• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Takagi, Cornette, Suehiro, GMW14400, Laurent, and Vaissiere.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer The only independent claim at issue, claim 1, recites a “Superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:6. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’227 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the extrinsic sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions). Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’227 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. Claim 1 indicates that the intermetallic layer has a “mean composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:1–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry—consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1001, 2:47–50. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’227 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Rabbe’s testimony. Dr. Rabbe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’227 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:60–64 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating … which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076 ¶ 166; Ex ¶ 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s construction of “intermetallic” for this proceeding does not fully account for the ’227 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently mean compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Because IHS was a company that created an online database with the purpose of providing (selling) standards including General Motors standards to the public, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to look to this database and would have been able to find GMW14400. Patent Owner presents no evidence to the contrary. Because a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner, we determine Petitioner establishes GMW14400 is qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,326,227 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,326,227
• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–16). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer All independent claims at issue, claims 1, 21, and 24, recite a “superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:11, 16:60, 17:21. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’602 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions) Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’602 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. The claims indicate that the intermetallic layer has a “mean iron composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:6–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that the iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry— consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Id. at 2:50–54. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’602 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Raabe’s testimony. Dr. Raabe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’602 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:57–61 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating . . . which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076, 166; Ex. 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s definition of “intermetallic” does not fully account for the ’602 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently defined mean iron compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28– 42; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). In particular, Petitioner argues that Takagi discloses a pre-coating thickness of 10–20 µm but does not explicitly disclose a post hot-stamping coating thickness corresponding to the pre-coating thickness. Pet. 11. Cornette teaches that the hot-stamping thickness causes coating expansion from 25 µm to about 40 µm, an increase of 60%. Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner and Dr. Miles reason that, when hot stamping Takagi’s product, the thickness would be 32 µm. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32); see also Pet. Reply 20–21. Thus, Patent Owner argues that Cornette evidences Takagi’s finally coating thickness without requiring modification of Takagi. Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach that post hot- stamping thickness could be varied and optimized as a result effective variable. Id. at 12–13; see also Pet. Reply 17–18. Cornette teaches, for example, that “[t]he average [pre-coating] layer thickness showing the best compromise between corrosion protection and weldability is 25 µm” and links this pre-coating thickness to a final thickness of “about 40 µm at the steel surface.” Ex. 1014, 9. Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to fill in other details of Takagi including, for example, selecting USIBOR 1500 steel, based on the teachings of Cornette. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that there is no reason to combine Takagi with the teachings of Cornette. PO Resp. 26. Patent Owner makes seven related arguments. Patent Owner first argues that the Petitioner’s position is speculative and lacks basis. Id. at 26–27. We disagree. Cornette evidences a final coating thickness for Takagi, and the references also suggest that final coating thickness is result effective. Second, Patent Owner argues that there would have been no incentive to seek a motivation to seek a thicker coating post-hot stamping. Id. at 28– 35. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s position that Takagi, by itself, would have reached a thicker coating after stamping as evidenced by Cornette. Pet. 11–12. Petitioner takes the position, with evidence, that practice of Takagi alone would reach the recited thickness. No motivation to modify Takagi is required under this position.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,961,602 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,961,602
• Syngenta Crop Protection AG v. Inflexion Point Technologies, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2025 · PGR2025-00045 · APJ Debra L Dennett · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). The burden is on Petitioner to show that the challenged patent is eligible for postgrant review. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Yeda Research & Dev. Co., PGR2016- 00010, Paper 9 at 10 (PTAB Aug. 15, 2016) (holding that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with a petitioner to demonstrate that the challenged patent is eligible for post-grant review). Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the cited evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that it is more likely than not that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable. We thus determine to not institute a post-grant review of the ’027 patent based on the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “a Bachelor of Science degree in Agricultural or Mechanical Engineering with 2–4 years of practical, applied experience in the field of agricultural machinery, including systems integration and fluid handling and sprayer control systems, or equivalent experience. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2001, ¶ 59). Patent Owner states that the differences in the asserted levels of ordinary skill should not change the outcome of the Petition. Id. For the purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition, which appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record and the ’027 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Our analysis, however, would not change were we to adopt Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that claim construction is necessary for the “seed-applied substance” term because Petitioner allegedly ignores the teaching of the specification in evaluating the term. Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner points to the specification, which defines a “seed-applied substance” as “includ[ing] any composition applied to seeds prior to the seeds being planted (e.g., when the seed comes in contact with the soil in a field).” Id. at 13 (quoting Ex. 1001, 7:45-48). Patent Owner contends that the term means “a substance that is applied directly to the seed before the seed comes into contact with the soil in a field.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001, ¶ 55). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner erroneously uses a definition that “allows the ‘seedapplied substance’ to be applied to the seed (and soil) as the seed lay planted in the soil.’” Id. For the purpose of addressing Petitioner’s grounds, we use the definition of “seed-applied substance” provided in the ’027 patent, i.e., “any composition applied to seeds prior to the seeds being planted (e.g., when the seed comes in contact with the soil in a field).” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history.”).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “3. Analysis Our analysis of whether Wagers discloses the limitation “individually applying the desired application amount of the selected type of the seed-applied substance to each seed as it is being delivered to the soil” is dispositive of Petitioner’s challenge to claim 1 as anticipated.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,102,027
• Zhuhai Cosmx Battery Co., Ltd. v. Ninge Amperex Technology LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00385 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–10 were anticipated by Nishikawa or obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner contends that A person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would typically hold an advanced degree in chemistry, material science, and/or a related discipline, and have at least two years of experience with designing and/or fabricating battery separators or have an equivalent level of education, training, and experience. Pet. 5. Patent Owner “adopts the definition proposed by Petitioner” for the purposes of the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 22. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition because it is consistent with the specification. We note that neither party indicated that the result would change under any different definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Absolute plastic deformation rate” and “relative plastic deformation rate” are the only claim terms disputed in this proceeding, and are clearly defined in the Specification and in claim 1. See Spec. 4:22–27, 4:47–54; 25:31–37. Because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s arguments are unconvincing. Petitioner points to nothing in Nishikawa that allows a POSITA to determine L2 (defined as “a length of 4 Tensile strength is measured as force per units area, such as MPa or psi. One MPa equals one N/mm2. Nishikawa Table 1 discloses tensile strength in N/cm. Ex. 1004 Table 1. Petitioner makes calculations to convert the reported N/cm into N/m2 and then to GPa, but provides no explanation for why tensile strength is reported in N/cm or how it was measured. See Pet. 31. the porous substrate after the porous substrate is stretched to breakage and docked along the fracture caused by the breakage and flattened”) or L2 – L0. See generally Pet., Ex. 1004. Petitioner and its expert, Dr. Pecht, fail to adequately explain why tensile strength divided by Young’s modulus is “a proxy for L1 – L2” or why such a proxy is sufficient to disclose the limitation as stated. Instead, we are required to rely on “approximations” and “estimates” with insufficient explanation of why such they are appropriate or adequate. See Pet. 26, 30, 32; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97, 105–108, 111.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,964,927
• Lam Research Corp. v. Inpria Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00033 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’888 Publication; Patent Owner’s motion to add substitute claims 13–23 is granted.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “priority issue are based on the cited disclosures of the ’867 application discussed above. Ex. 2009 ¶ 29. For the reasons discussed above, we do not view the cited disclosures as sufficiently supporting Dr. Banerjee’s conclusion that the ’867 application provides support for claim 1’s average thickness range (id.) and, therefore, give this testimony little weight. Stated somewhat differently, Dr. Banerjee’s advances an opinion (really a legal one) that is not supported by the facts and not in line with the caselaw discussed in this section (such as RAI).” slip op. at 26

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “priority issue are based on the cited disclosures of the ’867 application discussed above. Ex. 2009 ¶ 29. For the reasons discussed above, we do not view the cited disclosures as sufficiently supporting Dr. Banerjee’s conclusion that the ’867 application provides support for claim 1’s average thickness range (id.) and, therefore, give this testimony little weight. Stated somewhat differently, Dr. Banerjee’s advances an opinion (really a legal one) that is not supported by the facts and not in line with the caselaw discussed in this section (such as RAI).” slip op. at 26

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “d) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a” slip op. at 30

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “For these reasons, Patent Owner has met its burden to show by a” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 9,823,564 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 9,823,564
• Lam Research Corp. v. Inpria Corp.Instituted
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00033 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the ’888 Publication anticipates the claims.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). We may institute review, however, only upon a determination that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Applying that standard, for reasons set forth below, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “The test for written description support “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Specification must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventors invented what is claimed, and “reasonably” convey to those skilled in the art that the inventors “had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. The “level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id.” slip op. at 9

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “The test for written description support “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Specification must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventors invented what is claimed, and “reasonably” convey to those skilled in the art that the inventors “had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. The “level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id.” slip op. at 9

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

    “Even if we accept that the Examiner previously considered the effective filing date of claims 1–12, we determine that Petitioner identifies a material error by the Examiner. Id. We agree with Petitioner that “the Examiner never questioned the priority claim made by” the applicant during prosecution. Pet. 63. Further, the Examiner did not issue any rejection concerning whether the application that led to the ’564 patent supports the challenged claims. Id.; see id. at 63 n.20 (citing Ex. 1007, 489). Against that backdrop, we find Petitioner shows sufficiently that the Examiner materially erred by accepting the applicant’s priority date claim, as shown by our analysis above, and, as a result, materially erred by failing to appreciate the prior art status of the ’888 Publication, which Petitioner has demonstrated by a reasonable likelihood, on this record, anticipates the challenged claims. Id. at 63. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny review under Section 325(d) with respect to the ground that asserts anticipation by the ’888 Publication.10” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,823,564
• Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2023 · IPR2019-00731 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Remand

  Claim 28 is unpatentable under § 103(a) over Martin and Farley; Martin qualifies as prior art because Dr. Moran’s contribution made him a joint inventor of the relied-on disclosure.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “we do not agree with Patent Owner that evidence analogous to that in Duncan Parking is required in this case or for Petitioner to meet its burden by stating which specific aspects of the Facilitator were conceived by Dr. Moran. PO Remand 3–4. As the Federal Circuit stated, the facilitator described in Section 4.5 of the Martin reference plays a central role in the OAA disclosed in the specification of the ’560 patent. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; see Ex. 1011, 23–24 (Section 4.5); Ex. 1001, 19:14–19:62. In addition, Patent Owner admits that “large portions of the ’560 application and the Martin reference are identical or almost identical.” PO Resp. 1. We find that Petitioner and Dr. Moran have sufficiently identified the facilitator in the Martin reference as his work, and persuasively asserted that Dr. Moran’s background and experience with OAA and distributed software systems support his contribution to the conception of the facilitator in the distributed agent approach of Sections 4.1–4.5. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23–39. Dr. Moran’s testimony provides sufficient and persuasive detail to support his contribution claim to the facilitator of Section 4.5. Id.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “With respect to Dr. Moran’s contribution to the Martin reference, we find Dr. Moran’s testimony credible over that of Mr. Cheyer and Mr. Martin, because, as the Federal Circuit noted, because the latter testimony conflicts with other evidence of record. Google, 34 F.4th at 1088. Cheyer’s and Martin’s testimony that Dr. Moran’s role was administrative and non-technical with respect to the core infrastructure of OAA is belied by a separate article describing OAA that includes the facilitator and lists Dr. Moran as the lead author. Ex. 1174, 1–2, 4. Indeed, the OAA article lists Dr. Moran and Mr. Cheyer as authors but excludes Mr. Martin. Id. Although Mr. Cheyer disagrees with the article’s description of the origins of OAA and the facilitator (Ex. 2037, 78:23–79:12 (Mr. Cheyer asserting that he “would not agree in the characterization of Open Agent Architecture grew out of [earlier] works” as described in the article)), Mr. Cheyer admits patent]” (id. at 1088), “which is a continuation-in-part of the application that resulted in the ’115 patent” (id. at 1086). in his deposition that Dr. Moran was extremely technical, and probably made technical contributions to OAA (id. at 34:1–20, 64:16–20, 102:2–4). Similarly, Mr. Martin’s testimony also supports that Dr. Moran “may have made contributions to the technological development of either interfaces for use with OAA, agents used with OAA, or systems based on OAA.” Ex. 2038, 116:2–8, 117:7–119:10. When viewed in light of Dr. Moran’s status as a joint inventor on the closely related ’931 patent (Ex. 2002, code (75)) and as a lead author of the substantive paper that discusses OAA’s early development, we find Mr. Martin’s and Mr. Cheyer’s admissions—that Dr. Moran made technical contributions to OAA—undermine their testimony that Dr. Moran’s inclusion as an author on the Martin reference was a matter of administrative respect and not a result of a technical contribution. See PO Remand 11; PO Resp. 50–51. Indeed, we find Cheyer and Martin’s general description of Dr. Moran—as an administrator without technical contributions to the Martin reference—is not supported by the full record, which instead supports Dr. Moran’s contributions to technical work that involves the Martin reference, such as contemporary papers and the ’931 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1174, 2002. In sum, the testimony and contemporary evidence supports Dr. Moran’s testimony that his conception and contribution to the Martin reference, the facilitator, was technical and not merely administrative. Ex. 1007 ¶ 39.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention. Rather, we find that the Petition persuasively explains how Martin discloses a facilitator agent arranged to coordinate cooperative task completion within a distributed computing environment having autonomous service-providing electronic agents. Pet. 39; Ex. 1002 ¶ 100. Further, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that Farley discloses how agent functionality can be distributed across multiple processes. Pet. 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 101–102. Finally, Petitioner also provides persuasive reasons as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Martin and Farley, including reasons expressly provided by Farley. Pet. 40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103–104.” slip op. at 28

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE In our prior Final Written Decision, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) portions of Exhibit 1153; (2) Exhibits 1170, 1171, and 1172; (3) Exhibit 1174; and (4) portions of Exhibits 2037 and 2038; and we dismissed as moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) Exhibits 1158 and 1159 and (2) Exhibits 1175, 1176, and 1181. Final Dec. 26–30. We maintain these determinations on remand.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 7,069,560 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,069,560
• Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2023 · IPR2019-00728 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claim 63 unpatentable under § 103(a) over Martin and Kohn, finding Martin was prior art because Moran was a joint inventor.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner relies upon is sufficient to establish the degree to which the reliedon portions of the Martin reference were conceived by Dr. Moran, and the significance of those contributions to the overall anticipating disclosure of the Martin reference. See Google, 34 F.4th at 1086–88; Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contentions, Petitioner is not merely relying on Dr. Moran’s authorship to establish inventorship. PO Remand 8 (citing In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). Instead, Dr. Moran’s testimony establishes how his background led to his contributions to the multiple facilitator architectures disclosed in Martin and in the ’115 patent specification. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23– 34 (OAA project), 35–39 (OAA paper). In view of Dr. Moran’s testimony, we do not agree with Patent Owner that evidence analogous to that in Duncan Parking is required in this case or for Petitioner to meet its burden by stating which specific aspects of the Facilitator were conceived by Dr. Moran. PO Remand 3–4. As the Federal Circuit stated, the facilitator described in Section 4.5 of the Martin reference plays a central role in the OAA disclosed in the specification of the ’115 patent. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; see Ex. 1011, 23–24 (Section 4.5); Ex. 1001, 18:56–19:36. In addition, Patent Owner admits that “large portions of the ’115 application and the Martin reference are identical or almost identical.” PO Resp. 1. We find that Petitioner and Dr. Moran have sufficiently identified the facilitator in the Martin reference as his work, and persuasively asserted that Dr. Moran’s background and experience with OAA and distributed software systems support his contribution to the conception of the facilitator in the distributed agent approach of Sections 4.1–4.5. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23–39. Dr. Moran’s testimony provides sufficient and persuasive detail to support his contribution claim to the facilitator of Section 4.5. Id. Based on the record, the Federal Circuit’s remand squarely asks whether Dr. Moran’s stated contributions to the conception of the facilitator should be credited over Cheyer and Martin’s conflicting testimony regarding his lack of technical contribution. Google, 34 F.4th at 1088 (stating that “[t]he testimony of Dr. Moran, if credited, might well establish that he was a co-inventor of the particular portions of the Martin reference relied on by Google in, and relevant to, the challenge to particular claims”). When Dr. Moran’s testimony is viewed in combination with the supporting evidence,7 we find that incorporation of the facilitator in general, which is also found in the specification and claims, persuasively supports Dr. Moran’s testimony regarding his inventive contribution to the Martin reference. Specifically, we find Dr. Moran’s testimony persuasively supported and credible over the conflicting testimony and evidence offered by Mr. Cheyer and Mr. Martin. See Pet. Reply 12–13; Ex. 2038, 116:2–8, 117:7–119:10 (Cheyer admission that Dr. Moran made technical contributions to OAA); Ex. 2037, 34:1–20, 64:16–20, 102:2–4.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Upon weighing the parties’ testimony and evidence, we agree with Petitioner that sufficient evidence supports the technical contributions of Dr. Moran to OAA, including admissions by Mr. Martin that Dr. Moran made such contributions (see Ex. 2038, 116:2–116:8, 117:7–119:10; see also id. at 73:3–73:15); contemporaneous papers showing Dr. Moran’s contribution to the OAA including a facilitator (see Ex. 1170; Ex. 1174, 1– 2), and the ’931 patent (Ex. 2002). See Pet. Reply 5–7, 8, 12–13; Pet. Remand 11. In particular, Dr. Moran’s testimony establishes that he contributed to Section 4.5, the facilitator that plays an essential role in the OAA, that differs from prior art agents, and that is found in the ’115 specification. We find Dr. Moran’s contributions to be significant when measured against the full anticipating Martin reference, and to render him a joint inventor of the Martin reference. Google, 34 F.4th at 1085 (quoting Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358). 5. Conclusion Based on the full record, we find that Petitioner has provided persuasive evidence by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Moran is an inventive entity to the Martin reference. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established that Martin is “by another” and is prior art under § 102(a) to the ’115 patent. We next turn to the sole remaining ground based on the Martin reference to determine the patentability of the remaining challenged claim.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “combination of Martin and Kohn. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Olsen, provides persuasive testimony and evidence that Martin teaches compound goals and a skilled artisan would have been motivated in view of Kohn to modify Martin’s facilitator agent to interpret a compound goal that includes both local and global constraints. Pet. 32–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88. Dr. Olsen’s testimony does not evince hindsight, but instead supports the finding that an ordinarily skilled artisan could use compound goals required in Martin and apply the type of constraints (global and local) disclosed in Kohn. Ex. 2024, 159:4–160:16. In addition, Dr. Olsen testified, the proposed implementation “would have been a mere combination of known components and technologies . . . , according to known methods, to produce predictable results.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 87. We do not agree that this case presents the same technical issues raised in G.B.T. Inc. v. Walletex Microelectronics Ltd., IPR2018-00326, Paper 60 at 16–17 (PTAB June 25, 2019), where the petitioner’s declarant failed to show how the combination would have achieved desired results and features from the combination of the circuits. Here, Dr. Olsen identified known compound goals in Martin to which Kohn’s local and global constraints are applicable. Pet. 32–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88. In view of the level of skill in the art and the testimony of Dr. Olsen (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88; Ex. 2024, 159:4–160:16), we find that Petitioner establishes persuasive motivation to combine the software teachings of Kohn’s constraints into the goals of Martin and how the references would have been combined by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 29

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMotion to exclude, grantedMixed

    “III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE In our prior Final Written Decision, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) portions of Exhibit 1153; (2) Exhibits 1170, 1171, and 1172; (3) Exhibit 1174; and (4) portions of Exhibits 2037 and 2038; and we dismissed as moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) Exhibits 1158 and 1159 and (2) Exhibits 1175, 1176, and 1181. Final Dec. 25–28. We maintain these determinations on remand.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,851,115 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,851,115
• Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 20, 2020 · IPR2018-01154 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over Kwak; claims 15, 17–18, and 20 were not shown anticipated by Kwak, and claim 19 was not shown obvious over Kwak and Choi 2010.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Dec. on Inst. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute this issue. PO Resp. 11. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and we find the work experience is commensurate with the level of ordinary skill in the art. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, the ’558 patent requires a degree of knowledge that is specific to mobile device architecture as well as transmission and power circuitry for radio frequency devices. See Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1201, Abstract, 1:7–9, 30–31.” slip op. at 7

  • Prior constructionTerm construed petitioner constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. “current sense amplifier” (claim 15) Petitioner offers a claim construction for “current sense amplifier” (claim 15) to mean an “amplifier that produces a voltage from a current,” which is based on the ALJ’s construction in the parallel ITC proceeding. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1223, 11–12). Petitioner argues that the ITC construction is consistent with the ’558 patent specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 35–36 (Ex. 1201, 4:64–66, 5:7–10, 5:18–20). Patent Owner argues that this term does not require construction, but does not contest Petitioner’s contention or our adoption of this construction in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 10. Based on the full record and for the reasons given by the ALJ in the ITC proceeding (Ex. 1223, 11–12), we adopt the construction of “current sense amplifier” to mean an “amplifier that produces a voltage from a current.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “As we discussed in IPR2018-01152 and IPR2018-01153, and incorporate herein (1152 Final Dec. 12–21), the broadest reasonable interpretation is what would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1257. The ’558 specification and the context of claims 6, 8, and 13 and the related language of claim 19 support that the amplifier must be able to receive both the boosted supply voltage and the first supply voltage (a selective boost) as recited in the claims. PO Resp. 35–38; Ex. 1201, 1:42–50, 5:31–49, 8:55– 62, 8:62–9:17, 9:21–36, 10:19–29, Figs. 3 and 5. In light of these findings, we do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments that the plain language of the claim 19 identifies two alternatives that need not both be present. Pet. Reply 3–4. We credit and find persuasive Patent Owner’s evidence that the ’558 specification, which provides context for the interpretation of an ordinarily skilled artisan, refers to the capability of receiving or operating on both voltages at the source (envelope amplifier). See PO Resp. 35–38.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “On the full record, Petitioner has not provided sufficient or persuasive argument and evidence that Figure 6 is merely a more detailed implementation of Figure 5 such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would envision them as a single disclosure. Figure 6 specifically discusses a summing circuit operating on input current and offset current that differs from the voltage circuit signals shown in Figure 5. PO Sur-reply 13–14. We also note that feedforward node in Figure 6 differs from that shown in Figure 5. Indeed, Kwak expressly notes the differences and advantages between Figures 4 and 5 (showing summation of voltage signals) and Figure 6, which shows voltage signals converted into current signals before summation, stating that: In CMOS design, although three voltage signals can be added and then integrated as shown in Figs. 4 and 5, the simultaneous summation and integration of the signals at the node Vc, after the conversion of the three voltage signals into current ones, is advantageous, that is, the sensed output current of the linear amplifier, the feedforward current, and the high-frequency current through the ripple filter are added together and integrated at the node with the inverted polarity of the last one Ex. 1211, 2669. Kwak’s disclosure notes differences between the voltage signals of Figures 4 and 5 and the current conversion feedforward teachings shown in Figure 6. See id. On the full record, Petitioner has failed to persuasively establish that “a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination of elements” of claim 15 based on Kwak’s disclosures. See Microsoft Corp., 878 F.3d at 1068. Petitioner’s parallel citations to Figures 5 and 6 and joint discussion of the current summing and integration of Figure 6 and the voltage summing of Figures 5 (see Pet. 42–49), do not establish that Kwak shows the elements of the claim in an embodiment as arranged in the claims. Microsoft Corp., 878 F.3d at 1068–1069. Petitioner’s arguments and testimony evidence (Ex. 1203 ¶ 96; Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 94–96)) fail to address sufficiently the differences between Kwak’s Figures 5 and 6. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Kwak anticipates independent claim 15 or dependent claims 17, 18, and 20.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,698,558 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,698,558
• Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm IncorporatedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 15, 2020 · IPR2018-01250 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5–8, and 13 are unpatentable: Needham anticipates claims 1 and 5–7, and the asserted Needham-based combinations render claims 8 and 13 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art as of the Critical Date7 (a “POSITA”) would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science or a similar technical field together with 3-5 years of educational practicum or work experience in the field of computer vision and/or image processing. Ex. 1003 ¶ 7. Citing the testimony of its declarant, Dr. John Villasenor, Patent Owner argues that the level of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with “a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, and 2-3 years of experience in image processing.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner also argues that, “[a]lthough this definition differs from that proposed by petitioner, the difference would not change the actions of this proceeding.” PO Resp. 9. 6 Petitioner submitted the declaration of Dr. Larry Davis with its Petition, but, due to Dr. Davis’s unavailability for deposition, Petitioner sought to enter a substitute declaration in the record. We held a call with the parties to discuss the issue. On the call, the parties agreed to a general framework for dealing with the situation. Paper 11. After the call, the parties met and conferred and emailed us with their proposed solution to allow Petitioner to serve and file a substitute declaration (Ex. 3001), and we authorized the parties to proceed as agreed (Paper 11). Petitioner filed Dr. Bovik’s declaration as Exhibit 1003 and moved unopposed to expunge Dr. Davis’s declaration. Paper 13. We granted Petitioner’s unopposed motion and expunged Dr. Davis’s declaration. Paper 20. 7 Dr. Bovik identifies the Critical Date as December 9, 2009, the date of filing of US Provisional Application 61/285,063, to which the ’132 patent purports to claim priority. Ex. 1003 ¶ 6. skill in the art should be adopted. Although there are slight differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties’ declarants agree that a person with a Bachelor of Science degree in a field such as computer science and professional experience in image processing would qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1003 ¶ 7; Ex. 2001 ¶ 30. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person having a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, and three years of experience in image processing. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “presumption may be rebutted when a patentee, acting as a lexicographer, sets forth an alternate definition of a term in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Furthermore, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 1. Physical Object of a Predetermined Type Petitioner proposes a construction for “physical object of a predetermined type.” Pet. 3–4. There is no dispute between the parties that the art teaches “determining whether a first portion of digital image data represents a physical object of a predetermined type,” and, therefore, we agree with Patent Owner that this term does not require express construction. See PO Resp. 7–8.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “2. Gain Patent Owner argues that “gain” is “an attribute that relates to brightening or darkening a region of an image.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 107). Petitioner does not dispute that Patent Owner’s construction is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of gain but instead argues that “gain” is not limited to brightening or darkening. Pet. Reply 1–3. Because, as explained below, the asserted prior art teaches “gain” under Patent Owner’s construction, we need not determine the full scope of the term “gain” to resolve the dispute before us. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017. Rather, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction in our analysis below. Patent Owner argues that “gain map” is “a representation of a plurality of gain values corresponding to different locations of an image.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 107). Petitioner does not dispute that Patent Owner’s construction is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of “gain map”; rather, Petitioner’s dispute as to this term centers on the broadest reasonable interpretation of “gain,” discussed above. Pet. Reply 1– 3. Because, as explained below, the asserted prior art teaches “gain map” under Patent Owner’s construction, we need not determine the full scope of the term “gain map” to resolve the dispute before us. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017. Rather, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “dynamic range correction for a face than for a building if the face has a higher weight (“considered as more important”) than a building, such that “the human faces may be corrected so that they become more visible than buildings.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 22. In a passage cited by Patent Owner in support of its claim interpretation, the ’132 patent states that “the DRC [(dynamic range correction)] unit uses a weighting factor . . . to modify the gain obtained/calculated from the lookup table, according to whether the input pixel is part of a specified type of object.” Ex. 1001, 3:19–22, cited in PO Sur-reply 4–7. Needham and the ’132 patent, therefore, both describe determining a dynamic range correction based on identifying a face in the image and finding associated weights to apply in the correction operation. Ex. 1004 ¶ 22; Ex. 1001, 3:12–27. Furthermore, Patent Owner’s statement that “weights themselves are not corrections” (PO Resp. 19) is correct insofar as the correction is dynamic range correction performed according to the weights in Needham. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 22. But this disclosure of Needham is precisely what the ’132 patent discloses in performing dynamic range correction based on gain and weight values pertaining to particular objects, and, as discussed extensively above, this is the subject matter that Patent Owner contends claim 1 encompasses. See Ex. 1001, 3:12–27; see also PO Sur-reply 4–6. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s arguments support the finding that Needham describes the subject matter of claim 1 of the ’132 patent. Patent Owner argues that “Needham does not describe the cause- effect relationship that a determined type of physical object results in the particular correction that is applied to the objects of that type in the image” and that, “[t]o be ‘matched,’ a particular correction must be applied to a (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 51). Paragraph 22 of Needham, however, expressly discloses applying dynamic range correction to human faces differently from buildings because “human faces may be considered as more important than buildings.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 22. Patent Owner also argues the following in reference to Needham: “That correction parameters are specified for each feature is insufficient to demonstrate that the correction parameters are ‘matched’ to a particular object type.” PO Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 51). Yet, in characterizing the ’132 patent, Patent Owner argues the following: “A set of gain values or specific gain table for specific image content, such as a set of gain values or specific gain table applied to all faces, is a correction that is applied to faces because they are faces, i.e., a correction that is matched to faces.” PO Sur-reply 6 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 51). We fail to see a distinction between these two disclosures. Needham discloses that automated feature-based image correction mechanism 120 identifies “the set of specified image features” and that “a specified image feature may correspond to a human face, a building, an animal, etc.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. And, as Patent Owner acknowledges in the quote above (PO Resp. 15), Needham specifies correction parameters for each feature. See also Ex. 1004 ¶ 35 (“For each detected image feature, the corresponding correction parameters are retrieved 860.”). Thus, Needham’s disclosure of specifying correction parameters for feature types falls squarely within Patent Owner’s explanation of how the ’132 patent describes matching. Patent Owner also cites testimony from Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bovik, stating that, in paragraph 22 of Needham, dynamic range correction would occur even in the absence of a face, and Patent Owner” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,447,132 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,447,132

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.