- Canon U.S.A., Inc. / Canon Inc. v. Slingshot Printing LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · IPR2023-00309 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5–6, 8–10, and 13–15 as obvious over Benjamin144 and Benjamin703; claims 4, 11–12, and 16–20 as obvious with Childers.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “[O]ne or more factors may predominate.” Id. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Turning to the claim language, we agree with Petitioner that “proximity is measured along the trace relative to the bondpad,” and “[n]othing in the claims requires a comparison to other structures, like the heater arrays.” Pet. Reply 6. For example, claim 3 recites “wherein the 8 Deposition Transcript of Steven Dietl (Dec. 19, 2023). bondpad supplies power to the first heater array and the second heater array portions by power traces physically separated proximal to the bondpad.” Ex. 1001, 6:43–46 (emphasis added). In this context, “proximal” relates to the power traces, and where they are separated, relative to the bondpad. Id. In other words, the traces are separated nearer to the bondpad (which is the traces’ proximal end relative to the bondpad) then the end of the traces (which is the traces’ distal end relative to the bondpad). Id. This conclusion is consistent with the definitions for proximal and distal from the dictionary that Patent Owner identifies. In particular, “proximal” is defined as “situated nearer to . . . the point of attachment,” and “distal” is defined as “situated away . . . from the point of attachment.” Ex. 2001, 3; Ex. 1016, 3. Here, the point of attachment is the bondpad. Of note, the dictionary also states that proximal is “[t]he opposite of distal,” which reinforces that the distance comparison for the separation is relative to the ends of the power traces. Ex. 2001, 3. Obviously, there are two ends to the traces with one being proximal to the bondpad and the other distal thereto. And we find that consulting the dictionary definition is appropriate here under our circumstances. See Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving of “consult[ing] a general dictionary definition of [a] word for guidance” in determining ordinary meaning); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur decisions, including Phillips, do not preclude the use of general dictionary definitions as an aid to claim construction.”) (citation omitted).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Lastly, we have reviewed the experts’ testimony for this term. And we are persuaded by Dr. Pond’s testimony as we find it consistent with the claim language and the cited dictionary definitions. Ex. 2005,9 16:20–19:23. In contrast, we find Mr. Dietl’s testimony for this term contradicts the claim language and the cited dictionary definitions. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 55–57.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Thus, we view the combination of Benjamin144 and Benjamin703 as comprising a single disclosure in view of the incorporation by reference. See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Or at a minimum, the incorporation by reference provides an explicit motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references’ teachings. See Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988; see also Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Combining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.”). In addition, however, Petitioner argues that “utilizing a bondpad to supply FIRE energy signals to the fire lines 214 like in Benjamin[]703 would have been an obvious combination of prior art elements to yield predictable results.” Pet. 45–46; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 207–208. We agree with Petitioner’s argument and find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to combine Benjamin144 and Benjamin703 in the manner Petitioner does. In sum, we find that Petitioner shows that the combination of Benjamin144 and Benjamin703 teaches the bondpad limitation and provides sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support combining Benjamin144 and Benjamin703’s teachings.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 7,290,864 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,290,864 - Apple Inc. v. Immervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00472 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 3–7 are anticipated by Thibault, and claims 1–7 are obvious over Thibault.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s undisputed contention that a POSITA (person of ordinary skill in the art) “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing physics, optical engineering, electrical engineering and/or a similar discipline, and at least five years of experience in developing and designing optical imaging systems and have familiarity with image processing algorithms and optical design software” and that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner states: “Solely for purposes of this Response, Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition of a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 45). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “specific findings on the level of skill in the art . . . [are not required] ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“To the extent necessary to determine whether the disputed language of limitation 1[e] encompasses both Figure 6 and Figure 7, we agree with Petitioner that the language of limitation 1[e] encompasses both Figure 6 and Figure 7. We determine we need not expressly construe any other claim terms. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 27
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“presented a more comprehensive claim construction position in its Petition, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s “claim construction” positions in this proceeding are improperly responsive or belated. Claim construction can be an evolving issue. We have reviewed Petitioner’s presentation of its arguments at the outset, in the Petition, and we have addressed the Petition’s arguments regarding whether limitation 1[e] is an intended use, above. Regarding the remaining arguments, we note that our rules provide that a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). The Board “will permit the petitioner, in its reply brief, to address issues discussed in the institution decision,” but a petitioner “may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. A party also may submit rebuttal evidence in support of its reply.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/ TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (citing Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1077–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). We have reviewed the parties’ post-institution arguments regarding limitation 1[e], and we are not persuaded that the subsequent development of both parties’ positions on the interpretation of this term throughout the course of this proceeding is contrary to our rules. “There is no rule, for example, requiring a petition to describe all possible or reasonable claim constructions and to present invalidity theories under those constructions.” Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 75 F.4th 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Axonics court further opined that “we have continued to recognize that a petitioner is entitled under the APA to respond to new claim construction arguments made by a patent owner.” Id. at 1382. A recent Federal Circuit case addressing Axonics and a petitioner’s opportunity to respond to a patent owner’s newly presented claim construction argument, which was decided after oral hearing in this case, supports the Axonics approach. Apple v. Omni MedSci, No. 2023-1034, slip op. at 11–12 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2024). This case summarizes some relevant pre-existing case law in reaching its conclusion that under “both Axonics and earlier precedents, the Board abused its discretion here in refusing to consider [petitioner] Apple’s reply argument.” Id. (citing SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018); Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Thibault but, rather, only that “Thibault renders obvious claim 2.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 127–128). Petitioner argues that Thibault teaches “special optimization” of MTF to “control the image quality in production so that it remains in the specification.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3). Petitioner further argues that “a POSITA would have understood that Thibault’s lens designs were intended to achieve ‘constant image quality across a whole field of view,’” or “that it would have been obvious to achieve such an outcome using known ‘guidelines’ within the industry.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 128). Petitioner provided no development of an anticipation position with respect to claim 2. Accordingly, although Petitioner’s uncontested position on claim 2 supports a finding of obviousness based on Thibault, because it is reasonable, not persuasively controverted, and supported by testimony, it does not support a finding of anticipation.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 10,795,120 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,795,120 - PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00119 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim despite finding Wong was not shown to be prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–17 of the ’760 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 36–42). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’760 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:15–17, 7:49–51, 8:6–8, 9:10–12). We agree with Patent Owner that “slidably” in claim 1 requires that some continuous surface-to-surface contact must occur. Patent Owner further argues, however, that the figures, such as Figure 12A of the ’760 Patent, provide minimal clearance between the remote/latch release. Prelim. Resp. 10–11. These figures merely depict embodiments of an optical fiber connector after final assembly. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:51–57 (stating that Figure 12A depicts “one embodiment” and that Figure 12B is a top view of the Figure 12A connector). We do not discern anything about the word “slidably” or claim 1 that requires minimal clearance after assembly. We also do not discern anything about claim 1 that requires that, for example, the inner portion of the groove slide against the lower portion of the latch release. Rather, the inner portion of the groove must be above to “receive” the lower portion of the latch release. How does it receive it? It does so “slidably.” The recitation is met so long as the inner portion of the groove is configured such that it can receive the lower portion of the latch release via any sliding. Neither the inner portion nor the lower portion, in particular, must have sliding surface-to-surface contact. In a similar way, neither the outer portion of the groove nor the narrower portion of the latch release must have sliding surface-to-surface contact. Thus, rather than importing a minimal clearance requirement into claim 1’s “slidably” recitations and rather than requiring that specific components must slide (when the claim does not state as much), we understand, for example, “the inner portion of the groove being configured to slidably receive the lower portion of the latch release” to mean that the inner portion of the groove has structure capable of receiving the lower portion of the latch release via a sliding motion. Such sliding could include any degree of surface-to-surface contact between parts; for example, the bottom surface of the latch release could slide along the upper surface of the groove. Similarly, “the outer portion of the groove being configured to slidably receive the narrower portion of the latch release” means that the outer portion of the groove has structure capable of receiving the narrower portion of the latch release via a sliding motion.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“connectors. Pet. 14–16. Petitioner argues that Raven teaches a connector that includes two ferrules and that Kuffel teaches an MPO connector that contains MT ferrules. Id. at 15–17 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003, Fig. 1; Ex. 1004, 5:16–27; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 150–151). Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Kuffel’s MPO connectors (which contain MT ferrules) would be used to increase density within data transmission networks. Id. at 16 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004, 4:8–14; Ex. 1007 ¶ 147; Ex. 1015; Ex. 1025; Ex. 1027). Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified Raven’s two ferrule connector to use an MT ferrule (as Kuffel teaches) and argues that such a modification would improve Raven’s device in the same way as described in Kuffel. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 152–154). Petitioner argues that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making this modification. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 155). Petitioner argues that the modification (1) is supported by the disclosures of Kuffel and Raven, (2) represents a simple substitution, and (3) would enable Raven to incorporate a multi-fiber connector. Id. at 20–23 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 159–169). Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Raven and Kuffel with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,415,760 - PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00117 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all petitioned grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including anticipation of claim 1 by Nguyen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim, and we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims of the ’836 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“A reference qualifies as a printed publication only if it was publicly accessible before the effective filing date of the challenged patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); M & K Holdings, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 985 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Public accessibility “has been called the touch-stone” in determining whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication. M & K Holdings, 985 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (quotes and citations omitted).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“2. Independent Claim 1 a. Preamble Petitioner contends that Nguyen discloses the claim 1 preamble, which recites “an adapter for mating with optical fiber connectors.” Ex. 1001, 18:12. Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–30, Figs. 1, 2). We find that Petitioner’s contention for the claim 1 preamble is adequate for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“2. Reasons to Combine Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to modify Nguyen’s adapter in two ways. Pet. 54. First, Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to include “optical-fiber connectors that employ handles configured to remotely release connectors from the adapter” by replacing Nguyen’s connectors with Lee’s connectors. Pet. 54–56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 289–295). Second, Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to include “a transverse wall that includes slots halfway between two ends of the adapter and sleeve holders that employ sockets to mate with cylindrically-shaped ferrules” by replacing Nguyen’s wall with Lee’s sleeve holders. Pet. 54, 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 296–302). Petitioner provides several reasons for the first modification, including a desire for convenience, tightly packed fiber optic ferrules, ease of maintenance, and scalability. Pet. 54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 289–290). According to Petitioner, these goals would be served because “Lee’s handle allows a user to disengage the latch arm further from the adapter” whereas “[t]he latch arms of Nguyen require a user to be closer to the adapter.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 289). Petitioner also provides reasons for the second modification, asserting that “Lee’s sleeve holders are easy to maintain because they are removable, able to snap into place, and coordinate with dust caps to maintain cleanliness, as opposed to Nguyen’s immobile wall.” Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 297). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Nguyen’s adapter to incorporate Lee’s sleeve holders and slots to provide a system that is easier to maintain.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 298–299). We find that Petitioner’s asserted rationale for modifying Nguyen in view of Lee is adequate for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,333,836 - NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00142 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent “would have had at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and one to two years of experience in the field of circuit design, particularly the design of circuits operating at high frequencies.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent or identify any specific shortcoming in Petitioner’s definition. See Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 4. This definition is consistent with the ’330 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “no express constructions of the claims are necessary to assess whether the prior art reads on the challenged claims.” Pet. 8. However, Petitioner also cites to a Special Master Report and Recommendation on Claim Construction where “node” was construed to mean “a point of connection or intersection in an electrical circuit.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ex. 1015, 29). Patent Owner adopts this construction for purposes of this Decision on Institution. Prelim. Resp. 8. We find that this construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “node.” We thus apply the construction as such to our analysis below, and we determine that we need not provide an express construction of any other claim term for purposes of this institution decision.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“[claim] limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “A claim limitation is inherent in the prior art if it is necessarily present in the prior art, not merely probably or possibly present.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite, Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “[t]o anticipate, the reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F. 3d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, it is not enough to be able to find all of the pieces of the claimed invention somewhere in a prior art reference; rather, those elements must be set out in the prior art reference in the same way they are in the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,535,330 - NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00167 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence presented, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim based on any ground asserted in the Petition. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition is denied, and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 22
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“For all of the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Okabe discloses a semiconductor integrated circuit package with a first layer that includes “a first ground plane enabling electrical connection with low speed electronic circuitry” and a “second ground plane enabling electrical connection with high speed electronic circuitry.” Ex. 1001, 9:25–36.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a “bachelor’s degree in a field relating to the integrated circuit package manufacturing process like materials science, physics, electrical engineering, or other related subjects, and at least two to three years of experience with fabrication and packaging of integrated circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. As Patent Owner and Dr. Bernstein point out, Petitioner does not specify the frequencies at which duplexer 45 and VCO 70 operate in Okabe. Prelim. Resp. 20; Ex. 2001 ¶ 79. Nor does Petitioner direct us to any criteria for classifying circuitry as “high speed” or “low speed.” Prelim. Resp. 20; Ex. 2001 ¶ 79. As a result, we are left with only the assertion of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood about duplexer 45 and VCO 70. To support this assertion, Petitioner directs us to statements in Dr. Baker’s declaration that mirror the Petition. Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–73). Dr. Baker, however, does not cite to any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statements. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–73. “Thus, the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (August 24, 2022) (precedential); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Okabe discloses a second layer that includes a “third ground plane configured for electrical connection with low speed electronic circuitry” and a “fourth ground plane configured for electrical connection with high speed electronic circuitry.” Ex. 1001, 9:37– 43.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,646,091 - PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00032 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 on all asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 of the ’494 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“an IDS in the ’494 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that the record shows that Bhattacharya and Spain10 were listed on an IDS during prosecution of the parent ’358 patent, which the ’494 patent Examiner was required to consider. Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing MPEP 609.02). As such, we determine that Bhattacharya and Spain were presented previously to the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 9; Advanced Bionics at 7–8. We also agree with Patent Owner that the addition of Meunier does not substantially impact our § 325(d) analysis because of the Petition’s limited reliance on this reference. For these reasons, we determine that the first prong of Advanced Bionics is met and turn to the second prong.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with working with navigation and/or geolocation systems. 1003 ¶ 8; Pet. 6, n.2. According to Petitioner, “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 43. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’494 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,786,494 - PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00031 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 15–20, 24, 26, and 27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation and obviousness.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id.” slip op. at 6
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.7” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,400,358 - NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00168 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8 on all petition grounds addressing those claims, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–6 and 8 of the ’245 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in a field relating to the semiconductor manufacturing process, such as materials science, physics, electrical engineering, and/or other related subjects, and at least two to three years of experience with fabrication of integrated circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 20). Petitioner also contends “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’245 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Claim 1 affirmatively recites, for example, “a plurality of layers under the top layer.” Ex. 1001, 4:13. Claim 1 also affirmatively recites that the “plurality of layers compris[es] a bottom routing layer having signal traces thereon.” Id. at 4:14–15. So, claim 1 requires a bottom routing layer having signal traces. Claim 1 then recites “where[] none of the signal traces of the bottom routing layer are located over ball pads of the ball pad layer which are disposed in an area within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die.” Id. at 4:17–20. This recitation serves to describe the “signal traces of the bottom routing layer.” The recitation does not affirmatively recite a required location of any ball pads. Likewise, the claim as a whole also does not state that the ball pad layer comprises ball pads disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die. Rather, the claim recites “said ball pad layer having a plurality of ball pads” without affirmatively indicating where those ball pads must be located within the ball pad layer. Thus, on the present record, we interpret claim 1’s recitation of “none of the signal traces . . . within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die” as requiring that no signal traces of the bottom routing layer be located over ball pads of the ball pad layer disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die if any such ball pads exist in this location. We do not interpret claim 1 as affirmatively requiring ball pads disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die. To the extent Patent Owner maintains arguments regarding this recitation in a Patent Owner Response, we invite the parties to further address this claim construction issue at trial to the extent permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions for all of the elements of independent claim 1, as well as the supporting evidence. Pet. 45–55. Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s discussion of the particular structures and methods in Chung and Celeron establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial on the issue of whether the combined teachings of Chung and Celeron teach or suggest all of the limitations of independent claim 1. Id. Also, based on the present record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Chung and Celeron.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,345,245 - Canon U.S.A., Inc. / Canon Inc. v. Slingshot Printing LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 9, 2024 · IPR2022-01416 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–12, and 14–16 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, and 14 as anticipated by Studer ’708, and claims 2, 6, 7, 11, 15, and 16 as obvious over Studer ’708 …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “at least a Bachelor’s or Master’s level college degree in Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, Physics, Electrical Engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of training or experience in the design of inkjet cartridges and printheads.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner does not propose a description of the level of ordinary skill in the art or dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 20. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s description as it is consistent with the asserted prior art and the challenged patent’s specification. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“as a “physical structure other than the convoluted passageways inherently present in a capillary material such as felt, providing a more direct path for air to move from a space in the exit port of the fluid supply tank to the vent in the cover of the tank.” PO Resp. 20. Petitioner does not propose any express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 17. We determine that no 3 US 5,671,001, issued Sept. 23, 1997 (Ex. 1006, “Elliot”). 4 US 2005/0212878 A1, published Sept. 29, 2005 (Ex. 1005, “Studer ’878”). claim terms require express construction for us to determine unpatentability. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. As Petitioner notes, Studer ’708 discloses airflow in the claimed direction because it teaches “methods of the present invention . . . include venting a fluid container to ambient air with a vent located on the upper portion of the container.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1003, 7:39–41) (emphasis added). Studer ’708’s overall emphasis on venting air towards, rather than away from, its fluid interconnect port does not undermine Petitioner’s assertion that the system vents in the opposite direction, as well. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Pond, presents testimony explaining why that is so: “Studer 708’s air vents, air channels, and air spaces are open to the ambient atmosphere for the movement of air both to and from all such spaces.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 109. Further, “a PHOSITA would understand that the direction of this air flow is governed by air pressure inside and outside of the container and necessarily flows both internally and externally.” Id. ¶ 110. In addition, Dr. Pond explains conditions when “air from inside the container 12 must also be vented outside the container” including during “changes in temperature or pressure, jostling or dropping during shipping, or installation of the container into the printer.” Id. ¶ 89. With this explanation, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Studer ’708 discloses the claimed internal vent conduit for removing and releasing air, as the challenged claims require. (2) Claims 1 and 10 Summary Other than the argument addressed above, Patent Owner does not additionally challenge Petitioner’s anticipation challenge to claims 1 and 10. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence (see Pet. 18–34) and, based on that analysis as outlined above, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Studer ’708 anticipates independent claims 1 and 10.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“additional elements in claims 2, 6, 7, 11, 15, and 16, Patent Owner raises two arguments in contesting whether it would have been obvious to combine the two references. See PO Resp. 47–50. First, Patent Owner argues Studer ’708 and Studer ’471 are not analogous art because “Studer ’471 addresses the problem of air pockets being trapped within the capillary material, while Studer ’708 is directed to the entirely different issue of channeling air toward a fluid interconnect port to prevent leakage.” Id. at 48. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Studer ’708 and Studer ’471 are both within the same field of endeavor and address the same problem as the ’523 patent. Specifically, as Petitioner explains, “[j]ust like the ’523 patent, Studer 708 and Studer 471 are generally directed to capillary-filled ink containers that are removably connected to a printhead, and more specifically, to managing the air pressure and air pockets within capillary-filled ink containers.” Pet. 57; see In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 7,938,523 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,938,523
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.