- Charles River Laboratories, Inc. v. Seikagaku CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · PGR2025-00023 · APJ Per Curiam · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’629 publication; the claims are not entitled to the 2013 priority date.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSITA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining that “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSITA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSITA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 22; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the trial record, we find a POSITA with respect to the claims of the ’109 patent would have had a two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSITA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes an express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 22–23 (not proposing any constructions); PO Resp. 23 (“Patent Owner agrees that the terms can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.”). However, Patent Owner states that some of Petitioner’s arguments implicitly construe claim 1 in an erroneous manner. PO Resp. 23–28. “For example, Petitioner argues that ‘an adequate written description would have to either disclose representative examples of the possible working cascades of various proteins or some accurate structural feature of the claimed proteins that allow them to function in the claimed assay as a whole.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Pet. 35). Patent Owner argues that, contrary to what Petitioner’s argument allegedly implies, “Claim 1 is directed to a method for producing an endotoxin assay agent” and does not require the use – Owner that claim 1 does not require the use of endotoxin assay agent. However, the claimed endotoxin assay agent must be capable of performing the assay, as counsel for Patent Owner acknowledged. Tr. 83:5–9.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“In this case, to show that the claims of the ’109 patent are unpatentable for lack of written description, Petitioner would have needed to show that the specification as filed (i.e., the ’420 application) fails to reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the July 3, 2023, filing date. Petitioner did not. Pet. 23–24. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant offer testimony that could support such a showing. See Ex. 1003 ¶50 (“I have been asked to provide my opinions as to the state of the art in this field for purposes of determining what the inventors disclosed as their invention as of December 10, 2013.”), ¶51 (“Whenever I offer an opinion in this declaration about the knowledge of a POSA, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the claims of the ’109 patent or its description, the manner in have been led to do based on the prior art, I am referencing the December 10, 2013 timeframe.”). In our Institution Decision, we stated: Although the ’420 application is essentially identical to the ’767 application, the person of ordinary skill in 2013 is not the same as in 2023. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he [written description] test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the information presented in the Petition, which is limited to the perspective of a 2013 POSITA, does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable for lack of written description. Inst. Dec. 12 (alterations in original). During trial, Petitioner did not present any further arguments in support of Ground 1. See generally Pet. Reply. Petitioner has failed to prove that claims 1–9 are unpatentable for failing to meet the written description requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot shown unpatentable
“Although the evidence before us shows that, in 2013, a POSITA knew how to recombinantly express genes in expression systems such as CHO or HEK-293 cell lines, the evidence shows that this was true only for genes whose genetic sequences were known or readily available. See, e.g., Ex. 1069, 34:11–22 (“Q. Okay. So you would agree that the creation of the recombinant protein requires the underlying sequence of, as you said, the original animal? A. Of course.”) Because it is undisputed that, in 2013, the genetic sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C was unknown, or least not publicly available, Falko-Gunter does not support a finding of adequate written description here. See, e.g., Tr. 48:18–19 (“Patent Owner agrees that there had not been, as of 2013, the full length cDNA sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C published.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,959,109 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,959,109 - Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00150 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Skechers did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 were unpatentable, principally because the asserted art did not disclose the construed integral knit tongue.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’562 patent in February 2012 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 22. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Nike applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 15. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“inquiries.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the claims . . . [and t]he second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the properly construed claim to the prior art.” Id. Although an explicit claim construction analysis by a petitioner is not required in every case, a petition nonetheless must identify how the challenged claims are to be construed and how, as so construed, they are unpatentable under the statutory grounds asserted. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4). And, being part of a prima facia case, such an analysis is part of Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its patentability challenges. Petitioner has failed to satisfy the threshold burden for every ground based on this construction.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We do not find Petitioner’s contentions regarding the two annotated figures to be persuasive. First, those contentions, and the cited opinions of Dr. Adanur, are based on a claim construction that, as discussed above, we reject and for which neither party advocates. Second, Petitioner does not explain adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would discern, even with Petitioner’s added red ovals, a tongue distinct from the upper and tongue extending through the throat area. We also do not find persuasive Petitioner’s contentions regarding differing textures. See Pet. 32–33. Even if differing textures could rise to the level of distinguishing an integral knit tongue from the upper, the purported tongue texture 48" is not confined to the area identified by Petitioner as the tongue. See Pet. 31 (annotated Figure 11, reproduced above). For example, texture 48" outside of Petitioner’s oval appears to wrap approximately halfway around the ankle opening, which is not argued to be consistent with an ordinary artisan’s understanding of a tongue. Or, put another way, there is no indication that the portion of the 48" texture within Petitioner’s red oval, which purportedly represents the tongue, is distinguishable from the remaining portion of the 48" texture outside of the red oval. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider the relatively large area depicted as having texture 48" to be an “integral knit tongue.” In light of the above, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 1 and its dependent claims 2–4 as anticipated by Dua-592.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,060,562 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,825 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - New Balance Athletics, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00778 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim: Clark and Mills each failed to disclose required limitations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”).” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“in a continuous fashion, as shown in Figure 5, and this will include the portion that will be used for the upper (the textile element) and the material that is trimmed away (the surrounding textile structure)” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124–125)). Notably absent, however, from the above-identified portions of the Petition and testimony of Dr. Bookstein is any reference to material that is “trimmed away” or why any such material is regarded as surrounding a textile element, or any other component of Clark. In a later portion of the Petition addressing the second clause of limitation 1a, Petitioner makes reference to Clark’s column 4, lines 61 through 66, as disclosing a “trimming process.” Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex, 1003 ¶ 128). That portion of Clark generally expresses that “the exposed edge of the upper may be trimmed in any desired outline . . . and the trimmed edge may be bound or finished as desired.” E. 1004, 4:61–66. We agree with Patent Owner that, to the extent Petitioner and Dr. Brookstein rely on that portion of Clark to account for the first clause of limitation 1a, Petitioner does not meaningfully explain why Clark’s disclosure of “the potential trimming of an ‘exposed edge’ (singular)” of any textile element means that the textile element is regarded as “hav[ing] been knitted with a surrounding textile structure.” See Prelim. Resp. 15–16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 38). We credit Dr. Pastore’s testimony to that end, over that of Dr. Brookstein (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 128), as we find that Dr. Pastore’s testimony is more consistent with Clark’s actual disclosure and what it would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner states, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Nike applies New Balance’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’749 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our patentability evaluations below.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“in a continuous fashion, as shown in Figure 5, and this will include the portion that will be used for the upper (the textile element) and the material that is trimmed away (the surrounding textile structure)” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124–125)). Notably absent, however, from the above-identified portions of the Petition and testimony of Dr. Bookstein is any reference to material that is “trimmed away” or why any such material is regarded as surrounding a textile element, or any other component of Clark. In a later portion of the Petition addressing the second clause of limitation 1a, Petitioner makes reference to Clark’s column 4, lines 61 through 66, as disclosing a “trimming process.” Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex, 1003 ¶ 128). That portion of Clark generally expresses that “the exposed edge of the upper may be trimmed in any desired outline . . . and the trimmed edge may be bound or finished as desired.” E. 1004, 4:61–66. We agree with Patent Owner that, to the extent Petitioner and Dr. Brookstein rely on that portion of Clark to account for the first clause of limitation 1a, Petitioner does not meaningfully explain why Clark’s disclosure of “the potential trimming of an ‘exposed edge’ (singular)” of any textile element means that the textile element is regarded as “hav[ing] been knitted with a surrounding textile structure.” See Prelim. Resp. 15–16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 38). We credit Dr. Pastore’s testimony to that end, over that of Dr. Brookstein (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 128), as we find that Dr. Pastore’s testimony is more consistent with Clark’s actual disclosure and what it would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00275 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22–24, 44, and 46 based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Determining whether to institute has been delegated to the Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one claim. Accordingly, we grant the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“argues that we “should exercise . . . discretion to deny institution of Ground 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” Prelim. Resp. 8 (emphasis added). However, we do not institute on a ground-by-ground basis. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding that the Director’s prior “partial institution practice” was contrary to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). Even assuming Patent Owner requests that we exercise discretion to deny the entire Petition, its discretionary denial arguments could not support such a request because those arguments are limited to Ground 1. Patent Owner does not argue or present any basis for exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) as to any of the additional grounds. And, as discussed below, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in at least one of those additional grounds. For this reason alone, discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is not warranted.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“step [b], i.e., “contacting a treatment element of the treatment device with mucosal tissue in the patient’s nasal airway,” as recited in claim 9. Prelim. Resp. 17; see Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). As will become apparent from Patent Owner’s arguments, central to the dispute between the parties is Petitioner’s mapping of Gertner to limitation [b] and, in particular, to the recited “treatment element.” In Petitioner’s view, Gertner’s distal end 216 and expandable component 218 together form the recited “treatment element.” As Petitioner explains it, Gertner discloses that “the distal end 216 emits light from ‘within’ the expandable component 218, such that the light emitter and expandable component 218 (which together constitute distal end 216) act as a treatment element.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶¶103, 106, 107; Ex. 1002 ¶64). Petitioner further points out, with supporting evidence, that the expandable component contacts mucosal tissue. Id. (citing Ex. 1013 ¶¶37, 103).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Edwards-535. Pet. 61–64. Claim 16 recites: “A method as in claim 9, wherein adjusting the shape comprises forming at least one bend in a shaft of the treatment device.” For this additional subject matter, Petitioner points us to the bend in the structure that is designated with reference numeral 124 in Edwards-535, as illustrated in Figure 3B. Pet. 61–62. Petitioner also argues, with supporting evidence, that, even absent this disclosure, it would have been obvious to form a bend, as it is well known in the art to provide bendable catheters to facilitate insertion of a medical device. Id. at 62–64 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶130–132). Patent Owner’s sole argument is Edwards-535 fails to disclose limitation [b] of claim 9, from which claim 16 depends. Prelim. Resp 31– 32. That argument is not persuasive for reasons already discussed. Although we have already held that the single-claim threshold of § 314(a) has been met with respect to independent claim 9, we nonetheless further determine that there is a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing in showing that dependent claim 16 would have been obvious over Edwards-535.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,072,597 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2023 · IPR2023-01038 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–29 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining § 325(d) denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, for reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the ’745 patent’s challenged claims. We decline to deny the Petition on the basis of discretion under § 325(d). We institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportInstituted
“Conclusion Based on the preliminary record, we determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in establishing that the challenged claims are not entitled to a priority date that is earlier than October 7, 2016. Accordingly, Corteva ’437, which was filed May 2, 2005, and published November 17, 2005, is prior art under 32 U.SC. § 102. Ex. 1021, codes (22), (43).” slip op. at 55
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“missing in the disclosures of the priority applications. See, e.g., Paper 9 at 2 (citing evidence). Because the only issue in dispute at this time for Petitioner’s grounds based on Corteva ’437 is the applicable priority date for the challenged claims, the Office’s error is plainly material to Petitioner’s challenge under Grounds IA & IB, covering all claims. We do not further address the parties’ arguments about § 325(d) as applied to the obviousness challenge under Grounds IIA and IIB. Even if we agreed with Patent Owner’s arguments for discretionary denial of those grounds, we would not find that § 325(d) is sufficiently implicated based on our determination of error concerning the priority issue as explained above. For the foregoing reasons, we do not deny the Petition on the basis of discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 74
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,299,745 - PTAB · Mar 9, 2023 · IPR2022-01293 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on Wu grounds and compelling merits despite Fintiv factors favoring denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“f) Conclusion – Initial Fintiv Analysis We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of the first five Fintiv factors. Because our analysis is fact driven, no single factor is determinative of our conclusion. Considering these five Fintiv factors, we determine that they favor a discretionary denial. 2. Assessment of the Compelling Merits As we have found that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, we proceed to assess whether the record shows that Petitioner has presented a compelling unpatentability challenge.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. As discussed below, we have considered our whether to exercise our discretion to deny pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and determined not to exercise this discretion. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s definition appears generally consistent with Petitioner’s definition, with the exception of requiring 3 years or more (as systems. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s provided definition for the level of skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art as reasonable and consistent with the prior art, which does not encompass an open-ended (“at least 3 years”) amount of experience, and which is supported by the testimony of Dr. Acampora. We would reach the same conclusions if we were to remove the open-ended terminology from Patent Owner’s definition and adopt that.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Thus, the record does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “radio resources,” that requires the RF carriers, CDMA codes, TDMA time slots or other information defining and describing the way data is being transmitted cannot include the user payload data that is transmitted. 4. Our Partial Construction For our present purposes, we do not need to completely construe the term “radio resources.” Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. However, a partial construction is required, and for the reasons discussed above, for this Decision, we construe “radio resources” to encompass RF carriers, CDMA codes, and TDMA time slots, including those in which underlying data is transmitted.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,499 - Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd. / Globalfoundries U.S. Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 17, 2018 · IPR2016-01376 · APJ Jennifer Meyer Chagnon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 13 and 15 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious over Grill and Aoyama; the Board found a reason to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We note the parties’ proposals differ in the specific degree required (i.e., Master of Science vs. Bachelor’s of Science); however, neither party argues this distinction makes a difference in analyzing the asserted ground or other issues in this proceeding. For clarity of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is more specifically directed to the technology described in the ’696 patent. In addition, given the disclosures in the ’696 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner that a Master of Science degree (or equivalent) in the relevant area better reflects the level of education and training that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have possessed at the time than a Bachelor’s degree, as Patent Owner contends. Our findings and conclusions, however, would be the same under either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. The level of ordinary skill in the art in this case further is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. Construction of “using the [designated layer] as a mask” In the Institution Decision, we preliminarily construed the phrase “using the [designated layer] as a mask”6 as “using the [designated layer] to 6 Claim 13 recites several steps of etching “using” various layers—for example, the first resist pattern [step f]/second resist pattern and the mask pattern [step h]/patterned third insulating film [step i]—“as a mask.” As shorthand, we refer to the various layers as “the designated layer.” define areas for etching.”7 Inst. Dec. 11–15. We further determined that “to meet the limitation ‘using the [designated layer] for etching,’ the designated layer ‘must actually be used to define areas for etching.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Prelim. Resp. 6 (emphasis Patent Owner’s)). Patent Owner agrees with this construction—namely, that “‘using’ something ‘as a mask’ during etching means using it to define areas for etching.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner also applied this construction in this proceeding. See Tr. 6:7–18; see also id. at 19:10–16 (Petitioner’s counsel: “No, no, we did not present a construction and we did not contest the Board’s construction.”). The parties do not dispute that “using the [designated layer] as a mask” means “using the [designated layer] to define areas for etching,” and we discern no reason from the evidence presented to change this construction. We, therefore, maintain our preliminary construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 16
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“that “using the [designated layer] as a mask” encompasses a situation in which the modified mask pattern 358, having “edges that are in line and flush with” second resist pattern 359, is therefore used as a mask. For the reasons discussed above, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “us[ed] . . . as a mask” necessarily encompasses such a situation. See supra Section II.C.2. We note that the application of our construction would not preclude layer 358 as shown in Patent Owner’s modified Figure 16(a) from ever being a mask when etching layer 355, if it were in fact described as such. However, there is no such description in the Japanese priority application; instead, the corresponding discussion identifies only second resist pattern 359 as a mask for this etching step. See Ex. 1014 ¶ 96 (“If there is a concern that the second resist pattern 359 has been misaligned with the first resist pattern 357, then the mask pattern 358 should be dry-etched using the second resist pattern 359 as a mask before the second silicon dioxide film 355 is dry-etched using the second resist pattern 359 as a mask.” (emphasis added)). Further, as noted by Petitioner (Reply 10–11), the corresponding discussion is, at best, ambiguous as to whether mask pattern 358 is “used as a mask” for etching layer 355. Ex. 1014 ¶ 96 (“That is to say, if the mask pattern 358 is exposed to the openings of the second resist pattern 359 for the formation of contact holes because of the misalignment of the second resist pattern 359 with the first resist pattern 357, then the mask pattern 358 is dry-etched using the second resist pattern 359 as a mask. In this manner, the openings of the mask pattern 358 are expanded to include the openings for the formation of wiring grooves and contact holes.” (emphasis added)). This disclosure is not sufficient to provide support under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for step (h) of claim 13. See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application under 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1994), the earlier application must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994). . . . A disclosure in a parent application that merely renders the later-claimed invention obvious is not sufficient to meet the written description requirement; the disclosure must describe the claimed invention with all its limitations.” (citing Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997))); see also K & K Jump Start, 13 F. App’x at 984 (“In order for claim 1 of the [U.S.] patent to be entitled to the priority date of the [foreign] application, the test set forth in [Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1158] must be satisfied.”). 2. Conclusion as to Whether Grill Qualifies as Prior Art Having considered the evidence in this record, we determine that at least step (h) of claim 13 is not supported by the Japanese priority application.16 Accordingly, the effective filing date of the challenged claims is March 23, 1999, and Grill is available as prior art as to claims 13 and 15 of the ’696 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” slip op. at 39
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“2. Conclusion as to Whether Grill Qualifies as Prior Art Having considered the evidence in this record, we determine that at least step (h) of claim 13 is not supported by the Japanese priority application.16 Accordingly, the effective filing date of the challenged claims is March 23, 1999, and Grill is available as prior art as to claims 13 and 15 of the ’696 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). 16 Because we find that claim 13 is not supported by the Japanese priority application, we need not discuss the parties’ arguments and evidence regarding whether or not Grill is entitled to the priority date of the Grill provisional application. Nor must we decide whether Petitioner’s corresponding arguments and evidence submitted in the Reply are proper.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 6,197,696 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,197,696 - Hologic, Inc. v. Enzo Life Sciences, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 13, 2017 · IPR2016-00822 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place because it found sufficient evidence that the non-patent references were prior art for institution purposes.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“§ 42.62(a) states that “the Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply to a proceeding,” and that “a proceeding” is defined in § 42.2 to include the preliminary proceeding prior to institution. Id. at 6. Patent Owner then concludes incorrectly, however, that it was entitled to an evidentiary ruling during the preliminary proceeding. Id. at 6–7. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to the instant proceeding,7 a party is not entitled to an evidentiary ruling prior to institution. Indeed, our regulations create a postinstitution procedure for challenging evidence and ruling on those challenges. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. This post-institution procedure expressly applies to pre-institution evidence. Id. at 42.64(b)(1) (“Any objection to evidence submitted during a preliminary proceeding must be filed within ten business days of the institution of the trial.”). The Board’s procedure allows for curing of alleged evidentiary defects through the timely service of supplemental evidence. Id. at 42.64(b)(2). Ultimately, “[a] motion to exclude must be filed to preserve any objection.” Id. at 42.64(c). Motions to exclude in the instant inter” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that each of these references qualify as prior art printed publications. For example, Fish appears to be an article from the journal Arthritis and Rheumatism and bears a “March 1981” publication date on the cover of the volume as well as the cover page of the article. Ex. 1006, cover page and 534. Sato appears to be an article from the journal Radiation Research and bears a publication date of 1981. Ex. 1034, 646. Gilham appears to be an article published in a book titled Immobilized Biochemicals and Affinity Chromatography, which includes a copyright date of 1974 and an indication that it contains most of the papers presented in a “Symposium on Affinity Chromatography and Immobilized Biochemicals” held November 7–9, 1973. Ex. 1019, second page after cover (“Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data”). VPK appears to be an article from the journal Experimental Cell Research and is dated October 1982. Ex. 1008, cover page. Noyes appears to be an article from the journal Cell and is dated July 1975. Ex. 1007, 301. Finally, Ramachandran appears to be an article from the journal Biotechnology and Bioengineering and is dated 1975. Thus, each of these references bears a date prior to the earliest possible effective filing date for the challenged claims (i.e., Jan. 27, 1983). See Ex. 1001, 1:19; 35 U.S.C. § 120. Moreover, the references are either journal articles or excerpts from a book, and thus appear to have been publicly disseminated. Petitioner has made sufficient showing that these documents qualify as prior art printed publications. After institution, Patent Owner may, if it chooses to do so, continue to challenge the sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b).” slip op. at 4
- ExcludeNot reached
“§ 42.62(a) states that “the Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply to a proceeding,” and that “a proceeding” is defined in § 42.2 to include the preliminary proceeding prior to institution. Id. at 6. Patent Owner then concludes incorrectly, however, that it was entitled to an evidentiary ruling during the preliminary proceeding. Id. at 6–7. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to the instant proceeding,7 a party is not entitled to an evidentiary ruling prior to institution. Indeed, our regulations create a postinstitution procedure for challenging evidence and ruling on those challenges. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. This post-institution procedure expressly applies to pre-institution evidence. Id. at 42.64(b)(1) (“Any objection to evidence submitted during a preliminary proceeding must be filed within ten business days of the institution of the trial.”). The Board’s procedure allows for curing of alleged evidentiary defects through the timely service of supplemental evidence. Id. at 42.64(b)(2). Ultimately, “[a] motion to exclude must be filed to preserve any objection.” Id. at 42.64(c). Motions to exclude in the instant inter” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,064,197
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.