to transmit the camera’s image files GF / 10 to various printers 24 and various personal computers (PCs). See Ex. 1005, Fig. 4, ¶¶ 81, 85; Ex. 1003 ¶ 84; Pet. 14. Thus, Kuwata allows for and does not discourage communication between camera 22 and an Internet server such as Fisher’s external data source. In particular, Kuwata does not detract from the benefits of updating image output control information CI after the camera is manufactured, for example so that the camera can be paired with printers that were not yet on the market when the camera was manufactured. Moreover, Fisher recognizes that “a manufacturer may create various ancillary data files 418, and make the ancillary data files 418 available on a distributed computer network like the Internet for subsequent downloading and utilization by camera device 110.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 42, 55. That teaching in Fisher dovetails with Kuwata’s disclosure concerning camera manufacturers optimizing their cameras with various different printers, supporting Petitioner’s combination. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–89, 102–108.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,428,082 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,428,082

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.