• Nichia Corporation / Osram Opto Semiconductors, Inc. v. Lighting Science Group Corp.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 15, 2020 · IPR2019-01487 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claim 7 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Andrews anticipated or rendered the claim obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “But this argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim as we have construed it. In particular, in advancing this contention, Petitioner does not present any argument or evidence that thermal contact pad 36 of Andrews is in “solderable thermal contact” with the combination of plate 51 and insulating film 49. Rather, because we agree with Patent Owner that “‘solderable thermal contact’ requires solderability between the region and the base, not some other unclaimed structure,” we also agree with Patent Owner that “the Petition fails to show that Andrews teaches a ‘thermally conducti[ve] region’ solderable to a ‘thermally conducting base.’” Prelim. Resp. 30. In addition, Patent Owner specifically addresses the possibility that Andrews’s thermal contact pad 36 and insulating film 49 are in solderable contact, notwithstanding the omission of such an argument in the Petition. See id. at 30–31. Patent Owner observes that the bottom layer of what Petitioner identifies as the recited “thermally conducting base” is an electrically insulating film, and what Petitioner identifies as the recited “thermally conductive region” is an electrical conductor, “such as gold, silver, [or] tin.” Id. at 31 (quoting Ex. 1008 ¶ 70). Patent Owner asserts that “[i]t is not possible to solder a conductor such as gold, silver, or tin to a nonconductive insulating film.” Id. at 31. That assertion is consistent with a technical dictionary’s definition of “solderability” as “[t]hat property of a metal surface to be readily wetted by molten solder.” See Ex. 3001 (definition by The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms) (emphasis added). In light of these considerations, we conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claim 7 as anticipated by Andrews.” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “F. Summary Because we conclude that the Petition does not present a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating that any challenged claim is unpatentable, we also deny the Motion for Joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (permitting joinder only where a properly filed petition “warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”). We need not reach Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Prelim. Resp. 47–56. III. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Joinder is denied.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of skill in the art is apparent from the cited art and that such a person “would have had at least a B.S. in mechanical or electrical engineering or a related field, and four years’ experience designing semiconductor—including LED—packages.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–33). Patent Owner does not dispute this articulation, which we adopt for this Decision. See Prelim. Resp. 8.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “First, we find that the plain meaning of the phrase supports Patent Owner’s proposal. The adjectives “solderable” and “thermal” are grammatically parallel in the phrase, and there is no apparent reason why those adjectives do not each equivalently modify the noun “contact,” such that the “contact” between the thermally conductive region and the thermally conducting base must be both “solderable” and “thermal.” See Prelim. Resp. 25 (Patent Owner asserting that “[t]his term plainly requires ‘solderable thermal contact between a thermally conductive region and the thermally conductive base’”). Second, we find that the prosecution history of the ’421 patent also supports Patent Owner’s proposal. Although both parties cite the same relevant aspect of that prosecution history, they interpret it differently. See Pet. 33–34; Prelim. Resp. 26–29. When the application that matured into the ’421 patent was originally filed, independent claim 1 did not include the word “solderable,” but instead recited only that a bottom surface of the LED assembly include “a thermally conductive region in thermal contact with the thermally conducting base, for spreading heat transmitted to the base from the one or more LED die.” Ex. 1002, 21. After the Applicant successfully traversed an obviousness rejection based on a combination of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,847,935 (“Thaler”) and 6,565,239 (“Rizkin”), the Examiner rejected claim 1 as anticipated by U.S. Patent Publ. No. 2003/0189830 (Ex. 1011, “Sugimoto”). Id. at 109. Sugimoto describes a light-source apparatus using an LED in which light-emission efficiency is improved to achieve greater light-output intensity, operational life, and mechanical strength. Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 1, 17. In responding to the anticipation rejection during prosecution to distinguish Sugimoto, the Applicant made two amendments to independent claim 1. First, the claim was amended to add the last limitation of the issued claim (“further comprising an LED assembly mount selected from the group consisting of an electrically insulated fastener and a solderable bonding pad”). Ex. 1002, 124. Second, the claim was amended to add the word “solderable” in the limitation at issue, thereby requiring that the “thermally conductive region [be] in solderable thermal contact with the thermally conducting base” (emphasis added). Id. Both of these aspects of Applicant’s amendments were identified by the Examiner in the reasons for allowance as not disclosed by Sugimoto. Id. at 167.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,528,421
• Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Asus Computer International, Inc. v. James B. GoodmanSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 29, 2019 · IPR2017-02021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 10, and 16 are unpatentable over Ooishi and Palaniswami, with Abe added for claims 10 and 16; claims 2–4, 6–9, and 11–15, 17–20 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “reasonable construction consistent with the Specification of a control device “for selectively electrically isolating said memory devices from respective address lines and respective control lines so that when said memory devices are electrically isolated, any signals received on said respective address lines and respective control lines do not reach said memory devices” as recited in independent claims 1 and 10 requires that the control device electrically isolate the memory devices from all address and control lines that communicate with the memory devices.10” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’315 patent (a “POSITA”) would have had, inter alia, a bachelor’s degree in electrical, electronics, computer engineering; or the equivalent training, and would have had approximately 2 to 3 years of experience in computer systems, circuits, electronics, or a related discipline. Pet. 9; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–30. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 8. Based on our review of the ’315 patent, the cited prior art, and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony, we determine a specific finding regarding ordinary skill level is not required as the prior art reflects an appropriate level. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). However, to the extent a specific finding regarding the level of skill is required, we find Petitioner’s articulation of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the teachings of the prior art and adopt Petitioner’s description of a POSITA as someone who “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical, electronics, or computer engineering; or the equivalent training, and would have had approximately two to three years of experience in computer systems, circuits, electronics, or a related discipline.” See Pet. 9.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). A reference is deemed publically accessible upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence can locate it. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Petitioner asserts JESD21-C was published January 1997 and is prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 37–38. As support, Petitioner relies upon the Declaration of John J. Kelley (“the Kelley Declaration”), the current President of the Solid State Technology Association of the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”). See Ex. 1007 ¶ 2. Mr. Kelly states that JEDEC specification JESD21-C, Configurations for Solid State Memories, Release 7 (January 1997), a copy of which is attached to his declaration as Exhibit 17, “was made publicly available in January 1997.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 7. Mr. Kelley testifies that in January 1997 copies of the entire JESD21-C volume “would . . . have been available for purchase by anyone in the public” and that “pages comprising the specifically updated modules would have been sent to those who subscribed to the annual updating service for JESD21-C.” Id. ¶ 6. Patent Owner does not dispute that JESD21-C qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See PO Resp. 7. Based on the current record, we determine JESD21-C qualifies as a prior art printed publication under § 102(b).” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Dell discloses a control device that electrically isolates the memory devices as required under the claim construction set forth above in devices even when the devices are in a low-power or self-refresh mode, Petitioner has not shown that Dell’s memory devices are electrically isolated from “respective control lines” such that “any signals received on said . . . respective control lines do not reach said memory devices” as required by claims 1 and 10. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of the ’315 patent is unpatentable over Dell or that claim 10 is unpatentable over the combined teachings of Dell and Abe.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,243,315 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,243,315
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 27, 2018 · IPR2016-01404 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted the motion to excuse late filing and denied rehearing, maintaining that claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 33, 34, 39, 46, and 48 were not shown unpatentable over Bensimon.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision . . .” who “must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Petitioner’s argument is predicated upon a mischaracterization of our factual findings. Petitioner asserts that we found Bensimon “taught all of the elements of the claim in ‘one possible mode of operation.’” Reh’g Req. 1 (citing Decision 17). We, however, made no such finding. The phrase that Petitioner attributes to us—namely, “one possible mode of operation”—does not appear anywhere in our Final Written Decision. Compare Reh’g Req. 1 (citing Decision 17) to Decision 17. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, we did not find “that Bensimon sometimes teaches all of the elements of the claim” nor did we find “that Bensimon discloses a ‘restricted-access mode’ by disclosing a ‘write protection’ mode.” Reh’g Req. 1–3 (citing Decision, 16–17). Rather, we found the exact opposite—that Bensimon fails to disclose the claimed restricted-access mode because, as claimed, that mode requires the absence of the claimed device-specific security information (i.e. the read/write password, or alternatively the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag). Decision 16–17 (citing Reply 16– 22) (“Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device.”) (bolding added; italics original). slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “claim” nor did we find “that Bensimon discloses a ‘restricted-access mode’ by disclosing a ‘write protection’ mode.” Reh’g Req. 1–3 (citing Decision, 16–17). Rather, we found the exact opposite—that Bensimon fails to disclose the claimed restricted-access mode because, as claimed, that mode requires the absence of the claimed device-specific security information (i.e. the read/write password, or alternatively the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag). Decision 16–17 (citing Reply 16– 22) (“Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device.”) (bolding added; italics original).” slip op. at 6

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,968,459
• BMW Of North America, LLC v. Stragent, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2018 · IPR2017-00677 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 51–59 are unpatentable: claims 51–59 over Staiger and Millsap, and claims 51 and 54–57 over each OSEK-based obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We have reviewed the relevant deposition testimony, in which Dr. Miller was asked to identify the standard he used when construing claim terms in his Declaration. Ex. 1025, 27:1–34:14. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Miller did not provide responses sufficient to conclude that he was aware of and/or applied the correct claim-construction standard. See id. at 27:5–6 (“I used what is generally accepted in the field.”), 27:9–11 (“So to – for construing the claim terms is providing a definition of what the term is. So I provided a general definition for the terms.”), 30:3–6 (“Well, that’s the standard that I used for construing the claim terms in this Declaration. I don’t know if that’s the legal qualification for construing claim terms.”), 32:18–23 (“broadest reasonable interpretation” would mean “when you’re defining a term that you would define it in a way that is, first of all, reasonable, that it makes sense and that it’s broad, meaning general and that it’s interpreting the phrase or the term”). Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the appropriate remedy is exclusion of Dr. Miller’s testimony. As Patent Owner asserts, “[t]he role of the expert witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence is to ‘help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” Paper 24, 2–3 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (emphasis by Patent Owner). As Patent Owner further asserts, Petitioner does not “impugn[]” Dr. Miller’s credibility as an expert in the subject matter at issue. Id. at 3–4. We agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is improper in a motion to exclude.” Id. at 4 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Surfcast, Inc., Case IPR2013-00292 at 52–53 (Paper 93) (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014)). We accordingly deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “Petitioner alternatively argues in its Reply that “Because Dr. Miller did not apply the correct claim construction standard, his opinions on claim construction (Ex. 2001, §§16-21) should be afforded no weight.” Reply 2. Although we agree that the weight to be accorded to Dr. Miller’s testimony on claim construction is impacted by the uncertainty of the analytical procedure he followed, we are not persuaded that his testimony should be discounted wholesale. Dr. Miller provides relevant opinions on a number of issues, particularly including how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand certain terms in light of the Specification, that are helpful to us as the trier of fact. “There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.” Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1952).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “shared “in real time utilizing a second network protocol . . . ,” and dependent claim 59 recites that information is processed “to create, in real-time, messages in at least two other message formats . . . .” Petitioner argues that the Specification of the ’843 patent expressly defines “real-time”: “In the context of the present description, real-time may include any response time that may be measured in milli- or microseconds, and/or is less than 1 second.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 35–38. Accordingly, Petitioner proposes that “‘real-time’ should be construed as responses that occur in less than one second.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that the definition from the Specification should be adopted. PO Resp. 15. We construe “real-time” as Petitioner proposes, i.e., as including responses that occur in less than one second. The first part of the quote cited above provided in the Specification (“may be measured in milli- or microseconds”) is not limiting because any response time, no matter how large or small, may be measured in milli- or microseconds.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “been reached in association with the storage request.” Petitioner proposes that “threshold” be construed consistent with a dictionary definition it provides, as a “value above which something is true or will take place and below which it is not or will not.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1016, 5). Observing that the Specification of the ’843 patent uses “threshold” in the context of an elapsed time, Petitioner further proposes that this construction “include the maximum value (i.e., time-out) of a timer.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 21–25, col. 8, ll. 47–51). We agree, and accordingly construe “threshold” as Petitioner proposes.3 3. “heterogeneous networks” Dependent claim 55 recites that the “apparatus is operable such that the first network and the second network are heterogeneous networks.” The Specification of the ’843 patent defines “heterogeneous networks”: “In the context of the present description, heterogeneous networks may refer to any different communication networks with at least one aspect that is different.” Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 26–29. In light of this explicit definition, for purposes of this Decision, we construe “heterogeneous networks” as Petitioner proposes, i.e., as “networks having at least one aspect that is different.” Pet. 14 (citing 3 Patent Owner advocates for the same construction advanced by Petitioner, but omits inclusion of the maximum value of a timer. PO Resp. 15. Although Patent Owner asserts that the construction is otherwise “the definition provided by the ‘843 Patent,” it does not cite to the ’843 patent to support its assertion, and we are unable to identify such a definition in the patent. Nevertheless, we agree with Petitioner that any distinction between the constructions is not material to any grounds. See Reply 6.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,566,843 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,566,843
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 23, 2018 · IPR2017-00100 · APJ John P Pinkerton · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 8 and 9 were not proven unpatentable because Samsung did not establish that WD4 was a prior art printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Whether a reference is publicly accessible is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the “facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (GSM standard was “sufficiently accessible, at least to the public interested in the art” (citing In re Hall, 781 F. 2d at 899)). Just as indexing plays a significant role in evaluating whether a reference in a library is publicly accessible, “indexing, ‘[w]hether . . . through search engines or otherwise,’ [] is also an important question for determining if a reference stored on a given website in cyberspace is publicly accessible.” Blue Calypso LLC v. Groupon Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “[A] printed publication need not be easily searchable after publication if it was sufficiently disseminated at the time of its publication.” Suffolk Technologies, LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009). slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,917,772 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,917,772
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 23, 2018 · IPR2017-00099 · APJ John P Pinkerton · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 were not proven unpatentable because Samsung did not establish that WD4 was a prior art printed publication under § 102(b).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “evidence does not establish WD4 was indexed in a manner that one ordinarily skilled in the art, exercising reasonable diligence, could locate it. See Response 45. There is no evidence that the JCT-VC site provided users sufficient guidance on finding documents of interest. Importantly, there is no evidence that one could search for or locate WD4 based on its subject matter. Although the Torino document register contains the number, title, and source (i.e, authors’ names) of each document, the subject of the document is not listed or identified. See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160– 61 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding references were not publicly accessible, despite the use of indexing, because the references were indexed only by title and author’s name, rather than by subject). Furthermore, identifying a meeting location was key to navigating the JCT-VC site; however, there is no evidence showing that persons of skill in the art outside of JCT-VC would have had any knowledge or familiarity with the cities in which the JCT-VC meetings were conducted or that the names of the cities were helpful in any respect in locating a document on the site. For these reasons, the evidence does not support the conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the art at the time of the invention would have been aware of the JCT-VC document repository site, or that, if they were aware of the site, would have been able to locate the WD4 document relied upon by Samsung.” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Mr. Bross’s testimony is conclusory and insufficiently factually supported. We understand Mr. Bross to be testifying in this regard as a fact witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 602, rather than as an expert witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Under Rule 602, a fact witness may testify as to a matter only if “evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Here, Mr. Bross’s testimony is based on his “knowledge and recollection” and “the prominence of the JCT-VC” in the video coding industry. However, the particular factual knowledge on which the testimony is based is not described. Similarly, the “prominence” of the JCT-VC is nothing more than an unsupported assumption. We also find Mr. Bross has not been shown to have the requisite personal knowledge to testify about persons “who would regularly visit the JCT-VC site.” Even if we accepted Mr. Bross’s premise of the “prominence of the JCT-VC,” we would not find that to be a sufficient basis for Mr. Bross to reliably testify about persons “regularly visit[ing]” the JCT-VC site.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,917,772 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,917,772
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Harry Heslop And Sportbrain Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2018 · IPR2016-01464 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over the combinations of Vock, Smith, and Onari; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Root; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Browne; or Shum, Nikolic, and Root.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” should be interpreted to mean data related to a number of steps, which can include data gathered by a pedometer. Pet. 21. Petitioner highlights that during prosecution, Applicants argued that the scope of this claim term encompasses pedometer step data. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1017, 8). Petitioner also highlights that the Examiner in the reissue application interpreted this claim term to encompass any data developed from the number of steps of the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1022, 35). The Specification of the ’002 patent discloses examples of personal data as the number of steps counted during the user’s fitness activity or during the day, the distance walked by the user during the day, and the amount of calories burned by the user during the day. See Ex. 1001, 7:34, 8:53–55, 10:27–30. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also does not provide its own proposed construction of this claim term. We agree with Petitioner’s reasoning and construe the term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” as encompassing at least data gathered by a pedometer, including a number of steps, or data developed from a number of steps, including a distance walked or an amount of calories burned.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Supported by testimony of Dr. Eldering, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least two years of work towards a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related subject or equivalent, or at least one year of experience working with computer networks and web sites.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We determine that Patent Owner’s contention that Vock teaches away from using the pedometer of system 620 shown in Figure 21 with the system shown in Figure 1 is inconsistent with Vock’s disclosure that “system 620 [shown in Figure 21] is useful to joggers who can gate it to serve as a pedometer” and that “[d]ata may also be acquired by the accelerometer and telemetered to the electronics 626 via an RF link 631 back to a remote base 632 for storage and processing (e.g., such as the base station 70, FIG. 1).” Ex. 1006, 50:5, 49:21–23, and Fig. 21. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify the sensing unit of Vock to measure and transmit the number of steps taken by a user, and to modify the base station of Vock to provide feedback based on the number of steps, in light of the teachings of Smith, for the benefit of providing a user with additional information with which to quantitatively assess performance during a physical activity, and that such modifications would have been accomplished with a high chance of success. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 50–52. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the sensing unit of Vock to periodically transmit data gathered by the sensing unit to a base station, in light of the teachings of Onari, for the benefit of providing other users with updates on the performance of a user as new data is collected. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 55–62.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “SportBrain iSTEP product is evidence that the claims are not obvious. PO Resp. 32–36. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner has not established a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. Reply 22–23. In particular, Petitioner contends that the evidence suggests that data was sent from the activity tracker over a telephone line when the device was docked, rather than “over a wireless network” from “wireless communication devices” as claimed. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1024, 11). Accordingly, Petitioner shows that the challenged claims do not encompass the docked/telephone product for conveying data, and no nexus presumption exists. See Reply Br. 22–23; WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (error to reach obviousness conclusion without first weighing all the factors, and relied upon product must be “the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent” to obtain a presumption of nexus) (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Even if a nexus presumption were to apply, Patent Owner’s alleged commercial success does not provide any analysis with respect to market share, so it is not clear how 10,000 subscribers or units with accessories sold shows success that alters the obviousness calculus appreciably. See PO Resp. 35–36 (alleging 10,000 subscribers and 35,000 related units and accessories); Pet. Reply 23 (citing Ex. 1024, 7–8 (showing any success probably was due to the growing popularity of exercise trackers in general)). We determine that Patent Owner has not established commercial success or a nexus, such that the product identified by Patent Owner sent data over a wireless network from wireless communication devices, as required by the claims.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,454,002 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,454,002
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCOther
  PTAB · Jan 10, 2018 · IPR2016-01404 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 33, 34, 39, 46, and 48 not shown unpatentable: Bensimon did not disclose the claimed restricted-access mode, and Takahashi did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner states––and Patent Owner does not dispute––that “a person having ordinary skill in the art of secure computer data storage devices (i.e. in the art for the ’459 patent) would have had (i) a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and (ii) approximately two years of experience in the design or research of secure computer data storage devices.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). We agree with Petitioner’s statement of the level skill of an ordinary artisan at the time and adopt it as our own. Although Patent Owner does not directly address an ordinary artisan’s level of skill, Petitioner’s description of the level of skill accords with that of Patent Owner’s witness Dr. Goldschlag. Compare id., with Ex. 2004 ¶ 21 (opining that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or equivalent training, as well as two to three years of technical experience in the field of computer security and storage devices.”). We further find the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “within an electronic circuit embedded within the storage device.” Ex. 1001, 9:58–59, 10:34–35. Although these claims are not at issue in this case, they evince the patentee’s desire to employ each of the terms “unique” and “specific” where each is intended. It is well established that ordinarily different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings. . . .”); CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Further, the Specification describes that, depending on the selected security level, a cryptographic key can be generated using in part “device-specific security information derived from the unique format information of the removable storage device.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:1. The Specification thus describes the format information of the removable storage device as “unique” but describes the security information of the device merely as “specific,” not “unique.” Finally, the Specification discloses “for exemplary purposes only” an embodiment wherein “a unique, device-specific security information can be generated from the unique characteristics of the underlying storage medium.” Id. at 7:43–47 (emphasis added). The Specification thus describes device-specific security information as unique in a particular, non-limiting example and explicitly indicates that the device-specific security information derived in that example is “unique.” See id. In light of the foregoing description, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that “specific” in the context of the claim term “device-specific security information” means unique. Construing “specific” to mean “unique” as Patent Owner urges would render meaningless the subsequent use of “unique” in claims 9 and 17, without a clear indication in the Specification of such an intent. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. Instead, we accord the word “specific” its ordinary and customary meaning and construe “device-specific security information” as meaning “information particular to, but not necessarily unique to, a storage device and used to secure access to the storage device.” Although we construe the disputed term “device-specific security information,” our determination that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the Instituted Claims are unpatentable is not dependent upon our construction, as detailed below.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has not identified in Bensimon explicit or inherent disclosure of the claimed restricted-access mode. Claim 1 requires operating in restrictedaccess mode “when the storage device does not have the device-specific security information.” Ex. 1001, 9:24–26. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, either alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as meeting the claimed device-specific security information. Reply 13; Pet. 22. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of claim 1, Petitioner is required to show that Bensimon discloses operating in restricted-access mode when the storage device does not have the read/write password, or alternatively does not have the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag. See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that in order to show anticipation, claimed elements must be arranged as required by the claim). Petitioner does not make the required showing. As Petitioner argues: “these claims recite operating in one mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is present, and operating in another mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is not present.” Reply 16. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device. See id. at 16–22. Rather, Bensimon describes two different possible modes of operation when the read/write password is absent from the storage device, namely either no protection or write protection. Ex. 1004, 5:33–39, 6:3–4, 6:13–29. Contrary to the claim language, operation in Bensimon’s write protection mode depends upon the presence of the write protection password, not upon the absence of the read/write password and password-enabling flag (i.e. the claimed device-specific security information). Ex. 1004, 6:13–23; see also Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 18) (asserting the claimed restricted-access mode is met “when Bensimon’s storage device 100 only has the write-protection (read-only) password”). This disclosure is insufficient to establish anticipation because claim 1 requires operating in restricted access mode when the storage device does not have the device-specific storage information, which Petitioner asserts is the read/write password and password-enabling flag. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We similarly are not persuaded that Bensimon inherently anticipates claim 1. “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the cited disclosure identifies two possible modes of operation when the read/write password and password-enabling flag are absent from Bensimon’s storage device, neither of which necessarily must occur.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “E. Obviousness of Claims 2 and 34 based on Bensimon in combination with Takahashi Petitioner asserts dependent claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. Pet. 36–40 (analysis of claim 2) and 42–43 (analysis of claim 34). Petitioner’s analysis of these claims does not repair the deficiencies described above with regard to the claimed restrictedaccess mode. See id.; see also Reply 25. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above in the context of claim 1 and based on the full trial record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. See supra Section III.D.2.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,968,459
• LG Electronics, Inc. v. Broadcom CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2017 · IPR2017-01624 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Diaz did not disclose internally reprogrammable hardware accelerators, and the other grounds did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “3. Construction of “configurable” In construing this term, we have considered the specification of the ’353 patent and its prosecution history. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxycinn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In accord with these portions of the ’844 patent specification and file history discussed supra, we conclude that a hardware accelerator is configurable only if its functionality can be internally reprogrammed. Thus, under our construction, an accelerator selected by an API or other instrumentality would not itself be “configurable.” This will be discussed further infra.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, as Patent Owner argues, Diaz ’353 does not explicitly or inherently disclose hardware accelerators that are configurable to perform decoding functions according to a plurality of decoding methods. In Diaz ’533 the overall decoder — as opposed to the constituent hardware accelerators — is configurable in that the processor controls which hardware accelerators are activated. Prelim. Resp. 2, 5–8. We see no meaningful distinction in this respect between Diaz ’353 and Sullivan ’021 which, as discussed above, discloses an API that is configurable to select various hardware accelerators, but which are not themselves configurable, to assist in the decoding process. See Prelim. Resp. 6. In sum, the functionality of the hardware accelerators of Diaz ’353 cannot be internally reprogrammed, but rather can only be bypassed or reused for various operations. Therefore, in accord with our claim construction set forth above, we determine that those hardware accelerators are not “configurable” as required by claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as anticipated by Diaz ’353.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “C. Obviousness of Claims 8 and 14 over Diaz ’353 and Purcell ’483, and of Claim 12 over Diaz ’353 and Fandrianto ’459 or Kim As discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the issue of whether Diaz ’353 discloses the claim 1 requirement of configurable hardware accelerators. Claims 8, 12, and 14 depend from claim 1 and so also include this requirement by virtue of their dependency. Petitioner’s obviousness grounds directed to these claims is premised on Petitioner’s arguments with respect to claim 1 that Diaz ’353 discloses configurable hardware accelerators. Pet. 51–63. Petitioner does not provide argument or evidence — aside from the above-considered anticipation arguments based on Diaz ’353 alone — that the combination of Diaz ’353 with Purcell ’483, Fandrianto ’459 or Kim teaches or suggests “a hardware accelerator . . . configurable to perform the decoding function according to a plurality of decoding methods.” Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claims 8 and 14 as obvious over Diaz ’353 and Purcell ’483, or of claim 12 as obvious over Diaz ’353 and Fandrianto ’459 or Kim.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as anticipated by Diaz ’353.” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,284,844
• Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Jul 18, 2017 · IPR2016-01444 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing

  Granted Blue Coat’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1, 4–6, 9, 12–14, 17, 24, 35, and 37; the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted § 103 grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “reexamination proceeding. Of particular relevance, the reexamination concluded with a Reexamination Certificate issued on November 28, 2016, including a claim for the benefit of the November 8, 1996 filing date of U.S. Provisional Appl. No. 60/030,639 (“the ’639 provisional application”). Ex. 3006 at [60]. In denying the Petition, the Prior Decision noted that “Petitioner has taken no steps to explain or respond to the effect of these developments on its argument.” Dec. 7. This remains true. Nevertheless, we agree with Petitioner that our Prior Decision gave insufficient consideration to the Petition’s assertion that “U.S. Patent No. 7,613,926 [(“the ’926 patent”), i.e., an intermediate patent in the priority chain of the ’086 patent] fails to claim priority to the ’639 provisional application and instead the earliest priority document cited in the ’926 patent is [the ’194 patent].” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1012, col. 1, ll. 8–32); see Req. Reh’g 4–5, 6 n.4, 7–9. For a claim of a patent to be entitled to the effective filing date of an earlier filed application, each application in the priority chain must refer to the earlier filed application. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 1345, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request and proceed to the merits of the Petition.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedMixed

    “a formally defined safety policy” and allows checking “with certainty, that the proof is valid and hence the foreign code is safe to execute.” Ex. 1004, 107. Thus, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably understand Necula to teach that its proof-carrying code adds to the foreign code, consistent with the construction of “append” that we apply herein, and Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to apply that teaching to Swimmer’s representation of DSP data. See Pet. 46–49. This is not an instance, for example, in which Petitioner relies on a characterization of the problem provided by the patent to derive its reasoning. Cf., e.g., Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Indeed, Patent Owner’s contention that “the storage of the DSP in a database is one of the key features that distinguishes the ‘086 Patent over the prior art” dilutes the strength of its argument. The contrary positions of the parties’ declarants in their testimonial evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, which we resolve in the light most favorable to Petitioner for purposes of this Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing also with respect to these elements, and that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claims 1 and 9. See infra Section II.E.10 (discussing limits in our weighing of Patent Owner’s Secondary Considerations evidence in this Preliminary Proceeding).” slip op. at 21

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “be considered under 35 U.S.C. § 312 because Petitioner has failed to name all real parties in interest, as required by the statute.” Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties agree that, on June 12, 2016, Symantec Corporation (“Symantec”) announced that it was acquiring Petitioner. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 9. The Petition discloses that “[t]he transaction is expected to close in the third quarter of 2016,” and that “[a]s of the filing date of this petition the transaction has not been executed.” Pet. 13. The Petition further represents that “Symantec has not controlled or had the ability to control the filing of this petition, whether through funding or strategy.” Id. As noted above, Petitioner expressly identified Symantec as a real party in interest before any decision on institution of an inter partes review was made. Paper 8, 2. Patent Owner contends that “Symantec had control over the filing of the Petition during the period between the announcement of the acquisition and the closing of the acquisition,” which it asserts occurred on August 1, 2016. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner also contends that it “understands from the underlying litigation that ‘Blue Coat Systems, Inc.’ no longer exists 1 A petition to accept an unintentionally delayed claim of priority for the ’926 patent, claiming the benefit of U.S. Patent Appl. No. 08/790,097 which was filed January 29, 1997, was dismissed by the Office on June 13, 2017. Exs. 1027, 3007. A renewed petition was filed on June 16, 2017. Ex. 3008. At this time, the Office has not ruled on the renewed petition, and that pending petition accordingly does not affect our determination of the challenged claims’ effective filing date for purposes of this Decision. as an entity, or at least goes by ‘Blue Coat Systems LLC’ for at least the last two months.” Id. at 10. We have reviewed the evidence provided by Patent Owner and find it insufficient to support Patent Owner’s allegation that Petitioner has failed to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) or 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3). That evidence is, at best, suggestive regarding an issue that is not jurisdictional. Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., Case IPR2015-00739, slip op. (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (Paper 38) (precedential).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “Downloadable” Every challenged independent claim recites a “Downloadable,” and Petitioner contends that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘downloadable’ includes ‘an executable application program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination computer.’” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed construction parallels a statement made in the Specification of the ’194 patent. Ex. 1012, col. 1, ll. 44–47. Patent Owner “does not dispute” this proposed construction, which we adopt for purposes of this Decision. Prelim. Resp. 5. 2. “database” Challenged independent claim 42 recites “a database of Downloadable security profiles.” Petitioner contends that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘database’ includes ‘a collection of interrelated data organized according to a database schema to serve one or more applications.’” Pet. 15. Patent Owner also “does not dispute” this proposed construction, but argues that “the practical import of Petitioner’s proposed construction for the term ‘database,’ is that log files, such as Swimmer’s audit trail, do not fall within the scope of the claims.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. That is, Patent Owner contends that “logging functionality is distinct from storing in a database, which allows DSP to be efficiently retrieved from the database,” as compared with the “record-keeping” functionality of an “event log.” Id. at 7. Patent Owner’s argument was considered by the panel in IPR2015- 01892, which concluded that, “[t]o the extent that construction would exclude a log file consisting of an ‘unstructured collection of data on a computer,’ . . . [an] unstructured log file would not be a database,” but the construction does not “necessarily exclude[] all log files from being databases.” 1892 Dec. 16 (emphasis in original). We agree with the reasoning expressed in the Final Written Decision of IPR2015-01892. Id. at 12–17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,079,086

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.