• Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01030 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20, 22–31, and 33–37 are unpatentable; claims 21 and 32 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the proposed combinations failed to establish motivation to combine or the required airtight seal.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We find that the proposals from the parties substantially overlap, such that it remains unclear whether any substantive difference exists. Notably, neither party argues that the minor differences in the proposals lead to a different outcome on any issues in this proceeding. Based on our review of the proposals, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal because it is consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’483 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of the issues addressed in this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “hermetically sealed” module does not encompass waterproof modules that are not airtight. First, as Petitioner admits, as a general matter, “[s]omething that is hermetically sealed is sealed so as to be airtight.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1010, 269); PO Sur-reply 16. Petitioner later tries to argue that the specification puts a different spin on this meaning, but still acknowledges that “[o]utside the context of the ’483 patent, a hermetic seal is sometimes equated with an airtight seal.” See Pet. Post-hearing 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1010, 269). Based on our review of the record, the “ordinary meaning” of “hermetically sealed” means “airtight,” and, as noted above, “airtight” is not the same thing as “waterproof.” Second, the claims support Patent Owner’s position by including dependent claims that separately claim a “hermetically sealed” module (claims 13 and 32) and a “waterproof” module (claims 15 and 34), strongly suggesting that the terms have a different scope to avoid rendering some claims redundant. See Ex. 1001, 11: 65–66, 12:3–4, 12:52–53, 12:55–56. Petitioner argues in its Post-hearing brief that claims requiring waterproof modules are “a narrower species” of hermetic seal, but fails to explain how hermetic, airtight, and waterproof seals would not fall within the scope of both claims using its approach. Pet. Post-hearing Reply 2. Petitioner’s earlier argument in its Reply also seems to cut against this position by asserting that the specification “treats hermitically sealing as conventional and equivalent to waterproofing,” with different dependent claims directed to two allegedly “equivalent” terms making little sense. Pet. Reply 14 (emphasis added). The most natural reading of the claim language suggests that “hermetically sealed” means airtight, and does not encompass modules that are waterproof but not airtight. Third, while the specification does not define “hermetically sealed” and uses “waterproof” and “hermetically sealed” in similar contexts, it does not suggest that “hermetically sealed” does not require an airtight seal consistent with its ordinary meaning. See Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:47–53, 9:15–18, 10:47–50). Instead, the specification states that hermetic seals prevent water from contacting electronics, which remains consistent with Patent Owner’s position because airtight hermetic seals are also waterproof. See Ex. 1001, 6:47–53, 9:15–18. The specification also states that “[t]he module preferably houses any of the aforementioned electrical components in a substantially water-proof and wear resistant/moisture resistant environment and is preferably hermetically sealed.” Id. at 10:47–50 (emphasis added). This passage supports Patent Owner’s position by suggesting that the preferable “hermetically sealed” module goes beyond mere water resistance. See PO Sur-reply 16–17. slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Petitioner’s Anticipation Arguments and Evidence Petitioner argues that Howell-596 discloses every limitation of claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18, and points to specific portions of Howell-596 and expert testimony to support its arguments. See Pet. 10–20 (citing Ex. 1002; Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the evidence and arguments of record and find that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations in claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18 are disclosed by Howell-596 for the reasons set forth in the Petition, which we adopt as our own. See id.11 Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Howell-596 anticipates claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on these undisputed points and the parties’ arguments, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to establish that a POSITA would have been motivated to locate Howell-596’s module housing 1700, which contains its UV detection system 1500, behind a user’s ear. Petitioner never squarely addresses the fact that placing Howell-596’s UV detection system behind a user’s ear would negatively impact its performance. Pet. 31–33; Pet. Reply 17–22. As a result, even if we accept Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the various advantages when placing electronics behind a user’s ear, it fails to establish a motivation to combine that requires placing Howell-596’s module housing 1700, and therefore its UV detection system, behind a user’s ear. Petitioner never acknowledges the readily apparent disadvantages of placing a UV detection system behind the ear, where it may not work at all. See Pet. 31–33. Nor does Petitioner argue that, in its combination, adjustments would be made to ensure accurate operation of Howell-596’s UV detection system. See id. Similarly, Petitioner notes that both Howell-596 and Howell-833 disclose UV sensors behind the ear of a user, but those teachings do not establish that placing Howell-596’s module behind the ear would ensure proper operation of its UV detection system housed within that module. See Pet. Reply 17–22. Instead, even though Howell-596 discloses a sensor behind the ear of a user, it maintains the UV detection system in a module toward the front of the temple, away from the ear. See id. at 18–19; PO Surreply 21–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 205 (describing UV detection system 2102), Fig. 21 (showing UV detection system 2102 toward the front of the temple). Moreover, Petitioner’s reliance on the sensor placed behind the ear of the user in Howell-596 lacks weight because that sensor merely indicates that the device “is being worn by a user,” which serves a very different purpose than Howell-596’s UV detection system, which seeks to monitor a user’s exposure to UV radiation, a central purpose of Howell-596’s eyewear. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 205, code (57). Howell-833 also employs a UV sensor behind the ear, but Petitioner does not establish that it operates any differently than the “being worn” sensor in Howell-596, and therefore does not establish that Howell-596’s UV detection system would still work for its intended purposes in Petitioner’s proposed combination. See Pet. Reply 19–20.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,708,483 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,708,483
• Apple Inc. v. Immervision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00472 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 3–7 are anticipated by Thibault, and claims 1–7 are obvious over Thibault.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s undisputed contention that a POSITA (person of ordinary skill in the art) “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing physics, optical engineering, electrical engineering and/or a similar discipline, and at least five years of experience in developing and designing optical imaging systems and have familiarity with image processing algorithms and optical design software” and that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner states: “Solely for purposes of this Response, Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition of a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 45). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “specific findings on the level of skill in the art . . . [are not required] ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “To the extent necessary to determine whether the disputed language of limitation 1[e] encompasses both Figure 6 and Figure 7, we agree with Petitioner that the language of limitation 1[e] encompasses both Figure 6 and Figure 7. We determine we need not expressly construe any other claim terms. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 27

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “presented a more comprehensive claim construction position in its Petition, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s “claim construction” positions in this proceeding are improperly responsive or belated. Claim construction can be an evolving issue. We have reviewed Petitioner’s presentation of its arguments at the outset, in the Petition, and we have addressed the Petition’s arguments regarding whether limitation 1[e] is an intended use, above. Regarding the remaining arguments, we note that our rules provide that a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). The Board “will permit the petitioner, in its reply brief, to address issues discussed in the institution decision,” but a petitioner “may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. A party also may submit rebuttal evidence in support of its reply.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/ TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (citing Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1077–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). We have reviewed the parties’ post-institution arguments regarding limitation 1[e], and we are not persuaded that the subsequent development of both parties’ positions on the interpretation of this term throughout the course of this proceeding is contrary to our rules. “There is no rule, for example, requiring a petition to describe all possible or reasonable claim constructions and to present invalidity theories under those constructions.” Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 75 F.4th 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Axonics court further opined that “we have continued to recognize that a petitioner is entitled under the APA to respond to new claim construction arguments made by a patent owner.” Id. at 1382. A recent Federal Circuit case addressing Axonics and a petitioner’s opportunity to respond to a patent owner’s newly presented claim construction argument, which was decided after oral hearing in this case, supports the Axonics approach. Apple v. Omni MedSci, No. 2023-1034, slip op. at 11–12 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2024). This case summarizes some relevant pre-existing case law in reaching its conclusion that under “both Axonics and earlier precedents, the Board abused its discretion here in refusing to consider [petitioner] Apple’s reply argument.” Id. (citing SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018); Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Thibault but, rather, only that “Thibault renders obvious claim 2.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 127–128). Petitioner argues that Thibault teaches “special optimization” of MTF to “control the image quality in production so that it remains in the specification.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3). Petitioner further argues that “a POSITA would have understood that Thibault’s lens designs were intended to achieve ‘constant image quality across a whole field of view,’” or “that it would have been obvious to achieve such an outcome using known ‘guidelines’ within the industry.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 128). Petitioner provided no development of an anticipation position with respect to claim 2. Accordingly, although Petitioner’s uncontested position on claim 2 supports a finding of obviousness based on Thibault, because it is reasonable, not persuasively controverted, and supported by testimony, it does not support a finding of anticipation.” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 10,795,120 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,795,120
• Applied Materials, Inc. v. Ocean Semiconductor LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2021-01339 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16, 18–26, and 28–31 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 6, 9–13, 18, 19, 21–23, 28, and 29 are anticipated by Brcka; the remaining challenged claims are obvious over Brcka.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s proposal is generally consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) 6 Patent Owner does not present objective indicia of nonobviousness in this case. See generally, PO Resp. 9 (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). And we agree with Patent Owner that “additional education can compensate for less work experience and vice versa.” Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the POSA level with the additional clarification proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner does not identify any claim terms that require construction. Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion that no claim terms require construction. PO Resp. 16–17. We do not find it necessary to construe the claims in order to resolve this case. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “The implicit premise of Patent Owner’s argument is that Brcka discloses only failures and thus does not disclose “fault detection.” However, we credit the testimony of Dr. Shanfield that “[g]enerally you always need a fault to have a failure occur. So when there is a failure, a fault has occurred.” Ex. 2003, 74:6–11; see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (“A fault is an abnormal tool condition, such as when a parameter strays beyond its acceptable boundary. Faults may lead to failure, which is the ‘termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function.’”) (internal citation omitted), 81 (“Machine failure, though, means that a fault condition existed requiring termination of the machine function upon the wafer.”). Thus, Brcka’s disclosure of analyzing machine failures is also, necessarily, a disclosure of a analyzing a fault. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Brcka discloses “performing in a computer a fault detection analysis relating to processing of a workpiece.”” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner cites to the embodiment depicted in Brcka’s Figure 4 as illustrating Brcka’s “fault detection analysis.” Pet. 32–33; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–73. Figure 4 is a “flow diagram demonstrating operation of a learning system and [a] neural network model designed in accordance with at least one embodiment of [Brcka’s] invention.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 44. In step 415 of the operation disclosed in Figure 4, “a determination is made whether maintenance has been performed or a machine failure has occurred.” Id. ¶ 44, Fig. 4. If either of these things has happened, “a new reward value is calculated.” Id. In step 440, “a determination is made whether maintenance is needed.” Id. ¶ 45, Fig. 4. Thus, Brcka determines whether a failure has occurred, accounts for this determination by assigning a “reward value” (Fig. 4, step 425), and then decides whether maintenance is needed. On this record, the analysis reflected in these steps qualifies as a “fault detection analysis.” We recognize that Brcka’s fault detection analysis is used in a method that includes a predictive component. But, we do not find anything in the language of claim 1 that precludes performing the fault detection analysis as part of a predictive model. Indeed, the claim language requires only “performing . . . a fault detection analysis.” Moreover, the “fault detection” itself (i.e., Brcka’s step 415), as opposed to the analysis of the detected fault, is backward-looking, not predictive; it determines “whether . . . a machine failure has occurred.” Id. ¶ 44 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,676,538 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,676,538
• Gaf Materials LLC v. Kirsch Research And Development, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 24, 2022 · IPR2021-00192 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–33 are unpatentable: claims 1, 8–12, and 19 are anticipated by Lou; the remaining claims are obvious over the stated Lou-based combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “patent. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315–17. The term “extrusion lamination” does not appear anywhere in the ’482 patent outside of issued claim 1, but our understanding is supported by the prosecution history of the ’482 patent. Claim 1 as originally filed in the application that issued as the ’482 patent recited, in relevant part, “a reinforcing scrim of interwoven strands for supporting tensile forces in multiple directions; and at least one layer of thermoplastic material affixed to a side of the reinforcing scrim for providing a weather-resistant barrier.” Ex. 1002 (’482 patent prosecution history), 33. In response to a rejection of the claims as anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,523,357 to Peterson, describing a rubber mill calendering process, the applicant amended claim 1 to add the phrase “by extrusion lamination.” Id. at 71, 76. We find nothing to suggest that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that amendment to add a requirement of an additional layer of thermoplastic material, separate and apart from the “at least one layer of thermoplastic material” already recited in the original claim, to serve as a binder between the scrim and the original layer of thermoplastic material. The applicant explained in remarks accompanying the amendment, “Peterson fails to disclose forming a thermoplastic layer over the reinforcing scrim by an extrusion lamination process.” Id. at 71 (italics, underlining, and capitalization omitted). We, thus, find that the added phrase specifies how the recited “thermoplastic material” must be “affixed” to “the side of the reinforcing scrim,” but does not alter the recited function of the thermoplastic material, namely, “for providing a weather-resistant barrier.” Although the applicant’s remarks further state that “[c]ontrarily [to the rubber mill calendering process of Peterson], the roofing underlayment of the present invention is formed by an extrusion lamination process which bonds the various layers together, including the pre-formed films, reinforcement scrim, and slip-resistant material” (id.), claim 1 does not recite “pre-formed films” or “slip-resistant material”; such additional layers are recited in dependent claims 5 (“metallized film”) and 2 (“layer of slip-resistant material”), respectively (Ex. 1001, 6:29, 6:37). Looking finally to the extrinsic evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ experts and other exhibits filed by the parties, we find no persuasive evidence to show that the recitation of extrusion lamination requires an additional layer in addition to the recited scrim and the at least one layer of thermoplastic material affixed to a side of the scrim. In that regard, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s contentions, we are not persuaded that “extrusion lamination” and “extrusion coating” are mutually exclusive. Rather, we credit Mr. Kaczkowski’s testimony that extrusion coating would also be considered “extrusion lamination” if, for example, it “results in the extrudate being permanently bonded to the substrate.” Ex. 2020, 28:17–20. While Patent Owner argues that Mr. Kaczkowski’s statement “is nothing more than restatement of the extrusion coating process,” and “[t]o think otherwise would require believing that ‘extrusion coating’ involves a thermoplastic layer that is extruded, and thus coated, onto a substrate with the result being that it is not permanently bonded, i.e., it will delaminate from the substrate” (PO Sur-reply 5), we disagree with Patent Owner’s further contentions that “[s]uch a product makes no sense” and “[u]nder Petitioner’s theories, the [prior art] would not work” (id.). Although there could indeed be extrusion coating processes that would result in coatings that are not permanently bonded, it does not follow that the cited prior art used such processes. Further, although a laminate may be affixed to substrate by an adhesive or other binder, we find no persuasive evidence in the record that the binder must be a separate layer from the laminate.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “the “reinforcing scrim of interwoven strands” recited in claim 1 and Lou’s polypropylene polymer 2 to the recited “thermoplastic material.” Id. at 22– 23. Petitioner further contends that Lou discloses “affixing the thermoplastic material by extrusion lamination,” citing Lou’s disclosures that “[e]xtruder 20 supplies polypropylene polymer 2 through a slit orifice to deposit a thin continuous coating on the surface of sheet 1” and that coated sheet 3 is pressed by a calendaring nip formed by heated and unheated rolls. Id. at 23 (quoting Ex. 1005, 2:34–44) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19; Ex. 1005, 2:45– 49).” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Having considered the parties’ respective arguments, we find that Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the evidence of record, and we find that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings (including support both from the cited prior art and from Mr. Kaczkowski’s testimony) to combine the relevant teachings of Lou and Goodacre. We disagree with Patent Owner’s suggestion it is insufficient that Mr. Kaczkowski opined that a person of ordinary skill would have evaluated the proposed combination based on the combined teachings of the asserted references. As the Supreme Court has explained, When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Patent Owner does not dispute Goodacre’s teachings or that combining those teachings with Lou would increase the tensile strength of Lou’s underlayment, but appears instead only to fault Mr. Kaczkowski for not determining whether those solutions would be less expensive than other alternatives. Such arguments are not persuasive. Although, as cited above, Petitioner alleges in the Petition that a skilled artisan would have recognized cross-lamination as “a simpler, less costly way to manufacture a nonwoven reinforcing scrim . . . consistent with Lou” (Pet. 37), we find that is only one among several reasons identified by Petitioner and Mr. Kaczkowski for the combination (see, e.g., id. at 34–35 (additionally identifying increased tensile strength as a well-known benefit of orienting polyolefin fabric)), each of which is independently persuasive.” slip op. at 53

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “Motion to Exclude. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines “hearsay” as a “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying in the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is offering Dr. Reitman’s testimony for its truth. As Petitioner points out, Dr. Reitman’s testimony is presented in the Patent Owner Response in alleged support of Patent Owner’s argument. See Reply Mot. Excl. 1 (citing PO Resp. 22 (“Maureen Reitman recognized that ‘extrusion coating’ and ‘extrusion lamination’ were two different processes”; “[A]s Ds. [sic] Reitman recognized, a POSITA would understand ‘extrusion coating’ to be different than ‘extrusion lamination.’”)). Further, Rule 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 802. We agree with Petitioner that no exception or exclusion applies in this case. Mot. Excl. 1. Although, as Patent Owner contends, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,” and that “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted,” we are not persuaded that opinions of others offered in litigation are the sort of “facts or data” that experts in the field of roofing underlayments would reasonably rely on in forming their own opinions.” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 6,308,482 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,308,482

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.