• Atoptech, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2016 · IPR2014-01159 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5, 23, 24, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 31 was not shown anticipated, and claim 26 was not shown obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision to Institute, we construed “place and route unit (PRU).” We determined that the broadest reasonable interpretation of that term is, “a section of the IC design created to represent the physical partitioning of the IC design.” Dec. to Inst., 10. Neither party disputes that construction in their post-institution filings.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “in the underlying patent. In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1280; Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn Inc., 789 F.3d at 1298. Here, the specification expressly defines atomic blocks: Defining Atomic ("A") blocks (sometimes called units) – “A” blocks are the netlist blocks that will be physically partitioned to create place and route units (PRUs). "A" blocks may contain only standard cells or they may contain additional levels of hierarchy. For the purpose of partitioning the circuit design into PRUs, the "A" blocks are indivisible. Ex. 1001, 4:8–12. Consistent with the patentee’s express definition of atomic block, we determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of atomic block to be, “a netlist block that is indivisible for the purpose of physically partitioning the circuit design into place and route units (PRUs).”” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would possess a “Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a closely related field,” as well as “a minimum of one to two years of professional experience in the engineering development of integrated circuit technology.” Ex. 2004 (Declaration of Daniel Foty, Ph.D.), ¶ 15. At the oral hearing, Petitioner stated it had no dispute with Patent Owner’s proposal. Tr. 16:21–17:2. We determine that an express definition of the level of ordinary skill is not required. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be reflected in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”) (internal quotations omitted); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, we find the level of ordinary skill in the art to be reflected in the cited references.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “directed at efficient circuit design involving large and complex circuits, and determine that, as set forth in the VLSI textbook, FPGA is indeed a type of layout for physical design. We also credit the testimony of Dr. Ghiasi, who opines that: While Fields presents this logical approach to IC floorplanning in the context of FPGA design, one of ordinary skill as of September 2000 would have understood that the general teachings of Fields could be applied to the design of an ASIC chip as well as an FPGA chip and would have been motivated to apply the teaching of Fields to solve the problem of very large IC chip design. . . . One of ordinary skill in the field of EDA design would be familiar with IC design for both ASIC and FPGA formats and would rely on teachings in the context of FPGA chip design, especially in the front end of an EDA design flow, through floorplanning and partitioning of the physical design in addressing problems in ASIC chip design, and vice versa. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 72–73. Even assuming arguendo the Board were to accept Patent Owner’s assertion that design of an FPGA is “completely different” from design of an integrated circuit, the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) stated, “[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.” Thus, under KSR, such purportedly “different” teachings of Fields about FPGA design could be applicable to the physical design of an integrated circuit as described in the ’967 patent and in Su. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence, including the VLSI textbook and the Ghiasi declaration, and find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the applicability of Fields’ FPGA teachings to physical design of an integrated circuit as recited in claim 1 of the ’967 patent.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,567,967 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,567,967
• Atoptech, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2016 · IPR2014-01150 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 8, 9, 12, 16, 19–22 are unpatentable as obvious over Fields and Su; claims 32–36 are unpatentable as anticipated by Su.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Owner proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would possess a “Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a closely related field,” as well as “a minimum of one to two years of professional experience in the engineering development of integrated circuit technology.” Ex. 2004 (Declaration of Daniel Foty, Ph.D.), ¶ 15. At the oral hearing, Petitioner stated it had no dispute with Patent Owner’s proposal. Tr. 16:21–17:2. We determine that an express definition of the level of ordinary skill is not required. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be reflected in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”) (internal quotations omitted); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, we find the level of ordinary skill in the art to be reflected in the cited references.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “in the underlying patent. In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1280; Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn Inc., 789 F.3d at 1298. Here, the specification expressly defines atomic blocks: Defining Atomic ("A") blocks (sometimes called units) – “A” blocks are the netlist blocks that will be physically partitioned to create place and route units (PRUs). "A" blocks may contain only standard cells or they may contain additional levels of hierarchy. For the purpose of partitioning the circuit design into PRUs, the "A" blocks are indivisible. Ex. 1001, 4:8–12. Consistent with the patentee’s express definition of atomic block, we determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of atomic block to be, “a netlist block that is indivisible for the purpose of physically partitioning the circuit design into place and route units (PRUs).”” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ’967 patent, Fields, and Su are all directed at efficient circuit design involving large and complex circuits, and determine that, as set forth in the VLSI textbook, FPGA is indeed a type of layout for physical design. We also credit the testimony of Dr. Ghiasi, who opines that: While Fields presents this logical approach to IC floorplanning in the context of FPGA design, one of ordinary skill as of September 2000 would have understood that the general teachings of Fields could be applied to the design of an ASIC chip as well as an FPGA chip and would have been motivated to apply the teaching of Fields to solve the problem of very large IC chip design. . . . One of ordinary skill in the field of EDA design would be familiar with IC design for both ASIC and FPGA formats and would rely on teachings in the context of FPGA chip design, especially in the front end of an EDA design flow, through floorplanning and partitioning of the physical design in addressing problems in ASIC chip design, and vice versa. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 72–73. Even assuming arguendo the Board were to accept Patent Owner’s assertion that design of an FPGA is “completely different” from design of an integrated circuit, the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) stated, “[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.” Thus, under KSR, such purportedly “different” teachings of Fields about FPGA design could be applicable to the physical design of an integrated circuit as described in the ’967 patent and in Su. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence, including the VLSI textbook and the Ghiasi declaration, and find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the applicability of Fields’ FPGA teachings to physical design of an integrated circuit as recited in claim 1 of the ’967 patent.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “directed at efficient circuit design involving large and complex circuits, and determine that, as set forth in the VLSI textbook, FPGA is indeed a type of layout for physical design. We also credit the testimony of Dr. Ghiasi, who opines that: While Fields presents this logical approach to IC floorplanning in the context of FPGA design, one of ordinary skill as of September 2000 would have understood that the general teachings of Fields could be applied to the design of an ASIC chip as well as an FPGA chip and would have been motivated to apply the teaching of Fields to solve the problem of very large IC chip design. . . . One of ordinary skill in the field of EDA design would be familiar with IC design for both ASIC and FPGA formats and would rely on teachings in the context of FPGA chip design, especially in the front end of an EDA design flow, through floorplanning and partitioning of the physical design in addressing problems in ASIC chip design, and vice versa. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 72–73. Even assuming arguendo the Board were to accept Patent Owner’s assertion that design of an FPGA is “completely different” from design of an integrated circuit, the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) stated, “[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.” Thus, under KSR, such purportedly “different” teachings of Fields about FPGA design could be applicable to the physical design of an integrated circuit as described in the ’967 patent and in Su. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence, including the VLSI textbook and the Ghiasi declaration, and find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the applicability of Fields’ FPGA teachings to physical design of an integrated circuit as recited in claim 1 of the ’967 patent.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 6,567,967 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,567,967
• Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 14, 2015 · IPR2014-00970 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 14, 15, 19–25, and 27–34 are unpatentable; the Board found other challenged claims not shown unpatentable on the grounds decided.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The difference in the opinions of the two experts is that Dr. Sechen believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have an additional four years of experience, education, or a combination of the two, beyond that proposed by Dr. Alpert. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 7. According to Dr. Alpert, the difference in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art is not material to any dispute over claim construction or patentability in this inter partes review. Id. We accord greater weight to Dr. Alpert’s opinion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art because he has experience in both teaching students and working with engineers in the industry, while Dr. Sechen’s experience is primarily in teaching. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 7, 21 with Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 3, 5. Moreover, based on our review of the ’434 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’434 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Dr. Alpert’s opinion on the level of ordinary skill. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’434 patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The above disclosure uses the term “operable independently” to describe the data handlers as being discrete and functioning without being physically or logically connected to each other. Based on our review of the ’434 patent, the specification and claim 27 both use the term “operable independently” in the same manner, i.e., to describe a feature of the data handler that is distinct from its data generation feature. We agree with Petitioner, therefore, that when interpreted in the context of the ’434 patent in its entirety, the claim term “operable independently” “merely means that each data handler can operate without influence or control by any of the other data handlers.” Reply 5. The ’434 patent specification uses the term “operable independently” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and we find no basis for applying the narrower construction advanced by Patent Owner to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we interpret “operable independently” as “operable without influence or control by another.” See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1278–79.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the above description in Averbuj, we agree with Patent Owner that Averbuj describes memory interfaces (the alleged data handlers) that are configured to produce address and control signals, and that Averbuj describes producing address and control signals in certain circumstances, e.g., when Averbuj’s sequencer (the alleged control module) specifies writing data in a particular pattern that requires transformation to conform to a particular configuration of a memory module. See PO Resp. 33. We also agree with Petitioner, however, that Averbuj’s memory interfaces are further configured to apply to the memory modules the same address and control signals received from, and produced by, the sequencers for testing (see Reply 15), e.g., when the sequencer sends signals that can be applied, without modification or transformation (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 56), directly to a memory module irrespective of its physical configuration. Thus, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Averbuj’s sequencer meets the limitation of “a control module configured to generate address and control signals for testing the memory devices” as recited in challenged independent claims 1, 20, and 29 of the ’434 patent.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed in Section IV.B.2.e., a petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent” (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)), and “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response” (37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). We agree with Patent Owner that the Reply does more than merely respond to or rebut arguments made in Patent Owner’s Response; rather, it sets forth a theory that was not presented clearly in the Petition. Patent Owner’s position is supported by the fact that Dr. Sechen, whose skill level is at least (and appears to exceed) that of the ordinary artisan, apparently was unable to envision how Huang and Averbuj could be combined. Further, Dr. Alpert’s second declaration includes, at a minimum, opinions as to the understanding of the ordinary artisan with respect to the teachings of Huang and Averbuj that were not presented in his first declaration. In our judgment, consideration by the Board of the above-noted arguments in the Reply and evidence presented in Dr. Alpert’s second declaration in support thereof would be improper under 37 CFR § 42.23 and unfair to Patent Owner. We have, however, reviewed and considered the arguments in the Petition and evidence therein, and are in agreement with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not provided adequate explanation or evidence to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Huang and Averbuj. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 7–12, 17, 18, 20–25, 27, 28, and 30–35 would have been unpatentable over Huang and Averbuj.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 8,001,434 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,001,434
• St. Jude Medical, Inc. / St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. et al. v. Atlas IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00916 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6, 11, 14, and 21 are unpatentable: claims 6, 14, and 21 as anticipated by Natarajan 1992 and obvious over Natarajan ’542 and Bantz; claim 11 as obvious over two combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “With respect to transmission by the remotes, the proper construction of the “each” limitation requires only that each cycle have one or more intervals during which remotes are allowed to transmit. See supra Section II.A.1. Period B is such an interval, as it contains allocated slots during which individual mobile stations are allowed to transmit packets to the Access Point. See Ex. 1011, 5–6; Pet. 27; Ex. 1002 ¶ 118. The individual slots within Period B are also intervals. See Pet. 27; Ex. 1002 ¶ 122. Patent Owner’s argument that Period B is not an interval meeting the requirements of the claim is unpersuasive because it is premised on an incorrect claim construction requiring at least one interval in which a remote actually transmits to the hub. See PO Resp. 5–7. As explained previously, the Federal Circuit has rejected Patent Owner’s proffered construction of the “each” limitation. See supra Section II.A.1.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “the proper construction of the “each” limitation in claims of the ’734 patent. On appeal from summary judgment in the Medtronic case, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s so-called “plain meaning” construction, also urged by Patent Owner here. Medtronic, 2015 WL 6550622, at *10. Instead, the Federal Circuit determined that context was necessary to resolve the facial uncertainty of the claim language. Id. at *8. The court analyzed the relevant contextual evidence, including the additional claim language and references to transmission opportunities in the written description that we cited in our claim construction discussion in the Decision on Institution. Id. at *9. With analysis similar to ours, the Federal Circuit held, as we did, that the claim language, properly construed, requires only that each cycle have one or more intervals in which remotes are allowed to transmit frames. Id. Thus, the Federal Circuit, in a precedential opinion, rejected the same “plain meaning” claim construction argument made by Patent Owner in this proceeding. Also, as in this proceeding, Patent Owner provided no extrinsic evidence, so the court construed the disputed limitation based on intrinsic evidence—the claim language and the written description. Moreover, the court used the same Phillips-based claim construction approach that the Board applies when a patent has expired. Accordingly, in our patentability analysis we will apply the Federal Circuit’s construction of the “each” limitation, which, with respect to transmission by remotes, requires only that each cycle have one or more intervals during which remotes are allowed to transmit.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “With respect to transmission by the remotes, the proper construction of the “each” limitation requires only that each cycle have one or more intervals during which remotes are allowed to transmit. See supra Section II.A.1. Period B is such an interval, as it contains allocated slots during which individual mobile stations are allowed to transmit packets to the Access Point. See Ex. 1011, 5–6; Pet. 27; Ex. 1002 ¶ 118. The individual slots within Period B are also intervals. See Pet. 27; Ex. 1002 ¶ 122. Patent Owner’s argument that Period B is not an interval meeting the requirements of the claim is unpersuasive because it is premised on an incorrect claim construction requiring at least one interval in which a remote actually transmits to the hub. See PO Resp. 5–7. As explained previously, the Federal Circuit has rejected Patent Owner’s proffered construction of the “each” limitation. See supra Section II.A.1.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “the system of Natarajan 1992 instead utilized Bella’s cancellation method, which revokes a previous transmission allocation when a remote transmits no packets in a communication cycle, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the combination would result in “the hub revoking a previous transmission opportunity allocation of a remote which has not transmitted more than a predetermined number of frames” (zero) “during a previous number of communication cycles” (one). See Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 167. Furthermore, if Natarajan 1992 employed the cancellation technique of Bella, the hub would be “monitoring the frames transmitted by each remote during its transmission opportunity.” See Pet. 37; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 162, 164. Petitioner also has articulated sufficient reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that the subject matter of claim 11 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the combined teachings of the references. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); Pet. 35–37; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 156–60. According to Petitioner, for example, the combination would simplify the cancellation method of Natarajan 1992 by allowing the hub to revoke a time slot allocation when the remote stops transmitting. Pet. 36; Ex. 1002 ¶ 158. Relying on Dr. Haas’s testimony for support, Petitioner also asserts that using Bella’s cancellation method makes even more sense when the remotes are mobile, as in Natarajan 1992, because they may move outside of the hub’s range abruptly and be unable to cancel their own reservations. Pet. 37; Ex. 1002 ¶ 159. Moreover, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s position that only ordinary skill would be required to implement the reservation and cancellation method of Bella in the Natarajan 1992 system. See Pet. 37; Ex. 1002 ¶ 160. For these reasons, having considered the parties’ contentions and supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Natarajan 1992 and Bella.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 5,371,734 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,371,734
• St. Jude Medical, Inc. / St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. et al. v. Atlas IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2015 · IPR2015-00534 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6, 11, 14, and 21 are unpatentable: claims 6, 14, and 21 as anticipated by Natarajan 1992 and obvious over Natarajan ’542 and Bantz; claim 11 as obvious over two combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “I. INTRODUCTION We have jurisdiction to hear this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6, 11, 14, and 21 of U.S. Patent No. 5,371,734 are unpatentable. A. Procedural History St. Jude Medical, Inc., St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., and Pacesetter, Inc. (collectively, “St. Jude”) filed a Petition for inter partes review of claims 6, 11, 14, 21, and 44 of U.S. Patent No. 5,371,734 (Ex. 1001, “the ’734 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Atlas IP LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). On December 8, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 6, 11, 14, and 21 of the ’734 patent on asserted grounds of unpatentability. Paper 7 (“Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “by the parties as the “each” limitation: “repeating communication cycles, each of which has intervals during which the hub and the remotes transmit and receive frames.” E.g., Ex. 1001, 46:29–31 (claim 6). In the Decision on Institution, we construed this claim limitation “to require that each communication cycle include intervals during which the hub and remotes are allowed to transmit and receive, without requiring actual transmission of frames.” Dec. 12. We based our construction on the language of the claims, including additional language referring to “intervals . . . when the hub is allowed to transmit frames to the remotes [and] when the remotes are allowed to transmit frames to the hub.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 46:36– 39). We also considered the written description of the ’542 patent, which speaks of transmission opportunities during which remotes are provided an opportunity to transmit messages to the hub. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 12:14– 17).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “With respect to transmission by the remotes, the proper construction of the “each” limitation requires only that each cycle have one or more intervals during which remotes are allowed to transmit. See supra Section II.A.1. Period B is such an interval, as it contains allocated slots during which individual mobile stations are allowed to transmit packets to the Access Point. See Ex. 1011, 5–6; Pet. 27; Ex. 1002 ¶ 118. The individual slots within Period B are also intervals. See Pet. 27; Ex. 1002 ¶ 122. Patent Owner’s argument that Period B is not an interval meeting the requirements of the claim is unpersuasive because it is premised on an incorrect claim construction requiring at least one interval in which a remote actually transmits to the hub. See PO Resp. 5–7. As explained previously, the Federal Circuit has rejected Patent Owner’s proffered construction of the “each” limitation. See supra Section II.A.1.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner relies on a combination of Bella’s time slot cancellation method with the system of Natarajan 1992 to satisfy the additional limitations of claim 11. Pet. 34–38; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 161–67. Like Bella, Natarajan 1992 describes a system in which mobile stations make reservation requests for slot allocation. Ex. 1011, 7–8; see Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 165. If a mobile station requests isochronous service, the requested number of slots will be allocated to the mobile station in Period B of every frame until the mobile station cancels the allocation by sending a cancellation request. Ex. 1011, 8; see Pet. 36, 38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 166. Thus, Natarajan 1992 teaches “revoking a previous transmission opportunity allocation of a remote,” as recited in claim 11, when the hub receives a cancellation request from the remote. See Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 166–67. If the system of Natarajan 1992 instead utilized Bella’s cancellation method, which revokes a previous transmission allocation when a remote transmits no packets in a communication cycle, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the combination would result in “the hub revoking a previous transmission opportunity allocation of a remote which has not transmitted more than a predetermined number of frames” (zero) “during a previous number of communication cycles” (one). See Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 167. Furthermore, if Natarajan 1992 employed the cancellation technique of Bella, the hub would be “monitoring the frames transmitted by each remote during its transmission opportunity.” See Pet. 37; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 162, 164. Petitioner also has articulated sufficient reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that the subject matter of claim 11 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the combined teachings of the references. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); Pet. 35–37; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 156–60. According to Petitioner, for example, the combination would simplify the cancellation method of Natarajan 1992 by allowing the hub to revoke a time slot allocation when the remote stops transmitting. Pet. 36; Ex. 1002 ¶ 158. Relying on Dr. Haas’s testimony for support, Petitioner also asserts that using Bella’s cancellation method makes even more sense when the remotes are mobile, as in Natarajan 1992, because they may move outside of the hub’s range abruptly and be unable to cancel their own reservations. Pet. 37; Ex. 1002 ¶ 159. Moreover, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s position that only ordinary skill would be required to implement the reservation and cancellation method of Bella in the Natarajan 1992 system. See Pet. 37; Ex. 1002 ¶ 160.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 5,371,734 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,371,734
• Captioncall, L.L.C. v. Ultratec, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2015 · IPR2013-00544 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Rehearing

  Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted to modify the Ryan–McLaughlin combination analysis and denied otherwise; claims 7–11 remain unpatentable.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

    “II. DISCUSSION The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner Response, that for a patent to serve as prior art the patent must be enabled as to its own earliest claimed effective filing date in 1994. Req. 1–4; PO Resp. 15–22. We addressed this argument in the Final Decision and additionally examined the evidence of record as to whether Ryan would have enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation prior to the date of invention of the challenged patent. Final Dec. 22–25. We are not persuaded that we overlooked or misapprehended Patent Owner’s prior argument or made an erroneous interpretation of law.” slip op. at 3

  • ExcludeDecided for petitioner

    “transcript is inadmissible because it does not satisfy the requirements that all testimony, other than uncompelled direct testimony, must be in the form of a deposition transcript, 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(a), and that the witness shall be sworn, 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(f)(1). Req. 5. Therefore, according to Patent Owner, the Yamamoto transcript was “not taken, sought, or filed in accordance with these regulations [and] is not admissible.” Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.61(a)). Rule 42.53, however, is titled “Taking Testimony,” and applies only to testimony taken “during a testimony period set by the Board” for purposes of a particular review proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(b); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(c) (providing time limits set by the Board); id. § 42.53(d) (providing notice requirements). As stated in our Final Decision, Petitioner sought to admit the Yamamoto transcript as a deposition taken in the district court proceeding, not as deposition testimony taken in this inter partes proceeding. Final Dec. 32. And based on the parties’ stipulation in district court, we treated the Yamamoto transcript as sworn deposition testimony taken in the district court. Id. at 32–33 (citing Ex. 1067 ¶ 5). Petitioner filed the Yamamoto transcript as supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b), establishing that the Yamamoto transcript reasonably could not have been obtained earlier and that its consideration was in the interests of justice. Paper 59, 7–8. Therefore, Petitioner’s filing of the Yamamoto transcript complied with Board rules, and we properly relied on it in determining the public accessibility of Yamamoto. See Final Dec. 35–38. Having reviewed Patent Owner’s Request, we are not persuaded we misapprehended or overlooked any matter relating to the admissibility of the Yamamoto transcript.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “disclosure in the ’578 patent of “voice pattern.” Id. at 7–9. We disagree that our reliance on the “Brief Summary of the Invention,” which refers to “a speech recognition computer program which has been trained to the voice pattern of the call assistant,” was improper. See Final Dec. 12 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:44–46 (emphasis added)). Rather, in our Final Decision, we determined that the ’578 patent contemplated software trained to a “voice pattern of the call assistant,” as set forth in the “Brief Summary of the Invention,” as well as software “specifically trained to the voice of [a] particular call assistant,” as described in the context of a particular relay embodiment shown in Figure 1. Final Dec. 12 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:44–46; Ex. 1002, 5:44–47). Based on the evidence in the written description (including the disclosure of “voice pattern”), we determined that the ’578 patent did not indicate expressly how training occurs. Id. Giving the claim language its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification, we concluded we would not limit “trained to the voice of the call assistant” to require training to the voice of one particular call assistant. Id.” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,213,578
• Captioncall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2015 · IPR2013-00540 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Rehearing

  Denied Patent Owner’s request for rehearing of the Final Written Decision, which held claims 1 and 2 unpatentable, and denied its request for an expanded panel.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “ANALYSIS A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Final Decision, has the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Ryan1 did not qualify as prior art because it was not enabled (Paper 30, 15– 24 (“PO Resp.”)), we determined that Ryan was enabled prior to the date of invention of the challenged patent in 1997 and, therefore, qualified as prior art to the challenged claims. Final Dec. 18–23.” slip op. at 3

  • ExcludeDecided for petitioner

    “transcript is inadmissible because it does not satisfy the requirements that all testimony, other than uncompelled direct testimony, must be in the form of a deposition transcript, 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(a), and that the witness shall be sworn, 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(f)(1). Req. 7. Therefore, according to Patent Owner, the Yamamoto transcript was “not taken, sought, or filed in accordance with these regulations [and] is not admissible.” Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.61(a)). Rule 42.53, however, is titled “Taking Testimony” and applies only to testimony taken “during a testimony period set by the Board” for purposes of a particular review proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(b); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(c) (providing time limits set by the Board); id. § 42.53(d) (providing notice requirements). As stated in our Final Decision, Petitioner sought to admit the Yamamoto transcript as supplemental information, not as deposition testimony taken in this inter partes proceeding. Final Dec. 31. And based on the parties’ stipulation in district court, we treated the Yamamoto transcript as sworn deposition testimony taken in the district court. Id. at 33–35 (citing Ex. 1062 ¶ 5). Petitioner filed the Yamamoto transcript as supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b), establishing that the Yamamoto transcript reasonably could not have been obtained earlier and that its consideration was in the interests of justice. Paper 63, 7–8. Therefore, Petitioner’s filing of the Yamamoto transcript complied with Board rules, and we properly relied on it in determining the public accessibility of Yamamoto. See Final Dec. 30– 35.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Specification’s disclosure of “voice pattern.” Req. 10–11. We disagree that our reliance on the Specification’s “Brief Summary of the Invention,” which indicates “a speech recognition computer program which has been trained to the voice pattern of the call assistant,” was improper. See Final Dec. 7 (quoting Ex. 1021, 2:45-48 (emphasis added)). Rather, in our Final Decision, we contrasted the Specification’s use of “voice pattern of the call assistant” in its “Brief Summary of the Invention” with its use of “a voice recognition software package which is specifically trained to the voice of that particular call assistant” in the context of a particular embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 1. Final Dec. 7 (quoting Ex. 1021, 2:45–48, 5:45–48). Based on the evidence in the Specification (including the Specification’s disclosure of “a voice pattern”), we determined that the Specification did not indicate expressly that the voice recognition software is trained to the voice of only that particular call assistant or otherwise indicate that the voice recognition software is trained for the voice of only one call assistant. Final Dec. 7. We concluded that “we will not limit ‘trained to the voice of the call assistant’ to require training to the voice of only one particular call assistant, because the claim language encompasses the invention as disclosed in the Specification—software trained to a voice pattern of a call assistant.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1021, 2:41–49 (“Summary of the Invention”)).” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,233,314
• Captioncall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2015 · IPR2013-00550 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving the finding that claim 1 was anticipated by McLaughlin unchanged.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableDecided for petitioner

    “MoneyIn, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008), “for the proposition that anticipation can be based on combining characteristics of various distinct embodiments in a prior art reference.” Req. Reh’g 1 (citing to Final Dec. 20). Patent Owner’s argument mischaracterizes our Final Decision. We pointed to Net MoneyIn in support of our finding that McLaughlin “is describing options for a single system, not separate embodiments.” Final Dec. 20 (emphasis added). Further, Patent Owner overstates the importance of the word “embodiment”; the anticipation inquiry is whether there is “a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim,” i.e., the word “embodiment” is not itself governing. Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1359. In this case, Patent Owner has attempted repeatedly to get around McLaughlin’s anticipating disclosure by arguing that the various features are in different “embodiments,” essentially because they are under separate headings. But Patent Owner fails to address convincingly Petitioner’s assertions, backed by convincing testimony, that these features are all part of the same single prior art disclosure and arranged as claimed. In our Final Decision, we reviewed the facts and found that Petitioner had established that all of the elements of the claim were found in a single system in McLaughlin. See generally Final Dec. 15–24.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner next alleges that we “explained that a captioned telephone device is a single device that has the features in the body of the claim.” Req. Reh’g 2. Patent Owner mischaracterizes our Final Decision; we made no such statement or implication regarding a “single device.” Our Final Decision already explains why a construction including the phrase “single device” is not commensurate with the broadest reasonable interpretation. See Final Dec. 7–9 (setting forth our construction of the “captioned telephone device”). Specifically, we pointed out that the specification of the ’082 patent instructed one of ordinary skill in the art that “the captured telephone device displays text but need not output any audio signals,” or, in other words, there was no requirement for all features of the claims to be found in one housing or a “single device.” Final Dec. 9 (citing, e.g., an example in the ’082 specification where the speaker/microphone portion (telephone) was depicted as a separate device from the text display portion); Ex. 1021, 9:20–32, Figs. 4–6.” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “Written Decision “with less than a full panel.” Req. 11–13. Panel composition for an inter partes review is specified in 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), which states “[e]ach . . . inter partes review shall be heard by at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be designated by the Director.” The Director’s authority under 35 U.S.C. § 6 to designate panels has been delegated to the Chief Judge. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Standard Operating Procedure 1 (Rev. 14) (May 8, 2015) (“PTAB SOP 1”). As acknowledged by Patent Owner (Req. 11–12), the Final Decision was decided by three administrative patent judges, who are members of the Board. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (indicating that administrative patent judges, along with various members of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, constitute the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). The three administrative patent judges were designated by the Chief Judge according to PTAB SOP 1, titled “Assignment of Judges to Merits Panels, Interlocutory Panels, and Expanded Panels.” The Board, therefore, complied with the statutory requirements for panel composition. Accordingly, we did not issue the Final Decision with less than a “full panel,” as Patent Owner contends.” slip op. at 5

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,003,082
• Captioncall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2015 · IPR2013-00541 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–15 unpatentable based on the prior final written decision.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “ANALYSIS A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Final Decision, has the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Ryan1 did not qualify as prior art because it was not enabled (Paper 28, 16– 25 (“PO Resp.”)), we determined that Ryan was enabled prior to the date of invention of the challenged patent in 1997 and, therefore, qualified as prior art to the challenged claims. Final Dec. 23–28.” slip op. at 3

  • ExcludeDecided for petitioner

    “record will be treated as a sworn deposition taken in [the district court proceeding] at which both parties appeared and had the opportunity to question the witness.” Ex. 1062 ¶ 5 (Stipulation Regarding Seiichi Yamamoto). As explained in our Final Decision, we granted Petitioner’s motion to submit the Yamamoto transcript as supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b) relating to the prior art status of Yamamoto and, after supplemental briefing by the parties, determined the Yamamoto transcript was admissible. Final Dec. 36–41.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Specification’s disclosure of “voice pattern.” Req. 10–12. We disagree that our reliance on the Specification’s “Brief Summary of the Invention,” which indicates “a speech recognition computer program which has been trained to the voice pattern of the call assistant,” was improper. See Final Dec. 8–9 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:46–48 (emphasis added)). Rather, in our Final Decision, we contrasted the Specification’s use of “voice pattern of the call assistant” in its “Brief Summary of the Invention” with its use of “a voice recognition software package which is specifically trained to the voice of that particular call assistant” in the context of a particular embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 1. Final Dec. 8–9 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:46– 48, 5:44–47). Based on the evidence in the Specification (including the Specification’s disclosure of “a voice pattern”), we determined that the Specification did not indicate expressly that the voice recognition software is trained to the voice of only that particular call assistant or otherwise indicate that the voice recognition software is trained for the voice of only one call assistant. Final Dec. 9. We concluded that “we will not limit ‘trained to the voice of the call assistant’ to require training to the voice of only one particular call assistant, because the claim language encompasses the invention as disclosed in the Specification—software trained to a voice pattern of a call assistant.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:41–49 (“Summary of the Invention”)).” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,909,482
• Global Tel*link Corporation v. Securus Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00810 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 5–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by Silberschatz; Petitioner did not show claims 4 and 8 unpatentable because Silberschatz does not disclose allocating or de-allocating a specific telecommunications resource.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In this case, the ’637 patent discloses multiple embodiments of telephony and telecommunication resources being allocated and de-allocated, but during prosecution, the applicant removed the modifying limitation of “telecommunication”3 leaving only the term “resource” in the issued claims. Compare Ex. 1004, 60–69 (Application No. 09/072,436) with Ex. 1002, 44–47. The claims, thus, recite “resource” and do not recite “telecommunications resource” nor do they recite “computer resource.” The lack of a limiting term modifying “resource” indicates a scope broader than the scope encompassed by a “resource” that is limited to only a “telecommunications resource” or “computer resource.” Moreover, the Examiner characterized the claims of the application that issued as the ’637 patent as “broader in scope than the claims [in] the parent patent.” Ex. 1002, 95. The Applicant did not dispute the Examiner’s characterization of the claims. Id. at 107. Although the ’637 patent discloses embodiments using “resources,” the ’637 patent does not define explicitly the term “resource.” Therefore, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term as would be understood by one of 3 The term “telecommunication” was recited in the proposed claims of earlier-filed parent Application No. 09/072,436. The ’637 patent claims priority to patent Application No. 09/072,436. See Ex. 1002, 1. ordinary skill in the art. A technical dictionary, IEEE Dictionary4, defines “resource” as “[a]ny capability that must be scheduled, assigned, or controlled by the underlying implementation to assure non[-]conflicting usage by processes.” Id. at 976. As shown by the dictionary definition, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “resource” is not limited to a telecommunications resource or a computer resource.5 Thus, the ordinary meaning of “resource” is consistent with the term’s use in the ’637 patent, which readily interchanges the term “resources” with “components” and “capability” in the context of computer telephony resources. Ex. 1001, 1:27–29. For example, in one embodiment in the ’637 patent, the telecommunication “resource” is a telephony line card that is coupled to a telephone. Id. at 9:12–15. In other embodiments, the telecommunication “resources” are components or ports coupled via a data bus to a central processing unit system, a data port system, a video system, a network system, a storage controller, and a high speed communication system. Id. at 8:1–27, 10:64–11:10, 11:14–22. In every embodiment in the ’637 patent, 4 IEEE 100: The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms: Seventh Edition (Standards Information Network, IEEE Press ©2000) (Ex. 3001) (hereinafter “IEEE Dictionary”). 5 Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Forys, testified on cross-examination that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have telecommunications experience because all of the embodiments in the ’637 patent are directed to telecommunications. Ex. 2002, 47:2–14. Based on this testimony, Patent Owner argues that the ’637 patent would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of a telecommunications systems. PO Resp. 8–9. We agree the ’637 patent may have been understood in the context of a telecommunications system, however, that does not indicate that a skilled artisan would have understood “resource” to have been limited to only a telecommunications resource. resources are a component or capability of a system that is managed (i.e., identified, allocated, de-allocated) by some module in the service kernel. Id. at 9:27–39, 10:10–14, 10:64–11:10, 11:14–22. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s position, because” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Forys, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’637 patent “would have a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or an equivalent field and one year to two years of industry experience in telecommunications.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Patent Owner does not disagree with Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of skill in the art, nor does Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Akl, offer any contrary explanation regarding who would qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’637 patent. PO Resp. 9–10; Ex. 2003 ¶ 42. Based on our review of the ’637 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’637 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioner’s Declarant, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a similar discipline, and at least one year of work experience in telecommunications technologies. We further note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We do agree with Patent Owner’s argument, however, with regards to dependent claims 4 and 8, which require the return of “the allocated telecommunications resources to control of the management module.” Ex. 1001, 21:52–22:6, 22:44–52; see supra, Section II.A.3. Petitioner has not indicated a disclosure in Silberschatz that demonstrates the allocation or de-allocation of a specific telecommunications resource. Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to show Silberschatz anticipates dependent claims 4 and 8.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s position, because Petitioner identifies CPU time as a specific resource that is requested (Pet. 23–24), allocated (id. at 25), used (id. at 25), and de-allocated (id. at 26). We credit the testimony of Dr. Forys, who explains how and where Silberschatz discloses each element of the challenged claims. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 64–80. Specifically, Dr. Forys testifies regarding the request, allocation, use, and de-allocation of a single type of resource (e.g., CPU time), thereby meeting the limitations of the challenged claims. Id. ¶¶ 74–80. Although Patent Owner correctly points out that Petitioner discusses multiple types of resources, we do not agree that Petitioner discusses or applies the disclosure of Silberschatz inconsistently, because Petitioner at least consistently identifies CPU time as a resource requested, allocated, used, and de-allocated.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,324,637 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,324,637

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.