- Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Imperative Care, Inc. v. Inari Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2025-00156 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Schaffer combined with Hartley or Eller, with or without Garrison; anticipation by Schaffer and obviousness over Schaffer alone were not shown.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties propose essentially the same formal educational background for the POSA, but we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition lacks some specificity concerning the POSA’s work experience. That definition, if interpreted generically, could mean that a person qualifies as a POSA if they had, for example, a B.S. in mechanical engineering and only two years of experience with any type of product in any field. That is too broad. We find that a POSA would have had the agreed-upon educational credentials—an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline. Ex. 1003 ¶ 35; Ex. 2008 ¶ 76. 10 Although unspecified in this proceeding, in the related 1157 IPR, Patent Owner stated that the field of the invention is “hemostasis valves for use during intravascular procedures.” IPR2024-01157, Paper 13 at 22. engineering experience related to products in the field of the invention, which involves endovascular devices and the surgical procedures that use such devices. Ex. 1001, 1:24–60 (background of the invention). Such devices include, but are not necessarily limited to, hemostasis valves and catheters for minimally-invasive vascular surgeries. Id. Furthermore, as pointed out by Petitioner and consistent with the testimony of the parties’ experts, the POSA need not have had firsthand experience designing relevant medical devices, including hemostasis valves. Pet. Reply 28; see, e.g., Ex. 1019 (Zalesky Tr.), 72:11–73:7 (testifying direct experience “designing” hemostasis valves or aspiration catheters is not necessary, but “general experience with vascular devices and procedures” is required); Ex. 2006 (Thornton Tr.), 180:13–19. As Dr. Zalesky testified, the POSA’s experience related to such devices “could be as simple as bench testing and looking at clinical data.” Ex. 1019, 74:5–75:1; see also id. at 82:3–6 (testifying a POSA need not “have specific experience with different methodologies of hemostasis”). Lastly, a POSA would have had an understanding of such devices’ design requirements as determined by the needs of the physician, patient, and procedure, which understanding may be informed by work experience and/or study. Ex. 2006, 24:5–21.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“1. “aspiration catheter” Claim 1’s preamble recites “[a]n aspiration catheter.” Ex. 1001, 22:10. Petitioner contends that, as a general rule, a preamble does not limit the scope of a claim, and that the term “aspiration” here merely describes a non-limiting “intended use” of an otherwise structurally-complete invention defined by the body of the claim. Pet. 18–19. Patent Owner responds that 11 In the related 1157 IPR, Patent Owner moved to exclude Mr. Thornton’s testimony, which motion we denied. IPR2024-01157, Paper 35 at 70–72. Patent Owner filed no motion to exclude here. Owner’s arguments here.” PO Resp. 30. We need not further construe “aspiration catheter” as no dispute turns on that term’s meaning or whether it is limiting. Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375 (explaining that claims need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve matters in dispute).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“That does not, however, resolve the dispute about “flexibility.” On that issue, after considering the full record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that a “filament” as claimed is flexible. The claims support Patent Owner’s interpretation. Patent Owner cites the claim language, including the recitation that “the first filament [is] formed into a loop around the collapsible tubular sidewall defining a valve lumen” and that “a diameter of the valve lumen decreases in response to reducing a diameter of the loop.” As Patent Owner argues, and as we recognized at the institution stage, the claimed filament “must be flexible to constrict the valve lumen.” PO Resp. 23; Inst. Dec. 15–16; Ex. 2008 ¶ 68 (testifying that a POSA would understand this property of flexibility is essential to achieving the claimed loop formation and function). The Specification supports this understanding. Consider the “loop” embodiments as illustrated in Figures 6 or 7. Ex. 1001, Figs. 6–7. If the filament forming each depicted loop was somehow rigid, applying a force that seeks to pull the respective ends of the filament in opposing directions would not decrease the size of the loop—the loop would stay the same size and the filament would not circumferentially constrict and seal the elongate member’s lumen as described in the patent. Ex. 1001, 13:18–29.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument is unavailing. A steel beam or a plastic broom handle are longer than they are wide and yet conventionally rigid. And, specific to the subject matter here, as Mr. Thornton admits, machining the valve’s actuating members from plastic or metal, which Schaffer actually describes, would produce rigid members. Ex. 2005, 168:2–6; see also Ex. 2006, 152:8–10 (testifying a flexible aluminum wire would not be made from machining aluminum). Moreover, considering Schaffer’s cited drawings— Figure 32, in particular—does not show the actuating members changing shape or dynamically conforming to the outer surface of the seal module that those members are compressing, which, had that been shown, might indicate flexibility. Maybe the absence of any dynamic conformance of the surface of the actuating members is an unintended limitation or artifact of the drawing. Or maybe not, and what is shown is a rigid structure consistent with Schaffer’s other disclosures as already explained. We decline to find anticipation where Schaffer does not, with sufficient clarity and detail, describe a valve with a “filament” as claimed.21 Ultimately, on whether Schaffer describes rigid or flexible U-shaped actuating members, Dr. Zalesky’s interpretation of the reference is more plausible and we find greater evidentiary support for Patent Owner’s position on this issue. Notwithstanding Mr. Thornton’s testimony in his rebuttal declaration that a POSA reading Schaffer would have understood 21 Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Anticipation requires that a single reference describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.”) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). testimony on cross-examination was equivocal—he admitted “[i]t’s not clear” whether Schaffer’s U-shaped actuating members are flexible or rigid. Ex. 2006, 115:16–23 (testifying “[t]he material properties of the U-shaped actuating members are not clearly defined in the Shafer [sic] application”). Dr. Zalesky, in contrast, has consistently testified that a POSA would have understood that Schaffer describes rigid actuating members. See, e.g., Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 66–74 (citing, inter alia, Schaffer’s illustrations of the valve in operation, and the disclosed manufacturing and assembly methods as indicating that “the actuating members 55 are rigid rather than flexible”).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 11,697,012 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,697,012 - Imperative Care, Inc. v. Inari Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01157 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: the Board found them obvious over Schaffer with Hartley or Eller, though Schaffer alone did not anticipate and Hartley with Eller did not show claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 9.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“background for the POSA, but we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition lacks some specificity concerning the POSA’s work experience. That definition, if interpreted generically, could mean that a person qualifies as a POSA if they had, for example, a B.S. in mechanical engineering and only two years of experience designing any type of product in any field. That is too broad. We find that a POSA would have had the agreed-upon educational credentials—an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline. Ex. 1003 ¶ 35; Ex. 2008 ¶ 68. We also find that a POSA would have had 2–4 years of design or engineering experience related to products in the field of the invention, which involves endovascular devices and the surgical procedures that use such devices. Ex. 1001, 1:21–57 (background of the invention). Such devices include, but are not necessarily limited to, hemostasis valves and catheters for minimally-invasive vascular surgeries. Id. And, consistent with the testimony of the parties’ experts, the POSA need not have had firsthand experience designing hemostasis valves. See, e.g., Ex. 1015 (Zalesky Tr.), 72:11–73:7 (testifying direct experience “designing”” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Schaffer’s valve to include a single flexible string or wire that replaces the two U-shaped actuating members would have been seen by the POSA as potentially advantageous—giving further reason for the POSA to have made that change. Pet. 35–36. We credit Mr. Thornton’s testimony that a POSA would have understood that Schaffer’s U-shaped actuating members may into the lumen. Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. On the other hand, a POSA would have recognized that a single flexible string or wire that is looped completely around the exterior of the seal module/lumen would provide more uniform constriction and compression around the outer diameter of some commonlyused tools and including tools with diverse shapes and sizes. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80–88, 93–100. We observed this same reason for modifying the art at institution and, after considering the full trial record, our view has not changed. Inst. Dec. 37 (preliminarily finding that a POSA would have considered Hartley’s string or Eller’s wire “as providing expected benefits insofar as such a filament may more precisely and uniformly constrict a lumen against inserted tools of different sizes and shapes”). Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Zalesky, does not disagree that a flexible string or wire would have carried this advantage. Ex. 2008 ¶ 75 (testifying a “filament changes shape dynamically, allowing for better adaptability to the contours of the valve lumen as it is constricted”);21 Ex. 1015 (Zalesky Tr.), 86:19–87:4 (testifying that POSAs in 2017 would have recognized that the “cinching” effect provided by a filament would have been more effective for large-bore catheters based on “simple mechanical engineering and physics”). And, at the oral hearing, Patent Owner agreed that using Hartley’s string in Schaffer would help eliminate potential fluid gaps; but Patent Owner qualified its answer that such a benefit would allegedly only have arisen if “the highly-compliant” seal member material in Schaffer was removed,” slip op. at 53
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“that issue, after considering the full record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that a “filament” as claimed is flexible. On balance, the evidence supports Patent Owner’s interpretation. Patent Owner cites the claim language, including the recitation that “the filament circumferentially constricts the lumen to create a seal,” which Dr. Zalesky opines a POSA would have understood as implying a flexible structure. PO Resp. 25–26; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 71–76 (testifying, inter alia, that “[t]o ‘circumferentially constrict,’ the filament must be flexible and extend circumferentially about the lumen” such that “the filament will adapt to the shape of the lumen as the lumen is constricted and thus ‘circumferentially constrict’ the lumen as recited in Claim 1”).12 The Specification also describes the filament as being selectively “tightened” and “loosened” about the elongate member. Ex. 1001, 9:37–40, 9:55–59 (teaching “the filament 150 is tightened” when the actuator is released and “the filament 150 is loosened” when the actuator is pressed to open the valve)). Dr. Zalesky opines that a POSA would have understood the patent’s description of” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“challenge fails on this record whether the clearer prosecution drawings in Exhibit 1008 are considered in the analysis of anticipation by Schaffer, or not. Whether those prosecution drawings are considered “extrinsic evidence” to Schaffer (as argued by Patent Owner) or publicly-available “intrinsic evidence” with respect to Schaffer (as Petitioner argues) does not change our Decision on Ground 1. Opp. 10–11; Mot. Reply, 3–5. Patent Owner’s motion is, therefore, moot as to Ground 1.” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS 11,697,011 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,697,011 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,937,992 - PTAB · Nov 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00805 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“C. Patent Owner’s Arguments Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments presented in this proceeding were previously considered by the USPTO. See Prelim. Resp. 31–33. In her decision referring this matter to the Board, then-Acting Director Stewart rejected that argument. See Paper 20 at 2–3 (discussing why “Petitioner provides persuasive reasoning, supported by evidence, that discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is not appropriate”); see also Prelim. Resp. 31–33 (referring to and citing Patent Owner’s Discretionary Denial Brief (Paper 8)). We need not and do not address this issue further.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. As to the inclusion of physics in Petitioner’s definition, Dr. Singhose (a professor of mechanical engineering) testifies as to why undergraduate mechanical engineering degree holders would have the requisite knowledge here, but does not testify that undergraduate physics degree holders would not. See Singhose Decl. ¶¶ 2, 27, 28. In addition, Patent Owner and Dr. Singhose require “a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field,” but fail to identify what fields are “closely related.” See Prelim. Resp. 11; Singhose Decl. ¶ 27. Based on the Morse Declaration, we are persuaded at this stage that a hypothetical undergraduate physics degree holder would have adequate knowledge for one of ordinary skill in the art of the invention here. See Morse Decl. ¶ 31. As to the requisite years of experience proposed in the definitions— three for Petitioner versus “at least one” for Patent Owner—we note that Patent Owner’s definition is broader than, but includes, Petitioner’s definition. Moreover, for both the inclusion of physics and the years of experience issues, Patent Owner acknowledges that the arguments in the Preliminary Response “are not impacted based on which definition is applied.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Singhose Decl. ¶¶ 30–34). Further, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Petitioner does not propose express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12. Patent Owner also does not propose any express constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 12. On the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As discussed below, however, the parties dispute the meaning of “gaseous fuel.” We address this issue below in the analysis of the challenge to claims 1–3, 5–9, and 18 based on Nakafushi and Olmr.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,393,034 - Recor Medical, Inc. / Otsuka Medical Devices Co., Ltd. v. Medtronic Ireland Manufacturing Unlimited Co.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2022-00431 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1–3 and 8–12 are unpatentable over the instituted grounds; claim 4 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Federal Circuit (Paper 33), which vacated the original Final Written Decision and remanded the proceeding to the Board. See ReCor Med., Inc. v. Medtronic Ir. Mfg. Unlimited Co., No. 2023-2251, 2025 WL 944511 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (“the Appeal Decision” or “Appeal Dec.”); see also Paper 41 (copy of the Appeal Decision). The Federal Circuit’s mandate issued on May 5, 2025. See Paper 40. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6, and we issue this Final Written Decision on Remand under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons below, on the complete record, we conclude that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 8–12 of the challenged patent, and we conclude that Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unpatentability of claim 4.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentable
“and Petitioner’s rebuttal evidence. Objective evidence of nonobviousness, when present, must be considered as part of an obviousness inquiry. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art, the totality of the evidence submitted, including objective evidence of nonobviousness, may lead to a conclusion that one or more of the challenged claims would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984).” slip op. at 50
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“1. Claims 1–3 and 8–11 Because the obviousness ground based on Levin and Acker is dispositive as to challenged claims 1–3 and 8–11, we need not reach this additional ground as to those claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018) (holding that a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Boston Sci. Scimed, analysis in the appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Appeal Dec. *1–*2 (summarizing grounds at issue on appeal and not discussing anticipation based on Acker). Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (stating that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding,” such as “alternative arguments with respect to claims [the Board] found unpatentable on other grounds”); SK Hynix Inc. v. Netlist, Inc., IPR2017-00692, Paper 25 at 40 (PTAB July 5, 2018) (determining all challenged claims to be unpatentable and not addressing additional grounds). 2. Dependent Claim 4 As to dependent claim 4, in the context of this ground, Petitioner relies on Acker as to the additional limitations in claim 4 in the same manner as relied on in the context of the ground based on Levin and Acker. See Pet. 73 (“The combination teaches this element for the same reasons described in [the obviousness ground based on Levin and Acker], claim 4, with the exception that [one of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated based on his or her knowledge of prior renal denervation work, as noted above.”). Thus, for the same reasons discussed above (see § II.C.3.c), we determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 would have been obvious based on Acker and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. G. Asserted Obviousness of Claim 12 Based on Acker, the Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art, and Yock Petitioner asserts that claim 12, which depends from independent claim 1, would have been obvious based on Acker, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and Yock. Pet. 12, 75; Pet. Reply 35–36. Patent Owner provides arguments addressing this ground. PO Resp. 57–60; PO” slip op. at 75
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Independent Claim 1 Petitioner contends that Acker discloses each limitation of claim 1. Pet. 61–63; Pet. Reply 35. In the “Overview of the Ground” section, Petitioner references its proposed construction of the phrase “configured to” and states that “it is proper to consider whether the prior art is ‘capable of’ performing the recited functions, as opposed to requiring that a designer of a prior art device have actually conceived of the recited functional language.” Pet. 61. Petitioner continues: “If the PTAB agrees that this is the proper approach to claim construction, then Acker also anticipates the claims challenged in this ground.” Id. For the reasons below, we determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Acker. As to element 1d, which includes the phrase “configured to,”16 Petitioner states that Acker is capable of being used to target renal neural fibers outside of the blood vessel to thermally induce modulation of target neural fibers while protecting non-target tissue in the blood vessel wall from thermal injury for the reasons discussed under claim 1, limitation [1d] and in the section entitled “Reasonable Expectation of Success”, beginning on page 37 [of the Petition]. Pet. 62–63 (citing Daft Pet. Decl. ¶ 179) (first bracketed text added by Petitioner). Patent Owner argues that, in the context of this asserted ground based” slip op. at 71
Patent outcomesUS 8,845,629 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,845,629 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 4, and 7–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12–13; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundInstituted
“On the current record, this argument does not identify a deficiency in Petitioner’s position as to clauses 1C and 1D. Patent Owner implies that the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D require functionality recited elsewhere in the claim—namely, forming a “fluid dispersion” (Prelim. Resp. 4)—but Patent Owner does not adequately present evidence supporting this implied claim construction. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Instead, Patent Owner cites to the entirety of claim 1 in support of these implied functional requirements. See Prelim. Resp. 4. Stated differently, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why any particular component (or collection of components) must perform the function of forming the “fluid dispersion” recited in clause 1G. Moreover, even assuming as correct Patent Owner’s assertion that Sevy “requires downstream separation,” Patent Owner has not explained why such a 8 In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner appears to use different terms for the same concept: “downstream separation”; “post-formation correction”; and “post-atomization correction.” See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3 (“downstream separation”), 4 (“post-formation correction”), 5–6 (“post-atomization correction”). In any response, Patent Owner should clarify the scope of these terms. requirement would fall outside of the scope of claim 1. See Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘[A]ttorney argument is not evidence’ and cannot rebut other admitted evidence.” (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017))). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Sevy discloses or suggests the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 3–8 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 As Paper 7 in this proceeding, Patent Owner mistakenly filed the Preliminary Response in a related proceeding. one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears generally consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceedings that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, as revised above.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding, the record on the analogous art issue is incomplete. Petitioner seems to take the position that Kaiser is in the same “field” (Pet. 47), but Petitioner does not fully address the issue of analogous art. Although Petitioner was not required to anticipate this argument with its initial filing (see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharma., Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023)), Petitioner may wish to address this issue as appropriate in future briefing. We will consider the full record on this issue, if necessary, as part of our analysis in any final written decision. On the current record and in view of our decision to institute based on other grounds, we reach no conclusion as to whether Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Goubet and Kaiser as proposed.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,092,918 - Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00225 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–6, 11, 12, and 15–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Blain anticipates or renders at least one claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“1. Anticipation A prior art reference can only anticipate a claim if it discloses all the claimed limitations “arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.” Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Alternatively, to the extent Blain may not disclose that its instrument guide 14 “extend[s] outside a patient’s body to a medical practitioner,” Petitioner argues that it would have “been obvious based on common sense and the general knowledge of POSAs to make the length of the shaft of instrument guide 14 sufficiently long so that the physician would not have to stick his or her hand inside the incision location to insert the implant between the vertebrae.” Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood such a configuration to “provid[e] the known benefit of allowing the physician to maneuver and manipulate the delivery tool without having to insert his or her hand into the patient’s body to deliver and position the implant.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 124). And, relying on the declaration testimony of Mr. Culbert, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying the instrument guide 14 such that its handle 20 and shaft 22 extends outside the patient’s body, as this involved nothing more than lengthening the proximal shaft 22A and/or distal shaft 22B.” Id. at 54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 126); see also Ex. 1004, 5:4–6; Ex. 1005 ¶ 21 (Blain disclosing that “the relative lengths between the proximal shaft 22A and the distal shaft 22B can vary”).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage of the proceeding, however, we determine that no terms require explicit construction to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,730,805 - PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · PGR2025-00016 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 4–14 on all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute a post-grant review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a) (“When instituting post-grant review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and “notes that it substantially tracks” Patent Owner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 19–20; see also id. at 20 n.7 (defining one of ordinary skill in the art as having “at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical or Agricultural Engineering and two years of experience in the design of machines, or have had equivalent knowledge and experience”). Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. Patent Owner’s proposal is the same, except for use of the term “machines” instead of “vehicles.” Furthermore, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceeding that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“In contrast, we view the record at this stage as supporting an understanding of the “frame” in “mainframe” as a supporting structure. Patent Owner provides a dictionary defining “frame” as a “rigid supporting structure” (Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing Ex. 2009 at 3)), and Petitioner proposes “a supporting structure” based on that definition (see Pet. Reply CC Br. 3 (mistakenly citing Ex. 2007 rather than Ex. 2009)). Further, this dictionary definition does not contradict the “mainframe” described in the Specification or any other intrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Fig. 4, 2:44–45 (“FIG. 4 is a perspective view of a mainframe of a compact tool carrier.”); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23 (stating that judges may “rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents”).” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Patent Owner’s argument does not identify a deficiency in the Petition, however, because we did not adopt any part of Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “mainframe,” including the phrase “the body,” which serves as the starting point of Patent Owner’s argument here. See § II.C.3. Instead, we preliminarily construe “mainframe” under its plain and ordinary meaning as a primary supporting structure. Id. Limitation 4.2 makes clear that the “mainframe” supports the “loader.” The current record supports that at least the structures shaded in green and blue in the annotated version of Figure 1 of KR996 immediately above are the primary supporting structure for the loader (i.e., a “mainframe”)—i.e., when in operation, those structures provide the primary “weight-bearing frame supporting the loader unit 40” in KR996. Pet. 24 (“KR996’s mainframe includes the frame components of KR996 vehicle for supporting the attached loader unit 40 by providing structural or weight-bearing support when the vehicle is in operation.” (citing Velinsky Decl. ¶¶ 65–67)); Pet. 26–27 (stating that the “mainframe” are the “portions [that] are part of a frame or body making up the KR996 vehicle when in operation providing structural and weight-bearing support for the loader unit 40, in addition to support for other features such as the control station and drive mechanism” (citing Velinsky Decl. ¶ 67)); see, e.g., Ex. 1005, Figs. 7–9 (showing the vehicle of KR996 in operation). The testimony of Dr. Velinsky supports these positions, explaining that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the green and blue structures above as part of a “mainframe.” See Velinsky Decl. ¶¶ 66– 67, cited at Pet. 24–27. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented declaration testimony—but rather only attorney argument— supporting that one of ordinary skill in the art would have identified fixture 41 in KR996 as something other than a “mainframe.” See Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘[A]ttorney argument is not evidence’ and cannot rebut other admitted evidence.” (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017))). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that KR996 discloses or suggests the mainframe limitations.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,098,063
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.