- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00532 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over Warren, Warren and Dunn, Calderon and RepRap20208, and Calderon, RepRap20208, and Dunn.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“of ordinary skill in the art would have made the proposed combination in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success. Weighing our underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence persuades us that claim 7 of the ’381 patent is unpatentable over Calderon, RepRap20208, and Dunn. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 108
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Whether a document qualifies as a printed publication is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations. Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). slip op. at 69
Patent outcomesUS 10,556,381 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,556,381 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-01570 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–19 not shown unpatentable: Wang did not anticipate claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not render claims 11–19 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent is self-explanatory and would have been recognized by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. “Petitioner submits that no special constructions are required” because “the claim terms appear understandable in the context of the disclosure provided by the specification of the ’690 Patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Patent Owner “agrees that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 10. After reviewing the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any claim term to resolve any controversy in the proceeding. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Wang by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–19 not unpatentable: Wang did not establish anticipation of claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not establish obviousness of claims 11–19.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“challenge set forth in the Petition by citing the background of the ’690 patent and Dr. Willner’s deposition testimony and characterizing the same as “admissions” of Patent Owner in Petitioner’s Reply, such “evidence” did not form the basis of Appellant’s original position set forth in the Petition.6 Petitioner’s arguments that all of the components recited in claim 11 “were known in the prior art” or that Dr. Willner admitted the same are unpersuasive at least because the Petition did not set forth this position. Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments during the oral hearing, the Petition does not present challenges based on “Applicant Admitted Prior Art.” See generally Pet.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-00582 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 14–16, and 19 are unpatentable based on anticipation by or obviousness over Pratt, and obviousness over Pratt–Ku, Ku, or Ku–Jiang.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that formal education could substitute for practical experience, and vice versa. Pet. 6, PO Resp. 18. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions identified in the ’738 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–61. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. The outcome of our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We find insufficient support in the specification or prosecution history to narrow the term “haptic effect” to only one that has not been modified or combined with another haptic effect. The ’738 patent still refers to combined or modified haptic effects as a “haptic effect.” Ex. 1001, 11:35–38 (“a haptic effect may further be modified or combined with another haptic effect” and “the haptic effect can include one or more haptic effects”). We also find no support for importing into the construction of “haptic effect” the ’738 patent’s example in which a haptic effect can be “based on the proximity signal and the touch sensor signal.” That is already an explicit claim limitation. Id. at 14:19–20 (“generate a haptic output signal based at least in part on the first [proximity] and second [touch] sensor signals”). Including that limitation as part of the construction of “haptic effect” would render the limitation superfluous. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board was correct to not include in its construction of ‘menu’ features of menus that are expressly recited in the claims . . . . Construing a claim term to include features of that term already recited in the claims would make those expressly recited features redundant.”). We also disagree with Patent Owner that the ’738 patent’s references to haptic effects modified or combined with other haptic effects are unclaimed embodiments. The ’738 patent discloses that a proximity-based haptic effect may be combined with a touch-based haptic effect, such as when “a particular haptic effect associated with a particular control on a user interface element [is] further . . . modified or combined with another haptic effect based on the proximity sensor signal,” or when “the haptic effect [to be output by the processor] . . . include[s] a haptic effect meant to confirm ‘pushing’ on a virtual button.” Ex. 1001, 11:32–40. These examples are consistent with the claim language and we find no credible evidence in the record that these embodiments are intended to be excluded from the claimed invention. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that it would be incorrect to construe the term “haptic effect” to include the extraneous limitations Patent Owner proposes. We also agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’738 patent disclosure would have understood that a combined or modified haptic effect is still a haptic effect.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary. Ku discloses summing two overlapping vibration signals, one “based at least in part on” data from a proximity sensor and another “based at least in part on” data from a touch sensor. Ex. 1008, Fig. 12 (items 705, 710, and 715). The summed signal 715 is the basis for generating what the user would perceive as a single haptic effect. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 210–212. This meets limitation 1F. We agree with Petitioner’s argument as to why there would have been a motivation to modify Pratt to include Ku’s teachings. Petitioner’s argument is not merely that Pratt was ready for improvement; Petitioner persuasively argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to add Ku’s method for confirming that the user has touched the intended icon to Pratt’s system. Both Pratt and Ku already disclose using both proximity and touch data in generating a haptic effect, and based on the evidence of record, we are of the view that combining the two teachings would not have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Leapfrog presents no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in [electronic children's toys] was uniquely challenging or difficult to one of ordinary skill in the art.” (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–420))” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 11,175,738 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,738 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. Optronic Sciences LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01132 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 5 are anticipated by Anzai, claim 4 is obvious over Anzai and Yamazaki, and claims 1–7 are obvious over Yamazaki and Anzai.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “ordinarily skilled artisan”) at the time of the invention as having “a Bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with electronic and optoelectronic device design” and notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002, Neikirk Decl., ¶ 23). Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Bretschneider testifies that In my opinion, the field of “electronic and optoelectronic device design” is too broad. A POSITA of the ’121, had at least a Bachelors’ degree in a field of engineering or physics and at least two to three years of professional experience related to the design and manufacture of the relevant aspects of flat panel displays. Additional relevant graduate education related [sic] could reduce but not eliminate the time requirement for professional experience. While Dr. Neikirk proposes a different definition of a POSITA, the differences do not have material effect on my opinions rendered below. Regardless of which definition of a POSITA were used, my conclusions would remain the same Ex. 2005, Bretschneider Decl., ¶ 39. We agree with and will apply Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill is reflective of the education and experience that would have been required to understand the problems and solutions identified in the ’121 patent and the prior art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note that our conclusions would be the same even if we applied Patent Owner’s slightly narrower definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We find these definitions to be of some help in construing this term. We find that the common thread is that a “passivation layer” is an insulating layer that provides protection from the environment to the layers below it. See Ex. 1012, 140; Ex. 1013, 542, Ex. 1014, 798; Ex. 2010, 3; Ex. 2013, 1. We find this construction to be most consistent with the broad claim language and the disclosure in the Specification. Although “tying up dangling bonds,” may be a mechanism by which some materials provide such protection, nothing in the Specification or the extrinsic evidence provided appears to require that. Also, while chemical protection may be one kind of protection none of the evidence suggests that is the only protection that is provided. Moreover, nothing in the Specification supports reading a chemical protection requirement into the construction. Thus, we decline to adopt that portion of Patent Owner’s construction. Instead, we construe passivation layer as “an insulating layer that provides protection from the environment to the layers below it.” We need not construe the term any further to resolve the parties’ dispute over this claim language. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“constructions for “passivation layer” and “capping layer.” We find that Petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to show that Anzai discloses both a “passivation layer” and a “capping layer.” As we explained above, we have construed “passivation layer” to mean “an insulating layer that provides protection from the environment to the layers below it.” Petitioner has shown that “first planarization film 17” is an insulating layer. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 62–65. We further find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that “first planarization film 17” is “formed over the entire surface for flattening, which will protect the semiconductor surface from the surrounding environment.” Id. ¶ 63. We have rejected Patent Owner’s contentions that the film must tie up “dangling bonds,” and instead determined that protecting the surface from the environment is sufficient. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Anzai discloses the “passivation layer” of claim 3. As we explained above, we have construed “capping layer” to be “an insulation layer covering (i.e., capping) an underlying layer or structure.” Here, Petitioner has shown that Anzai’s planarization film 19 meets the claimed “capping layer.” See Pet. 20. We find that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that “planarization film 19” is made of insulating material. As Dr. Neikirk persuasively testifies, Anzai discloses that planarization layer 17 may be made of an organic resin for flattening the surface. EX1003, 4:20-24. While Anzai does not disclose the material for planarization layer 19, it must be made of an insulation material because in the embodiment of Fig. 3A, it is the sole layer between electrode layer 71 and cathode layer 65 forming the second capacitor. Id., 6:3–8; Fig. 3A. Moreover, Anzai discloses that the first planarization film 17 and the second planarization film 19 for the first embodiment “function as the capacitance insulating film for this configuration.” Id., 5:62–67. Ex. 1002, Neikirk Decl., ¶ 62. We find this testimony well-reasoned and entitled to substantial weight. We further agree with Dr. Neikirk that a “POSITA would further understand that the second planarization film 19 is then further disposed on the first planarization film 17 (capping the passivation layer).” Id. ¶ 63 (citing Ex. 1003, 5:3–13; Figs. 2A–B, 3A–B). Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Anzai discloses the claimed “capping layer.” Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“motivation to combine Anzai and Yamazaki. See Pet. 25–27; Ex. 1002, Neikirk Decl., ¶¶ 78–79. First, Patent Owner argues that essentially silicon nitride is an inferior material to use for Anzai’s planarization layer 17 compared with organic resin. PO Resp. 13–15. However, “[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is the best option, only that it be a suitable option.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 797, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original). Patent Owner does not argue that silicon nitride would not work, but rather that it would be more difficult and more expensive to use. See PO Resp. 14. But “the fact that the two disclosed apparatus[es] would not be combined by businessmen for economic reasons is not the same as saying that it could not be done because skilled persons in the art felt that there was some technological incompatibility that prevented their combination. Only the latter is telling on the issue of nonobviousness.” Grit Energy Solutions LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, 957 F.3d 1309, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Orthopedic Equip. Co., Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Likewise, a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Here, Petitioner explains that “a POSITA would have known that organic materials usually have lower dielectric constants than inorganic materials, such as SiN, and a higher dielectric constant is desirable for the insulator in a capacitor since that leads to higher capacitance per unit area.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1002, Neikirk Decl., ¶ 78). Petitioner further explains that this “then allows a reduced area storage capacitance element, one of the objectives of Anzai.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003, code (57)). Patent Owner’s focus mainly on planarization (PO Sur-reply 16–17) ignores that the Anzai’s planarization layers 17 and 19 also “function as the capacitance insulating film.” Ex. 1003, 5:65–67. Thus, although there are tradeoffs, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate the teachings of Yamazaki regarding potential materials for planarization layers 17 and 19. Second, Patent Owner argues that a Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate reason to select silicon nitride from Yamazaki’s list of potential materials. We disagree. Petitioner has explained the benefits of selecting a high dielectric inorganic material. Pet. 26. Yamazaki provides only three potential options—silicon oxide, silicon nitride, and silicon oxynitride. See Ex. 1004, 11:45–50. Moreover, Dr. Neikirk testified, supported by multiple references, that using silicon nitride was well known in the prior art at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1002, Neikirk Decl., ¶ 75 (citing Ex. 1007; Ex. 1008; Ex. 1009). “When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Indeed, “[i]f a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. This is the case here. Petitioner has shown that a person of ordinary skill seeking to improve the capacitance of Anzai’s planarization layers 17 and 19, without increasing the size of the capacitor, would have looked at the inorganic materials identified in Yamazaki as suitable for the purpose, and it would have been would obvious to choose silicon nitride, a well-known, and predictable material for the application. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to show a sufficient reason for selecting silicon nitride from Yamazaki’s list of suitable materials. Third, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s contentions only support” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 7,586,121 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,586,121 - Lenovo (United States), Inc. v. University Of RochesterSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-01225 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3–7 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8–12 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish asynchronous operation between domains.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“specification is the ‘single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’ . . . and ‘is, thus, the primary basis for construing the claims.’” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Although Patent Owner contends that the Specification disparages systems that impose significant restrictions on the possible choices of frequencies (PO Resp. 21), we find availing Petitioner’s contention that “[s]upport for Patent Owner’s construction is absent from the specification.” Pet. Reply 10. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner’s claim construction “appears to be based on a single paragraph of the ’443 patent referring to preexisting ‘synchronization schemes [that] restrict the phase relationship and relative frequencies of the clocks.” Id. That is, the only reference by Patent Owner to the Specification is that the Specification states that “Some synchronization schemes restrict the . . . relative frequencies of the clocks, thereby eliminating the need for hardware arbitration [27]. Unfortunately, these schemes impose significant restrictions on the possible choices of frequences.” PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:32–36). We agree with Petitioner that such disclosure in the Specification “does not describe how these synchronization schemes ‘restrict the phase relationship and relative frequencies’ with any specificity.’” Pet. the Specification that some schemes impose restrictions on the possible choices of frequency is not a disparagement of any system that has limited choices of frequency or would preclude the claims from covering such prior art techniques. Instead, as Petitioner points out, the Specification of the ’443 patent states “[t]he preferred embodiment uses four domains […] so that domains may vary somewhat in size and still be covered by a single clock.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 5:57–59). As Dr. Baker testified in support of Petitioner’s contention, “the preferred embodiment of the ’443 patent relies on a single external master clock that distributes a signal to the local PLL of each domain.” See Ex. 1032 ¶ 9. Thus, although Patent Owner contends that clock signals generated based on a master clock cannot be interpreted to be generated independently of the clock signals generated for others of the plurality of domains (PO Resp. 49), we agree with Petitioner that such claim construction would “exclude[] the preferred embodiment of the ’443 patent,” which is disfavored. Pet. Reply 11. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that “changeable independently” of the other domains does not require that the separate clocks in the plurality of domains be globally-asynchronous.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“As both parties recognize, (PO Resp. 5; Pet. Reply 12), “[actual] [r]eduction to practice in the United States requires that the invention be embodied in tangible form.” Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, actual reduction to practice requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every element. not sufficient. See Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Here, Patent Owner does not provide any evidence showing every element of the claims in physical or tangible form, as required, but rather contends that the Specification refers to the Paper, wherein the Paper stated that simulation using a software, SimpleScalar, was performed. PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that the SimpleScalar simulation was not an actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention. Pet. Reply 12. As Petitioner points out, claim 1, for example, is directed to a “microprocessor,” wherein “Patent Owner has presented no evidence and has not alleged that any physical microprocessor was ever produced or operated.” Id. at 13; see PO Resp. 15–17. And as Petitioner points out, “Patent Owner has produced no evidence of any physical prototype of the claimed microprocessor that could have validated the simulation.” Pet. Reply 13–14. We agree with Petitioner that, at most, such simulation “demonstrated feasibility for prototyping of a microprocessor,” but not a tangible form of the microprocessor itself as required for an actual reduction to practice. Id. at 14; see also Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 1, 67 (1991) (“The feasibility of the optical alignment system may have been proven by the optical mock-up, but the optical mock-up was not a reduction to practice of the proposed MHU–145/M trailer.”).” slip op. at 36
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Here, we find that Petitioner has not met its burden to prove that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “the functional units of Georgiou operate asynchronously since they have different clocks.” Pet. 74 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 211–219). Specifically, although Petitioner relies on Georgiou for teaching different clocks, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that such application would operate asynchronously requires gapfilling. Id. As Patent Owner points out, Georgiou discloses a clocking architecture in which “all domain clocks are derived from a shared master clock through predetermined rational dividers.” PO Resp. 49. Petitioner concedes during the oral hearing that, in systems such as Georgiou, each domain clock is set a fraction of a master clock, and thus, the various domain clocks are “possibly” synchronous with each other. Tr. 59:4–14 (JUDGE DANG: . . . would being fractions of the master, wouldn’t they be synchronized with each other? MR UHR: They may be, . . . the answer is possibly.”) Thus, we find Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that the functional units of Georgiou operate “asynchronously” lacks sufficient support in the record. We find the testimony of Dr. Baker insufficient to support Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 213, 215–219. In his declaration, Dr. Baker testified that he “provided several references . . . that explain operating domains asynchronous to one another while the domains operate synchronously.” Id. ¶¶ 215–219. However, although such references explain “globally asynchronous, local synchronous (GALS) systems” (id. ¶ 216), Dr. Baker does not explain why a POSITA “would have known that a functional unit of Georgiou also operates asynchronous with respect to at different frequencies.” Id. ¶ 217. Without evidentiary support, we are left with speculation and impermissible hindsight. See in Re Wagner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in speculation. See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wallen, 565 F. App’x 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014), both citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ([T]he Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”). In sum, based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s showing is insufficient. Thus, based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Georgiou teaches “operating the microprocessor such that each domain operates synchronously, while the domains operate asynchronously relative to one another,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 28
- BurdenMixed
“of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “the functional units of Georgiou operate asynchronously since they have different clocks.” Pet. 74 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 211–219). Specifically, although Petitioner relies on Georgiou for teaching different clocks, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that such application would operate asynchronously requires gapfilling. Id. As Patent Owner points out, Georgiou discloses a clocking architecture in which “all domain clocks are derived from a shared master clock through predetermined rational dividers.” PO Resp. 49. Petitioner concedes during the oral hearing that, in systems such as Georgiou, each domain clock is set a fraction of a master clock, and thus, the various domain clocks are “possibly” synchronous with each other. Tr. 59:4–14 (JUDGE DANG: . . . would being fractions of the master, wouldn’t they be synchronized with each other? MR UHR: They may be, . . . the answer is possibly.”) Thus, we find Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that the functional units of Georgiou operate “asynchronously” lacks sufficient support in the record. We find the testimony of Dr. Baker insufficient to support Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 213, 215–219. In his declaration, Dr. Baker testified that he “provided several references . . . that explain operating domains asynchronous to one another while the domains operate synchronously.” Id. ¶¶ 215–219. However, although such references explain “globally asynchronous, local synchronous (GALS) systems” (id. ¶ 216), Dr. Baker does not explain why a POSITA “would have known that a functional unit of Georgiou also operates asynchronous with respect to at different frequencies.” Id. ¶ 217. Without evidentiary support, we are left with speculation and impermissible hindsight. See in Re Wagner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in speculation. See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wallen, 565 F. App’x 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014), both citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ([T]he Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”). In sum, based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s showing is insufficient. Thus, based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Georgiou teaches “operating the microprocessor such that each domain operates synchronously, while the domains operate asynchronously relative to one another,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 7,089,443 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,089,443 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. Optronic Sciences, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01133 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 are unpatentable: claims 1–5, 9, and 12–13 as anticipated by Weaver, and claims 6–8 and 10–11 as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, “the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art). In general, we agree with the areas of agreement in the parties’ proposals. In particular, Patent Owner proposes “at least a Bachelors’ degree in a field of engineering or physics,” which includes “electrical engineering or a comparable field of study” as Petitioner proposes. Pet. 4 (emphasis added); PO Resp. 10. We agree with Petitioner that by defining the engineering field as “electrical” or “comparable,” we can exclude engineering fields “having nothing to do with displays, such as biomedical, civil, chemical or environmental engineering.” Pet. Reply 1. Petitioner also proposes approximately “one or more years of professional experience” which includes Patent Owner’s “at least two years of professional experience.” Pet. 4; PO Resp. 10. Furthermore, both parties agree that “[a]dditional graduate education could [reduce . . . the time requirement] for professional experience.” Id. Thus, we adopt both parties’ proposed POSITA of having a Bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering or a comparable field of study, plus at least two years of professional experience, wherein additional graduate education could reduce the time requirement for professional experience. Id. Such proposal comports with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“The plain language in claim 1 of “auxiliary electrode” does not preclude that the “electrode” may be a power line, bus line, or resistor. Ex. 1001, 8:47–52. Nothing in the Specification clearly precludes “auxiliary electrode” from being a “bus line” or “power line,” as Patent Owner proposes. PO Resp. 25–27. We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that the Specification discloses that “the power line ‘PL’ is shown in Figure 1, but the power line PL is not an electrode that is shown in Figure 2.” Id. at 26–27. Here, Patent Owner points to no portions in the Specification that provide the requisite “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” to warrant interpreting the claim language at issue as supporting Patent Owner’s contention that an auxiliary electrode cannot be a power line, bus line, or resistor. Id.; In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1984). That is, although Patent Owner points to Figures 1 and 2 of the Specification for support of its contention, Figures 1 and 2 of the Specification merely show various examples of power line and an auxiliary electrode. PO Resp. 26–27. Thus, although the referenced portions of the Specification discuss various examples wherein an auxiliary electrode may be implemented, nothing in these referenced portions of the Specification clearly precludes the “auxiliary electrode” from being a power line or any electrode that is “the road to get to an end point,” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Patent Owner points to no special definition, implicit or explicit, for “auxiliary electrode” that is set forth in the Specification which supports Patent Owner’s construction with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. In particular, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that “‘bus line 430’ is not an ‘auxiliary electrode’” (PO Resp. 28–33), because Patent Owner is relying on a claim construction of “auxiliary electrode” as precluding “essential” elements and requiring “more than the end structure of a conductor” (id.), that is not adopted by our construction discussed above. Here, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s reliance on Weaver’s bus line 430 for providing the claimed “electrode,” that is “supplemental to other electrodes in the structure.” Pet. 18; see also Ex. 1004 ¶ 26, Fig. 4; Ex. 1003 ¶ 92. We find availing Petitioner’s contention, supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that a POSITA would have understood that “anode 406 and bus line 430 are connected in parallel,” which means that “bus line 430 is a supplemental electrode that reduces the total resistance of the pixel structure.” Pet. 19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 94. Thus, we find availing Petitioner’s contention, supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that Weaver’s bus line 430 is an electrode supplemental to other electrodes in the structure that is electrically insulated from transistor 410 by passivation layer 409, wherein OLED 400, which includes cathode 422, organic layer 424, and anode 406, is disposed above bus line 430, and wherein anode 406 of OLED 400 is electrically connected to bus line 430 by via 428. Pet. 16–19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 89–94. That is, we find availing Petitioner’s contention that, like the ’509 patent’s auxiliary electrode 120, bus line 430 is electrically insulated from transistor 410, wherein OLED 400 is disposed above bus line 430 and anode 406 electrically connected with bus line 430. Compare Pet. 2–3 (annotated” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We also find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that the proposed modifications to Weaver would involve changing the process. PO Resp. 33– 34. We agree with Petitioner, whose contentions are supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that “to provide additional components from the same layer is a layout change that a POSITA would have been able to perform without changing the process.” Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex 1003 ¶ 157; Ex. 1020 ¶ 45). Further, contrary to Patent Owner’s contention that POSITA would not have combined Weaver with Lee ’053, Song, Lee ’149, or Bae without the use of hindsight (PO Resp. 33–45), as Petitioner points out, Lee ’149, for example, “explicitly teaches that ‘the electrode pattern 45 serves to lower the resistance of the first electrode 41.” Pet. Reply 58 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 38). Similarly, Bae “explicitly teaches that the “auxiliary electrodes 139 contact the first electrode 132 to commonly apply a voltage to the sub-pixels” and “reduces the resistance of the first electrode.” Id. at 66 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 37, 59). As such, Petitioner’s proposed combinations are supported by at least by Lee ’149’s and Bae’s teachings of applying a second electrode to lower the resistance and voltage drop between anode 406 and the VDD line of Weaver. See, e.g., Ex. 1011 ¶ 38; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 37, 59. We are persuaded by Dr. Baker’s testimony that a POSITA would have understood that higher resistance between the power or ground line to the light emitting device would consume more power and require higher operating voltages, and thus, would have been motivated to implement the solutions of Lee ’053, Song, Lee ’149, or Bae to lower the resistance between anode 406 and voltage source VDD in Weaver. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 145, 158, 184, 203. We agree with Petitioner, supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success the combining the references as suggested, wherein such modification “involves modifications of only routine skill in the art,” which “involve known method,” and “would have yielded predictable results. Pet. 42, 48–49, 59, 67–68; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 145, 158, 184, 203. That is, we determine that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning explaining why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. Based on the complete record presented, we determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6–8 would have been obvious over the combination of Weaver and Lee ’053 or alternatively over the combination of Weaver and Song, and that claims 10 and 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Weaver and Lee ’149 or alternatively over the combination of Weaver and Bae.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 9,263,509 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,263,509 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00714 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: Goldenberg anticipates or renders claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–19 obvious, and Goldenberg with Cruz-Hernandez renders claims 7, 14, and 20 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’907 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:14–62. Because we discern no dispositive difference between the parties’ proposals, and neither party has argued that the choice between the two would affect the outcome,6 we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. We note, however, that our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,627,907 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,627,907 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00762 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 and 8–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Koskinen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.6 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Additionally, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known and been familiar with information elements (IEs) that specified an RLC reordering timer value based on (1) general knowledge that IEs carried information in RRC messages and (2) that 3GPP TSs describe an IE carrying recording timer duration information for the RLC layer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 151; Ex. 1014, 219–20. Accordingly, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art “that the PDCP timer information, which used similar variables as its RLC counterpart (Koskinen, ¶¶37-38), would also be carried in a PDCP configuration IE.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 151.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,863,573
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.