- Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,524,002 - Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00349 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not disclose the claimed sequence of screen captures used to assemble a media stream.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not dispute the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. No express finding is necessary. The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 14–15; PO Resp. 22. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“c. Analysis “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan does not anticipate claim 1 because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 26–29. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. Sur-reply 21. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 26–29; Sur-reply 21.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“All other challenged claims require the “generating” and “assembling” operations because they depend from claims 1, 12, or 17. Petitioner does not allege that the additional references—Durante, Ma, Suzuki, Wanamaker, Heikens, Matthews, or Wilsher—teach or suggest the “temporal sequence of screen captures” recited in claim 1. Rather, Petitioner’s reasoning in the challenges to the dependent claims pertaining to the screen captures mirror the rationale presented in the independent claim. See, e.g., Pet. 25 (arguing that Avellan’s screen captures correspond to the video content in the challenge to claim 2), 26–27 (arguing that Avellan obtains screen captures from a playback of a video on the webpage in the challenge to claim 4). Petitioner’s argument that Avellan teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depend on the reasoning and insufficiently supported characterizations of Avellan in the challenges based on 35 U.S.C. § 102, as discussed above. See Pet. 40–60. grounds based on anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that any challenged claim is unpatentable as anticipated by Avellan or obvious over any of the combinations of Avellan and the other cited references.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,123,074 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,123,074 - Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations; claims 10–26 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan does not teach limitations [10d]–[10f].
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). The Petition further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of delivering multimedia content. Resp. 18. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions. slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 11; Resp. 18–19; Reply 5. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “‘Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). Reasonable inferences of a POSITA may suffice to establish inherent disclosure in a prior art reference such as Farber. See Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–1075 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is disclosed in that reference.”). Here, however, we find the Petition’s argument and evidence insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Farber inherently discloses limitation [1b].” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,140,441 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,140,441 - PTAB · Feb 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00988 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all petition grounds; it found a reasonable likelihood of success on the Josiam-based grounds, while the Bharadwaj grounds lacked established prior-art status.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, as well as the evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–14 of the ’281 patent.3” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this institution decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner.11 It is not materially disputed by the Patent Owner and is consistent with the ’281 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner asserts “that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 3. “Patent Owner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the challenged claims.” Prelim. Resp 11. At this stage, no need exists to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve any dispute between the parties.12 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“contention that either of the cited documents alone discloses all the elements of these limitations. And, the disclosure relied on in Exhibit 1007 is not alleged to be found in Exhibit 1009 and vice-versa. Patent Owner has not shown that any of the pre-May 14, 2016, Korean applications from which the ’281 claims priority includes disclosure of all the elements recited in limitations 1.9 and 8.6. At least at this stage, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown, for the purpose of institution that Josiam is prior art.16 We credit the testimony of Dr. Buehrer cited in the Petition that none of the Korean applications to which the ’281 patent claims priority filed earlier than May 14, 2016, “explicitly, implicitly, or inherently discloses using both the bandwidth field of the HE-SIG-A and the resource unit allocation field of the HE-SIG-B to indicate channel puncturing information as the claim elements require. . . . At best, these documents discuss indicating unused channels using either HE-SIG-A or HE-SIGB fields—but not both.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 (Buehrer Decl.) ¶¶ 90–91). Dr. Buehrer’s testimony has not been shown by Patent Owner to be inaccurate.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,687,281 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01069 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on Bharadwaj alone and Bharadwaj with Yu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, [a]n expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 2–4. Patent Owner, however, notes that, in related district court litigation, Petitioner has asserted that some claims terms are indefinite. Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has taken inconsistent claim construction positions between the district court and the Board. Paper 14 at 1–3 (citing Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025-00340, Paper 18 at 4 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2025) (informative); Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 4–5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential)). Petitioner responds that, in the related district court litigation, the parties have narrowed the claim construction disputes and that Petitioner accords the plain and ordinary meaning to claim terms and no longer asserts that any claim term of the ’077 patent is indefinite. Paper 15 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1126 (Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief)). The evidence supports Petitioner’s position because, in the related district court litigation, the defendants agree with the plaintiff (Patent Owner) that certain phrases in the ’077 patent claims should be given their “[p]lain and ordinary meaning” and are “not indefinite.” Ex. 1126, 6 (native page 1). Thus, the record does not show inconsistent claim construction positions that warrant denial under PTAB precedent. See Revvo, Paper 20 at 5 (addressing a situation in which a petitioner advances “different claim construction positions” in district court and at the PTAB). See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Bharadwaj includes subject matter that is not in Bharadwaj-Prov59, namely the change from adding the value Resp. 20; Ex. 1007 ¶ 51 (adding m); Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (subtracting m); Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioner, however, points out this change in the Petition and acknowledges that it is after the identified critical date of August 20, 2015. See Pet. 28. Thus, we do not understand Petitioner to be relying on Bharadwaj’s disclosure of subtracting m to determine length, as disclosed in the publication of the non-provisional application, as a prior art disclosure. We understand Petitioner to be relying on disclosures in Bharadwaj-Prov059 for prior art teachings for its obviousness contentions. Patent Owner does not appear to dispute that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art, arguing instead that it is improper to rely “on matters in Bharadwaj beyond ‘incorporation by reference’ of the Bharadwaj-Prov59.” See Prelim. Resp. 20–21. On this record, we determine that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art as of its June 2, 2015, filing date by virtue of its incorporation by reference into Bharadwaj, a published US patent application. Ex. 1006 ¶ 1; see Pet. 12–13.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,313,077 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01026 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because the Baliarda-543 challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we 1 Petitioner filed a confidential version of the Petition as Paper 3 and a public version of the Petition as Paper 4. We cite to the public version of the Petition. institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 in the ’677 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill as of the ’677 patent’s effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 40. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’677 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:26–6:47, 42:47–44:61, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term, phrase, or limitation requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although “Dou does not require its ‘diversity antenna architecture’ to provide spatial diversity,” Dou nevertheless requires a wireless device with some type of diversity antenna architecture. See, e.g., Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 14, 17–18, 22–24, 30, 32–34, codes (54), (57), claims 1 and 16. As an example, Dou’s independent claim 1 covering a “wireless device” requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 1. As another example, Dou’s independent claim 16 covering a “wireless device” also requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 16. As yet another example, Dou’s Abstract describes a “wireless device” including a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at code (57). Petitioner does not explain how the proposed combination provides anything other than spatial diversity. See Pet. 33–35; Prelim. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118–124. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that with Ciais-Quadband’s antenna used for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208, the two identical quadband antennas would have:” slip op. at 46
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,031,677 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01027 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Baliarda-543 anticipates or renders obvious those claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Regarding spatial diversity, Dou explains that a first internal antenna and a second internal antenna “may be separated by a distance (D) that is no less than the quarter wavelength (>=λ/4) of the lowest frequency.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 24; see Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 35, 44. Consistent with Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency, “a commonly accepted rule of thumb is that at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas is necessary to provide effective spatial diversity.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 33, 35, 47. Effective spatial diversity requires sufficient spacing between antennas because that technique “uses multiple antennas to improve signal reliability and performance by mitigating the effects of multipath fading and other interference.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 33. “Multipath fading occurs when a wireless signal propagates along multiple different paths of differing lengths because of interactions with obstacles, resulting in portions of the signal energy arriving at a receiver with different phases slightly offset in time.” Id. Locations insufficiently separated in terms of wavelength “tend to experience similar fading and interference characteristics.” Id. Thus, closely spaced antennas “cannot provide effective spatial diversity.” Id. By providing sufficient spacing between antennas, however, “the likelihood increases that at least one of the antennas will be positioned at a location where the multipath or other interference is relatively low, thereby improving overall signal quality and reliability.” Id. As Patent Owner contends, the proposed combination modifies Dou’s ground plane 310 to replicate Jing’s ground plane with dimensions of 36 mm × 60 mm and limits “the extent of Dou’s ground plane 310 so that it [does] not extend behind Jing’s antenna at 306, just like Dou does not extend it behind antenna 308.” See Pet. 35–36; Prelim. Resp. 20 (quoting Pet. 35); Prelim. Sur-reply 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 120; Ex. 2010 ¶ 45. The lowest frequency of Jing’s antenna is 900 MHz. Ex. 1011, 2657–58; see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118, 154; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 37, 44. The wavelength (λ) corresponding to a frequency of 900 MHz is 333.3 mm, and a quarter wavelength (λ/4) is 83.3 mm. Ex. 2010 ¶ 44. In the proposed combination, a distance of 60 mm separates the” slip op. at 49
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,349,200 - PTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00934 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9 are obvious over Bharadwaj and Sun.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, as well as the evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–9 of the ’210 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedNot reached
“We are aware, however, that we must not confuse access with accessibility. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., 929 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[A] petitioner need not establish that specific persons actually accessed or received a work to show that the work was publicly accessible.”). Dr. Hansen notes that the cover of 802.11ax_D1.0 grants permission to reproduce the document to others for consideration. Ex. 1026 ¶ 72; see Ex. 1004, 1 (“Permission is hereby granted for IEEE Standards Committee participants to reproduce this document for purposes of international standardization consideration.”). Dr. Hansen also testifies that meetings to discuss 802.11ax_D1.0 were open to the public. Ex. 1026 ¶ 58 (citing Appendix J to declaration). Thus, it appears, on the current record, that the purpose of 802.11ax_D1.0 was to promote dialogue with interested artisans, which indicates public accessibility. See Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We have previously held that where a publication’s purpose is ‘dialogue with the intended audience,’ that purpose indicates public accessibility.” (citation omitted)). After having reviewed all the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we would like to see further development of this issue during trial. The current record is not well-developed on this issue either factually or legally. With regard to the factual record, Patent Owner has not yet had the opportunity to depose Dr. Hansen or been given a full opportunity to marshal its own evidence on this issue. With regard to the law, we would like to see the parties apply the relevant case law to the developed facts as to the public accessibility and prior art status of 802.11ax_D1.0. We will determine, if necessary and appropriate, whether 802.11ax_D1.0 is prior art to the challenged claims of the ’210 patent based on the full record as developed during trial.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“As an initial matter, Bharadwaj and Sun are both analogous art to the ’210 Patent in that that they are both concerned with the design of the PHY data unit for supporting MU-MIMO transmissions in the downlink. SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153- 158. . . . In addition, both Bharadwaj and Sun describe MU- MIMO downlink PHY data unit structures in the context of 802.11ax. SAMSUNG-1013, ¶[0064]; SAMSUNG-1015, ¶[0031]; SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153-158. . . . . [A] POSITA implementing Bharadwaj’s preamble designs would have been motivated to look to another reference, like Sun, for an understanding of the format of the user field that would support non-MU-MIMO allocations and the single-user transmission scenario. A POSITA would have combined the teachings of Bharadwaj with Sun to realize implementation details for the HE-SIG-A and HE-SIG-B fields of the HE MU PPDU to better support both MU-MIMO and non-MU-MIMO allocations. SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153-158. . . . . A POSITA would have found it obvious to look to Sun for modifying Bharadwaj to include the user field format for SU (non-MU-MIMO) allocation to complement Bharadwaj’s disclosure of the MU-MIMO user field format and to provide a more complete system that would allow HE MU PPDUs to support both MU-MIMO allocations for multiple users and non-MU-MIMO allocations for a single user. SAMSUNG- 1003, ¶¶153-158. The combination also would have been obvious and predictable for at least the following reasons: 1) both Bharadwaj and Sun describe designs for a PHY data unit (or PPDU) to support communications between an AP and a station within a high-efficiency Wi-Fi network, consistent with 802.11ax; 2) both Bharadwaj and Sun describe the PPDU design for supporting MU-MIMO downlink transmission as including HE- SIG-A and HE-SIG-B fields; and 3) Bharadwaj already describes the format for the user field for the MU-MIMO allocation, while also recognizing the single-user scenario, and the combination merely involves the addition to Bharadwaj of the user field format for the single-user allocation, as taught by Sun. SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153- 158. The combination is obvious also because elements of the combined system would each perform similar functions they had been known to perform in similar contexts outside the combination. SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153-158. . . . . A POSITA would have reasonably expected success implementing the combination, especially considering the substantially similar 802.11ax techniques described in each reference. SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153-158. Additionally, combining the teachings of Bharadwaj with Sun would have merely involved combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results. SAMSUNG-1003, ¶¶153-158.” slip op. at 31
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that “no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner notes that “both parties have submitted terms for construction in the district court for this Patent” (Prelim. Resp. 6), but that “for purposes of [the] Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the challenged claims” (id. at 8). Accordingly, at this stage, no need exists to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes.9 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,159,210 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell LtdSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00735 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 9–13 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7, 8, 14, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because WinTV was not established as a prior-art printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The Decision on Institution adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8–9. We find Patent Owner’s stated level to be less precise than that proposed by Petitioner in that the modifier “at least” used by Patent Owner imposes no upper bound on the amount of experience possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art. Also, Patent Owner states: “The difference between the Board’s definition and Patent Owner’s does not change the arguments set forth herein.” PO Resp. 5. Thus, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.10 C.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the district court’s construction is better than Petitioner’s proposed construction, because for reasons indicated by Patent Owner, which are not disputed by Petitioner, settings in the computer, e.g., dedicated folders for each user, are the user profiles, rather than simply data alone of any kind. Further, when asked about the appropriateness of the district court’s construction, counsel for Petitioner expressed that Petitioner has no objection to the Board’s adopting the district court’s construction for “user profile”: JUDGE LEE: So, you’d be fine with just going with the District Court’s construction? MR. HEINTZ: Yes, Your Honor. Tr. 15:22–24. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the district court’s construction for “user profile,” i.e., “a collection of settings and information associated with a user.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“2. “the first group of video information being configured to allow a user to edit” Petitioner asserts: “This limitation should be construed for the purposes of this proceeding as meaning at least that a user can modify which video information is a part of the first group of video information.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner neither proposed its own construction nor disagreed with Petitioner’s proposed construction. We adopt the meaning as proposed by Petitioner. D.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not reach a resolution on the issue of relative cost between a wired LAN versus a wireless LAN, because Petitioner’s assertion that wireless LANs “were often cheaper and easier to install” is nebulous by use of the imprecise word “often.” “Often” cheaper permits “often” not cheaper. Much depends on how many access points would exist in the wired LAN. Petitioner does not discuss that consideration in the context of Horn. Also, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s other stated reasons for implementing Horn’s LAN as a wireless LAN: (1) that a wireless LAN can be more convenient to users, and (2) Baumgartner provides adequate motivation by disclosing transmission of video from server 36 via communications network 34 such as the Internet over link 48 implemented wirelessly to user computer equipment 22 such as a personal computer. Pet. 29–32. We are persuaded that a wireless LAN provides more user convenience by enabling the user equipment accessing the external network to be flexibly located within the range of the LAN without need to have wires installed to run to those locations. That is true whether there is only one user equipment or there are multiple user equipment, one per user. In the case of only one user equipment, the user can access the external network from a wide range of locations and change that location flexibly. In the case of multiple user equipment, one per user, each user can access the external network from his or her own preferred location, and also change that preference at any time without regard to whether wires have been installed to the preferred location.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,017,815 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,017,815 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.