- Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00958 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled original claims 1, 2, and 4–6, denied cancellation of claim 3 and substitute claims 7–12, and found substitute claims 7, 8, and 10–12 unpatentable on four obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“proposed assessment of a person of ordinary skill in the art, as a person having a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or related engineering disciplines, and two years of experience in multi-lens camera systems. Paper 6, 8–9. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its briefing. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the subject matter of the ’638 patent. As Patent Owner does not raise an objection, or provide an alternative description, we continue to use the same assessment of a person of ordinary skill in the art that we used in the Institution Decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (in the context of an inter partes review, applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction at that stage of the proceeding. Paper 6, 10. In its briefing, Patent Owner does not address any claim construction issues. In its Opposition to the Revised Motion to Amend, Petitioner does not propose any express claim construction. To the extent that the determination of the meaning of any claim term is necessary, we use its ordinary and customary meaning in this Decision. D. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements” slip op. at 14
- ScopeMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“Section 316(d) does not permit a Patent Owner to cancel or propose substitutes for non-challenged claims. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1). We therefore grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel original claims 1, 2, and 4–6 of the ’638 patent, but do not grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel claim 3, because claim 3 was not challenged by Petitioner.1 E. Proposed Substitute Claims 7–12” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We disagree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s reliance on Yadav (Ex. 1009) is improper because Yadav “was not published until May 16, 2013, more than three years after the priority date of the ’638 patent.” However, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1), a published patent application, such as Yadav, is deemed to be prior art as of its filing date, not its publication date as Patent Owner asserts. See Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 125 F. 4th 1120, 1126–27 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“[U]nder § 102(e)(1), even if a patent application was published after a claimed invention, it may serve as prior art to the invention if the application was filed before the invention.”). Yadov was filed on September 14, 2009 (Ex. 1009, code (22)), before the ’638 patent’s earliest possible priority date of December 25, 2009 (Ex. 1001, code (30)), making it prior art.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,482,638 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,482,638 - Ascentcare Dental Product, Inc. v. Solmetex, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01175 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not sufficiently show the patent was eligible for IPR when it filed the petition less than two months after issuance.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We determine that Petitioner cannot credibly certify that the ’418 patent is available for inter partes review, based on a claim of priority on the face of the ’418 patent to the ’939 provisional application filed prior to the effective date of the AIA, where, as here, Petitioner contradictorily contends in the Petition that the ’939 provisional application “does not support all claim limitations” of the ’418 patent.4 Id. If Petitioner’s allegation that claims of the ’418 patent are not supported by the ’939 provisional application is correct, then the ’418 patent would be a post- AIA patent for which a petition may not be filed earlier than 9 months after the ’418 patent issued. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(c). Thus, based on the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner, Petitioner fails to show that the ’418 patent is eligible for inter partes review when Petitioner filed the Petition less than two months after the ’418 patent issued. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c), 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a)(1). We, therefore, deny the Petition. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Petition complies with 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) and, therefore, deny the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached
“review when the Petition was filed “because the ’418 Patent claims priority to December 7, 2012 and is therefore,” not a post-AIA patent. Pet. 17 (emphasis added). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the ’418 patent is a post-AIA patent if any claim of the ’418 patent does not have priority to the ’939 provisional application, regardless of whether, on its face, the ’418 patent “claims priority” to an application filed prior to the effective date of the AIA. See In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] patent’s claims are not entitled to an earlier priority date merely because the patentee claims priority.”).” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 12,290,418 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01026 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because the Baliarda-543 challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we 1 Petitioner filed a confidential version of the Petition as Paper 3 and a public version of the Petition as Paper 4. We cite to the public version of the Petition. institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 in the ’677 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill as of the ’677 patent’s effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 40. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’677 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:26–6:47, 42:47–44:61, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term, phrase, or limitation requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although “Dou does not require its ‘diversity antenna architecture’ to provide spatial diversity,” Dou nevertheless requires a wireless device with some type of diversity antenna architecture. See, e.g., Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 14, 17–18, 22–24, 30, 32–34, codes (54), (57), claims 1 and 16. As an example, Dou’s independent claim 1 covering a “wireless device” requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 1. As another example, Dou’s independent claim 16 covering a “wireless device” also requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 16. As yet another example, Dou’s Abstract describes a “wireless device” including a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at code (57). Petitioner does not explain how the proposed combination provides anything other than spatial diversity. See Pet. 33–35; Prelim. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118–124. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that with Ciais-Quadband’s antenna used for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208, the two identical quadband antennas would have:” slip op. at 46
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,031,677 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01027 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Baliarda-543 anticipates or renders obvious those claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Regarding spatial diversity, Dou explains that a first internal antenna and a second internal antenna “may be separated by a distance (D) that is no less than the quarter wavelength (>=λ/4) of the lowest frequency.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 24; see Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 35, 44. Consistent with Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency, “a commonly accepted rule of thumb is that at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas is necessary to provide effective spatial diversity.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 33, 35, 47. Effective spatial diversity requires sufficient spacing between antennas because that technique “uses multiple antennas to improve signal reliability and performance by mitigating the effects of multipath fading and other interference.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 33. “Multipath fading occurs when a wireless signal propagates along multiple different paths of differing lengths because of interactions with obstacles, resulting in portions of the signal energy arriving at a receiver with different phases slightly offset in time.” Id. Locations insufficiently separated in terms of wavelength “tend to experience similar fading and interference characteristics.” Id. Thus, closely spaced antennas “cannot provide effective spatial diversity.” Id. By providing sufficient spacing between antennas, however, “the likelihood increases that at least one of the antennas will be positioned at a location where the multipath or other interference is relatively low, thereby improving overall signal quality and reliability.” Id. As Patent Owner contends, the proposed combination modifies Dou’s ground plane 310 to replicate Jing’s ground plane with dimensions of 36 mm × 60 mm and limits “the extent of Dou’s ground plane 310 so that it [does] not extend behind Jing’s antenna at 306, just like Dou does not extend it behind antenna 308.” See Pet. 35–36; Prelim. Resp. 20 (quoting Pet. 35); Prelim. Sur-reply 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 120; Ex. 2010 ¶ 45. The lowest frequency of Jing’s antenna is 900 MHz. Ex. 1011, 2657–58; see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118, 154; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 37, 44. The wavelength (λ) corresponding to a frequency of 900 MHz is 333.3 mm, and a quarter wavelength (λ/4) is 83.3 mm. Ex. 2010 ¶ 44. In the proposed combination, a distance of 60 mm separates the” slip op. at 49
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,349,200 - Bizlink Technology, Inc. v. Anderson Power Products, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00687 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 7–12 are unpatentable; claim 4 is not shown unpatentable because Winkler does not establish that its insulating barriers press against each other when partially disconnected.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner’s first argument that a level of ordinary skill in the art that encompasses an individual having experience with electrical circuits but not electrical connectors is not consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’017 patent. See PO Resp. 7. The field of the invention of the ’017 patent is “electrical connectors, and more particularly, . . . an electrical connector that suppresses arcing if connected or disconnected while current is flowing.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–9. Consistent therewith, the challenged claims are directed to “[a]n electrical connector pair” and recite structural features of the electrical connector pair. Id. at 4:20–56, 5:1–20.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We find that the intrinsic evidence supports maintaining our construction in the Institution Decision that “insulating” means “electrically insulating.” See Dec. 11–12. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the insulating barriers would be unable to be configured to “block[] substantially all through-air arcing paths between the first and second electrical contacts,” as claimed, unless they were electrically insulating. See Ex. 1001, 4:36–44. Moreover, as Patent Owner avers, our interpretation of “insulating” as it applies to the first and second insulating barriers should be the same as for the first and second housings. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1345 (“whatever interpretation we assign [to a word used in a claim] should encompass both uses because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Ex. 2001 ¶ 102. Accordingly, we find Dr. Eldering’s testimony persuasive as to this issue and determine that the diagram shows what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably inferred Winkler to disclose when the connectors are partially disconnected. Compare Ex. 1004, Fig. 2, with Pet. 33; see also Ex. 1004, 3:14–27 (discussing the process by which the connectors are engaged with each other).” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Id. at 3:27–37 (emphasis added). These wall portions 58 are located between the distal ends of the terminals and where Petitioner proposes to add a printed circuit board or wiring board to Winkler. See id. at Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46 (diagrams showing Winkler as modified to have a printed circuit board or wiring board). As such, movement of Winkler’s terminals appears to be mostly limited to within their respective receiving pockets. Given the above teachings, we fail to see how Petitioner’s proposed modification would have meaningfully interfered with the degree of freedom of movement required by Winkler’s terminals. Notably, Mr. Locati’s testimony regarding this issue is conclusory. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 120. Because movement of Winkler’s terminals occurs primarily in the receiving pockets, we also do not discern how the solder joint of Petitioner’s proposed modification would experience undue stress or risk breaking due to that movement. See Ex. 1004, 1:47–55, 3:14–37, Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46. This is particularly true in view of Winkler’s teaching that each cylindrical end portion may be soldered to a cable. See id. at 2:6–10; see also Pet. 43 (arguing that Winkler teaches soldering to a cable but not specifically to a printed circuit or wiring board). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Winkler and Handbook.” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 8,808,017 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,808,017 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Chien-Min SungAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00534 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–6, 9–12, and 20 are anticipated by or obvious over Sung ’026; claims 5–10 and 13–19 are obvious over the listed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“We secondly conclude a POSITA would have had at least two years of experience designing and/or developing CMP technology per Patent Owner’s formulation, but we reject Patent Owner’s additional contention that this experience must include designing and/or developing pad dressers” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In his deposition testimony, Dr. Tsai testifies that the Sung ’026 patent application publication “intends to make a diamond disk that has all the protrusion[s] with identical heights and with the same orientation.” Ex. 1049, 50:2–4. Dr. Tsai also testified that “[i]n addition, [Sung ’026] also intends to control the depths of penetrating into the pad. For example, if I want to penetrate 10 micron into the pad, then the protrusion height should be at least 10 micron.” Id. at 50:10–13. So, contrary to Dr. Tsai’s Declaration testimony in Ex. 2011 ¶ 69, Dr. Tsai clarifies in his deposition testimony that Sung ’026 intends to combine three distinct aspects or embodiments. He testifies that “first one is that you need to have the same orientation, same shape so you can have the consistency; and No. 2, you would like to have the same height; and No. 3, you would like to control the penetration depths.” Ex. 1049, 51:2–6. Dr. Tsai was then asked “[s]o Sung ’026 is trying to combine all three of those together, correct?” Id. at 51:9– 10. His answer was “[t]hat’s correct, because if you can have a very good control of those, then -- and that time period back then, then you can make a very perfect diamond disk.” Id. at 51:11–13. Based on the evidence as discussed above, we determine that Sung ’026 discloses the elements and limitations in clause 1[C]. In particular, we credit Dr. Shanfield’s testimony (as summarized above) over Dr. Tsai’s declaration testimony, because Dr. Tsai’s deposition testimony essentially agreed with Dr. Shanfield that Sung ’026 discloses all the aspects recited in claim 1 together in a single embodiment.” slip op. at 48
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Moreover, our general approach for considering challenges to the admissibility of evidence was outlined in Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., IPR2013-00053, Paper 66 at 19 (PTAB May 1, 2014). As stated in Corning, similar to a district court in a bench trial, the Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal with administrative expertise, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to evidence presented. Id. (citing Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941) (stating, in the context of reviewing an administrative determination of the National Labor Relations Board based on findings by a Trial Examiner, “We think that experience has demonstrated that in a trial or hearing where no jury is present, more time is ordinarily lost in listening to arguments as to the admissibility of evidence and in considering offers of proof than would be consumed in taking the evidence proffered . . . One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received . . . .”)). Moreover, “there is a strong public policy for making all information filed in an administrative proceeding available to the public.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00010, Paper 59 at 40 (PTAB February 24, 2014). Rather than excluding evidence that is allegedly hearsay, confusing, misleading, untimely, and/or irrelevant, we will simply not rely on it or give it little or no probative weight, as appropriate, in our analysis. “In an inter partes review, we regard it as the better course to have a complete record of the evidence to facilitate public access, as well as appellate review.” Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. Game Controller Tech. LLC, IPR2013-00634, Paper 32 at 31 (PTAB Apr. 14, 2015); see also Gnosis S.p.A. v. S. Alabama Med. Sci. Found., IPR2013-00118, Paper 64 at 43 (PTAB June 20, 2014) (citing Donnelly, 123 F.2d at 224 (“If the record on review contains not only all evidence which was clearly admissible, but also all evidence of doubtful admissibility, the court which is called upon to review the case can usually make an end of it, whereas if evidence was excluded which that court regards as having been admissible, a new trial or rehearing cannot be avoided.”)).” slip op. at 32
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s argument is that “several distinct portions of Sung ’026 purportedly, when viewed together, disclose an embodiment that satisfies the recitation of Claim Limitation [1C].” Id. at 20. Patent Owner asserts, however, that “these individual embodiments of Sung ’026—which it describes in separate portions of the reference as discrete ‘aspects’ of the invention of Sung ’026—cannot not be used collectively to satisfy the anticipation standard.” Id. (citing Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371). Simply put, it is Patent Owner’s position that because Sung ’026 fails to disclose these various aspects in a single embodiment as Claim Limitation [1C] recites, Sung ’026 cannot anticipate claim 1. It is Petitioner’s position that Dr. Tsai’s deposition testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions that Sung ’026 anticipates independent claim 1 because the various alleged “individual embodiments” are part of a unified whole that overcome the circumstances discussed in Net MoneyIN. In his deposition testimony, Dr. Tsai testifies that the Sung ’026 patent application publication “intends to make a diamond disk that has all the protrusion[s] with identical heights and with the same orientation.” Ex. 1049, 50:2–4. Dr. Tsai also testified that “[i]n addition, [Sung ’026] also intends to control the depths of penetrating into the pad. For example, if I want to penetrate 10 micron into the pad, then the protrusion height should be at least 10 micron.” Id. at 50:10–13. So, contrary to Dr. Tsai’s Declaration testimony in Ex. 2011 ¶ 69, Dr. Tsai clarifies in his deposition testimony that Sung ’026 intends to combine three distinct aspects or embodiments. He testifies that “first one is that you need to have the same orientation, same shape so you can have the consistency; and No. 2, you would like to have the same height; and No. 3, you would like to control the penetration depths.” Ex. 1049, 51:2–6. Dr. Tsai was then asked “[s]o Sung ’026 is trying to combine all three of those together, correct?” Id. at 51:9– 10. His answer was “[t]hat’s correct, because if you can have a very good control of those, then -- and that time period back then, then you can make a very perfect diamond disk.” Id. at 51:11–13. Based on the evidence as discussed above, we determine that Sung ’026 discloses the elements and limitations in clause 1[C]. In particular, we credit Dr. Shanfield’s testimony (as summarized above) over Dr. Tsai’s declaration testimony, because Dr. Tsai’s deposition testimony essentially agreed with Dr. Shanfield that Sung ’026 discloses all the aspects recited in claim 1 together in a single embodiment.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 9,138,862 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,138,862 - Synaffix B.V. v. Hangzhou Dac Biotech Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24, 26, and 29–31 are unpatentable; claims 25 and 32–34 were not shown unpatentable, and the motion to exclude was dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- RemandOther
“review of claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 1, 3. Patent Owner, Hangzhou DAC Biotech Co., Ltd., filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”). We initially determined that the information presented in the Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17. Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel (“DRP”). Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Delegated Review Panel vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised claim construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”). On August 30, 2024, we instituted an inter partes review after remand from the Director. Paper 25 (“Inst. Dec.”). Patent Owner subsequently filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 31, “Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 36, “Reply”), Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 44, “Sur-reply”), and Petitioner filed a Sur-sur-reply (Paper 48, “Sur-sur-reply”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther
“I. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1089 and 1090. Paper 50. As we did not rely on either of Exhibits 1089 or 1090 in deciding this matter, Patent Owner’s motion is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 96
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableMixed
“For these reasons, Patent Owner’s arguments and cited evidence also” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“function as R2, and the ethyl group may function as R4, which can be a linear alkyl having 1–6 carbon atoms. We note that claim 3 permits R5 and R6 to be absent. For these reasons, the arguments presented in the Petition demonstrate that claim 3 would have been obvious over Singh’s Compound 3 when modified in view of Harris.” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 10,131,682 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,131,682 - Tesla, Inc. v. Graphite Charging Company LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00388 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Wang and Wang with AESO did not establish the claimed analysis, and Cooley did not disclose reducing current power consumption.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the claims require a decision engine to perform those elements.” Tr. 48:17– 20. In light of this, we fail to understand the basis for Patent Owner’s objection to the characterization of the level of ordinary skill involving experience with “intelligent” techniques or devices that control grid electricity. We determine that Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the Specification and the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner (PO Resp. 12, 49–50) points to the Specification’s list of “[e]xamples of power reduction actions.” Ex. 1001, 8:47–63. Patent Owner asserts that the list includes numerous examples of power reductions that occur in the present and one that takes place in the future—namely, “scheduling nonessential operations at a different time (e.g., nonessential software or hardware upgrades).” Ex. 1001, 8:61–62 (cited at PO Resp. 12, 50). We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention (PO Resp. 12) that the applicant, by including the term “current” in the claims, intentionally narrowed the claims to power consumption reductions that occur temporally in the present, rather than those that occur in the future. See Pet. Reply 6–7 (Petitioner asserting that Patent Owner’s position is “inconsistent with the specification’s examples,” but then arguing that the Specification does not support that position rather than pointing to any purported inconsistencies). Because the independent claims recite the term “current,” construing the term in the temporal sense is not, as Petitioner argues, importing into the claims an example from the Specification. See Pet. Reply 8.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Given the interchangeable nature taught for various features of Wang’s embodiments, it would have been a routine and obvious matter for a POSA to combine aspects from Wang’s various embodiments (e.g., data acquisition, internal hardware, data analysis performed by the UMC receiver 400 and/or the display 200). Moreover, many of Wang’s embodiments–particularly of specific smart appliance types– include common components, thus further confirming combinability of aspects of the disclosed embodiments. A POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining features of the embodiments together. Id. at 77–78 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 201–203). We determine that these reasons are inadequate and too generic to satisfy Petitioner’s burden as they lack a clear explanation of what and how “aspects from Wang’s various embodiments” are proposed to be combined along with reasoning specific to that proposal. Petitioner, for example, does not explain adequately or persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added a display that purportedly receives and analyzes data to a “smart appliance,” when that appliance already has an application processor that purportedly receives and analyzes the same data. It is not enough for Petitioner to allege that all of the elements of the challenged claims can be found somewhere in the various embodiments of Wang; Petitioner must also show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the elements in the manner as arranged in the challenged claims. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”). We find Petitioner has not shown an adequate reason to combine embodiments.” slip op. at 38
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentable
“We determine that these reasons are inadequate and too generic to satisfy Petitioner’s burden as they lack a clear explanation of what and how “aspects from Wang’s various embodiments” are proposed to be combined along with reasoning specific to that proposal. Petitioner, for example, does not explain adequately or persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added a display that purportedly receives and analyzes data to a “smart appliance,” when that appliance already has an application processor that purportedly receives and analyzes the same data. It is not enough for Petitioner to allege that all of the elements of the challenged claims can be found somewhere in the various embodiments of Wang; Petitioner must also show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the elements in the manner as arranged in the challenged claims. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”). We find Petitioner has not shown an adequate reason to combine embodiments.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 8,291,243 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,291,243
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.