- PTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2022-01142 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–14 on all asserted grounds: anticipation by or obviousness over Roy or Chang, and obviousness over Simonoff and Naef.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, we conclude Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that claims of the ’124 patent are unpatentable under the presented grounds. Therefore, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims (1–14) under the grounds raised in the Petition, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30).9 Patent Owner states that it “adopt[s] Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’124 Patent as well as the asserted prior art.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner adds that “[t]he expert witnesses of the parties are persons of (at least) ordinary skill in the art of the ’124 Patent and its claims.” Id. We accept Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’124 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[]” evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). B.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“In re Merck for this point). And, further, when considering obviousness, the prior art must be considered for all of its teachings, including unpreferred embodiments. See Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989). With this precedent in mind, we restate that Simonoff’s disclosure appears to fully include Naef’s disclosure. Ex. 1006, 3:24–29. Further, both references apparently identify the existence and general functionality of central-server systems for remote computer collaboration where the server is in charge of updating all networked computers’ displays, even if Naef’s disclosed invention is not such a system, but instead puts a client computer in control. See generally Ex. 1006; Ex. 1007. Finally, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Terveen, testifies that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have had good reason to “improve Simonoff’s similar collaboration system” by having its server return update/annotation messages back to the source client along with the other clients during its “multi-casting,” as suggested by Naef, because this would “avoid[] conflicts between user inputs and [would] allow[] the source client to see the edits as the other clients would see them. Ex. 1003 ¶73 (citing Ex. 1015, 12:56–67; Ex. 1008, 45; Ex. 1006, 24:22–27). At this stage of the proceedings, we credit Dr. Terveen’s testimony and find Petitioner’s position reasonable. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments or evidence at this stage (we are not entirely sure what qualifies Mr. Sunatori’s as a reliable witness at this point) so as to dissuade us from instituting trial on this ground.” slip op. at 52
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Owner’s positions on claim construction, both identifying that claim construction is unnecessary and then proposing the above-indicated claim construction. Prelim. Reply 1. Petitioner argues that neither the disputed claim language itself nor the Specification supports Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because the claims simply state “that the output message includes information defining the content to be shared, not the input message itself or a copy of it.” Id. Petitioner cites two portions of the ’124 patent’s written description that contradict Patent Owner’s narrow definition of the claim language––the first indicating that input messages and output messages may be in different formats and have different data and that the output messages can be generated once the input messages are read (Ex. 1001, 14:27–33), and the second indicating that the output messages could combine multiple input messages, and that output messages represent input messages that themselves represent computer input such as a mouse drag (id.at 33:1–9). We agree with Petitioner that the record does not support narrowing the meaning of the disputed claim language as argued by Patent Owner and, based on the present record, we do not expressly construe this claim language.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,963,124 - Flowco Production Solutions LLC v. Well Master CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01386 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–11, 13, 15, 16, 18–21, 23, and 24 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We therefore deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. DISCUSSION A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or an appropriate engineering discipline, as well as at least three years of experience in designing well plungers.” Pet. 5–6. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. Prelim. Resp. 2; Ex. 2001 ¶ 38. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“The ’892 patent prosecution history evidences that an unimpeded fluid path does not include valves. During prosecution, Patent Owner amended the independent claims to claim “an unimpeded fluid path” in claims 1 and 23 and “an unimpeded narrow passageway within the fluid path” in claim 18. Ex. 1002, 61–64 (emphasis in original). Patent Owner argued that, The Applicant has amended independent claims 1, 18, and 23 to clarify that the fluid path is unimpeded. The alleged fluid path through the body of the plunger disclosed by Brown identified at page 4 of the Office Action is not unimpeded due to the presence of valves 76 and 102/104. Thus, Brown cannot anticipate claims 1, 2, 4–8, 12, 18, 19 or 23 of the present application. Id. at 66. In response, the Examiner issued a Notice of Allowability but did not provide a Statement of Reasons for Allowance. Id. at 43. “Prosecution disclaimer can arise from both claim amendments and arguments.” Tech. Props. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., 849 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Here, Patent Owner’s amendments to claim an unimpeded fluid path/passageway and arguments distinguishing Brown’s fluid path as being impeded by valves 76, 102/104 (versus unimpeded as claimed) clearly and unmistakably disclaimed coverage of plungers having bypass valves in the fluid path and narrow passageway through the plunger body.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“b. Motivation to Combine Further, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that a skilled artisan would not have modified Gray’s bypass valve with Victor’s stopper because their different principles of operation would render Gray’s plunger unsuitable for its intended purpose of providing lift in early stage wells. See Prelim Resp. 35–38 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 66–75, 103–107, 111). Mr. Cosby testifies that Gray and Victor operate differently so adding a narrow passage of Victor to Gray’s plunger would reduce the ability of Gray’s plunger to work in high pressure wells. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 103–07; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 57, 91, 98, 111–12. The record supports Mr. Cosby’s testimony, and Petitioner’s attorney arguments do not address the arguments and evidence. Pet. 14–15. For this additional reason, Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating the unpatentability of any of claims 1–11, 13, 15, 16, 18–21, 23, and 24 under Ground 1.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,627,892 - PTAB · Nov 29, 2022 · IPR2022-00864 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7–36, 40, and 41 on all asserted §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent; 2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it; 3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition; 4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition; 5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent; 6. the finite resources of the Board; and 7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director notices institution of review. Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 15–16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential). The General Plastic factors are not dispositive, but part of a balanced assessment of the relevant circumstances in a proceeding, including the merits. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuide Consolidated (“TPG”).” slip op. at 10
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredOther
“Arguments and information that are not presented and developed in the Petition, but instead are incorporated by reference, are not entitled to consideration, as it is improper to incorporate by reference arguments from one document into another document. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 at 7–10 (PTAB August 29, 2014) (informative) (discussing incorporation by reference). We note that Patent Owner does not argue that Petitioner has failed to adequately present a reason to combine Zupancich and Bosher in that asserted ground absent the allegedly improperly incorporated discussions in paragraph 413 of the Jobin Declaration. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not view as improper Petitioner’s reliance on that paragraph of the Jobin Declaration as part of its reason to combine analysis. 4. Conclusion For these reasons, these arguments by Patent Owner do not present any bases to deny the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have “had at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical or structural engineering, or related fields, and two years’ experience designing structures with comparable mechanical and/or structural elements to the ’855 Patent’s subject matter.” Pet. 10 (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 23–26). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional experience may compensate for less education.” Id. (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 23–26). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any of the claim language discussed in this section or any other claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent 15 “VIPs” refers to vacuum insulated panels. necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).16” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,263,855 - PTAB · Oct 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00878 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 55–72, 78–80, and 83–85 on all eight asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been a mechanical engineer, medical device engineer, or an interventional cardiologist with a working knowledge of stent-based prostheses for use in a patient’s heart or vasculature to replace and/or repair a diseased valve, intravascular delivery systems for the delivery of such prostheses, and methods associated with the delivery and implantation of such prostheses in a patient. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶ 27). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioners’ definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 3 (citing Pet. 31). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“On the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner that the term “folds” need not be construed at this time. We further agree with both parties that many claim terms are defined by the ’400 patent and these definitions control. Pet. 26; Prelim. Resp. 16. The meaning of the claim term “substantially conical” is central to our analysis of Grounds 5–8. Accordingly, we reproduce the definition of this term from the Specification of the ’400 patent below:” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“folds” need not be construed at this time. We further agree with both parties that many claim terms are defined by the ’400 patent and these definitions control. Pet. 26; Prelim. Resp. 16. The meaning of the claim term “substantially conical” is central to our analysis of Grounds 5–8. Accordingly, we reproduce the definition of this term from the Specification of the ’400 patent below: resembling a cone or a portion thereof at some point in the practical use of the structure with the specific property that the transverse (that is, on a plane of section generally perpendicular to the axis of flow of the valve) cross-sectional perimeter or area of said structure in the operationally closed position decreases monotonically moving from the level of the leaflet apposition to the proximal end of the valve. Ex. 1001, 12:47–54. We agree with Patent Owner and Petitioner that this definition of “substantially conical” applies to the claims at issue in this proceeding. issue in this proceeding for at least some of the challenges presented by Petitioner as will be discussed in Sections II.D–II.H below. As, however, construction of this claim term is not required for our institution decision, we invite the parties to brief this issue in their respective responses to this decision. slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“however, the references relied are the same or substantially the same as art presented to the Office. Prelim. Resp. 75.8 We thus determine under the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework that these references were previously presented to the Office. Accordingly, we proceed to the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework and consider whether Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10 (“[I]f the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something”). In Grounds 1–4, Petitioner explains how references meet the limitations of the claims at issue. Pet. 31–75. For the reasons discussed in Section II.D–II.G below, we find that Petitioner demonstrates that the Examiner erred by overlooking the specific teachings in the relevant prior art such that the error by the Office was material to the patentability of the challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 21. Thus, with respect to Grounds 1–4, on this record, we determine that the totality of the evidence favors declining to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,737,400 - PTAB · Oct 4, 2022 · IPR2022-00851 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19, 39, and 40 on all asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“the claims challenged in this proceeding and in the ’293 IPR. Of the nine claims challenged in the ’293 IPR, seven are also challenged in this proceeding. Based on the overlap in the claims challenged in the ’293 IPR and this proceeding, the first factor weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenInstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical or structural engineering, or related fields, and two years’ experience designing structures with comparable mechanical and/or structural elements to the ’511 Patent’s subject matter.” Pet. 10 (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 23–26). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional experience may compensate for less education.” Id. (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 23–26). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 25
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any of the claim language discussed in this section or any other claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we 14 “VIPs” refers to vacuum insulated panels. need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).15” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,913,511 - Ironridge, Inc. v. Pegasus Solar, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 10, 2022 · PGR2022-00024 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show that any challenged claim 1–12 was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below we determine that the information presented does not show that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus deny institution of post-grant review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(b) (“At any time prior to institution of post-grant review, the Board may deny all grounds for unpatentability for all of the challenged claims. Denial of all grounds is a Board decision not to institute post-grant review.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s counsel was sufficient to meet the service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.205. Section (a) of that regulatory provision states that “[t]he petition and supporting evidence must be served on the patent owner at the correspondence address of record for the subject patent. The petitioner may additionally serve the petition and supporting evidence on the patent owner at any other address known to the petitioner as likely to effect service.” Section (b) adds that, “[u]pon agreement of the parties, service may be made electronically.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.205(b) (emphasis added). Although Petitioner does appear to have emailed the Petition to persons satisfying the requirements in § 42.205(a), there is nothing in the record indicating an agreement between the parties that service may be made electronically, as required by § 42.205(b). See, e.g., Ex. 1020 at 1 (showing an attorney for Petitioner in this proceeding asking Mr. Holm if Patent Owner would “agree to electronic service” without any showing of a subsequent agreement). Without an agreement between the parties as to sufficiency of electronic service, we find Petitioner’s emailing of the Petition to Mr. Holm and Mr. Fisher insufficient to effect service.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“B. Discretion Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) and § 325(d) Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under § 324(a) and under § 325(d) to deny institution. See Prelim. Resp. 50–51 (discussing § 324(a)), 11–21 (discussing § 325(d)). Because we deny the Petition after considering the merits of each ground, we need not and do not reach Patent Owner’s arguments based on discretion.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, structural engineering, or similar technical field, with at least three years of relevant (metal fabrication, aluminum extrusion, architectural glass structural) product design experience.” Pet. 36 (citing Cinnamon Decl. ¶ 51). Petitioner adds that “[a]n increase in experience could compensate for less education.” Id. (citing Cinnamon Decl. ¶ 51). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,998,847 - MG Freesites Ltd v. Scorpcast, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00510 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 9–11, 18–20, 22, 26, and 27 are unpatentable; claims 13 and 24 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the asserted references fail to disclose the claimed navigation sequence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science (or equivalent) plus approximately two years of work experience with technologies relating to content annotation and/or content sharing among multiple users.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–33). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 10. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the level of skill reflected in the ’063 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We apply the same claim construction standard used by Article III federal courts and the International Trade Commission, both of which follow Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Accordingly, we construe each challenged claim of the ’063 patent to generally be “the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“Analysis Legal Standard for Corroborating Conception “Conception is a question of law predicated on subsidiary factual findings, one of which is the sufficiency of corroboration.” Apator Miitors ApS v. Kamstrup AS, 887 F.3d 1293, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We not reach the question of whether co-inventors Mr. Sreenath and Mr. Avedissian conceived of the claimed invention prior to June 4, 2009 unless “there is sufficient corroboration.” Kolcraft Enter., Inc. v. Graco Child.’s Prods., conception must be corroborated by other, independent information.” Id. (citations omitted). We examine all pertinent evidence under a rule of reason analysis “to determine whether the inventor’s testimony is credible.” Id. “Even under the ‘rule of reason’ analysis, however, the evidence of corroboration must not depend solely on the inventor himself.” Apator, 887 F.3d at 1295.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner supports its position that the display of the first and second images in Geer changes from the first segment to the second segment with the testimony of Dr. Porter. Ex. 1002 ¶ 185. Dr. Porter testifies that “when video playback is of the first video segment (e.g., corresponding to the first advertisement), the first image (e.g., image of MP3 player) is displayed both as product icon 312a and within the displayed advertisement, whereas the second image (e.g., image of sunglasses) is displayed only as product icon 312b.” Id. Dr. Porter further testifies that “[w]hen video playback is of the second video segment (e.g., corresponding to the second advertisement), the first image is displayed only as product icon 312a, whereas the second image is displayed both as product icon 312b and within the displayed advertisement.” Id. ¶ 186 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47–48, Figs. 3A–3C). Dr. Porter also points to the text of paragraph 47 of Geer that “pop-out window contains a more detailed description of the product represented by the first ¶ 185 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 47). We find that Dr. Porter’s testimony is entitled to substantial weight because it is focused on the actual claim language concerning the “display” of the first image and second image and is supported by the disclosure of Geer. In particular, he explains how the display of the product icons changes and the fact that a larger picture of the product appears when the icon is selected is particularly probative of a change in the “display” of the first image and the second image. This testimony is confirmed by Figures 3B and 3C. In Figure 3B, the sunglasses are displayed only as a small image in scrubber bar 306. In Figure 3C, the sunglasses are displayed both as a small image in scrubber bar 306 and as a larger image in the pop-out window 316. We credit Dr. Porter’s testimony over that of Dr. Valerdi because Dr. Valerdi’s testimony focuses on the images of product icons in the scrubber area, not on the display of the images.” slip op. at 59
Patent outcomesUS 9,899,063 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,899,063 - MG Freesites Ltd v. Scorpcast, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5–8, 10, 11, 15–17, 20, 21, and 25–28 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds failed to establish required claim limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science (or equivalent) plus approximately two years of work experience with technologies relating to content annotation and/or content sharing among multiple users.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 9. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the level of skill reflected in the ‘463 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with the determination in IPR2020-01697 that not all areas in the recited “scrubber area” must perform scrubbing functionality for the following reasons. First, claim 1 recites “the scrubber area comprising a scrubber that includes a draggable scrubber control that indicates video playback progress via a scrubber timeline . . . and which is manipulable to control playback of the first video file by dragging the scrubber control.” Ex. 1001, 50:61–67. The use of the open-ended transition “comprising” indicates the scrubber area may include more than the draggable scrubber control. Second, the Specification of the ’463 patent describes “scrubber area” as including a “scrubber bar” and optionally “an area adjacent to the scrubber bar.” Id. at 2:48–54. But, the description of the optional area the adjacent area must include scrubbing functionality. See id. Third, our determination that the area adjacent the scrubber control does not necessarily include scrubbing functionality is consistent with Figure 10 of the ’463 patent where the right-hand side of scrubber area 1002 includes items unrelated to scrubbing functionality, e.g., volume control.10 For the foregoing reasons, we do not adopt the EDTX construction of scrubber area because doing so would require us to read a limitation into “scrubber area” that, in our view, is not supported by the evidence.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Pet. 46. We note, however, that Roberts does not use the terms “scrubber” or “scrubber area.” See generally Ex. 1004. Dr. Porter testifies that the red rectangles added to Figures 9 and 13 represent a “scrubber area” but, he cites no persuasive evidence from Roberts to support his opinion concerning the size and shape of the alleged scrubber areas in Roberts’ Figures 9 and 13, nor does he explain why images 904 and 1004 are “adjacent” the timeline. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 78–79. Therefore, his testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). In order to satisfy this limitation, Petitioner creates different size scrubbing areas in Figures 9 and 13 of Roberts to fit its obviousness theory. Image 904 in Roberts’ Figure 9 is near the timeline but does not border the timeline. In addition, only one image, not the first plurality of images, is shown in the scrubber area Petitioner identifies in Figure 9. In Roberts’ Figure 13, images 904 and 1004 are shown within Petitioner’s larger proposed scrubbing area, but neither image borders the timeline. In Figure 13, image 904 is further from the timeline than image 1004 and further from the timeline than in Figure 9. Ex. 1004, Figs. 9, 13. Petitioner, however, fails to explain why image 904, which is positioned differently in Figure 9 and Figure 13, is adjacent the timeline in both. See Pet. 45–48.” slip op. at 34
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Analysis The language of limitation 1.5 recites that “at least partly in response to detecting that a user . . . select[s] the first image . . . causing the playback of the first video file to jump to a segment of the first video file corresponding to the first image.” Ex. 1001, 51:1–11. Both parties agree that this language imposes a temporal requirement that the user selects the first image and, then after the user selection, the playback of the first video file jumps to a segment of the first video file corresponding to the first image. Tr. 58:8–18, 109:9–10.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 9,703,463 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,703,463 - PTAB · Jun 8, 2022 · IPR2022-00293 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 7–11, 30, and 31 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses a twopart framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d): (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med- El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB 9 US 2004/0226309 A1, published November 18, 2004 (Ex. 1012, “Broussard”). Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying this framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph). If, after review of factors (a), (b), and (d), we determine that the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, then factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner demonstrates that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, structural engineering, or a related field, and two years of experience designing structures with comparable mechanical and/or structural elements to the subject matter of the ’511 Patent.” Pet. 12 (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 22–25). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional experience may compensate for less education.” Id. (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 22–25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See Prelim. Resp. 10; GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes express constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 11. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,913,511 - PTAB · Jun 8, 2022 · IPR2022-00292 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 19–21, 23, 26–31, 33, 35–37, and 41 on all asserted grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“The mere fact that the additional prior art references relied on by Petitioner (i.e., Ekerot, Kuhn, Loeffler, and Sinclair) pertain to one or more of the same fields to which the art cited in prosecution also pertains is not sufficient alone to satisfy the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework by showing that these additional references are “substantially the same” as art previously presented to the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 45–46. Indeed, the prior art cited in petitions for inter partes review and the art cited during prosecution of the challenged patent will likely always relate to the same subject matter as that in the claims at issue. On these facts, we conclude that Petitioner bases at least the first three asserted grounds (Kuhn; Loeffler and Kuhn; Sinclair and Kuhn) on prior art and arguments that are not the same or substantially the same as the prior art or arguments before the Examiner. When considering the Petition as a whole, we find that it does not sufficiently implicate the concerns addressed by § 325(d) to warrant discretionary denial. Because the first part of the framework in Advanced Bionics is not met, we need not reach “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8–9.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical or structural engineering, or a related field, and two years of experience designing structures with comparable mechanical and/or structural elements to the subject matter of the ’855 Patent.” Pet. 10 (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 22–25). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional experience may compensate for less education.” Id. (citing Jobin Decl. ¶¶ 22–25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See Prelim. Resp. 10; GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes express constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 8. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,263,855
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.