- PTAB · Nov 15, 2023 · IPR2023-00821 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 3 are anticipated by Jones and claims 1–20 are obvious over Jones, Zheng, and Keenan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’008 patent is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues, at least at this stage of the proceeding, that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’008 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Mr. Hurlbut (Ex. 1003 ¶ 33).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner proffers constructions for two terms, namely, (1) “threat model components” and (2) “attack paths,” as recited, for example, in independent claim 4. Pet. 12. Petitioner submits that it defines these two terms “consistent with the ’008 patent specification and applies the plain and ordinary meaning that [the skilled artisan] would attribute to the remaining terms.” Pet. 12. “Patent Owner submits that the Board need not engage in any pre-institution claim construction of these [two] terms.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based upon our consideration of the record at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that it is unnecessary to interpret expressly any term in the ’008 patent claims for which we institute inter partes review. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017. Nevertheless, we determine that briefing during the trial on the proper interpretation of certain claim terms may assist us in resolving issues presented in this case. In particular, we invite the parties to address the proper construction of the limitation “redefine the first threat model by including in it a second threat model associated with the component group,” as recited, for example, in independent claim 1, and to provide evidentiary support therefor (the parties should focus particularly on defining the full scope of what it means to “redefine” the first threat model and to “include” a second threat model “in” a first threat model). To the extent that a party proposes that this limitation should have its ordinary and customary meaning, we encourage the party to explicitly identify such meaning(s) and the evidentiary support therefor. In addition, the parties should consider whether Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential) applies to limitations of the challenged claims, such as claim 1’s recital of “configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving one or more user inputs, add a component group to the first threat model.”” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Pet. 35–36 (emphases added) (citing Ex. 1004, 6:12–34; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–84). As we understand Petitioner’s argument (and its expert’s testimony), Petitioner argues Jones “modifies,” i.e., “redefines,” a “first threat model” (level n) by “including” in it cybersecurity threats (e.g., via metadata) associated with nested components (i.e., “a second threat model”), to produce the “modified” (“redefined”) “first threat model” (level n+1). See id.; In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832–33 (anticipation “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test”). In other words, Petitioner argues that, although Jones may not use the identical terminology as the ’008 patent, Jones nevertheless explicitly discloses limitation 1[f] to the skilled artisan, by describing modifying a first “threat” model from a level “n” model to a level “n+1” model by including therein threats associated with a particular layer of components (nested components), i.e., a second “threat” model. Based on the record before us, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,699,008 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Oct 20, 2023 · IPR2023-00599 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds: anticipation by Lee and obviousness over Lee and Chen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“The Director’s Memo provides that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc.,[5] the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Director’s Memo 3. With our authorization, Petitioner has filed a stipulation, which stipulates “that, if the PTAB institutes inter partes review, Petitioner ‘will not pursue in [Apex Beam Technologies LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00188-JRG (E.D. Tex.) (consolidated with Apex Beam Technologies LLC v. ZTE Corporation, Case No. 2:22-cv-00031-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.))] the specific grounds [asserted in IPR2023-00599], or . . . any other ground . . . that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in an IPR (i.e., any ground that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103 on the basis of prior art patent or printed publications).’” Ex. 1022, 1 (quoting Sotera Wireless, Inc., Paper 12 at 13–14) (alterations in original). We determine that the language of this stipulation sufficiently comports with the language of the stipulation discussed in the Director’s Memo. See Director’s Memo 3. We accordingly decline to discretionarily deny institution in view of the related district court litigation.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We do not read Xerox to require us to give little weight to an expert declaration solely because some or all of it is also repeated within the Petition. Rather, Xerox found a declaration was entitled to little weight where the declaration merely repeated “the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support.” Xerox, Paper 9 at 15 (emphasis added). If declaration testimony is supported sufficiently and, in turn, supports contentions in the Petition, we do not give it little to no weight simply because it is repeated in the Petition. Patent Owner does not point to any specific statements in Dr. Kakaes’s declaration and explain specifically why Patent Owner believes they are conclusory, and thus, Patent Owner has not sufficiently explained the applicability of Xerox here. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 13 n.1, 18 n.2, 21 n.3, 23 n.4, 25 n.5, 28 n.6, 29 n.7, 47–48. Moreover, we can assess the weight to be given to Dr. Kakaes’s declaration testimony, including based on its corresponding factual support, if any, and afford such testimony an appropriate weight. Accordingly, at this stage, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to assign no weight to all of Dr. Kakaes’s declaration testimony.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt the recitals of “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. Pet. 13. We also decline to adopt Petitioner’s assertion concerning “[a]dditional relevant work experience,” as it also is vague and open-ended. As adopted, we view the definition for the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the ’081 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “no terms need construction to resolve the controversy in this forum.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner argues that at this stage of the proceeding, “claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We determine that no express constructions are needed for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). Rather, at this stage of the proceeding, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,912,081 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00656 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Keenan anticipates the claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’366 patent is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all Challenged Claims of the ’366 patent on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the earliest effective filing date of the ’366 patent: would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, mathematics, or a similar discipline, with at least three years of relevant industry or research experience, including experience in software development and designing or implementing threat models. Additional work or research” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner proffers constructions for four terms, namely, (1) “third party software application,” (2) “third party diagram components,” (3) “visual representations of the threat model components,” and (4) “threat model components,” each as recited, for example, in independent claim 1. Pet. 12–14. Petitioner submits “[Patent Owner] defined [these] claim terms in the specification and file history,” “Petitioner is applying those definitions in this petition,” and “[f]or all other claim terms, Petitioner applies the plain and ordinary meaning that a [skilled artisan] would attribute to those terms.” Pet. 12. “Patent Owner submits that the Board need not engage in any pre-institution claim construction of these [four] terms.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based upon our consideration of the record at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that it is unnecessary to interpret expressly any term in the ’366 patent claims for which we institute inter partes review. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017. Nevertheless, we determine that briefing during the trial on the proper interpretation of certain claim terms may assist us in resolving issues presented in this case. In particular, we invite the parties to address the proper construction of “threats,” “threat model components,” “visual representations of the threat model components,” and “mapping files,” and the evidentiary support therefor. To the extent that a party proposes that such a term should have its ordinary and customary meaning, we encourage the party to explicitly identify such meaning(s) and the evidentiary support therefor.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“does not disclose the “threats” described and claimed in the ’366 patent. See Prelim. Resp. 5–7, 11–19. Based on the record before us at this stage of the proceeding, we disagree and preliminarily find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing, as further discussed below. In particular, Patent Owner concedes that “Keenan discloses that color can ‘represent different types of risk (e.g., cyber, environmental, accidental, etc.),’” where Keenan displays such colors associated with objects in a topology. Prelim. Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 1004, 16:40–51) (emphases added); see Ex. 1004, Fig. 7. But Patent Owner then merely concludes, without citing any factual support, that “use of a color identifying the generic nature of a risk still fails to disclose any threats associated with the risk.” Id. at 17– 18. On the other hand, Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Hurlbut, testifies: Keenan demonstrates that its risk measurement and display includes a determination of threats where Keenan discloses a risk measurement view that uses [] color to “represent different types of risk (e.g., cyber, environmental, accidental, etc.).” [Ex. 1004], 16:40–51. [The skilled artisan] would understand that “types of risk,” as disclosed in Keenan are threats because the described examples are all types of threats (cyber, environmental, accidental). Thus, Keenan discloses threats within its risk analysis. Moreover, [the skilled artisan] would understand that risk is a function of threats exploiting vulnerabilities to obtain, damage, or destroy assets. In other words, threat modeling is used to identify risk. Ex. 1003 ¶ 79 (cited at Pet. 21–24); see id. ¶ 82 (cited at Pet. 26–28). Patent Owner disputes this testimony of Mr. Hurlbut using only attorney argument, and without telling us, for example, why Mr. Hurlbut allegedly is wrong (e.g., by explaining why specific “types” of risk do not fall within the scope of “threats” as broadly recited in claim 1, or how “risk” is not a function of “threats” in Keenan, as explained by Mr. Hurlbut). See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”). Moreover, although Patent Owner characterizes the “types of risk” disclosed in Keenan as identifying a “generic nature of a risk” (Prelim. Resp. 17–18 (emphasis added)), we note that “threats” is broadly recited in claim 1 with no requirement as to any level of specificity of such threats.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,713,366 - PTAB · Aug 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00309 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 and 8–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityOther
“A. Real Parties-In-Interest The parties identify themselves as the real parties-in-interest. Pet. 1; Paper 3, 1.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“invention of the ’864 patent would have had “a Bachelor’s or Master’s level college degree in Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, Physics, Electrical Engineering, or a related field, and two years of training or experience in the design of inkjet printheads or semiconductor circuit layout.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 56). Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute [Petitioner’s] characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of [Patent Owner’s] Preliminary Response, except that it disagrees that a degree in Materials Science is sufficient.” Prelim. Resp. 16.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner, however, also argues that under the plain and ordinary meaning, “power traces” “are narrow connections between a wider bond pad and a heater array.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, citing Figs. 1–3). This term does not appear in independent claim 1, but rather in dependent claims 3 and 5. See Ex. 1001, 6:31–39, 6:43–46, 6:49–51. We note that the term “traces” appears in independent claim 8, but Patent Owner does not address whether “traces” has the same meaning as “power traces.” Prelim. Resp. 17. In addition, Patent Owner argues that “[t]he term ‘physically separated proximal to the bondpad’ should be interpreted consistent with the ’864 patent to mean ‘separated at a location nearer to the bond pad than the heater arrays.’” Prelim. Resp. 17; see id. at 17–18 (arguing that the language of claims 1 and 3 supports its construction); id. at 18 (citing Ex. 2001; Ex. 2002) (arguing that dictionary definitions support its construction). This term appears in dependent claims 3 and 9, and similarly in dependent claim 15. Ex. 1001, 6:43–46, 7:4–5, 7:26–8:2. As we discuss below, we find that Petitioner shows by a reasonable likelihood that claim 1—as well as other claims that also do not contain these terms—would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See supra Section V.C (finding at this stage that challenged claims would have been obvious in view of the combination of Benjamin144 and Benjamin703). Thus, we determine that no express constructions are needed for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). Moreover, at this stage of the proceeding, we do not view these issues as being fully developed. The parties should fully develop the record for any claim construction issues relating to these terms, and any other terms in dispute,7 during trial in accordance with our Rules. If the parties assert a term has its plain and ordinary meaning, but dispute what that plain and ordinary meaning is, such a dispute needs to be resolved as a matter of claim construction. See Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,290,864 - Apple Inc. v. Immervision, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Aug 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00472 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds: anticipation and/or obviousness based on Thibault, Matsusaka, and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“used to compensate” language is an “intended use,” we agree with Patent Owner that the language including and following the “being used to compensate” language of claim 1 results in a structural limitation. Per the language of claim 1, the location of the “zone” is keyed to an area of the image where the quality drops due to a drop either of relative illumination or of MTF, and where the image magnification takes effect. The language of claim 1 requires that the zone be “intentionally” created. Within this “zone,” lower or higher object to image magnification (compared to linear targeted resolution) is required depending on the conditions. The “being used to compensate” language describes the conditions (i.e. lower relative illumination or lower MTF) that lead to the intentional creation of the “zone” where the image magnification is required. As Patent Owner notes, the “being used to compensate” language explains “how the created zone is arranged within the field of view of the optical apparatus.” Prelim. Resp. 11. This “tells us something about the structural requirements” of the zone intentionally created within the apparatus. K-2 Corp., 191 F.3d at 1364. Accordingly, we decline to view the “being used to compensate” language of claim 1 as an “intended use.” Any claim construction at this stage in the proceeding is preliminary, and our final determinations as to claim construction will be made on the full record, as developed during trial.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing physics, optical engineering, electrical engineering and/or a similar discipline, and at least five years of experience in developing and designing optical imaging systems and have familiarity with image processing algorithms and optical design software” and that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner states that solely for purposes of the Preliminary Response, it “does not object to Petitioner’s definition of a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Prelim. Resp. 10. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that Petitioner’s comparison of Thibault’s Figure 6 and the ’120 patent’s Figure 7 (above), particularly with respect to the downward resolution curve circled in green, supports Petitioner’s assertion that Thibault’s apparatus meets the “being used to compensate” language. Id. at 30–31. We are also persuaded that Petitioner’s comparison of Thibault’s Figure 6 and the ’120 patent’s Figure 7, in view of the language of the ’120 patent (the “downward curve between maximum value 712 and position 714 allows the lens system to have a higher relative illumination value toward the edge of the field of view,” Ex. 1001, 6:36–41), supports Petitioner’s assertion that Thibault’s apparatus “would therefore have the same impact on relative illumination as described in the ’120 Patent.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 123). Although Patent Owner argues that “slope alone cannot equate to the claimed magnification zones” (Prelim. Resp. 16), at this stage in the proceeding we have unrebutted testimony from Petitioner’s declarant, providing reasoning supporting Petitioner’s arguments about Thibault’s disclosures and limitation [1e]. Pet. 25–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 117–124). On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its arguments that Thibault discloses and/or renders obvious the limitations of claim 1. On the present record, Patent Owner does not substantively dispute Petitioner’s arguments as to dependent claims 2–7. Prelim. Resp. 13–18. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and the cited evidence, and, on the present record, Petitioner shows sufficiently that Thibault discloses the limitations of claims 2–7. Accordingly, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its argument that claims 1–7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Thibault.” slip op. at 29
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A “prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Although the elements must be arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,795,120 - Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2023 · IPR2019-00731 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Remand
Claim 28 is unpatentable under § 103(a) over Martin and Farley; Martin qualifies as prior art because Dr. Moran’s contribution made him a joint inventor of the relied-on disclosure.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“we do not agree with Patent Owner that evidence analogous to that in Duncan Parking is required in this case or for Petitioner to meet its burden by stating which specific aspects of the Facilitator were conceived by Dr. Moran. PO Remand 3–4. As the Federal Circuit stated, the facilitator described in Section 4.5 of the Martin reference plays a central role in the OAA disclosed in the specification of the ’560 patent. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; see Ex. 1011, 23–24 (Section 4.5); Ex. 1001, 19:14–19:62. In addition, Patent Owner admits that “large portions of the ’560 application and the Martin reference are identical or almost identical.” PO Resp. 1. We find that Petitioner and Dr. Moran have sufficiently identified the facilitator in the Martin reference as his work, and persuasively asserted that Dr. Moran’s background and experience with OAA and distributed software systems support his contribution to the conception of the facilitator in the distributed agent approach of Sections 4.1–4.5. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23–39. Dr. Moran’s testimony provides sufficient and persuasive detail to support his contribution claim to the facilitator of Section 4.5. Id.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“With respect to Dr. Moran’s contribution to the Martin reference, we find Dr. Moran’s testimony credible over that of Mr. Cheyer and Mr. Martin, because, as the Federal Circuit noted, because the latter testimony conflicts with other evidence of record. Google, 34 F.4th at 1088. Cheyer’s and Martin’s testimony that Dr. Moran’s role was administrative and non-technical with respect to the core infrastructure of OAA is belied by a separate article describing OAA that includes the facilitator and lists Dr. Moran as the lead author. Ex. 1174, 1–2, 4. Indeed, the OAA article lists Dr. Moran and Mr. Cheyer as authors but excludes Mr. Martin. Id. Although Mr. Cheyer disagrees with the article’s description of the origins of OAA and the facilitator (Ex. 2037, 78:23–79:12 (Mr. Cheyer asserting that he “would not agree in the characterization of Open Agent Architecture grew out of [earlier] works” as described in the article)), Mr. Cheyer admits patent]” (id. at 1088), “which is a continuation-in-part of the application that resulted in the ’115 patent” (id. at 1086). in his deposition that Dr. Moran was extremely technical, and probably made technical contributions to OAA (id. at 34:1–20, 64:16–20, 102:2–4). Similarly, Mr. Martin’s testimony also supports that Dr. Moran “may have made contributions to the technological development of either interfaces for use with OAA, agents used with OAA, or systems based on OAA.” Ex. 2038, 116:2–8, 117:7–119:10. When viewed in light of Dr. Moran’s status as a joint inventor on the closely related ’931 patent (Ex. 2002, code (75)) and as a lead author of the substantive paper that discusses OAA’s early development, we find Mr. Martin’s and Mr. Cheyer’s admissions—that Dr. Moran made technical contributions to OAA—undermine their testimony that Dr. Moran’s inclusion as an author on the Martin reference was a matter of administrative respect and not a result of a technical contribution. See PO Remand 11; PO Resp. 50–51. Indeed, we find Cheyer and Martin’s general description of Dr. Moran—as an administrator without technical contributions to the Martin reference—is not supported by the full record, which instead supports Dr. Moran’s contributions to technical work that involves the Martin reference, such as contemporary papers and the ’931 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1174, 2002. In sum, the testimony and contemporary evidence supports Dr. Moran’s testimony that his conception and contribution to the Martin reference, the facilitator, was technical and not merely administrative. Ex. 1007 ¶ 39.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention. Rather, we find that the Petition persuasively explains how Martin discloses a facilitator agent arranged to coordinate cooperative task completion within a distributed computing environment having autonomous service-providing electronic agents. Pet. 39; Ex. 1002 ¶ 100. Further, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that Farley discloses how agent functionality can be distributed across multiple processes. Pet. 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 101–102. Finally, Petitioner also provides persuasive reasons as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Martin and Farley, including reasons expressly provided by Farley. Pet. 40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103–104.” slip op. at 28
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE In our prior Final Written Decision, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) portions of Exhibit 1153; (2) Exhibits 1170, 1171, and 1172; (3) Exhibit 1174; and (4) portions of Exhibits 2037 and 2038; and we dismissed as moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) Exhibits 1158 and 1159 and (2) Exhibits 1175, 1176, and 1181. Final Dec. 26–30. We maintain these determinations on remand.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 7,069,560 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,069,560 - Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2023 · IPR2019-00728 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claim 63 unpatentable under § 103(a) over Martin and Kohn, finding Martin was prior art because Moran was a joint inventor.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner relies upon is sufficient to establish the degree to which the reliedon portions of the Martin reference were conceived by Dr. Moran, and the significance of those contributions to the overall anticipating disclosure of the Martin reference. See Google, 34 F.4th at 1086–88; Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contentions, Petitioner is not merely relying on Dr. Moran’s authorship to establish inventorship. PO Remand 8 (citing In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). Instead, Dr. Moran’s testimony establishes how his background led to his contributions to the multiple facilitator architectures disclosed in Martin and in the ’115 patent specification. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23– 34 (OAA project), 35–39 (OAA paper). In view of Dr. Moran’s testimony, we do not agree with Patent Owner that evidence analogous to that in Duncan Parking is required in this case or for Petitioner to meet its burden by stating which specific aspects of the Facilitator were conceived by Dr. Moran. PO Remand 3–4. As the Federal Circuit stated, the facilitator described in Section 4.5 of the Martin reference plays a central role in the OAA disclosed in the specification of the ’115 patent. Google, 34 F.4th at 1087; see Ex. 1011, 23–24 (Section 4.5); Ex. 1001, 18:56–19:36. In addition, Patent Owner admits that “large portions of the ’115 application and the Martin reference are identical or almost identical.” PO Resp. 1. We find that Petitioner and Dr. Moran have sufficiently identified the facilitator in the Martin reference as his work, and persuasively asserted that Dr. Moran’s background and experience with OAA and distributed software systems support his contribution to the conception of the facilitator in the distributed agent approach of Sections 4.1–4.5. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23–39. Dr. Moran’s testimony provides sufficient and persuasive detail to support his contribution claim to the facilitator of Section 4.5. Id. Based on the record, the Federal Circuit’s remand squarely asks whether Dr. Moran’s stated contributions to the conception of the facilitator should be credited over Cheyer and Martin’s conflicting testimony regarding his lack of technical contribution. Google, 34 F.4th at 1088 (stating that “[t]he testimony of Dr. Moran, if credited, might well establish that he was a co-inventor of the particular portions of the Martin reference relied on by Google in, and relevant to, the challenge to particular claims”). When Dr. Moran’s testimony is viewed in combination with the supporting evidence,7 we find that incorporation of the facilitator in general, which is also found in the specification and claims, persuasively supports Dr. Moran’s testimony regarding his inventive contribution to the Martin reference. Specifically, we find Dr. Moran’s testimony persuasively supported and credible over the conflicting testimony and evidence offered by Mr. Cheyer and Mr. Martin. See Pet. Reply 12–13; Ex. 2038, 116:2–8, 117:7–119:10 (Cheyer admission that Dr. Moran made technical contributions to OAA); Ex. 2037, 34:1–20, 64:16–20, 102:2–4.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Upon weighing the parties’ testimony and evidence, we agree with Petitioner that sufficient evidence supports the technical contributions of Dr. Moran to OAA, including admissions by Mr. Martin that Dr. Moran made such contributions (see Ex. 2038, 116:2–116:8, 117:7–119:10; see also id. at 73:3–73:15); contemporaneous papers showing Dr. Moran’s contribution to the OAA including a facilitator (see Ex. 1170; Ex. 1174, 1– 2), and the ’931 patent (Ex. 2002). See Pet. Reply 5–7, 8, 12–13; Pet. Remand 11. In particular, Dr. Moran’s testimony establishes that he contributed to Section 4.5, the facilitator that plays an essential role in the OAA, that differs from prior art agents, and that is found in the ’115 specification. We find Dr. Moran’s contributions to be significant when measured against the full anticipating Martin reference, and to render him a joint inventor of the Martin reference. Google, 34 F.4th at 1085 (quoting Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358). 5. Conclusion Based on the full record, we find that Petitioner has provided persuasive evidence by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Moran is an inventive entity to the Martin reference. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established that Martin is “by another” and is prior art under § 102(a) to the ’115 patent. We next turn to the sole remaining ground based on the Martin reference to determine the patentability of the remaining challenged claim.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“combination of Martin and Kohn. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Olsen, provides persuasive testimony and evidence that Martin teaches compound goals and a skilled artisan would have been motivated in view of Kohn to modify Martin’s facilitator agent to interpret a compound goal that includes both local and global constraints. Pet. 32–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88. Dr. Olsen’s testimony does not evince hindsight, but instead supports the finding that an ordinarily skilled artisan could use compound goals required in Martin and apply the type of constraints (global and local) disclosed in Kohn. Ex. 2024, 159:4–160:16. In addition, Dr. Olsen testified, the proposed implementation “would have been a mere combination of known components and technologies . . . , according to known methods, to produce predictable results.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 87. We do not agree that this case presents the same technical issues raised in G.B.T. Inc. v. Walletex Microelectronics Ltd., IPR2018-00326, Paper 60 at 16–17 (PTAB June 25, 2019), where the petitioner’s declarant failed to show how the combination would have achieved desired results and features from the combination of the circuits. Here, Dr. Olsen identified known compound goals in Martin to which Kohn’s local and global constraints are applicable. Pet. 32–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88. In view of the level of skill in the art and the testimony of Dr. Olsen (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49, 77–88; Ex. 2024, 159:4–160:16), we find that Petitioner establishes persuasive motivation to combine the software teachings of Kohn’s constraints into the goals of Martin and how the references would have been combined by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 29
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMotion to exclude, grantedMixed
“III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE In our prior Final Written Decision, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) portions of Exhibit 1153; (2) Exhibits 1170, 1171, and 1172; (3) Exhibit 1174; and (4) portions of Exhibits 2037 and 2038; and we dismissed as moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (1) Exhibits 1158 and 1159 and (2) Exhibits 1175, 1176, and 1181. Final Dec. 25–28. We maintain these determinations on remand.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 6,851,115 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,851,115 - Canon U.S.A., Inc. / Canon Inc. v. Slingshot Printing LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 24, 2023 · IPR2022-01415 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–10, 13, or 14 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’629 patent would have had “at least a Bachelor’s level college degree in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Physics, Computer Science or a related field, and at least two years of training or experience in the design of inkjet printheads.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 45). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’629 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 42–43. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt the recitals of “at least” as that language is vague and openended. Pet. 14–15. This definition is consistent with the ’629 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The parties both argue that we should construe “non-contiguous hybrid arrangement” to mean “[a]n arrangement in which the first set of logic cells are interleaved or interlaced with the second set of logic cells.” Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 43. Petitioner supports its argument by pointing to the claim construction order from the HP litigation, which provides this construction for this term. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1010, 4 (construing non-contiguous hybrid arrangement)). Patent Owner supports its argument by citing to the written description and figures of the ’629 patent. Prelim. Resp. 43–46 (citations omitted). For example, Patent Owner cites Figure 4 of the challenged patent, and its accompanying text, and argues that Figure 4 illustrates that the “logic cells [are] interleaved in a manner that minimizes the space between heater arrays by forming a single linear array.” Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 4). The accompanying text teaches that “the magenta logic cells 440a–n may be interleaved between the cyan logic cells 420a–n in an alternating manner to form a single, linear hybrid cyan/magenta P-logic array 302.” Ex. 1001, 5:67–6:4; Prelim. Resp. 45 (citing same). The ’629 patent adds that “[b]ecause of this interlacing of cyan P-registers 420a–n and magenta P-registers 440a–n, neither the cyan P-registers 420a–n nor the magenta P-registers 440a–n remain contiguous,” and that “[f]or example, in F[igure] 4, the cyan logic cell 420b is followed by the magenta logic cell 440a instead of the next cyan logic cell 420c.” Ex. 1001, 6:10–15; Prelim. Resp. 45 (citing same). We have reviewed the parties’ arguments, and we adopt the parties’ proposed construction for this term. In addition, we determine that no express construction is needed for any other term for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“However, we agree with Patent Owner that Hayasaki does not disclose that AND circuit array 5M’ and AND circuit array 5Y are arranged in a non-contiguous hybrid arrangement. Prelim. Resp. 51–52, 54–63. Rather, Hayasaki’s AND gates are arranged in a grid, with each magenta 6 Petitioner argues that “‘a first and a second set of logic cells’ is indefinite because it is unclear if this requires (i) a first set of logic cells and a second set of logic cells, (ii) first and second sets of logic cells, or (iii) a set of first logic cells and second logic cells.” Pet. 30 n.5. We disagree. The plain reading of this limitation corresponds to a first set of logic cells and a second set of logic cells, which is in accord with the interpretation Petitioner applies in this proceeding. Id. AND gate of AND circuit array 5M’ located directly aligned with the corresponding yellow AND gate of AND circuit array 5Y—they are not interleaved or interlaced. Ex. 1004, Fig. 9. Put differently, Hayasaki teaches that AND circuit array 5M’ and AND circuit array 5Y comprise two separate columns of logic cells that are not interleaved or interlaced. See Ex. 1004, Fig. 9, ¶ 93. Thus, Hayasaki does not teach sets of logic cells in a non-contiguous hybrid arrangement.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,559,629 - Laltitude LLC, Dba Picasso Tiles v. Altus Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00155 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
The sole challenged claim was held unpatentable as anticipated by Zhao US and Zhao CN; the Board did not reach the three obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“same as that used for infringement, except that for anticipation, the patented design is compared with the alleged anticipatory reference rather than an accused design. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The ordinary observer test for design patent infringement was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), as follows: [I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other. Id. at 528. The ordinary observer test requires the fact finder to consider all of the ornamental features illustrated in the figures that are visible at any time in the “normal use” lifetime of the accused product, i.e., “from the completion of manufacture or assembly until the ultimate destruction, loss, or disappearance of the article.” Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1241. Further, while the ordinary observer test requires consideration of the overall prior art and claimed designs, [t]he mandated overall comparison is a comparison taking into account significant differences between the two designs, not minor or trivial differences that necessarily exist between any two designs that are not exact copies of one another. Just as “minor differences between a patented design and an accused article’s design cannot, and shall not, prevent a finding of infringement” . . . so too minor differences cannot prevent a finding of anticipation. Id. at 1243 (citation omitted) (quoting Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (1984)).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS D719,138 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation - PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01416 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–12, and 14–16 on all petitioned grounds based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on the arguments and evidence of record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’523 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’523 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “at least a Bachelor’s or Master’s level college degree in Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, Physics, Electrical Engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of training or experience in the design of inkjet cartridges and printheads.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner does not propose a description of the level of ordinary skill in the art or dispute Petitioner’s description. Prelim. Resp. 19–20. At this stage, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 17; Prelim. Resp. 20. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Studer ’708’s focus on venting air towards, rather than away from, its fluid interconnect port does not undermine Petitioner’s assertion that the system would vent in the opposite direction, as well. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Pond, presents testimony explaining when and how that would be so: “Studer 708’s air vents, air channels, and air spaces are open to the ambient atmosphere for the movement of air both to and from all such spaces.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 109. Further, “a PHOSITA would understand that the direction of this air flow is governed by air pressure inside and outside of the container and necessarily flows both internally and externally.” Id. ¶ 110. With this yet-unrebutted explanation, Petitioner has, at this stage, shown sufficiently that Studer ’708 discloses the claimed internal vent conduit for removing and releasing air, as the challenged claims require.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,938,523
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.