• Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01158 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Tateishi, and claims 5, 7, 8, and 15 as obvious over Tateishi.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner has not offered persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the claims in light of the Specification would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “control signal” to be as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. We do not construe the claims such that the “control signal” must be the exclusively controlling factor of a component, as Patent Owner urges. Petitioner’s position, on the other hand, is consistent with the evidence of record. We construe “control signal” as having its plain and ordinary meaning, namely a signal configured to control a circuit component. D. The Asserted Anticipation of Claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 by Tateishi” slip op. at 24

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Tateishi discloses the “control signal” recited in limitations 1B2 and 1D of independent claim 1.” slip op. at 37

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “based on the Tateishi application publication (Ex. 1007), that the Tateishi Patent (Ex. 1005) also anticipates claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18. See Pet. 23–24 (“The Tateishi Patent is also prior art under (pre-AIA) §102(e)”; identifying Ground 1 as anticipation “under §102 by Tateishi and/or the Tateishi Patent”). However, we are unable to locate in the Petition or Petitioner’s Reply a discussion of or citation to the Tateishi Patent other than under the Petitioner’s heading “Identification of Challenge and Relief Requested” on pages 23 and 24 of the Petition. Cf. id. at i–x (Table of Contents identifying a section of the Petition discussing the Tateishi (Application) anticipation ground but not a section discussing a Tateishi Patent anticipation ground). Although the issued patent may be substantively identical to the published application, Petitioner does not assert that, and we decline to compare the documents to determine whether that is the case. In light of Petitioner’s silence on the alternative ground, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tateishi Patent anticipates 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 9,041,377 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,041,377
• Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00871 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim; it also found institution inefficient based on Ground 1 alone.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. The Alleged Unpatentability of Claims 1, 11, and 12 as Anticipated by TI,” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims of the ’608 patent. IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 39

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Here, Petitioner advances five challenges with four directed to the same three independent claims. Pet. 3. We, for the reasons discussed below, determine that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Grounds 2 through 5. We further determine that, based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds and all the challenged claims based on evidence and arguments directed only to Ground 1 would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, even if Petitioner met the requisite burden for institution as to Ground 1, we would exercise our discretion and not institute an inter partes review. E. The Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 11, and 12 by Galinski (Ground 2)” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,590,608
• Duration Media LLC v. Rich Media Club LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2023-00953 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 were not proven unpatentable under either §103 ground because the evidence did not show the claimed viewability determination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive. Indeed, it is unclear how Petitioner’s proposal accounts for the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. See Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256 (identifying these factors, among others, as “a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art”). Nor does Petitioner, in its Reply, address, let alone rebut, Patent Owner’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had some experience and/or knowledge in internet advertising. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner proposes that a “person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar major involving computer programming (or at least four years of practical computer programming experience) and at least two years of experience (in or out of college) in the field of internet advertising.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2045 ¶54). We agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have some experience in internet advertising, although we fail to see why one year would not be enough to familiarize sufficiently a computer scientist and/or programmer with the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. Based on the competing proposals, arguments, and evidence before us, we adopt and apply the following level of skill in assessing Petitioner’s challenges to the patentability of the claims of the ’329 patent: a person that would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical (or similar) engineering with about three years of experience being in the field of internet advertising.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s resurrected argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of § 311(b). Section 311(b) provides: “A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed cancel the claims of the ’329 patent on the basis of Badros, Harkins, and Krassner. Pet. 11. Petitioner did not base its request, in whole or in part, on the Krassner publication. Id. Krassner clearly is a patent. It issued on August 13, 2019, far too late to be § 102(b) prior art. Even if we assume Krassner is also a “printed publication” withing the meaning of § 311(b), the same date would apply: August 13, 2019. Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the document that is Krassner was published prior to when it issued on August 13, 2019. That another document (the Krassner publication), which published much earlier, may contain the same or similar disclosure is not relevant to when Krassner was patented or published. In sum, Krassner is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). b) Whether Krassner is Prior Art Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Although Krassner is not prior under 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b), we” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner responds that, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, “Harkins teaches that its invention can be used in web pages.” Pet. Reply 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶30). Although Petitioner’s citation is off by one paragraph, Petitioner’s response about what Harkins teaches is correct. See Ex. 1004 ¶29 (“The present invention may be implemented for provision of virtually any type of advertising (e.g., print, radio, television, Internet, billboard, etc.) via any type of advertising medium (e.g., newspaper, magazine, radio broadcast, Web pages, billboards, etc.) without departing from the scope of the present invention.”). We find that Harkins is from the same field based on its express statement that it is applicable to “virtually any type of advertising” and “any type of advertising medium,” including “Web pages.” Ex. 1004 ¶29. Further, even if this were insufficient to place Harkins in the same field as the ’329 patent, we find that Harkins is reasonably pertinent to the particular problems with which the ’329 patent inventors were involved. In sum, we find that Harkins is analogous art to the ’329 patent.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

    “Paper 60 (“PO Mot. To Exclude”), 9–10.6 Patent Owner is correct in this regard and, thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude with respect to the testimony in the second Smedley Declaration and the Madansky Declaration opining that Badros teaches the determination limitation. Paper 60, 9–12. Petitioner, in its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, argues that Patent Owner’s arguments about the “viewability test” were “surprising.” Paper 62, 8. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. The “viewability test” is a claim limitation. Petitioner should have anticipated that Patent Owner would argue that limitation. See In re Gardner, 449 F. App’x 914, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court has held that when evaluating claims for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, all the limitations of the claims must be considered and given weight.” (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Univ. of Strathclyde v. 6 Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude seeks to exclude, in part or in whole, Exhibits 1020–1022, 1025–1030, and 1034–1040, which were submitted with Petitioner’s Reply, of which Exhibits 1026 and 1027 are the declaration by Dr. Madansky and the second declaration by Dr. Smedley, respectively. Mot. To Exclude. The Motion to Exclude also seeks to exclude “Exhibits” 1017 and 1018, which are not filed or of record in this case but which are referenced in the Reply. Id. For example, Exhibit 1017 is the Krassner publication, which Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to add to the record as supplemental information. See Paper 21, 3 n.1 (expunging the Krassner publication and stating that it “need not -- and indeed may not -- be re-filed under a new exhibit number”). Apart from the portions of Dr. Smedley’s second declaration and Dr. Madansky’s declaration opining that Badros teaches the “determination” limitation, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot. obviousness determination generally requires a finding that “all claimed limitations are disclosed in the prior art’.” (citing PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner argues that “[v]iewability tests were well known for well over a decade prior to the ’329 patent’s priority date.” Reply 9. If that were the case, then Petitioner should have made its argument in the Petition. Section 312(a) of Title 35 is titled “Requirements of Petition,” and it specifies that a petition must identify, among other things, “the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim, including . . . (B) affidavits or declarations of supporting evidence and opinions, if the petitioner relies on expert opinions.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon; and . . . the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge.”). Thus, “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Board’s Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 73 (Nov. 21, 2019).7 Dr. Smedley’s testimony in his second declaration, that “Badros discloses Patent Owner’s ‘viewability test’” (Ex. 1027 ¶11), is clearly evidence to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. The same is true of Dr. Madansky’s testimony that she agrees with Dr. Smedley in this regard. Ex. 1026 ¶4.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,443,329 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,443,329
• Unified Patents, LLC v. VL Collective IP LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 18, 2023 · IPR2022-01086 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, and 15 are unpatentable over Sonohara; claims 20 and 21 were not shown unpatentable because Sonohara’s assignment rule is based on timestamps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Goodrich, proposes what Patent Owner characterizes as “a somewhat different level,” namely “an individual with at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related area and two years of experience developing software tools and/or computer systems for use in the area of audio or video creation, encoding, and/or distribution.” PO Resp. 13; Ex. 2007 ¶ 50. Although we agree that the respective articulations are “somewhat different,” they are generally similar, and our Decision does not depend on nuanced distinctions regarding the level of ordinary skill. Indeed, Dr. Goodrich describes his proposed articulation as “approximate,” such that “more work experience could compensate for less education or more education could compensate for less work experience.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 50. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Dr. Freedman’s testimony, we adopt it for this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We nevertheless note that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion that claims 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, and 15 (but not claims 20 and 21) have been shown to be unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence were we to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal. See PO Resp. 13 (“this Response establishes that Petitioner’s arguments fail even under its preferred definition of the level of ordinary skill”).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached

    “We need not resolve this dispute because we reach the same ultimate conclusion that Petitioner shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, and 15 are unpatentable, but not that claims 20 and 21 are unpatentable, even if we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction that the preambles are limiting and the first and second data files must be different. See Reply 15 (Petitioner asserting that “there is no need to construe the preambles as the prior art meets them even if construed”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). For purposes of this Decision, we accordingly treat the preambles of independent claims 1 and 9 as limiting, and with the recited “first data file” and “second data file” as distinct data files.4” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the emphasized sentence defines the term “content-related.” See PO Resp. 15–16 (Patent Owner arguing that “[t]here are thus three strong indications of lexicography: (1) ‘content-related’ is set off by quotation marks; (2) the patentee used the word ‘is’ to describe the term ‘content-related’; and (3) the patentee states what ‘content-related’ is ‘understood to mean.’” Nor does Petitioner disagree that the sentence is definitional. See Tr. 8:15–16 (referring to the “term content-related as it’s defined in the specification”). Indeed, in the Starz litigation, the district court also treated the sentence as definitional, a fact that we find significant as a matter of comity. See Ex. 1018, 111:24–112:1 (district court judge stating at Markman hearing, “I’m going to adopt . . . the express definition provided in the specification”). But like the district court, we discern insufficient reason to adopt the additional gloss that Patent Owner seeks to apply to the definition of “content-related.” That is, Patent Owner proposes that we additionally construe the phrase “syntactical meaning” within the definitional statement to arrive at Patent Owner’s proposed construction. PO Resp. 16–20. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he specification makes clear, through its use of consistent and repeated examples, that ‘syntactical meaning’ requires a specific relationship between the data segments within a data file: succeeding data segments within a data file must be ordered so as to present the content in its intended sequence when rendered.” Id. at 17 (citing VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Alloc, Inc. v. ITC, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368–71 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Patent Owner adds that the claims, the context provided by the problems solved by the ’794 patent, and the cross-examination testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Freedman, all support this additional aspect of Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Id. at 18–20. Relying on additional direct testimony by Dr. Freedman, Petitioner counters this position as “improperly import[ing] limitations from the specification that are not required by the claims” and “render[ing] other portions of claim 1 superfluous.” Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 22); see Tr. 10:18–20 (Petitioner explaining at oral hearing that “the syntax information is simply just identification information which is used to find out what the order of the files is. But the identification information does not by itself indicate the order. It’s just an identifier.”). We agree with Petitioner that it would be imprudent to adopt Patent Owner’s additional gloss because, “[w]hile claims must be construed in light of the specification, . . . limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims, . . . for ‘[i]t is the claims that measure the invention.’” Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (other citations omitted). It is apparent that the Applicant for the ’794 patent understood how to define terminology recited in the claims, but chose to limit its definition of “content-related” in terms of the broader phrase “syntactical meaning” rather than through narrower specific reference to presentation order. In addition, claims 1 and 9 already specify “sequentially outputting the first and second data segments according to their chronological sequence,” which supports Petitioner’s observation that requiring an additional sequential order to “content-related . . . data segments” renders other portions of claim 1 superfluous. See Reply 3. We accordingly adopt the definitional construction provided by the” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “As a basic principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.” Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed Cir. 2003) (citing Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added). As such, a statement during prosecution qualifies as a disavowal of claim scope only if it is “so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness” and “so unmistakable as to be unambiguous evidence of disclaimer.” Id. at 1325 (citations omitted). “Consequently, for prosecution disclaimer to attach, [Federal Circuit] precedent requires that the alleged disavowing actions or statements made during prosecution be both clear and unmistakable.” Id. at 1325–26. “The party seeking to invoke prosecution history disclaimer bears the burden of proving the existence of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that would have been evident to one skilled in the art.” Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire Pharms., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2016). And “[s]tatements by the patent owner are not considered in a vacuum; rather, the skilled artisan would look at the record as a whole in assessing claim scope.” Galderma Lab’s v. Amneal Pharma, 806 F. App’x 1007, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The prosecution history must be examined as a whole in determining whether estoppel applies.”)). We have reviewed the prosecution history, which we summarize supra § I.A.3., and we have particularly reviewed those portions highlighted by Patent Owner. See PO Resp. 32–40. We reach the same conclusion as the district court in the Starz litigation that the standard for attachment of prosecution disclaimer is not met. See Ex. 1018, 109:15–22 (district court stating at Markman hearing, “I’ve also carefully reviewed the portions of the prosecution history relied on by VideoLabs, including the patentee’s arguments regarding the Shin and Rosenau references, and I’m up [sic: not6] persuaded there was a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of all assignment rules that perform assignments by using exact timing information”). slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,605,794 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,605,794
• Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2022-00972 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable because Speight anticipates them; the Board found Peisa anticipation and Peisa–Heo obviousness unproven for the challenged claims in those grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as three years of experience in wireless communication technology, or a master’s degree in electrical engineering, or other equivalent degree,” and that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47–49). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s contention or propose a level of skill. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. On the complete record, we adopt this level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “agreement that this claim term should be read as reciting two mutually-exclusive alternatives with respect to the “third parameter.” Dec. 11. The parties do not challenge this construction in the Patent Owner Response, Reply, or Sur-reply. On the complete record, we construe “wherein resources are allocated for data of each channel having a second parameter above zero prior to another channel’s data for transmission having a third parameter less than or equal to zero” as reciting two mutually-exclusive alternatives with respect to the “third parameter.”” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition is required to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Petitioner argued in the Petition that “as properly construed, the claimed ‘first parameter,’ ‘second parameter,’ ‘third parameter,’ and ‘fourth parameter’ are four different parameters.” Pet. 17–18. In the Institution Decision, Petitioner prevailed on that point and “we agree[d] with Petitioner that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels.” Dec. 14. Patent Owner “relie[d] on the Board’s construction ‘that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels,’” and proposed distinct parameters in the Specification that it alleges are examples of second and third parameters, albeit not the same two parameters proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 9, 29. Petitioner now proposes new constructions for the second and third parameters that would limit those parameters to the two examples it advanced in the Petition and improperly supports these new constructions with new expert testimony and an exhibit from the prosecution of a later patent. Reply 20–25; Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 20–29; Ex. 1038. See also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”)10 73 (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”). As Patent Owner observes (Sur-reply 10 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 21), it has no opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence contesting the new constructions. See TPG 73–74 (Nov. 2019) (“The sur-reply may not be accompanied by new evidence other than deposition transcripts of the crossexamination of any reply witness. Sur-replies should only respond to arguments made in reply briefs, comment on reply declaration testimony, or point to cross-examination testimony.”). We agree with Patent Owner that it would be unfair to consider Petitioner’s new construction. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”). Thus, Petitioner has forfeited its new claim construction arguments and they will not be considered. See TPG 74 (“While replies and sur-replies can help crystalize issues for decision, a reply or sur-reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered.”). Moreover, these arguments would be unpersuasive even if considered. Petitioner has, at most, cited description in the Specification to show that its identified second and third parameters are examples corresponding to the recited second and third parameters. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 84–95. This description does not define the second and third parameters nor purport to exclude from the claims any parameter that would otherwise meet the language of the claims. The prosecution history to which Petitioner cites, that of a child application, took place after the prosecution of the ’466 patent and thus, does not constitute a definition or disclaimer of subject matter for claims of the ’466 patent. In any case, the brief argument in the cited response to office action, that “[i]n the algorithm, the first value is provided by the wireless network for each of a plurality of buffers where the buffer having the second value above a threshold transmits data first,” does not define the second and third parameters, disavow any values from those parameters, or even discuss the third parameter. Ex. 1038, 12. Petitioner’s extrinsic evidence, Dr. Akl’s testimony, does little more than repeat the arguments in the Reply and, thus, is of little value. Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 20–29. In sum, we maintain our construction that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels. Under this construction, RAAUq” and RAAUq’, respectively, could potentially be second and third parameters, as could RAAUq’ and RAAUq”, respectively, as long as they satisfy the rest of the pertinent language of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “production, we still would find that a skilled artisan would not have been able to ascertain from the disclosure in the ’421 application that RAAUq’ could take values less than zero. Instead, even if we were to credit Dr. Lomp’s testimony, to conclude that RAAUq’ can take negative values, a skilled artisan would need to program computer software to simulate the ’421 application’s algorithm and correctly choose starting parameters and other context variables without guidance from the description in the ’421 application. This case is similar to that in New Railhead, where the written description was insufficient because “one of ordinary skill in the art must first make the patented invention before he can ascertain the claimed features of that invention.” 298 F.3d at 1295. This case also is similar to Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, in which an application’s written description was insufficient because assumptions and starting variables were not knowable from the disclosure in the application. 849 F.3d at 1058. Thus, even if we were to conclude that Patent Owner has met its burden of production, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the ’421 application does not provide written description support for Alternative A. In sum, we conclude that the ’421 application does not provide written description support for the challenged claims and that, therefore, Speight is prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 9,681,466 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,681,466
• Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. / Beijing Boe Display Technology Co. et al. v. Element Capital Commercial Company Pte. LtdInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00696 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claim 1 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any asserted Inukai-based ground rendered it unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) . The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes that no formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding. Pet. 18. Patent Owner agrees. Prelim. Resp. 4. We determine that it is not necessary to construe any claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Both parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, or a related field.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27); Prelim. Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 22–23). The parties, however, disagree about the work experience one of ordinary skill would have had. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill would have had “at 1 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. least two years of relevant work experience in the field of integrated circuit design and manufacturing.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). Patent Owner contends that one of ordinary skill would have had “at least two years of relevant work experience in the field of display device technology.” Prelim. Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 21–23). Both parties agree that “[a]dditional education can remedy lack of work experience and vice versa.” Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 5. We note that the ’760 patent and challenged claim concern both display device technology and integrated circuit design for display devices. The ’760 patent and challenged claim do not appear to concern integrated circuit manufacturing processes. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, or a related field and at least two years of relevant work experience in the field of integrated circuit design for display devices. However our decision in this proceeding would not change if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “sufficiently show that Inukai 576 discloses a wiring portion that “crosses” a control line. As noted above, Petitioner acknowledges that the right protrusion’s “full outline is not explicitly shown,” but contends that one of ordinary skill “would have understood or found obvious that the protrusion would have been the same length as the protrusion on the right, due to the ‘endcap rule.’” Pet. 51. However, based on the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to provide sufficient support that the “endcap rule” is universally applied. In this regard, we find reasonable Dr. Silzars’s testimony that the “endcap rule” is, “at best, a design generalization which may be used in some applications for semiconductor manufacturing, heavily dependent on what materials are used, what the purpose of the semiconductor [is] and especially the manufacturing process.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 60. Petitioner relies on the Borodovsky patent, but Borodovsky merely describes the general concept that an endcap of a transistor gate may extend some minimum distance beyond an active region so as to ensure that any rounding of the endcap does not occur over the active region. Ex. 1010, 4:21–33; Ex. 2001 ¶ 63; Pet. 52–53. Borodovsky, however, does not suggest how the rule would have been applied to Inukai 576. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 63. Petitioner also does not point to anything in Borodovsky that states that the “endcap rule” requires gate electrodes of the same size or length. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. Borodovsky’s design rule merely requires that the endcap extends at least a minimum length, not an exact length, beyond the active region, and states that “other size up amounts may be used.” Ex. 1010, 9:42–46; Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. Thus, assuming Inukai 576’s protrusions are of different length, as pictured, Petitioner’s evidence does not show persuasively that the shorter protrusion would violate the “endcap rule” merely because it is shorter than the other protrusion. We note that Dr. Liu testifies that one of ordinary skill would “have known that in order to maintain a consistent current voltage characteristic for the double-gate transistors, the two channel portions of the double-gate structure would be made as uniformly identical as possible.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 114. Dr. Liu, however, does not provide any evidence or citation for this statement. Id. Dr. Liu also states that “[t]he endcap rule applies to all gates fabricated in the transistor,” so one of ordinary skill “would have understood that the two gates over transistor 107 have equal length,” and thus “the two protrusions would extend equal distance beyond the semiconductor layer.” Id. Again, however, Dr. Liu does not explain why the “endcap rule” would require or suggest this outcome, particularly because the description of the “endcap rule” merely requires that gates have a certain minimum length beyond the semiconductor layer they intersect, not that the gates be of equal length. Id.” slip op. at 35

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,525,760
• Netflix, Inc. v. Robocast, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 11, 2023 · IPR2023-00081 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Netflix had not shown a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 37, or 38 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the ’451 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We do not see a substantial difference between the parties’ proposals. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, our Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 10

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “we consider whether that construction was intended to encompass varying durations during the creating step or the displaying step. In its opinion, the Microsoft court observed that the defendants in that case argued that “before created,” and that “the ‘duration information’ is a parameter that the user can then interact with in order to vary the display of each resource.” Ex. 1014, 22. Patent Owner, the court continued, argued that “all that is required is for the user to maintain control over the actual presentation of the resource during the ‘displaying’ step, and that no duration information need be provided during the ‘creating a show structure of nodes’ step.” Id. at 22–23. The Microsoft court “agree[d] with [Patent Owner] that the user should be able to vary the duration of the content during show structure playback. This is the ‘interactive’ component of the claim.” Id. at 23; see also Prelim. Resp. 29 (arguing that this reasoning supports Patent Owner’s position that “the claim language expressly requires that the end user be able to ‘vary said duration’ for how long resource content currently ‘is being displayed’ to the user in ‘accordance with said show structure’ to which the resource belongs”). Here, the Microsoft court expressly states that the duration is varied during show structure playback, which is a clear reference to claim 1’s step of “displaying a content corresponding to each of said resources automatically in accordance with said show structure.” The Microsoft court “also finds that some duration information must be provided when the show structure of nodes is created,” that “‘parameter’ is a helpful concept for construction,” and that “the ‘duration information’ may be understood to be synonymous with a ‘parameter,’ as that timing information is the variable that will specify how long a particular content will be displayed.” Ex. 1014, 23. Thus, the Microsoft court construed claim 1 to require providing a variable duration parameter in the creating” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther

    “As noted above, the Microsoft court construed “interactively variable duration information” to mean “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1014, 22. The construction itself suggests that the duration information is varied during display, because it is in the context of resources being displayed sequentially and “the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” As to Escobar, Petitioner contends that “[w]hen playing decision lists/timelines in the authoring tool using Button 174 (invoking subroutine E), the user is the viewer of the content.” Pet. 49 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:40–45). Thus, Petitioner appears to contend that, during the process of creating a show structure, the creator is a viewer if the creator can view the edited content corresponding to a node as the show structure is being created. Here, Petitioner would satisfy the “viewer” aspect of the Microsoft court’s construction by pointing to a creator viewing a piece of the show structure during the creating step, although Escobar does not teach that the creator can vary the duration of content while viewing it or that durations can be varied while a show structure (as opposed to a node being created) is being displayed in the displaying step, as discussed in more detail below.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,155,451
• Sercomm Corp. v. Atlas Global Technologies, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Apr 12, 2023 · IPR2022-01519 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–19 because Petitioner did not show Chun was prior art, defeating both proposed obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner’s burden includes demonstrating that the evidence on which it relies constitutes prior art to the subject patent” slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “We find the above-noted arguments persuasive. They account for what is actually set forth in the Korean provisionals, are supported by the testimony of Dr. Psounis, and are unaddressed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and either a master’s degree in one of these fields of study or a minimum of two years of experience working in the wireless communications industry. An individual with an advanced degree in a relevant field would require less experience in the design of wireless communication systems and methods.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party offers any specific construction for any claim term. See Pet. 7; Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we have given all claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning and determine that it is not necessary to make that meaning explicit for any term.” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,912,513
• Sercomm Corporation v. Atlas Global Technologies, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2023 · IPR2022-01520 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Sercomm did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–9 and 11–19 unpatentable under any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition, Preliminary Response, and related briefing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of challenged claims 1–9 and 11–19 of the ’919 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, based on the record before us, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’919 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although slight differences exist in the formulation of such skill level between the parties, we discern no meaningful differences because none of those differences would affect the outcome of our analysis. Considering the subject matter of the ’919 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and parties’ proposed definitions of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill cumulatively set forth above by the parties, which is consistent with testimony of both parties’ experts (Ex. 1003 ¶ 41; Ex. 2003 ¶ 48).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “‘number of the one or more station information fields in the NDPA’ found earlier in the claims by explaining that this number is the number of station information fields in the NDPA, rather than, for example, the number of a particular station information field.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Patent Owner argues “Petitioner’s construction simply removes the term ‘cardinality’ from this claim element,” and “introduces ambiguity into the claims by suggesting that the number could be either the number of station information fields or the number (or index) of the station information field directed to a station,” which is the very ambiguity “the patentee sought to avoid” during prosecution.” Id. at 20–22; see id. at 21–27. We agree with Patent Owner and find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 159 (Examiner stating, “The applicant proposed amending the claim to further define the process of determining a number and further defining the number as a cardinality wherein the cardinality is a number of elements in a set or group.” (emphasis added)).6” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner and find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive. In particular, we find Petitioner does not show sufficiently, let alone with particularity, how or why 802.11ac allegedly discloses (explicitly or inherently) the combined features of “determining” that the number of elements in the set of STA Info fields “is one,” and “in response to” that determination, transmitting first CSI feedback in response to receiving the NDP. Instead, as noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 32), Petitioner merely contends that, because 802.11ac’s VHT SU beamforming can be performed with a single station, 802.11ac allegedly discloses sending feedback in response to determining that the number of the one or more STA Info fields in the NDPA is one. We find Petitioner’s reasoning here unpersuasive, and agree with Patent Owner and its expert that Petitioner does not explain, sufficiently and with particularity, how any disclosure in 802.11ac describes channel sounding feedback being sent or received in response to determining the number of STA Info fields. See Prelim. Resp. 31–33; Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 104–109; see also Prelim. Resp. 28–31. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that the cited evidence adequately supports Petitioner’s contention that 802.11ac discloses limitation 1.D, namely “in response to determining that the number of the one or more station information fields in the NDPA is one, transmitting first Channel State Information (CSI) feedback in response to receiving the NDP,” as recited in independent claim 1.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,020,919
• Corning Optical Communications LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2022 · IPR2021-00762 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–12 not unpatentable because Petitioner did not show that FlexWave Prism Manual was publicly accessible before the critical date.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Our determination regards obviousness to an ordinarily skilled person rather than “to the judge, or to a layman, or to those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). We therefore remove the open-ended term “a minimum of” from Petitioner’s proposal, and adopt for this decision the following definition: “a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had: (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering; and (2) 3–4 years of industry experience in wireless communications networks and engineering. However, an individual with an advanced degree in electrical engineering would require less industry experience (e.g., 1–2 years).” This level of skill comports with the teachings of the ’508 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). No claim terms require construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “c) Conclusion After considering this record evidence, Petitioner has not shown that one of ordinary skill would have performed the searches Mr. Stravitz performed on the EAS database. Mr. Stravitz’s searches appear to have been performed at the direction of counsel to discover whether and how FlexWave Prism Manual could be retrieved from the EAS database by someone who knew about FlexWave Prism Manual, without consideration of whether one of ordinary skill would have performed the searches absent a search directed towards FlexWave Prism Manual or would have known about the EAS database. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that one interested in and ordinarily skilled in the art relating to the ’508 patent would have found FlexWave Prism Manual using the EAS database.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For these reasons, our determination is that FlexWave Prism Manual has not been shown to be publicly available. E. Conclusion For the reasons given above, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that FlexWave Prism Manual was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons of ordinary skill in the art, exercising reasonable diligence, could have located it. All instituted grounds of unpatentability rely on FlexWave Prism Manual. Pet. 23–77; see Dec. on Inst. 17–29. Therefore, Petitioner fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the instituted grounds.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 9,826,508 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,826,508

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.