• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Daedalus Prime LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-01343 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 13–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Bose and White, alone or in the asserted combinations, failed to teach claimed workload comparisons or workload monitoring.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded and find for the reasons given that Petitioner fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that White teaches or suggests “receiving a bus workload for a communication bus and a first processing element workload for a first processing element based on an integrated circuit reaching a limit.” Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Brogioli testifies that “[t]he workload is a function of the demands imposed by, e.g., applications running on the system, and may or may not be subject to direct control, whereas the conditions under which that workload is processed are controlled directly.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 66. We agree with Dr. Brogioli and find that White’s frequency and voltage monitoring and adjustments do not result in the power management logic receiving the bus workload as recited in claim element 4[a]. Id. ¶¶ 64–66. We find the testimony of Mr. Wyatt on this issue unconvincing. Wyatt Decl. ¶ 103. In support of his opinion that “monitoring the operating voltages and frequencies of the logic core 120A and common logic bridge 110 is monitoring the workload of those components,” he states: “It was well understood that operating frequency and voltage of a component reflect the activity and use, or workload, of that component.” Id. However, he does not provide any evidentiary support for this statement. We, therefore, give it little weight. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 40 (Nov. 2019)5 (“Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little or no weight.”) (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “response. Paper 9. At the institution stage, therefore, Patent Owner did not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art or provide its own description. We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 12–13. In its Response, Patent Owner states that it “uses this definition” in its analysis. PO Resp. 15 (citing Brogioli Decl. ¶ 25). In view of the foregoing, for this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’494 patent and the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Mr. Wyatt. See Wyatt Decl. ¶ 21.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted

    “Post-institution, Patent Owner proposes a construction for the term “workload.” PO Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner contends that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that in the ’494 patent, the term ‘workload’ means ‘an amount of activity over a quantum or period of time.’” Id. at 15. Dr. Brogioli’s testimony supports this construction, as does Mr. Wyatt’s. Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 36–38; Wyatt Dep. 34:14–36:9. The ’494 patent also supports this construction. Ex. 1001, 8:20–22, 9:60–63. Petitioner does not dispute this proposed construction in its Reply. For the reasons given, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “workload.”” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Nowhere does Petitioner or its expert point to an explicit disclosure in Bose of making a comparison of the claimed “bus workload and a bus workload threshold.” Instead, Petitioner relies on its expert’s opinion as to what a person of ordinary skill might have known, without any additional supporting evidence. See, e.g., Pet. 26 (“[A person of ordinary skill] would have understood global PMCU compares a workload threshold as exemplified by the predicted power and performance of each power mode and the monitored workload to select and adjust the power mode of a component” (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 54–55)). This opinion is not supported by the record. The only disclosure of a comparison in Bose that we have been shown is the comparison of PowerTotal to PowerMax in step 303 of Figure 3, which Petitioner does not rely on to meet the “comparison” limitation in the claim. Hearing Tr. 17:16–20. Also without proper support is Petitioner’s assertion that “a [person of ordinary skill] would have understood that in Bose, selecting or adjusting power mode for a component entails comparing a workload threshold, such as predicted power and performance associated with each power mode with real time statistics, such as the monitored workload of a component.” Pet. 26 (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 55–56). We determine that for the reasons given, Petitioner fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed comparison element 1[g] of claim 1 is taught or suggested by Bose. We find, therefore, that Petitioner has not demonstrated that claim 1 is anticipated by Bose, nor has Petitioner demonstrated that to a person of ordinary skill, claim 1 would have been obvious in light of Bose.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,898,494 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,898,494
• Code200, Uab / Teso LT, Uab et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Oct 19, 2022 · IPR2022-00862 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Rehearing

  On Director remand, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6–11, 13, and 15–24 on all petitioned grounds and granted joinder with IPR2021-01493.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office vacating our previous decision denying institution, remanding for further proceedings, and ordering us to reconsider joinder after reconsidering the decision denying institution. Paper 18 (“Remand Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “We consider the Director’s Memorandum, which directs that “the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds present compelling unpatentability challenges. See infra Sections IV, D–I. In particular, in our view at this stage of the proceeding, the Petition presents compelling evidence that three prior art references, including Border, which was not before the jury in the Teso litigation, anticipate many of the claims of the ’510 patent. We determine that instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds present compelling unpatentability challenges. See infra Sections IV, D–I. In particular, in our view at this stage of the proceeding, the Petition presents compelling evidence that three prior art references, including Border, which was not before the jury in the Teso litigation, anticipate many of the claims of the ’510 patent. We determine that instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “As discussed above, we determine that the merits of this action present a compelling unpatentability challenge. Absent joinder, a one-year bar would apply to Petitioner, and, again, the merits presented in this challenge would not be reached by the Board in a final written decision. Under these specific circumstances, we determine joinder is appropriate in the interests of justice. Because NetNut has been dismissed from the 1493 IPR, there are no longer issues of cooperation and duplication that would have to be addressed between petitioners. Additionally, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316(11), maintaining the previously-set trial schedule in the 1493 IPR is not necessary when joinder is granted. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). Thus, the schedule will be adjusted in accordance with a Revised Scheduling Order, entered concurrently with this Decision.” slip op. at 37

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,484,510
• Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing granted
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,925,308
• Semiconductor Components Industries, LLC D/B/A On Semiconductor v. Power Integrations, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2018 · IPR2016-01589 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 14–19 are unpatentable: claims 14–16 as obvious and claims 17–18 as anticipated and obvious, and claim 19 as obvious; the motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Kelley, testified “Stone is silent on its implementation, so it doesn’t actually tell you any of this is being done with current or any circuit structure.” Ex. 1030, Kelley Tr. 68:3–6. We agree. We determine that Stone studies the effect of modulating sequences on the resultant spectral power density of the square edged PWM waveform. Ex. 1020, 2, Figs 1–2. Stone’s disclosure of storing the modulation sequence for the frequency hopping spread spectrum in EPROM is not limited to any particular circuit implementation. Petitioner cites Dobkin as disclosing the relevant implementation— i.e., an implementation that reduces switching noise in a switched power regulator by generating a time varying secondary current to charge a capacitor that causes the output of VCO to vary the switching frequency of the regulator. Ex. 1004, 2:53–3:4. Dobkin varies the switching frequency by a constant amount, e.g., by 50 kHz between 75 kHz and 125 kHz, thereby spreading the noise over a broader spectrum. Id. Stone examines the effect of various switching frequency modulations. Referring to Patent Owner’s TNY256 device, Dr. Kelley testified, “you jitter somewhere around that baseline, but not very far” and “I think the prior reference Stone suggests varying the frequency very, very widely. And then if you read further on, it sort of confirms what I said about the practical difficulties in doing such an implementation.” Id. at 66:16–18, 67:21–68:3. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Holberg, agrees with Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Kelley, that Stone identifies potential problems of using large amounts of jitter and asserts that Stone provides a reason for a person of ordinary skill to select the low jitter embodiment of Stone. Ex. 1029, Holberg Suppl. Decl. ¶ 20 (citing (Ex. 1020, 4). Dr. Holberg further testified that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to adapt the magnitude of Dobkin’s primary and secondary current sources to implement Stone’s example of a small range of jitter. Ex. 1029, Suppl. Holberg Decl. ¶ 21. In view of the testimony of both Dr. Kelley and Dr. Holberg, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to apply the teachings of Stone to jitter by a small amount the switching frequency in a power converter as configured by Dobkin, where the switching frequency is varied by changing a secondary current supplied to a circuit that drives a VCO by an amount less than the primary current.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner responds that prior litigation concerned only claim 1 of the ’876 Patent, and Patent Owner has failed to show a nexus between the secondary considerations and the merits of the subject matter recited in claim 14. Pet. Reply 16–17. Petitioner argues that “any presumption of a nexus in the IPR is overcome by the fact that PO previously attributed the same evidence of secondary considerations to features of Claim 1 that are not present in Claims 14 or 17.” Id. at 16. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the “digital jitter” feature recited in claim 1 is not recited in claims 14 and 17. Id. at 17. Petitioner notes that Patent Owner’s Vice President of marketing, David Mathews, and Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Kelley, both agreed that the counter and the digital to analog converter in claim 1 that are not recited in claim 14 make claim 1 digital. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1031, Transcript of Deposition of David Matthews (“Matthews Tr.”) 11:7–12:9; Ex. 1030, Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Arthur Kelley (“Kelley Tr.”) 59:20–60:16, 62:15–23). Petitioner further notes that, although Mr. Matthews stated he had no knowledge of patent matters and could not speak to the patent claims (Hrg.. Tr. 43:21–45:24), Dr. Kelley acknowledged that claims 1 and 14 are distinguished from each other because claim 1 recites a counter and a digital to analog converter that are not recited features of claim 14 (Pet. Reply 18). Thus, the very features Patent Owner relies upon to demonstrate non-obviousness of the invention recited in claim 1 are not features of the claims that are the subject of the challenges in this proceeding. In view of the above, we agree that the evidence is insufficient to show a nexus between the claimed subject matter and purported secondary or objective considerations as to claims 14–16. In consideration of the above, we are persuaded that there is insufficient persuasive evidence of objective considerations of non-obviousness for claim 14 and dependent claims 15 and 16. Having determined that Petitioner has demonstrated all the limitations of claims 14– 16 are taught in the prior art and that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the references as discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 14 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Dobkin and Stone and that claim 15 is unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Dobkin, Stone and Manlove.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “The dispositive question is “whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer” that a reference teaches or discloses all of the elements of the claimed invention. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A reference can anticipate a claim even if it “d[oes] not expressly spell out” all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would “at once envisage” the claimed arrangement or combination. In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962), Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (noting that “in considering the disclosure of a reference, it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom”). We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments concerning Habetler. A conventional implementation of a triangle wave generator uses known VCO circuitry that responds to a voltage control signal—Petitioner notes that Danstrom, discussed in the Petition, discloses such an oscillator where internal charging current, and thereby the slope of the triangle wave, is controlled by an input voltage. Pet. Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1011, 3:38–55, fig. 2). Patent Owner points out that voltage summing circuits are well-known. PO Resp. 16–17. But the notation in Habetler is not a standard circuit diagram with a junction or node, where the sum of the incoming and outgoing currents are equal. Instead, Habetler’s description of the implementation in Figure 4 explicitly discloses summing voltages using the same notation in Figure 4 that Habetler uses in Figure 5. In view of Habetler’s explicit disclosure and use of identical notation in Figures 4 and 5, we agree that in Figure 5 Habetler illustrates a summing block, and that a person of ordinary skill could reasonably infer the use of a well-known voltage summing amplifier to implement this function to supply a control voltage to Habetler’s triangle wave generator. Thus, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown Habetler discloses all the limitations of method claim 17. Claim 18 recites the further limitation of clocking a counter with the output of the oscillator. Figure 5 of Habetler, as shown in Petitioner’s annotations, includes a triangle generator and a peak detector used to clock a counter. Thus, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that Habetler discloses the further limitation recited in claim 18. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 17 and 18 are unpatentable as anticipated by Habetler.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “CLAIM CONSTRUCTION In our Decision to Institute, we construed the term “cycling one or more secondary current [voltage] sources” to mean the application of secondary current [voltage] sources to generate a time-varying secondary 2 U.S. Pat. No. 5,929,620, issued Jul. 27, 1999 (Ex. 1004). 3 D.A. Stone, B. Chambers, D. Howe, Easing EMC problems in switched mode power converters by random modulation of the PWM carrier frequency, IEEE 1996 (Ex. 1020). 4U.S. Patent No. 5,699,024, issued Dec. 16, 1997 (Ex. 1016). 5 Thomas Habetler, Acoustic Noise Reduction in sinusoidal PWM Drives Using a Randomly Modulated Carrier, IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics, vol. 6, No. 3, July 1991 (Ex. 1019). 6 European Patent Application EP0321794A2, filed Dec. 8, 1988 (Ex. 1006). current [voltage] in a manner that repeats over time. Dec. to Inst. 17. As neither party disputes this claim construction, we apply the same construction in this Decision. No other terms require construction.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 6,249,876 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,249,876
• Qualcomm Inc. v. Bandspeed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 7, 2016 · IPR2015-01580 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5, 6, 8, 17, 18, and 20 are unpatentable; claims 7 and 19 were not shown unpatentable because Cuffaro does not disclose a specified number of votes and the obviousness testimony was insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “After institution, Qualcomm Inc. filed substantially the same petition in IPR2015-01580 (IPR2015-01580, Paper 1), together with a Motion for Joinder of IPR2015-01580 with the instant proceeding (IPR2015-01580, Paper 2). On September 17, 2015, we granted a motion to terminate this proceeding with respect to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc., but not as to Patent Owner, leaving only Patent Owner as a party to the proceeding. Paper 22. On November 16, 2015, we granted Qualcomm Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Qualcomm Inc. to the instant proceeding. Paper 23. Qualcomm Inc. (“Petitioner”) is now the sole petitioner.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “phrase “means for . . . .” Petitioner construes these terms in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, identifying an algorithm described in the specification corresponding to each “means” limitation. Pet. 7–9 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 8, l. 8–38, col. 8, ll. 49–col. 9, l. 16, col. 19, l. 25–col. 20, l. 67). Petitioner identifies a general purpose computer, processor 704 in Figure 7, as structure for “executing the instructions associated with the corresponding function” recited in each “means limitation,” except for the “means fro [sic] the first participant to communicate . . .” recited in claims 5 and 20. Pet. 7–9 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 7, col. 25, ll. 13–18). For the “means fro [sic] the first participant to communicate” limitation, Petitioner identifies transceiver 216, shown in Figure 2, reproduced supra. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, col. 9, ll. 54–59). Patent Owner does not contest these identifications. We agree with Petitioner’s identifications and adopt them as our constructions of the means-plus-function limitations. Specifically, as to those means-plus-function limitations that correspond to processor 704 in Figure 7, Petitioner identifies in its claim chart the algorithm described in the specification for performing each function of these means. Pet. 8–9; See also Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“When dealing with a ‘special purpose computer-implemented means-plus-function limitation,’ [the Federal Circuit] require[s] the specification to disclose the algorithm for performing the function.”); Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen a computer is referenced as support for a function in a means-plus-function claim, there must be some explanation of how the computer performs the claimed function.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by this reasoning. As Petitioner observes, the embodiments of the ’624 patent identified by Patent Owner are characterized as “examples,” and a person of ordinary skill “would understand that the example scenarios of the specification are not necessarily limiting on the claims.” Reply 3 (citing Ding Supp. Decl. ¶ 6). In addition, Petitioner notes that claim language in related patents owned by Patent Owner explicitly refers to participants, evidencing Patent Owner’s understanding “how to expressly create participant-specific voting requirements in claims.” Id. at 3. At the oral hearing, Patent Owner suggested that explicit reference to participants in such other claim language “was because it wanted to clarify that each participant got a single vote,” and explained its position that, in the claims at issue in this proceeding, “participant is implicit in the claim language as it is.” Tr. 78:16–25. But the claims are directed to a “communications apparatus,” and recite “votes” in the context of what the “particular communications channel” “receives.” Nothing within the structure of the claims requires resolving the origin of such votes. Furthermore, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is inconsistent with the construction it agreed to before the district court in the Qualcomm Litigation. In that litigation, the parties agreed that the term “vote” should be construed as “a binary expression (to use or not to use),” a construction that makes no reference to the origin of the “vote” as from a participant or otherwise. Ex. 1014, 6. We see no compelling reason to excuse the inconsistency by adopting a narrower construction when the Board applies a claim-construction standard (broadest reasonable interpretation) that could only result in the same or a broader construction. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A patent may not, like a ‘nose of wax,’ be twisted one way to avoid anticipation and another to find infringement.” (quoting Sterner Lighting, Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc., 431 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1970))). Accordingly, we construe “votes to use a particular communications channel” as “expressions of preference for using the particular communications channel.”” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner responds that “the Gerten device is not capable of and expressly teaches away from performing this functionality.” PO Resp. 15 (citing Melendez Decl. ¶ 33). Patent Owner contends that “Gerten’s disclosure is directed toward eliminating channels for use in an entire piconet as opposed to eliminating channels for use by certain participants within a piconet.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that Gerten does not disclose a selection kernel capable of maintaining synchronization between a master and more than one slave in a piconet, with the master and one slave using a default set of channels while the same master and a different slave use a different set of channels. Id. We are not persuaded that the absence of a specific teaching of such a selection kernel supports the conclusion that one of skill in the art would understand Gerten to function in the manner Patent Owner suggests. In this instance, Petitioner refers to two embodiments of Gerten “in which a first participant communicates with a second participant via a normal sequence and with another participant via an adaptive hopping sequence.” Reply 5. First, Figure 3 of Gerten is reproduced below. Figure 3 illustrates “methodology for determining and communicating channels to be avoided to a remote device.” Ex. 1003, col. 2, ll. 4–6. As illustrated in the drawing, a master unit performs a discovery process (block 110) upon connecting with a new slave unit. Ding Decl. ¶¶ 60, 64. If the slave unit is capable of using interference avoidance, the master unit begins the process of determining a modified set of channels for use (block 120). Id. ¶ 45. If a second slave unable to use interference avoidance enters the piconet, standard frequency hopping is used. Supp. Ding Decl. ¶ 9. Under Patent Owner’s characterization of Gerten, entry of the second slave into the network would require the first slave necessarily to revert back to the default hopping sequence. Id. ¶ 10. But this would undermine the stated benefits of Gerten, which explicitly discloses: The above process can be applied to a Bluetooth example and includes identification of a Bluetooth device’s ability to support interference avoidance, the measurements of signal strength on all channels and identification of which channel should not be used without violating the FCC rules, a method of modifying the Bluetooth hop sequence so that it will avoid channels containing strong or fixed interferers while still supporting standard Bluetooth hopping with other non-enabled members of the piconet and a method of relating necessary interference avoidance information to the remote Bluetooth devices. Ex. 1003, col. 4, l. 66–col. 5, l. 9 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,477,624 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,477,624
• LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Display Group LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01666 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Shinohara anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Following institution, LG Electronics, Inc. filed timely a Petition and Motion for Joinder in Case IPR2015-01666, challenging the same claims of the ’973 patent on the same ground as that on which we instituted review in this proceeding, plus one additional ground. See Paper 24, 2. LG Electronics, Inc. agreed to abandon the additional ground should IPR2015- 01666 be joined with this proceeding. See id. at 2 n.1. To administer the proceedings more efficiently, we granted LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Case IPR2015-01666 with the instant proceeding. Id. at 5. For purposes of this Decision, we refer to LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc., jointly, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther
  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “B. Anticipation by Shinohara A claim is anticipated if each limitation of the claim is disclosed in a single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As recently reiterated by the Federal Circuit, “a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). We analyze this ground based on anticipation in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner repeats its unsuccessful argument that, “[w]ithout offering a construction for this term, the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. Petitioner responds that this term (1) does not require construction; (2) is limited to a specific embodiment in the specification; (3) and imports a limitation from the specification into the claims. Reply 3–4. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing the prior art do not rely on a particular construction for this term. See infra.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 7,434,973 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,434,973
• LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Display Group LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2015-00506 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Shinohara anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Following institution, LG Electronics, Inc. filed timely a Petition and Motion for Joinder in Case IPR2015-01666, challenging the same claims of the ’973 patent on the same ground as that on which we instituted review in this proceeding, plus one additional ground. See Paper 24, 2. LG Electronics, Inc. agreed to abandon the additional ground should IPR2015- 01666 be joined with this proceeding. See id. at 2 n.1. To administer the proceedings more efficiently, we granted LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Case IPR2015-01666 with the instant proceeding. Id. at 5. For purposes of this Decision, we refer to LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc., jointly, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner repeats its unsuccessful argument that, “[w]ithout offering a construction for this term, the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. Petitioner responds that this term (1) does not require construction; (2) is limited to a specific embodiment in the specification; (3) and imports a limitation from the specification into the claims. Reply 3–4. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing the prior art do not rely on a particular construction for this term. See infra.” slip op. at 6

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “the ’176 grandparent application is insufficient. “Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Reply 5–6. We find that the cited disclosures in the ’176 grandparent application do not describe the density, size, depth, or height of the deformities at approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of light sources. As discussed above, Patent Owner maintains that a skilled artisan reading the ’176 grandparent application would know that “the approximate midpoint between the two light sources is an area farther away from a light source.” PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by this argument, for it does not establish that the approximate midpoint between adjacent pairs of light sources is the only area farther away from a light source. As Petitioner points out, “the increased distance from the light source is not limited to a distance along the length of the panel member, along the width of the panel member, or along any direction at all.” Reply 11. Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden under Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (burden of production shifted to patent owner to prove entitlement to earlier filing date).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the ’176 grandparent application, as originally filed, provides written description support for the disputed limitation. Therefore, we determine that claims 1–5 are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the ’176 grandparent application and Patent Owner is thus entitled only to the effective filing date of the application for the ʼ973 patent, February 9, 2007. As a consequence, we find that Shinohara qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,434,973 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 7,434,973
• Masterimage 3d, Inc. / Masterimage 3d Asia, LLC v. Reald Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 20, 2016 · IPR2015-00035 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board denied cancellation of claims 1–23 because Petitioner did not show Schuck was entitled to the provisional filing date, so it was not prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “as those presented in Dynamic Drinkware, with a few exceptions. The main difference is that here, Patent Owner did not have the burden to antedate Schuck because the ’455 patent was filed before the actual filing date of Schuck. The result of that difference is that the burden of production started with Petitioner and remains with Petitioner to establish that Schuck is entitled to claim priority to the ’657 provisional. Dynamic Drinkware is clear in that Petitioner is required to “compare the claims of . . . [Schuck] to the disclosure in the . . . [’657] provisional application.” Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1381. The Federal Circuit explained: “A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with § 112, ¶ 1.” Id. (citing In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 537 (CCPA 1981)). Petitioner acknowledges that the ’657 provisional fails to provide support under § 112, first paragraph, for Schuck’s claim 1. Supp. Reply 4. Petitioner’s claim chart, submitted as “Appendix 1” to its Supplemental Reply, indicates that the ’657 provisional refers to a “doublet lens” rather than a “telephoto lens pair.” Id. at App. 1, A-5. And Petitioner does not argue that the “doublet lens” provides support for the recited “telephoto lens pair.” See generally id.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

    “It is only “confidential information” that may be protected from disclosure, 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(7), and, even then, there is a public interest in “maintaining a complete and understandable file history” of the proceeding. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). The standard for granting a motion to seal is “for good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). The party moving to seal bears the burden of proof in showing entitlement to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for patent owner

    “as those presented in Dynamic Drinkware, with a few exceptions. The main difference is that here, Patent Owner did not have the burden to antedate Schuck because the ’455 patent was filed before the actual filing date of Schuck. The result of that difference is that the burden of production started with Petitioner and remains with Petitioner to establish that Schuck is entitled to claim priority to the ’657 provisional. Dynamic Drinkware is clear in that Petitioner is required to “compare the claims of . . . [Schuck] to the disclosure in the . . . [’657] provisional application.” Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1381. The Federal Circuit explained: “A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with § 112, ¶ 1.” Id. (citing In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 537 (CCPA 1981)). Petitioner acknowledges that the ’657 provisional fails to provide support under § 112, first paragraph, for Schuck’s claim 1. Supp. Reply 4. Petitioner’s claim chart, submitted as “Appendix 1” to its Supplemental Reply, indicates that the ’657 provisional refers to a “doublet lens” rather than a “telephoto lens pair.” Id. at App. 1, A-5. And Petitioner does not argue that the “doublet lens” provides support for the recited “telephoto lens pair.” See generally id.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “for multiple reasons. First, Petitioner acknowledges that what it refers to as “the Milburn doctrine” was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and Petitioner does not show persuasively that we should read Milburn as requiring anything beyond application of that statutory section in light of the facts presented here. Supp. Reply 6. Second, Milburn did not address directly the question of whether an issued patent is entitled to claim priority to a provisional patent application, and, specifically, what must be shown in order to do so. Third, Schuck claims priority to not one, but three provisional applications, which was not the case in Milburn. Fourth, in Giacomini, the Federal Circuit expressly considered Milburn and stated: “An important limitation [on 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1)] is that the provisional application must provide written description support for the claimed invention.” Giacomini, 612 F.2d at 1383 (emphasis added). Although the Federal Circuit did not address the application of the argument—that the reference patent’s provisional application fails to provide written description support for the claimed subject matter—in Giacomini, because the appellant had waived it, the Federal Circuit’s decision acknowledges that there was an argument that could have been raised. Id. Finally, Dynamic Drinkware is directly on point and clearly establishes that Petitioner is required to show that the claimed invention of Schuck finds written description support in the ’657 provisional in order to rely on the ’657 provisional’s filing date. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1381. It is undisputed that Petitioner has not done so. We find that Petitioner has not shown that claim 1 or any other claim of Schuck is supported by the ’657 provisional, and, thus, Petitioner has not shown that Schuck is entitled to claim priority to the ’657 provisional’s filing date. See Apple, Case IPR2015-00969, slip op. at 12–13. The result of our finding is that Schuck does not qualify as prior art, under § 102(e), to the ’455 patent, and, therefore, is not a reference which may be relied upon to establish the unpatentability of claims in an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) claims 1–8, 10–14, and 16–22 are unpatentable as anticipated by Schuck and (2) claims 9, 15, and 23 are unpatentable as obvious over Schuck and APA.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,857,455 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,857,455
• Microsoft Corporation v. Enfish, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 2, 2015 · IPR2013-00560 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 47–48 are unpatentable as anticipated by Visual Basic, and claims 49–50 as obvious over Visual Basic and Jensen; claims 51–53 were not shown unpatentable, and claims 17–23 were terminated.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Enfish contends that our construction for “object identification number” is incomplete. PO Resp. 15. We evaluate Enfish’s contention below. Enfish also provides a proposed construction for “anchor,” recited in claims 21 and 51. PO Resp. 22. Because we determine that Microsoft has not met its burden with respect to these claims for other reasons, no construction of this term for the purposes of this Decision is necessary. We discern no reason, based on the complete record now before us, to change our constructions in the Decision to Institute of “logical table,” “object identification number,” and “attribute set.”” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “evidence, and the detailed claim analysis, which reads persuasively all elements of claim 47 onto the disclosure of Visual Basic. Pet. 33–46 (citing Ex. 1104, LR 162, 185, 280, 425, 484, 532, 558, PF 1, 3, 18, 37–39, 40, 47, 76, 80, PG 453, 471, 481, 482 ; Ex. 1119 ¶¶ 67–98). For example, we are persuaded that Microsoft has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Visual Basic discloses configuring memory according to a logical table, as recited in claim 47. In the cited portions above, Visual Basic discloses storing data in a computer formatted as a table object, which is “a logical representation of a physical table.” Ex. 1104, LR 558. The table object comprises “records (rows) and fields (columns).” Id.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “2007 ¶ 231. In contrast to Dr. Jagadish’s statement, however, Jensen teaches an object-oriented application for managing information retrieved from a structured database, such as a relational database. Ex. 1106, Abstract. Enfish further contends that Microsoft does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the pointers of Jensen to the indexing structure in Visual Basic. PO Resp. 35. We, however, are persuaded that Microsoft has shown a sufficiently articulated reason with rational underpinning to support obviousness (Pet. 48–49 (citing Ex. 1119 ¶¶ 387–404)). Microsoft, for example, states “[i]t was well known in the art at the time that indexes such as the index disclosed in [Visual Basic], maintain object identification numbers of the cell for locating data.” Pet. 49 (emphasis added). Microsoft continues, “Jensen discloses containing the address in a pointer, e.g., a physical memory address (i.e., OIDs).” Id. (citing Ex. 1106, 7:29–35). Dr. Hosking testifies “[i]t was well known in the art at the time that Index Objects locate data by maintaining object identification numbers in the internal pointers as disclosed in Jensen.” Ex. 1119 ¶ 403 (emphasis added). Dr. Hosking further testifies “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine Jensen’s teaching of maintaining the OIDs in a pointer with [Visual Basic’s] disclosure of identifying the logical columns / rows with the OIDs.” Ex. 1119 ¶ 404. The predictable use of familiar prior art elements according to their established functions renders the recited invention obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “invention, the totality of the evidence submitted, including objective evidence of nonobviousness, may lead to a conclusion that the claimed invention would not have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). However, to accord substantial weight to objective evidence requires the finding of a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“success is relevant in the obviousness context only if there is proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.”). Enfish contends that the claimed invention received industry accolades, including praise from Microsoft, satisfied a long-felt need, resulted in success where others had failed, as well as commercial success. PO Resp. 42–47. Enfish points to features of claim 17, which Enfish contends are the features of the claimed invention that resulted in the objective indicia of success to which Enfish refers. Id. at 43–44. Claim 17 of the ’775 patent, however, is challenged on the basis that it is anticipated by Visual Basic. Secondary considerations do not weigh into determinations regarding anticipation. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Because we conclude that Microsoft has not shown that claims 51–53 of the ’775 patent are unpatentable for other reasons, the only claims that we need to evaluate are dependent claims 49 and 50 of the ’775 patent. Microsoft asserts that claims 49 and 50 are obvious over the combination of Visual Basic with a reference that teaches referencing objects through two-way pointers. Pet. 49 (citing Ex. 1106, 7:29–35). Enfish has not shown a nexus between any of the accolades or successes it says occurred and the use of two-way pointers.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 6,163,775 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,163,775

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.