• Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityInstituted
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00240 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–42 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial under §§ 314(a) and 325(d).

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review “unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We determine whether to institute a post grant review on behalf of the Director. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated there is a reasonable likelihood that the petition would prevail in showing that at least one challenged is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “patient is MSI-H after enrollment in a study in which pembrolizumab is to be administered is not within the scope of the claim step “in response to determining that the colorectal cancer is microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, treating the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab.” At this point in the proceeding, though, we do not interpret the claim step as meaning anything other than the treatment of colorectal cancer patients after they have been determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient. Although the term “in response to” in claim 1 requires that treatment of the patient occur after the determination that the colorectal cancer is MSI-H, we do not interpret the term to mean that other patients are not treated or that the recruitment and enrollment of patients for a clinical trial has any bearing on the steps recited in claim 1. We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Patent Owner has not directed us to evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood treating a patient “in response to” the determination that the patient has a condition excludes treatment of other patients without the condition, although it does require that treatment of the patient occur after the determination that the colorectal cancer is MSI-H. The language of claim 1 refers only to patients that are determined to have microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient colorectal cancer, not to other patients. (See Ex. 1001, 25:40–50.) At this point in the proceeding, the record does not indicate that the treatment of patients determined not to be MSI-H is be factored into whether the teaching of treating patients determined to be MSI-H anticipates the method of claim 1. At this point in the proceeding, we construe the “in response to” limitation of claim 1 to mean that pembrolizumab is administered to a patient after the patient has been determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, regardless of whether pembrolizumab is also administered to other patients.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “H Study Record teaches treating colorectal cancer patients after they were determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient with pembrolizumab. (See MSI-H Study Record, Ex, 1005, 4 (Arms and Interventions); see also id., 2 (Study Identification), 3 (Study Description), 4–5 (Outcome Measures), 5–6 (Eligibility); see Neugut Decl., Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 58–62.) At this point in the proceeding, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that there is a reasonable likelihood of a causal relationship in the MSI-H Study Record between treatment of colorectal cancer patients and the determination of their MSI status — all colorectal cancer patients determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient were treated. Whether or not other patients were treated or enrolled in the study does not detract from this teaching.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “Furthermore, to the extent the MSI-H Study Record does not disclose the limitation of “in response to determining that the colorectal cancer is microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, treating the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab,” the record before us supports this limitation being rendered obvious by Pernot and the MSI-H Study Record. Specifically, because Pernot teaches that colorectal cancer patients are good candidates for immunotherapy, the evidence of the current record shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to use to PD-1 inhibitors to treat colorectal cancers. (See Ex. 1006, 3741.) Additionally, the focus in the MSI-H Study Record on a clinical study treating colorectal cancer patients who had been determined to be MSI-H with prembrolizumab indicates that it would have been obvious to test for this condition before treatment. The additional references discussed by Petitioner contribute further to a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail. For example, Libson reports the successful treatment of a colorectal cancer patient having MSI-H status with a PD- 1 inhibitor (see Ex. 1057, 463-64) and Champiat discusses evaluating the clinical activity of PD-1 agents in DNA mismatch repair, such as MSI+, colorectal cancer (see Ex. 1032, e27817-5). (See Pet. 44.) Thus, based on the entire record before us, Petitioner presents a reasonable likelihood that the method of claim 1 would have been considered obvious by one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,591,393
• Life Spine, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01602 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 8–10 are anticipated by Weiman, and claims 4–7 and 11–14 are obvious over Weiman and Mozeleski; the revised motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 (Drewry Decl.) ¶¶ 76–79). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. See generally Response. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive, and credit, Mr. Drewry’s testimony that (1) a POSITA would have appreciated that the proposed modification to replace Weiman’s screw/socket with Waugh’s angled version provides benefits including “avoiding selected muscular and abdominal anatomical structures,” and (2) such “benefits would have been desirable for certain applications, such as those where the patient’s anatomy dictates that OLIF would provide the patient with the best medical outcome.” Ex. 1044 (Drewry Second Supp. Decl.) ¶¶ 23–26; see also Ex. 1043 (Waugh), ¶¶ 54, 87–90 (describing use of angled screw holes to, e.g., “receive a fastener via a surgical pathway” and configured “to penetrate endplate tissue of a vertebral body”). We find the weight of evidence supports Petitioner’s articulation of a POSITA’s understanding of how to use angles to avoid anatomical features” slip op. at 61

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that no terms require construction “because they are shown to be anticipated and/or obvious regardless of construction.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner did not propose any terms for construction. See generally Response. We determine that no claim terms require express construction to render this Decision.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “j. Conclusion on Claim 1 For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Weiman discloses each and every limitation of claim 1, and therefore anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,956,087 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,956,087
• NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00142 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent “would have had at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and one to two years of experience in the field of circuit design, particularly the design of circuits operating at high frequencies.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent or identify any specific shortcoming in Petitioner’s definition. See Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 4. This definition is consistent with the ’330 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “Petitioner argues that “no express constructions of the claims are necessary to assess whether the prior art reads on the challenged claims.” Pet. 8. However, Petitioner also cites to a Special Master Report and Recommendation on Claim Construction where “node” was construed to mean “a point of connection or intersection in an electrical circuit.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ex. 1015, 29). Patent Owner adopts this construction for purposes of this Decision on Institution. Prelim. Resp. 8. We find that this construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “node.” We thus apply the construction as such to our analysis below, and we determine that we need not provide an express construction of any other claim term for purposes of this institution decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “[claim] limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “A claim limitation is inherent in the prior art if it is necessarily present in the prior art, not merely probably or possibly present.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite, Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “[t]o anticipate, the reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F. 3d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, it is not enough to be able to find all of the pieces of the claimed invention somewhere in a prior art reference; rather, those elements must be set out in the prior art reference in the same way they are in the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,535,330
• NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00167 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence presented, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim based on any ground asserted in the Petition. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition is denied, and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 22

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “For all of the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Okabe discloses a semiconductor integrated circuit package with a first layer that includes “a first ground plane enabling electrical connection with low speed electronic circuitry” and a “second ground plane enabling electrical connection with high speed electronic circuitry.” Ex. 1001, 9:25–36.” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a “bachelor’s degree in a field relating to the integrated circuit package manufacturing process like materials science, physics, electrical engineering, or other related subjects, and at least two to three years of experience with fabrication and packaging of integrated circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. As Patent Owner and Dr. Bernstein point out, Petitioner does not specify the frequencies at which duplexer 45 and VCO 70 operate in Okabe. Prelim. Resp. 20; Ex. 2001 ¶ 79. Nor does Petitioner direct us to any criteria for classifying circuitry as “high speed” or “low speed.” Prelim. Resp. 20; Ex. 2001 ¶ 79. As a result, we are left with only the assertion of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood about duplexer 45 and VCO 70. To support this assertion, Petitioner directs us to statements in Dr. Baker’s declaration that mirror the Petition. Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–73). Dr. Baker, however, does not cite to any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statements. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–73. “Thus, the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (August 24, 2022) (precedential); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Okabe discloses a second layer that includes a “third ground plane configured for electrical connection with low speed electronic circuitry” and a “fourth ground plane configured for electrical connection with high speed electronic circuitry.” Ex. 1001, 9:37– 43.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,646,091
• NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · May 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00168 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8 on all petition grounds addressing those claims, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–6 and 8 of the ’245 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in a field relating to the semiconductor manufacturing process, such as materials science, physics, electrical engineering, and/or other related subjects, and at least two to three years of experience with fabrication of integrated circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 20). Petitioner also contends “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’245 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 1 affirmatively recites, for example, “a plurality of layers under the top layer.” Ex. 1001, 4:13. Claim 1 also affirmatively recites that the “plurality of layers compris[es] a bottom routing layer having signal traces thereon.” Id. at 4:14–15. So, claim 1 requires a bottom routing layer having signal traces. Claim 1 then recites “where[] none of the signal traces of the bottom routing layer are located over ball pads of the ball pad layer which are disposed in an area within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die.” Id. at 4:17–20. This recitation serves to describe the “signal traces of the bottom routing layer.” The recitation does not affirmatively recite a required location of any ball pads. Likewise, the claim as a whole also does not state that the ball pad layer comprises ball pads disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die. Rather, the claim recites “said ball pad layer having a plurality of ball pads” without affirmatively indicating where those ball pads must be located within the ball pad layer. Thus, on the present record, we interpret claim 1’s recitation of “none of the signal traces . . . within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die” as requiring that no signal traces of the bottom routing layer be located over ball pads of the ball pad layer disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die if any such ball pads exist in this location. We do not interpret claim 1 as affirmatively requiring ball pads disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die. To the extent Patent Owner maintains arguments regarding this recitation in a Patent Owner Response, we invite the parties to further address this claim construction issue at trial to the extent permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions for all of the elements of independent claim 1, as well as the supporting evidence. Pet. 45–55. Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s discussion of the particular structures and methods in Chung and Celeron establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial on the issue of whether the combined teachings of Chung and Celeron teach or suggest all of the limitations of independent claim 1. Id. Also, based on the present record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Chung and Celeron.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,345,245
• Life Spine, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2024 · IPR2022-01435 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable: Chung anticipates claim 10, and the Olmos-based obviousness grounds establish unpatentability of claims 1–11.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “9 Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner’s Reply brief “presents copious new evidence and theories that exceed the scope of proper reply” and “[t]he Board should refuse to consider” it. Sur-reply 7–9. This generic objection to the entire Reply fails to provide adequate notice regarding which of Petitioner’s theories and arguments Patent Owner contends are allegedly new and improper. See, e.g., Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 76 F.4th 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (rejecting generic objection to alleged new theories in reply as failing to provide adequate notice of which theories are allegedly new). Accordingly, we reject Patent Owner’s request that we “refuse to consider” the entirety of the Reply. Where Patent Owner’s Sur-reply raises more particularized complaints regarding Petitioner’s allegedly improper new arguments, we address those complaints as appropriate below.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Accordingly, we find Petitioner has not shown that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Chung.” slip op. at 65

  Patent outcomesUS 10,137,001 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,137,001
• Canon U.S.A., Inc. / Canon Inc. v. Slingshot Printing LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 9, 2024 · IPR2022-01416 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–12, and 14–16 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, and 14 as anticipated by Studer ’708, and claims 2, 6, 7, 11, 15, and 16 as obvious over Studer ’708 …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had “at least a Bachelor’s or Master’s level college degree in Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, Physics, Electrical Engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of training or experience in the design of inkjet cartridges and printheads.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner does not propose a description of the level of ordinary skill in the art or dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 20. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s description as it is consistent with the asserted prior art and the challenged patent’s specification. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “as a “physical structure other than the convoluted passageways inherently present in a capillary material such as felt, providing a more direct path for air to move from a space in the exit port of the fluid supply tank to the vent in the cover of the tank.” PO Resp. 20. Petitioner does not propose any express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 17. We determine that no 3 US 5,671,001, issued Sept. 23, 1997 (Ex. 1006, “Elliot”). 4 US 2005/0212878 A1, published Sept. 29, 2005 (Ex. 1005, “Studer ’878”). claim terms require express construction for us to determine unpatentability. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. As Petitioner notes, Studer ’708 discloses airflow in the claimed direction because it teaches “methods of the present invention . . . include venting a fluid container to ambient air with a vent located on the upper portion of the container.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1003, 7:39–41) (emphasis added). Studer ’708’s overall emphasis on venting air towards, rather than away from, its fluid interconnect port does not undermine Petitioner’s assertion that the system vents in the opposite direction, as well. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Pond, presents testimony explaining why that is so: “Studer 708’s air vents, air channels, and air spaces are open to the ambient atmosphere for the movement of air both to and from all such spaces.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 109. Further, “a PHOSITA would understand that the direction of this air flow is governed by air pressure inside and outside of the container and necessarily flows both internally and externally.” Id. ¶ 110. In addition, Dr. Pond explains conditions when “air from inside the container 12 must also be vented outside the container” including during “changes in temperature or pressure, jostling or dropping during shipping, or installation of the container into the printer.” Id. ¶ 89. With this explanation, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Studer ’708 discloses the claimed internal vent conduit for removing and releasing air, as the challenged claims require. (2) Claims 1 and 10 Summary Other than the argument addressed above, Patent Owner does not additionally challenge Petitioner’s anticipation challenge to claims 1 and 10. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence (see Pet. 18–34) and, based on that analysis as outlined above, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Studer ’708 anticipates independent claims 1 and 10.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “additional elements in claims 2, 6, 7, 11, 15, and 16, Patent Owner raises two arguments in contesting whether it would have been obvious to combine the two references. See PO Resp. 47–50. First, Patent Owner argues Studer ’708 and Studer ’471 are not analogous art because “Studer ’471 addresses the problem of air pockets being trapped within the capillary material, while Studer ’708 is directed to the entirely different issue of channeling air toward a fluid interconnect port to prevent leakage.” Id. at 48. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Studer ’708 and Studer ’471 are both within the same field of endeavor and address the same problem as the ’523 patent. Specifically, as Petitioner explains, “[j]ust like the ’523 patent, Studer 708 and Studer 471 are generally directed to capillary-filled ink containers that are removably connected to a printhead, and more specifically, to managing the air pressure and air pockets within capillary-filled ink containers.” Pet. 57; see In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 7,938,523 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,938,523
• Life Spine, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2022-01434 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 and 15 are unpatentable over Chung and Olmos-based obviousness grounds; claims 10–14 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not teach the claimed complementary relationship.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “improperly incorporates-by-reference 12 pages of expert testimony via a single sentence.” PO Sur-reply 16 n.2 (citing Pet. Reply 17, which in turn cites Ex. 1026 (Hatch Decl.) ¶¶ 49–66). We find that many of the paragraphs within the cited range (i.e., Hatch Declaration paragraphs 49–66) appear to have a tenuous connection to the proposition for which Petitioner cites these paragraphs. See Pet. Reply 17. That said, we find that paragraphs 53–55 directly relate to Petitioner’s proposition in the Reply, i.e., that “Petitioner’s experts explain why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would rely on a cross-sectional view over a perspective view for making the determination in question, because only the cross-sections provide the needed side view directly orthogonal to the positions of the yellow expansion portion and the end of the dovetail.” Id. Accordingly, we find that paragraphs 53–55—the only paragraphs we cite from Petitioner’s range in reaching our conclusion—are not improperly incorporated by reference into Petitioner’s Reply.” slip op. at 66

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “provide Petitioner an opportunity to respond under the new construction, and decline to strike Petitioner’s relevant argument and evidence. Cf. Axonics, 75 F.4th at 1383 (“[W]hen the Board adopts a new claim construction following institution, an IPR petitioner must have adequate notice and an opportunity to respond under the new construction.”). Like in Axonics, in its new arguments on Reply, Petitioner here relies on the same embodiment from the same prior art reference that it relies on in the Petition to support the same legal argument, i.e., that Olmos’s Figure 16 embodiment discloses the “complementary with one another” limitation of challenged claims 10– 14. See Axonics, 75 F.4th at 1384; see also Apple Inc. v. Andrea Elecs. Corp., 949 F.3d 697, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (permitting petitioner to elaborate in reply on an unpatentability theory presented in the petition). Moreover, we permitted Patent Owner to file (and it indeed did file) a sur-reply brief and expert declaration that addressed Petitioner’s new obviousness theories. Accordingly, both parties had adequate notice of our preliminary construction and an opportunity to respond under that new construction. For these reasons, we deny Patent Owner’s motion to strike.” slip op. at 124

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “from the expansion portion. We agree with Patent Owner that the wording of this limitation as a whole requires that the “extension necessarily must protrude beyond a longitudinal end of the expansion portion.” Id. at 11. We also agree with Patent Owner that “[u]nder Petitioner’s tenuous theory, an extension in any direction except 90 or 180 degrees would satisfy the claim language since any such direction has a so-called ‘longitudinal component.’” Id. at 13. For these reasons, we disagree with Petitioner’s argument that the purported “longitudinal component” of Chung’s extension satisfies limitation 1[h].” slip op. at 55

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “would have been motivated to add an extension to the Figure 16 embodiment because “an integrally-formed extension advantageously requires fewer parts, which facilitates both manufacturing and use.” Pet. 118. We agree with Patent Owner that this argument is unavailing. PO Resp. 50. Petitioner’s combination entails adding an extension (from Figure 8) to an embodiment lacking one (Figure 16). We agree with Patent Owner that adding a new component (whether separately or integrally) can in some instances complicate manufacturing/assembly and increase costs. See id. (citing Ex. 2013 (Culbert Decl.) ¶ 115). Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that the proposed combination in this instance would reduce complexity or facilitate the manufacturing process. Accordingly, we do not rely on this argument offered by Petitioner.” slip op. at 106

  Patent outcomesUS 8,845,731 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,845,731
• Intel Corporation v. Ax Wireless, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01145 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–10 on both asserted § 103 grounds: Yu and Hansen with WWiSE.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “The touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a printed publication is whether it was publicly accessible at the critical time. SRI Int’l v. Internet Security Systems, Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Public accessibility exists where the reference document “has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Patent Owner argues that a relevant person of ordinary skill using reasonable diligence would not reasonably have located the paper residing on the TGn ftp site. Prelim. Resp. 9–10. We discern three potential avenues for public availability in the assertions set forth by Petitioner: (1) availability to the members of TGn through the Wireless World website; (2) availability to others through the ftp site; and (3) availability to others through Mentor. We address each in turn, taking into account Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] at the critical time “would have had at least a master’s degree in electrical engineering or similar discipline, and/or two to three years of experience working or conducting research in the field of wireless communication protocols, or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71). Patent Owner does not contest this assessment. Prelim. Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’146 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Here, neither party sets forth any claim construction. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 3. Therefore, we construe the claims pursuant to § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues, and we agree at this stage, that a general desire to combine two competing proposals as expressed in Hansen does not specifically motivate incorporating ER header bits into the standard, as asserted by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 43–45. Although insufficient by itself to support the asserted combination, such an expressed desire to combine proposals provides some impetus to consider features from each proposal as a compromise to create the new IEEE standard, and we consider that in our consideration of Petitioner’s other reasons.” slip op. at 32

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,212,146
• Intel Corporation v. Ax WirelessInstituted
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2024 · IPR2023-01139 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, and 7–9 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Intel would prevail on at least one claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)5 (“Fintiv Memo”). The Fintiv Memo sets forth, inter alia, that the Board will not discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a) when a petitioner submits a so-called Sotera stipulation, i.e., the petitioner “stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Fintiv Memo 7 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020)). A Sotera stipulation mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting PTAB and district-court decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and PTAB. Id.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in electrical engineering or similar discipline, and/or two to three years of experience working or conducting research in the field of wireless communication protocols, or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). would have had at the time of the invention of the ’272 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 9. As adopted, we view the definition for the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the ’272 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “Here, neither party sets forth any term for claim construction. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 3. Thus, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “awaiting peer review on an FTP server as “placing posters at an unpublicized conference with no attendees,” with no record that it “was accessible to anyone other than the peer-review committee.” SRI, 511 F.3d at 1197. Here, there is ample evidence that membership in the working group, attendance at its meetings, and access to its documents was available to the public. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14 (meetings open to public); 15 (submissions presented at meetings and available to all participants); 18 (stating that “an interested member of the public could visit the 802wirelessworld website, click the ‘become a member ‘link . . . and download any submissions that had been uploaded”). Unlike SRI, WWiSE was not intended for a select group of people to review prior to its publication; instead, WWiSE was intended for public debate among the working group members to influence their choices for the new 802.11n standard. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 89 (WWiSE presentation in July 2005 presented aspects from the various TGn Sync and WWiSE proposals”). SRI is therefore also inapposite to the facts here. Of greater significance to the facts at hand is the court’s analysis in GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, 908 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In GoPro, the court stated, “our case law directs us to also consider the nature of the conference or meeting; whether there are restrictions on public disclosure of the information; expectations of confidentiality; and expectations of sharing the information.” Id. at 694 (citing Medtronic v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd, 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (public accessibility indicated where “a publication’s purpose is ‘dialogue with the intended [public] audience’”). In GoPro, the court noted that the trade show at issue, “not unlike conferences . . . is directed to individuals interested in the commercial and developmental aspects of products.” GoPro, 908 F.3d at 694. The GoPro court determined that, although its trade show was open only to dealers rather than the general public, the document at issue “was disseminated with no restrictions and was intended to reach the general public.” Id. at 695. Like GoPro, WWiSE was disseminated with no expectation of confidentiality, as it was available to be shared by the TGn members through unrestricted download and by sharing the publicly available ftp site location and access credentials. Ex. 1007 ¶ 19. Public disclosure was encouraged, not restricted, as evidenced by the public nature of the TGn meetings at which proposals such as WWiSE were discussed by the working group. Id. ¶¶ 14, 18, 19. Moreover, the WWiSE proposals were known to the public as one of two finalist proposals considered for adoption as the new standard. globe at IEEE meetings,” “support has coalesced around two main proposals, from groups named TGn Sync and WWiSE.”). Also like GoPro, the relevant audience was involved in the meeting because the TGn group members and attendees of the 802.11 working group meetings were engineers, researchers, and business persons interested in networking technologies, including wireless local area networking (WLAN) technologies. Ex. 1017 ¶ 14; see also Ex. 2015, 311 (stating that “quite a few manufacturers of electronic devices that might use 802.11 (Cisco, Nokia, Nortel, Philips, Samsung, Sanyo, Sony, and Toshiba) have also become part of the effort”). Based on the above facts, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,917,272

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.