• Nearmap US, Inc. v. Eagle View Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2022-01090 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–42 and 46–66 are unpatentable as obvious over Littleworth, Linder, Middlebrook, and Nishitani; claims 5, 23, and 38 on the Heller ground were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “area emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience related to computerized image analysis and three-dimensional modeling.” Pet. 4. Further, “education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Although Patent Owner presents its own formulation, see PO Resp. 23, Patent Owner notes that “there does not appear to be any meaningful distinction between” the parties’ formulations. PO Sur-reply 29– 30. We adopt Petitioner’s description as it is consistent with the prior art and ’436 patent’s specification. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Our decision would not change under either party’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “required in claims 1 and 18 “mean[s] that the two images are ‘captured independently of each other and without metadata (or other information) relating angles of cameras that captured the images.’” Pet. 5 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 20). In addition to its expert, Petitioner cites as support the patent’s prosecution history, in which Patent Owner asserted this definition. Id. at 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003, 167–169; Ex.1004 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not propose a construction for this limitation. We agree with Petitioner that images that are not a stereoscopic pair means that the two images are captured independently of each other and without metadata (or other information) relating angles of cameras that captured the images.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “B. WHETHER LITTLEWORTH AND LINDER ARE PRIOR ART Patent Owner asserts Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Littleworth and Linder are prior art. PO Resp. 9–19; PO Sur-reply 9–11. We addressed this issue based on the same arguments in IPR2022-01009. See PO Resp. 9– 19; Pet. Reply 31–35; IPR2022-01009, Paper 28 at 21–27, 28–31. As we explained, the evidence of record supports that Littleworth and Linder were publicly available before the critical date. IPR2022-01009, Paper 28 at 25– 27, 31. Thus, for the same reasons explained in IPR2022-01009, we maintain Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Littleworth and Linder were publicly available before the critical date.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “been motivated to correlate the images described in Littleworth based on the selected control points in order to allow the images to be utilized in the threedimensional model generation process, as taught by Linder.” Pet. 29. Patent Owner argues that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Littleworth and Linder as Petitioner proposes because Linder is limited to corresponding stereoscopic images and would not have been suitable for correlating Littleworth’s non-stereoscopic imagery. PO Resp. 40–46. We addressed this issue based on the same arguments in IPR2022-01009. See PO Resp. 40–46; Pet. Reply 10–22; IPR2022-01009, Paper 28 at 48–57. As we explained there, the evidence of record, including Dr. Forsyth’s testimony and relevant passages from Linder, supports that Linder’s correlation method applies more broadly than to just stereoscopic images, and none of the additional material Patent Owner cites undermines Petitioner’s proposed combination. See IPR2022-01009, Paper 28 at 52–54, 56–67. Thus, for the same reasons explained in IPR2022-01009, we maintain Petitioner has articulated sufficient rationale to support that its proposed combination of Littleworth and Linder would have been obvious.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,078,436 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,078,436
• Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2022-00989 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5–11, 13, and 15–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Sullivan995 and Sullivan460; anticipation was not shown, and the other obviousness ground was not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience” and “[a]dditional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77). Petitioner further states that the “Petition does not turn on this precise definition, and the challenged claims would be unpatentable from the perspective of any reasonable person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 15–16. We find that the ’539 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’539 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “awake state” Claim 24 recites, in part, “to determine whether breathing patterns indicate an asleep state or an awake state.” Ex. 1001, 11:36–12:7; see also id. at 9:49–64 (claim 1 reciting “between an awake state and an asleep state”), 10:42–56 (claim 11 reciting “at least one of an awake state or an asleep state”). In regard to its allegations of obviousness, Petitioner’s arguments suggest an “awake state” ordinarily means when a patient is not asleep. Pet. 36–37, 42. By contrast, with regard to its allegations of anticipation, Petitioner argues that under Patent Owner’s “implied construction of ‘an awake state’ based on [Patent Owner’s] infringement allegations” in district court, “the patient is in an awake state when there is an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep.” Id. at 68–70 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 2, 158, 159). Petitioner provides no further support for this “implied construction” purportedly taken from Patent Owner’s district court allegations. Id. Dr. Kirkness, in support of Petitioner, applied the plain meaning of all terms and phrases. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. In regard to supporting Petitioner’s allegations of anticipation, Dr. Kirkness merely assumed Patent Owner’s purported district court claim construction “position to be true.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 253. In this proceeding Patent Owner does not propose an express meaning for “awake state.” See PO Resp. 29–33. More generally, Patent Owner states that the ’539 patent “teaches how to distinguish between an awake state and an asleep state.” Id. at 8. From the arguments of the Parties, we discern no dispute in this proceeding that a plain and ordinary meaning of an “awake state” is a state in which a patient is not asleep. See Ex. 1001, 3:1–5 (distinguishing between “a wake state” and “a sleep state”), 7:22–24 (describing an embodiment with a processing arrangement that “may determine whether the patient is in a sleep state or a wake state based on the breathing pattern”).8 We apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “awake state” in this proceeding and further determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an awake state means “an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Next, we turn to the Specification. “While we read claims in view of the specification . . . we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F. 3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Id. In order for a patentee to act as its own lexicographer, the “patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning’” and “must ‘clearly express an intent’ to redefine the terms.” Bradium Tech., 923 F. 3d at 1044. In this case, Patent Owner does not argue that it disavowed the full scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of claim 24, nor does Patent Owner argue that it explicitly defined “analyzing the breathing patterns” in the Specification. See, e.g., PO Resp. 29–32. We determine that there is no disavowal nor any explicit lexicographic definition of “analyzing the breathing patterns” in the Specification. Patent Owner instead relies on an “implied lexicography” theory as to why we should construe the phrase as Patent Owner proposes. PO Sur-reply 2, 6–7 (citing, inter alia, AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We disagree.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments—that Petitioner fails to show any motivation to combine and that Sullivan460 is not enabled— merely because Dr. Kirkness indicated in a deposition that he did not know how a preset level is calculated from a sentence in Sullivan460. As Petitioner explains, enablement “is not a requirement to prove invalidity under §103.” Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1357 (under §103, “a reference need not be enabled; it qualifies as a prior art, regardless, for whatever is disclosed therein”). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that the Challenged Claims do not require any preset level for a flow rate, and a person of ordinary skill “would have understood that a preset level is established from previously-acquired data or data from a previous window of time, such as an average level, for example, as taught in Sullivan995.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2014, 38:2–16; Ex. 1005, 17:3–27, Fig. 12). Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s assertion is unsupported, and that “Petitioner is obligated to address this challenge, and failed to do so.” PO Sur-reply 18–19 (citing In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). We find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive because they are supported by the asserted references. Sullivan995 discloses that the computing system may “calculate control values of patterns for each patient based on moving average values or such values or patterns will be pre-programmed into the computing system.” Ex. 1005, 17:14–18. According to Sullivan995, when “signals deviate from predetermined values or patterns the computer system generates a signal which is sent to the feedback speed controller on the blower motor.” Id. at 17:19–22. Based on this disclosure, and given that Sullivan460 incorporates Sullivan995 by reference, we agree with Petitioner that Sullivan460’s disclosure of detecting that the flow rate has fallen below a preset level would have informed a person of ordinary skill that this level was predetermined, so that “the controller 100 activates the nCPAP apparatus 90 to supply air to the patient 30 at a pressure which ameliorates or eliminates the upper airway flow limitation.”16 Ex. 1006, 10:17–21.” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 9,427,539 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,427,539
• Patent Quality Assurance, LLC / Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2023 · IPR2022-00479 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable: claims 1–7, 9–11, and 13–16 as obvious over Harris, Abadeer, and Zhang; claims 2, 11, and 12 with Cornwell; and claim 8 with Bilak.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “claim 14, which recites a “means for providing the operating voltage to the memory at a value at least as great as the minimum operating voltage in response to the operating value selected by the processor being below the 1 Our bracketed designations for limitations largely follow those used by the parties. See Pet. 25–46. 2 US 5,867,719, issued Feb. 2, 1999 (Ex. 1003). 3 US 2006/0259840 A1, published Nov. 16, 2006 (Ex. 1004). 4 US 2003/0122429 A1, published July 3, 2003 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 7,702,935 B2, issued Apr. 20, 2010 (Ex. 1006). 6 US 2005/0188230 A1, published Aug. 25, 2005 (Ex. 1007). minimum operating voltage.” Pet. 24, 64; Ex. 1001, 14:31–37. Petitioner points out that a district court construed the term as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, with the claimed function and a corresponding structure of the “power supply selector.” Id. at 64 (quoting Ex. 1028, 2). Patent Owner does not challenge or otherwise address that construction, and we apply it in this decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “This distinction is particularly significant because Harris describes that its low-power feature is realized by using “the test mode.” Ex. 1003, 4:64–65. The test mode uses a software-selected switch that allows the CPU to write to a register to control which power supply is provided to the memory. Id. at 3:9–18, 3:50–51. Thus, Harris describes that the low-power feature uses a software-defined switching threshold, and nothing about that threshold requires that it be the same as the threshold used for the failure mode. The failure mode, in contrast, is “a hardware controlled function” that monitors the voltage on the VDD terminal, and when that voltage “drops below a set level or threshold, the voltage on the Vstby terminal 132 is switched to power the memory 105 to sustain memory contents when either main or VDD power is failing.” Id. at 3:52–60. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “Harris’s system cannot use a threshold [for its low-power feature] lower than the power-failure detection threshold.” PO Resp. 11–12 (emphasis omitted). The two aspects use different mechanisms to control which power supply is provided to the memory. Relatedly, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner fails to justify “why a POSITA would have been motivated to abandon the ‘failure mode’ in favor of pursuing the specific ‘low power feature.’” Id. at 14. Because Harris’s failure mode and low-power feature are distinct aspects of Harris’s operation, however, there would have been no need for skilled artisans to abandon one in favor of the other. In that regard, we credit Dr. Singh’s testimony that because Harris’s circuitry can be used for multiple functions, skilled artisans would have understood “how the operation of the circuitry would have been configured differently for those different functions or operations.” Ex. 1040 ¶ 9. Patent Owner argues additionally that, even if the low-power feature is distinct from the failure mode, Petitioner has not justified using the failure mode’s “set level or threshold” with a different threshold for the low-power feature. PO Resp. 13–14. But that argument ignores that the low-power feature uses software to control the switch, rather than the hardware-controlled failure mode, as described above. Because the low-power feature and failure mode are based on different controlling mechanisms, Harris already describes using different thresholds for switching the memory’s power supply in the two instances. And as Dr. Singh testifies, achieving the desired power savings or low-power operating parameters would have motivated skilled artisans to select a specific minimum operating voltage for the low-power feature. Ex. 1040 ¶ 9.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “When the evidence shows that a product includes “the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent,” we presume that any commercial success of the product is due to the patented invention. PPC Broadband v. Corning Optical Commc’ns, 815 F. 3d 734, 746–747 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Such a presumed nexus requires not only that a commercial product embodies the claims, but also that it is coextensive with them. See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[P]resuming nexus is appropriate ‘when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018))). Petitioner notes that the jury infringement verdict is on appeal. Pet. Reply 23. According to Petitioner, Patent Owner fails to show the verdict demonstrates commercial success with a nexus to the challenged claims. Id. at 24. Petitioner argues that the challenged claims were not the basis for customer demand of the accused products. Id. (citing Ex. 1044, 811:13– 812:24 (Intel employee Adam King testifying that Intel’s customers care about numerous technical attributes, including graphics performance for video editing, camera quality for video conferencing and power efficiency for laptops)). Petitioner notes that Patent Owner accused only the “C6 SRAM multiplexer” feature of infringing the ’373 patent (Ex. 1042, 453:20– 25; Ex. 1044, 815:16–816:21) and that Patent Owner’s damages expert, Dr. Sullivan, “conceded that many of the thousands of other features ‘have nothing to do with what [Patent Owner] accuses.’” Pet. Reply 24 (quoting Ex. 1043, 690:19–691:24). The record before us does not show that Intel’s product or products underlying the infringement verdict are coextensive with “the invention disclosed and claimed.” See Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373, 1377; Facebook, Inc. v. Express Mobile Inc., IPR2021-01457, Paper 38 at 76–80 (PTAB Mar. 14, 2023) (concluding an infringement verdict was insufficient to establish nexus). Rather, the record shows that the accused products contained many features beyond those claimed in the ’373 patent. Ex. 1043, 690:19–691:24; Ex. 1044, 815:16–816:21. That evidence persuades us that, regardless of a presumed nexus, the commercial success does not have a nexus with the challenged claims.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Both Harris and the ’373 patent are in the field of memory power supply. While Harris describes a voltage-supply system allowing for a particular testing approach, its field is not limited to its primary purpose of soft-defect testing on-chip memory. Rather, Harris also describes that its system allows other features such as failure protection and a low-power feature. Ex. 1003, 3:50–67, 5:59–5:4. Thus, we find that Harris’s field is memory power supply, and more specifically, switchable memory power supplies. As discussed, the ’373 patent describes its related art as making tradeoffs between performance and power when choosing voltage and frequency for processors and memory. Ex. 1001, 1:12–25. While the ’373 patent describes determining the minimum operating voltage for each part and storing that determined value (id. at 2:3–37, 6:22–8:15), its disclosures are considerably broader in scope. The patent describes selecting memory voltage based on multiple considerations, such as using the logic voltage when it is higher than the memory minimum operating voltage, or a variety of minimum voltages depending on operating circumstances. Id. at 3:30–5:41. As to the system controlling a memory’s power supply, the ’373 patent describes mechanisms that may be used to control a memory’s power supply, such as power supply selector 21. Id. at 2:52–59, 5:42–58. It details operation of the power supply controller 28 and selector 21. Id. at 8:33–9:4. The ’373 patent describes alternatively that memory may be permanently coupled to a particular voltage bus that is scaled to provide the desired power. Id. at 2:59–61, 5:61–67. The disclosures regarding mechanisms for controlling the memory power supply show that the ’373 patent’s field is broader than just determining the minimum operating voltage. We find that the ’373 patent’s field includes switchable memory power supplies, supporting that Harris is from the same field as the ’373 patent. As to whether Harris is reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’373 patent, Petitioner contends that the ’373 patent addresses “lowering power consumption in integrated circuits, considering that ‘different types of circuitry within a data processing system may have different ranges of allowable operating voltages’ and that ‘the processor may be able to operate at a lower voltage than is possible for the memory.’” Pet. Reply 19 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:12–25, 2:5–7). Petitioner contends that Harris addresses the same problem with its circuit to “ensure the memory is provided with sufficient voltage to avoid data loss.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003, 3:54–56, 3:64–67 (Harris’s disclosure of switching memory power supply “to avoid memory data loss”)). Patent Owner’s expert agrees that the ’373 patent addresses “the problem of providing different voltages to different parts of the circuit” to accommodate different “allowable operating voltages.” PO Resp. 49 (quoting Ex. 2052 ¶ 159). As discussed above, Harris discloses a mechanism for providing different voltages to different parts of its circuit, whether for testing or low-power operation. Ex. 1003, 3:50–67, 5:59–5:4. We find that Harris is reasonably pertinent to the problem of providing different voltages to different parts of the circuit. While the ’373 patent addresses other problems also, that does not undermine the problem to which Harris is reasonably pertinent. See Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 2021-1601, 2022 WL 1576779, at *4 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 2022) (nonprecedential) (holding that the patent owner’s identification of an additional problem beyond that supporting analogous art was irrelevant); Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (noting the analysis considers “one or more problems to which the claimed invention relates”). Accordingly, Harris is analogous art to the ’373 patent because it is both from the same field of endeavor and reasonably pertinent to a problem confronting the inventor of the ’373 patent.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 7,523,373 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,523,373
• Patent Quality Assurance, LLC / Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2023 · IPR2021-01229 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–7, 9–11, and 13–16 over Harris, Abadeer, and Zhang; claims 2, 11, and 12 with Cornwell; and claim 8 with Bilak.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Petitioner contends that no claim requires construction other than claim 14, which recites a “means for providing the operating voltage to the memory at a value at least as great as the minimum operating voltage in response to the operating value selected by the processor being below the 1 Our bracketed designations for limitations largely follow those used by the parties. See Pet. 25–46. 2 US 5,867,719, issued Feb. 2, 1999 (Ex. 1003). 3 US 2006/0259840 A1, published Nov. 16, 2006 (Ex. 1004). 4 US 2003/0122429 A1, published July 3, 2003 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 7,702,935 B2, issued Apr. 20, 2010 (Ex. 1006). 6 US 2005/0188230 A1, published Aug. 25, 2005 (Ex. 1007). minimum operating voltage.” Pet. 24, 64; Ex. 1001, 14:31–37. Petitioner points out that a district court construed the term as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, with the claimed function and a corresponding structure of the “power supply selector.” Id. at 64 (quoting Ex. 1028, 2). Patent Owner does not challenge or otherwise address that construction, and we apply it in this decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree. Primarily, Harris’s description of the low-power feature does not restrict the feature to a particular timing for switching the memory’s power supply. Instead, Harris uses “while” as a term of contrast— the memory receives the second power supply voltage, in contrast to the CPU, which receives the first power supply voltage. Ex. 1003, 4:66–5:2. Although Harris does not limit the low-power feature’s switching methodology, Petitioner explains that because Harris separately describes threshold-based voltage switching (in connection with the failure mode), implementing the claimed threshold-based switching in connection with the low-power mode would have involved using that known technique to achieve a predictable result (avoiding memory data loss). Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 76). We agree, and find that skilled artisans would have had reason to and would have known how to implement Harris’s low-power feature with the threshold-based switching described in Harris’s failure mode.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “When the evidence shows that a product includes “the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent,” we presume that any commercial success of the product is due to the patented invention. PPC Broadband v. Corning Optical Commc’ns, 815 F. 3d 734, 746–747 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Such a presumed nexus requires not only that a commercial product embodies the claims, but also that it is coextensive with them. See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[P]resuming nexus is appropriate ‘when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018))).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “and therefore cannot be used in an obviousness combination. PO Resp. 39– 52. To be analogous art, Harris must be in the same field of endeavor as the ’373 patent or be reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’373 patent. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,523,373 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,523,373
• Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2023 · IPR2019-00731 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Remand

  Claim 28 is unpatentable under § 103(a) over Martin and Farley; Martin qualifies as prior art because Dr. Moran’s contribution made him a joint inventor of the relied-on disclosure.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “we do not agree with Patent Owner that evidence analogous to that in Duncan Parking is required in this case or for Petitioner to meet its burden by stating which specific aspects of the Facilitator were conceived by Dr. Moran. PO Remand 3–4. As the Federal Circuit stated, the facilitator described in Section 4.5 of the Martin reference plays a central role in the OAA disclosed in the specification of the ’560 patent. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; see Ex. 1011, 23–24 (Section 4.5); Ex. 1001, 19:14–19:62. In addition, Patent Owner admits that “large portions of the ’560 application and the Martin reference are identical or almost identical.” PO Resp. 1. We find that Petitioner and Dr. Moran have sufficiently identified the facilitator in the Martin reference as his work, and persuasively asserted that Dr. Moran’s background and experience with OAA and distributed software systems support his contribution to the conception of the facilitator in the distributed agent approach of Sections 4.1–4.5. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23–39. Dr. Moran’s testimony provides sufficient and persuasive detail to support his contribution claim to the facilitator of Section 4.5. Id.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “With respect to Dr. Moran’s contribution to the Martin reference, we find Dr. Moran’s testimony credible over that of Mr. Cheyer and Mr. Martin, because, as the Federal Circuit noted, because the latter testimony conflicts with other evidence of record. Google, 34 F.4th at 1088. Cheyer’s and Martin’s testimony that Dr. Moran’s role was administrative and non-technical with respect to the core infrastructure of OAA is belied by a separate article describing OAA that includes the facilitator and lists Dr. Moran as the lead author. Ex. 1174, 1–2, 4. Indeed, the OAA article lists Dr. Moran and Mr. Cheyer as authors but excludes Mr. Martin. Id. Although Mr. Cheyer disagrees with the article’s description of the origins of OAA and the facilitator (Ex. 2037, 78:23–79:12 (Mr. Cheyer asserting that he “would not agree in the characterization of Open Agent Architecture grew out of [earlier] works” as described in the article)), Mr. Cheyer admits patent]” (id. at 1088), “which is a continuation-in-part of the application that resulted in the ’115 patent” (id. at 1086). in his deposition that Dr. Moran was extremely technical, and probably made technical contributions to OAA (id. at 34:1–20, 64:16–20, 102:2–4). Similarly, Mr. Martin’s testimony also supports that Dr. Moran “may have made contributions to the technological development of either interfaces for use with OAA, agents used with OAA, or systems based on OAA.” Ex. 2038, 116:2–8, 117:7–119:10. When viewed in light of Dr. Moran’s status as a joint inventor on the closely related ’931 patent (Ex. 2002, code (75)) and as a lead author of the substantive paper that discusses OAA’s early development, we find Mr. Martin’s and Mr. Cheyer’s admissions—that Dr. Moran made technical contributions to OAA—undermine their testimony that Dr. Moran’s inclusion as an author on the Martin reference was a matter of administrative respect and not a result of a technical contribution. See PO Remand 11; PO Resp. 50–51. Indeed, we find Cheyer and Martin’s general description of Dr. Moran—as an administrator without technical contributions to the Martin reference—is not supported by the full record, which instead supports Dr. Moran’s contributions to technical work that involves the Martin reference, such as contemporary papers and the ’931 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1174, 2002. In sum, the testimony and contemporary evidence supports Dr. Moran’s testimony that his conception and contribution to the Martin reference, the facilitator, was technical and not merely administrative. Ex. 1007 ¶ 39.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention. Rather, we find that the Petition persuasively explains how Martin discloses a facilitator agent arranged to coordinate cooperative task completion within a distributed computing environment having autonomous service-providing electronic agents. Pet. 39; Ex. 1002 ¶ 100. Further, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that Farley discloses how agent functionality can be distributed across multiple processes. Pet. 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 101–102. Finally, Petitioner also provides persuasive reasons as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Martin and Farley, including reasons expressly provided by Farley. Pet. 40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103–104.” slip op. at 28

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE In our prior Final Written Decision, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) portions of Exhibit 1153; (2) Exhibits 1170, 1171, and 1172; (3) Exhibit 1174; and (4) portions of Exhibits 2037 and 2038; and we dismissed as moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) Exhibits 1158 and 1159 and (2) Exhibits 1175, 1176, and 1181. Final Dec. 26–30. We maintain these determinations on remand.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 7,069,560 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,069,560
• Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2023 · IPR2019-00728 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claim 63 unpatentable under § 103(a) over Martin and Kohn, finding Martin was prior art because Moran was a joint inventor.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner relies upon is sufficient to establish the degree to which the reliedon portions of the Martin reference were conceived by Dr. Moran, and the significance of those contributions to the overall anticipating disclosure of the Martin reference. See Google, 34 F.4th at 1086–88; Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contentions, Petitioner is not merely relying on Dr. Moran’s authorship to establish inventorship. PO Remand 8 (citing In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). Instead, Dr. Moran’s testimony establishes how his background led to his contributions to the multiple facilitator architectures disclosed in Martin and in the ’115 patent specification. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23– 34 (OAA project), 35–39 (OAA paper). In view of Dr. Moran’s testimony, we do not agree with Patent Owner that evidence analogous to that in Duncan Parking is required in this case or for Petitioner to meet its burden by stating which specific aspects of the Facilitator were conceived by Dr. Moran. PO Remand 3–4. As the Federal Circuit stated, the facilitator described in Section 4.5 of the Martin reference plays a central role in the OAA disclosed in the specification of the ’115 patent. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; see Ex. 1011, 23–24 (Section 4.5); Ex. 1001, 18:56–19:36. In addition, Patent Owner admits that “large portions of the ’115 application and the Martin reference are identical or almost identical.” PO Resp. 1. We find that Petitioner and Dr. Moran have sufficiently identified the facilitator in the Martin reference as his work, and persuasively asserted that Dr. Moran’s background and experience with OAA and distributed software systems support his contribution to the conception of the facilitator in the distributed agent approach of Sections 4.1–4.5. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23–39. Dr. Moran’s testimony provides sufficient and persuasive detail to support his contribution claim to the facilitator of Section 4.5. Id. Based on the record, the Federal Circuit’s remand squarely asks whether Dr. Moran’s stated contributions to the conception of the facilitator should be credited over Cheyer and Martin’s conflicting testimony regarding his lack of technical contribution. Google, 34 F.4th at 1088 (stating that “[t]he testimony of Dr. Moran, if credited, might well establish that he was a co-inventor of the particular portions of the Martin reference relied on by Google in, and relevant to, the challenge to particular claims”). When Dr. Moran’s testimony is viewed in combination with the supporting evidence,7 we find that incorporation of the facilitator in general, which is also found in the specification and claims, persuasively supports Dr. Moran’s testimony regarding his inventive contribution to the Martin reference. Specifically, we find Dr. Moran’s testimony persuasively supported and credible over the conflicting testimony and evidence offered by Mr. Cheyer and Mr. Martin. See Pet. Reply 12–13; Ex. 2038, 116:2–8, 117:7–119:10 (Cheyer admission that Dr. Moran made technical contributions to OAA); Ex. 2037, 34:1–20, 64:16–20, 102:2–4.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Upon weighing the parties’ testimony and evidence, we agree with Petitioner that sufficient evidence supports the technical contributions of Dr. Moran to OAA, including admissions by Mr. Martin that Dr. Moran made such contributions (see Ex. 2038, 116:2–116:8, 117:7–119:10; see also id. at 73:3–73:15); contemporaneous papers showing Dr. Moran’s contribution to the OAA including a facilitator (see Ex. 1170; Ex. 1174, 1– 2), and the ’931 patent (Ex. 2002). See Pet. Reply 5–7, 8, 12–13; Pet. Remand 11. In particular, Dr. Moran’s testimony establishes that he contributed to Section 4.5, the facilitator that plays an essential role in the OAA, that differs from prior art agents, and that is found in the ’115 specification. We find Dr. Moran’s contributions to be significant when measured against the full anticipating Martin reference, and to render him a joint inventor of the Martin reference. Google, 34 F.4th at 1085 (quoting Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358). 5. Conclusion Based on the full record, we find that Petitioner has provided persuasive evidence by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Moran is an inventive entity to the Martin reference. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established that Martin is “by another” and is prior art under § 102(a) to the ’115 patent. We next turn to the sole remaining ground based on the Martin reference to determine the patentability of the remaining challenged claim.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “combination of Martin and Kohn. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Olsen, provides persuasive testimony and evidence that Martin teaches compound goals and a skilled artisan would have been motivated in view of Kohn to modify Martin’s facilitator agent to interpret a compound goal that includes both local and global constraints. Pet. 32–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88. Dr. Olsen’s testimony does not evince hindsight, but instead supports the finding that an ordinarily skilled artisan could use compound goals required in Martin and apply the type of constraints (global and local) disclosed in Kohn. Ex. 2024, 159:4–160:16. In addition, Dr. Olsen testified, the proposed implementation “would have been a mere combination of known components and technologies . . . , according to known methods, to produce predictable results.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 87. We do not agree that this case presents the same technical issues raised in G.B.T. Inc. v. Walletex Microelectronics Ltd., IPR2018-00326, Paper 60 at 16–17 (PTAB June 25, 2019), where the petitioner’s declarant failed to show how the combination would have achieved desired results and features from the combination of the circuits. Here, Dr. Olsen identified known compound goals in Martin to which Kohn’s local and global constraints are applicable. Pet. 32–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88. In view of the level of skill in the art and the testimony of Dr. Olsen (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88; Ex. 2024, 159:4–160:16), we find that Petitioner establishes persuasive motivation to combine the software teachings of Kohn’s constraints into the goals of Martin and how the references would have been combined by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 29

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMotion to exclude, grantedMixed

    “III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE In our prior Final Written Decision, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) portions of Exhibit 1153; (2) Exhibits 1170, 1171, and 1172; (3) Exhibit 1174; and (4) portions of Exhibits 2037 and 2038; and we dismissed as moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) Exhibits 1158 and 1159 and (2) Exhibits 1175, 1176, and 1181. Final Dec. 25–28. We maintain these determinations on remand.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,851,115 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,851,115
• Laltitude LLC, Dba Picasso Tiles v. Altus Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00155 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  The sole challenged claim was held unpatentable as anticipated by Zhao US and Zhao CN; the Board did not reach the three obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “same as that used for infringement, except that for anticipation, the patented design is compared with the alleged anticipatory reference rather than an accused design. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The ordinary observer test for design patent infringement was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), as follows: [I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other. Id. at 528. The ordinary observer test requires the fact finder to consider all of the ornamental features illustrated in the figures that are visible at any time in the “normal use” lifetime of the accused product, i.e., “from the completion of manufacture or assembly until the ultimate destruction, loss, or disappearance of the article.” Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1241. Further, while the ordinary observer test requires consideration of the overall prior art and claimed designs, [t]he mandated overall comparison is a comparison taking into account significant differences between the two designs, not minor or trivial differences that necessarily exist between any two designs that are not exact copies of one another. Just as “minor differences between a patented design and an accused article’s design cannot, and shall not, prevent a finding of infringement” . . . so too minor differences cannot prevent a finding of anticipation. Id. at 1243 (citation omitted) (quoting Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (1984)).” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS D719,138 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
• Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01599 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kalanick and Kemler, anticipated by Lalancette, or obvious over Lalancette and Kemler.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Prelim. Resp. 5. At the institution stage, we adopted Petitioner’s more general formulation, with one qualification. Inst. Dec. 19. We stated we would also expect a person of ordinary skill to have at least some experience in wireless cellular network protocols, as suggested by Patent Owner. Id. at 19–20. We reasoned that our review of the ’987 patent and the cited prior art did not suggest that specific experience with data privacy policies and protection models would be required, given the focus of the ’987 patent on more general principles of cellular communications and signaling. Id. at 20. However, we observed that our decision would be the same under either formulation. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We also find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Williams, Petitioner’s expert, “acknowledges that Lalancette does not disclose the use of a mobile communication device associated with the driver.” Id. (citing Ex. 2022, 128:14–129:25, 132:1–8). Patent Owner misrepresents Mr. Williams’s testimony. Mr. Williams was not asked whether Lalancette “discloses” a mobile communication device, but rather was asked “You’ll agree that La[l]ancette doesn’t identify the mobile computer as a mobile communication device associated with the driver?” Ex. 2022, 129:10–13. specifically referenced, that description is not in that passage.” Id. at 129:14–16. Notably, Mr. Williams also testified that (i) “[t]he nature of La[l]ancette requires some sort of computing device in the taxi that has the ability to receive and communicate in order to get information, for example, icon information from the central computer”; (ii) “mobile computer . . . has a variety of form factors inclusive of something like a [s]martphone”; and (iii) “[i]n the passage where [Lalancette] references mobile computer, it doesn’t have a specific form factor discussion such as referencing [s]martphones.” Id. at 125:17–22, 129:20–25, 132:5–8.” slip op. at 38

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. “indicator” In our Institution Decision, we construed the term “indicator” as a “code (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier, for display to enable a match between a user/rider and a driver.” Inst. Dec. 22. We determined this construction was consistent with the description of an indicator in the specification of the ’987 patent. Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:9–13). Neither party challenges this construction, which we maintain for this Final Written Decision. See PO Resp. 6; Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Because the specification and prosecution history do not explicitly provide a definition for the term “generate,” we looked to extrinsic sources to determine its plain meaning. Inst. Dec. 24. The Federal Circuit has approved the use of dictionaries for guidance in claim construction, “so long as the extrinsic evidence does not contradict the meaning otherwise apparent from the intrinsic record.” Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving of “consult[ing] a general dictionary definition of [a] word for guidance” in determining ordinary meaning); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. general dictionary definitions as an aid to claim construction.”) (citation omitted). One dictionary definition of “generate” is “to bring into existence: such as: . . . to originate by a vital, chemical, or physical process: PRODUCE.” See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generate. We therefore construed the term “generate” as it relates to the controller in reference to a signal in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to originate or produce the signal.” Inst. Dec. 24–25.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 10,169,987 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,169,987
• Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00265 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–19, 21, 24, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Eyal and Wiser; claims 15, 16, 19, 21, and 27 are also unpatentable over Madison and Wiser.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “The Specification sets forth the following definition: “[a] reservation is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, consistent with the definition in the Specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system . . . to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62. We agree with Patent Owner that the construction of the term “reservation” does 7 not require “a set of instructions uniquely identifying the communication device.” As to “reservation identification,” we adopt Patent Owner’s construction, construing the term “reservation identification” as “identification of a reservation” because this construction is consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, without requiring the identification to be unique.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, consistent with the definition in the Specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system . . . to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62. We agree with Patent Owner that the construction of the term “reservation” does 7 not require “a set of instructions uniquely identifying the communication device.” As to “reservation identification,” we adopt Patent Owner’s construction, construing the term “reservation identification” as “identification of a reservation” because this construction is consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, without requiring the identification to be unique.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Here, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’360 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or equivalent.” Pet. 16. And, such an artisan also would have had “at least two years of experience in distributed systems, multimedia streaming, and various HTTP-related technologies, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience,” citing to the Declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D., for support. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59−61). Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Michael Adams, provides similar assessment, but also testifies that such an artisan, alternatively, would have had “at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or multimedia streaming.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 28. Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments. We apply Patent Owner’s assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. However, our analysis would be the same under either party’s description.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “added). Dr. Houh testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have used Wiser’s voucher ID in Eyal’s play-list because delivery servers may have a “limited number of active streams of data being delivered at any one time,” so that generating and tracking reservations by the content server using voucher IDs is necessary. Ex. 1003 ¶ 144 (citing Ex. 1006, 14:65−15:1). We agree with and credit Dr. Houh’s testimony, and we find that such an artisan of ordinary skill would have understood that, in Eyal in combination with Wiser, the voucher ID provided in the play-list is uniquely associated with the client device and a viewing session of the media. Ex. 1003 ¶ 151 (citing Ex. 1006, 8:30−33, 15:23−28). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that “Wiser teaches away from video.” PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 174). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, nothing in Wiser would discourage a relevant artisan from applying its teachings to video media, as Patent Owner alleges. Patent Owner’s argument of teaching away is based on speculation. As discussed above, Wiser’s disclosure is not limited to audio media. Ex. 1006, 1:5−8, 1:23−26, 3:8−10; Ex. 1083, 145:20−147:21. The “mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Moreover, KSR instructs us that “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize 20 that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. As Dr. Houh testifies, “[s]ervers’ limited streaming capacity was a common media delivery problem, and well-known solutions existed before the ’360 Patent, including generating a reservation to ensure resource availability for streaming media to the user.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106, 167 (citing Ex. 1019, 263 (Discussion on Resource Reservation Protocols (RSVP) in the book entitled “Communication and Computing for Distributed Multimedia Systems”); Ex. 1023 (RSVP Specification); Ex. 1024, 194 (Discussion on the Reservation Protocol in the book entitled “Multimedia Servers”)).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,591,360 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,591,360
• Western Digital Corporation / Western Digital Technologies, Inc. et al. v. Martin KusterAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2022 · IPR2020-01410 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9–13, and 18 as anticipated by Hsiao, and claims 1–18 as obvious over Hsiao and Sun.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill does not materially differ from that articulated by Mr. Welch. Both require a bachelor’s in many of the same fields and roughly one to two years of experience with USB protocols or USB product development. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner indicates that the outcome of any arguments made in this case would change depending on the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s description, which we determine to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The term “mounted on” appears in several limitations of claim 1, including limitations 1.c, 1.d, and 1.e. The dispute between the parties, however, centers only on how the term should be construed in limitation 1.e, which recites “a contact bar mounted on the connection surface of the substrate” (Ex. 1001, 9:63–64) and only with respect to the Grounds involving Chen. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions that Hsiao teaches a contact bar “mounted on” the connection surface of the substrate. See PO Resp. 42–55. For the reasons stated below, we determine Petitioner has not shown that Chen teaches certain other limitations of the independent claims regardless of whether it teaches “a contact bar mounted on the connection surface of the substrate.” See infra § II.D.2. Thus, it is not necessary to construe the term “mounted on” to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “2. Embedded to be Exposed Upon the Cover of the Contact Bar The only word in the phrase “embedded to be exposed upon the cover of the contact bar,” recited in claims 1, 12, and 18, that Petitioner offers a construction for is the word “embedded,” which Petitioner argues has no special meaning in the art and should be afforded its ordinary dictionary definition of “set firmly into a mass or material.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 111). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction. PO Resp. 34–35. We adopt Petitioner’s construction, which we find is supported by the evidence of record. Ex. 1005 ¶ 111.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “It is well established that when a party seeks to prove conception through an inventor’s testimony, the party must proffer independent evidence corroborating the inventor’s testimony. Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330. To be “independent,” the corroborating evidence must be evidence other than the inventor’s testimony. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The sufficiency of the proffered corroboration is determined by a “rule of reason” analysis in which all pertinent evidence is examined. See NTP, 654 F.3d at 1291. Even under the “rule of reason” analysis, however, the “evidence of corroboration must not depend solely on the inventor himself.” Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1321; see also Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (corroborating evidence must be “independent of information received from the inventor”).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,705,243 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,705,243

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.