• Ledup Manufacturing Group Ltd. v. Seasonal Specialties, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2026 · IPR2024-01258 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–14 are unpatentable; claims 3 and 8 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the Inoue–Smith obviousness rationale was insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) if in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not agree with Petitioner that the fact pattern before us is analogous to Rembrandt. The rationale to combine the teachings of Inoue and Smith provided in the Petition focuses on replacing incandescent bulbs with LEDs, and includes the generic statement that “[t]he numerous record-supported advantages, set forth in Smith provide a clear motivation for use of the teachings of Smith as applied to Inoue, so as to enjoy the advantages set forth in Smith.” Pet. 47. The testimony in Dr. Schubert’s Declaration at pages 99–100 cited in support of Petitioner’s Reply arguments was not cited or otherwise referenced in the Petition. See Pet. 46–55. We find that the Petitioner’s Reply is not responsive to the Institution Decision and is improper because it presents a new rationale to combine the teachings of Inoue and Smith that was not expressed in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23; CTPG § II.I. Petitioner could have presented its rationale to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23; CTPG § II.I. Accordingly, we do not consider Petitioner’s new rationale to combine the teachings of Inoue and Smith presented for the first time in the Reply. Based on the entire record, but not including Petitioner’s new rationale and newly cited support to Smith and Dr. Schubert’s testimony (Exs. 1013, 1017) presented for the first time in the Reply, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sets forth in the Petition sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the circuit of Inoue to include a light source or LED light source with a twinkling or flashing effect in view of Smith’s teachings. See Pet. 46–47, 49–50, 51–53, 55. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of independent claim 9 and dependent claims 3, 5, and 6 would have been obvious over the teachings of Inoue and Smith.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “Based on Petitioner’s citations to Holler, Inoue, and Dr. Schubert’s testimony (Ex. 1013), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to “use the resistive value as taught by Holler in the circuit of Inoue to control the illumination of the light sources so that the other illumination devices in the serial light string will not go dark or change illumination if one of the LEDs fails or becomes disconnected.” Pet. 27; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Based on the entire record and including the reasons explained above in Section II.D.2. addressing anticipation of claim 1 by Inoue, we determine Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 1 and 10 would have been obvious over Inoue and Holler. See Pet. 26–32.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “We observe that, aside from Declaration testimony of Mr. Altamura and accompanying exhibits, Patent Owner does not offer any additional evidence to establish reduction to practice. An inventor’s testimonial assertion of inventive facts requires corroboration by independent evidence. Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The purpose of the corroboration requirement is to prevent fraud, by providing independent confirmation of the inventor’s testimony. Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Without the requirement of independent corroboration, there would be a great temptation to commit perjury and the adverse party would be effectively precluded from a successful rebuttal. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A rule of reason applies to determining whether the inventor’s testimony has been corroborated. See id. at 1195. “The rule of reason, however, does not dispense with the requirement for some evidence of independent corroboration.” Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Accordingly, based on the entire record, we find that Mr. Altamura’s Declaration testimony is uncorroborated. Yu is prior art to the ’252 Patent because Patent Owner is unable to establish actual reduction to practice earlier than the July 31, 2006, filing date of Yu.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 11,096,252 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,096,252
• Ledup Manufacturing Group Ltd. v. Seasonal Specialties, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2026 · IPR2024-01259 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are unpatentable; claims 3 and 8 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the Petition lacked a sufficient motivation to combine Inoue and Smith.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because it advocates for the importation of functional limitations from the ’794 Patent Specification into the claims––namely the disclosure that the bypass circuit continues to conduct electricity, and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one or more individual lighting elements in the series are burned out, missing, or defective. See PO Resp. 7–9. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Moreover, the language that Patent Owner wishes to import into the claim from the Specification is functional language that describes the function of the resistor bypass circuit. As explained below in the section addressing the subsequent claim recitation “conducting current at all times across the light sources when current is flowing through the circuit regardless of whether the LED light source are conducting current therethrough,” functional language is evaluated in view of the applied prior art to determine whether it imparts additional structure to distinguish the claimed invention over the prior art. Accordingly, to the extent the preamble recitation is limiting, we need not provide an express construction for “[a] resistor bypass circuit for a series lighting circuit.”” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

    “We understand the term “inherent resistance” to mean the resistance at a particular operating current or voltage across the LED light source. Neither party disputes our understanding of the term “inherent resistance.” See Dec. on Inst. 9–10; PO Resp. 7–9; Pet. Reply.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and four years of practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or alternatively “would have had a master’s degree and three years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Ex. 1013, 31 ¶ 3; see also Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of institution. See PO Resp. 2. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’794 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because, as explained above in Section II.A., we decline to import functional language into the claim from the Specification to construe the preamble recitation as requiring the function of “continu[ing] to conduct electricity and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one more individual lighting elements in the series are out, loose, broken, missing/removed, or defective.” Having considered both parties’ arguments and corresponding cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Inoue discloses each of the limitations of claim 1. Based on the entire record, we determine Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Inoue. See Pet. 25–26.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 11,533,794 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,533,794
• Ebates Performance Marketing, Inc. Dba Rakuten Rewards / Zillow Group, Inc. et al. v. International Business Machines Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2022-00646 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 12–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 5–11, 17, and 20 are not unpatentable, based on the Sunada grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “certain arguments based on the Kayak FWD. Reply 1–5. Yet, the Federal Circuit vacated the Kayak FWD and remanded to the Board for further consideration. Ex. 1006, 2 (“We vacate the Sunada IPR decision because it rests on an incorrect claim construction of the ‘federated computing environment’ limitation of all claims at issue, and we remand for further consideration under the correct construction.”), 8 (“The Board’s decision in IPR2016-00608 is vacated because it rests on an incorrect claim construction, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “shown that Sunada discloses “protected resources” under our claim construction of the term and, accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Sunada anticipates claims 1, 3, 12, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “1. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Crovella, contends that a” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableMixed

    “shown that Sunada discloses “protected resources” under our claim construction of the term and, accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Sunada anticipates claims 1, 3, 12, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,631,346 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,631,346
• Fitbit LLC v. Philips North America LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 4, 2021 · IPR2020-00910 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7–10, 13, 15, 16, 22, and 24–26 are unpatentable; claim 14 is not shown unpatentable because the cited grounds do not establish separate data input/output ports.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Although the respective positions are very similar and our analysis would be the same under either Patent Owner’s or Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, from our review of the record, we find Patent Owner’s more specific articulation of the relevant experience is appropriate and consistent with the disclosure of the ’233 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s description.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “obviousness challenges, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments based on its characterizations of the plain meaning of “security mechanism governing information transmitted between the first personal device and the second device.” The ’233 patent explicitly discloses that the use of passwords or encryption can be used to secure information transmitted between devices. Ex. 1001, 8:12–22, 13:25–67. The use of passwords or security keys certainly provides a form of “governing” of information transmitted between devices. We note that the courts in the Fitbit and Garmin cases have concluded likewise: [Patent Owner’s expert] provides minimal explanation for — and cites to no evidence in support of — his opinion that encryption ‘does not govern or control [the] transmission [of information]’ . . . [and] that opinion appears to conflict with the specification and claims. Ex. 1081, 25. [Patent Owner’s expert’s] conclusory opinion should not be afforded any weight. Ex. 2023, 14. We conclude that it is unnecessary to provide an explicit construction of the phrase at issue, and do not agree with Patent Owner that techniques such as the use of passwords or encryption fall outside of the scope of claim 1.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other

    “directional communications module to transition from the powered-down state to the powered-up state.” Ex. 1001, 16:18–20. Petitioner proposes to construe this portion of the claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, including specifying the disclosed structure corresponding to the recited function as “components capable of providing a magnetic, mechanical, sound or ultrasound, infrared, or radio frequency signal, and structural equivalents thereof.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:15–60, 16:16–30; Paradiso Decl. ¶¶ 49–50). Petitioner, however, also states that “[t]he ’233 patent explains that the ‘means for signaling’ can be ‘a mechanical signal, such as throwing a switch or applying pressure to a pad.’” Pet. 83; see Ex. 1001, 14:35–36. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s proposed articulation of the corresponding structure is correct. In our Decision to Institute, we stated that it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the disclosed structure that performs the function recited in claim 26 includes a switch that turns the bi-directional communications module on and off. Dec. 12. Patent Owner agrees that such structure is encompassed by the “means for signaling. . .” of claim 26. PO Resp. 12. We reiterate for purposes of this Decision that it is sufficient to note that the disclosed structure includes a switch as described.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “includes the claimed short-range bi-directional wireless communications module, and explains that this term is meant to “include premises and facility based wireless networks.” Ex. 1001, 5:57–65. Even though wireless communications modules necessarily have inputs and outputs, we preliminarily concluded, based on these disclosures, that the data input/output ports of claim 14 had to be separate from the “short-range bi-directional wireless communications module” of claim 1 — otherwise the requirement of data input/output ports in claim 14 would be superfluous. Dec. 38–39. See Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (favoring a construction that does not render another limitation “superfluous”). Petitioner points out that there is no example disclosed in the ’233 patent that embodies claim 14 — i.e., no example in which two devices communicate with each other, both using a local area wireless LAW 330 module and a Data I/O port 160. Reply 7. Therefore, argues Petitioner, claim 14 should not be construed to cover subject matter not disclosed in the ’233 patent. Reply 9. However, as both Petitioner and Patent Owner point out, the ’233 patent discloses that both the personal medical device PMD 100 shown in Figure 2 and the medical device interface MDI 600 shown in Figure 4C can include both a wireless communication module 300 and data I/O ports 160, which provides support for claim 14, notwithstanding that the specific connections of components required by claim 14 are not explicitly illustrated. Reply 7–8; Sur-Reply 10–11; Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:47–49, 54–55. Moreover, Petitioner admits that the example of Figure 3A, which uses wireless communication modules 300, “does not include a data I/O port like claim 14.” Reply 8 (emphasis added). This admission contradicts Petitioner’s argument that “wireless communications module” and “data input/output port” are two terms that refer to the same structure. Reply 9 (citing Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings, not that they necessarily refer to two different structures”)). Accordingly, we maintain our preliminary conclusion as expressed in the Institution Decision that the data input/output ports of claim 14 are separate from the “short-range bi-directional wireless communications module[s]” of claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,088,233 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,088,233
• Fitbit LLC v. Philips North America LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 4, 2021 · IPR2020-00783 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7–10, 13, 15, 16, 22, and 24–26 are unpatentable; claim 14 was not shown unpatentable because the references did not disclose separate data input/output ports.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Although the respective positions are very similar and our analysis would be the same under either Patent Owner’s or Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, from our review of the record, we find Patent Owner’s more specific articulation of the relevant experience is appropriate and consistent with the disclosure of the ’233 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s description.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “From our review of the record, including the testimony of Petitioner’s expert Dr. Paradiso, we are persuaded that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the reliance on the combinations of Jacobsen with Quy for Ground 4, Geva for Ground 5, and Reber for Ground 6. For each ground, Petitioner’s reliance on the tertiary references demonstrates that the particular features disclosed (Bluetooth, GPS, and a power button) were well known and readily incorporated into a Jacobson-type system, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so with a reasonable expectation of success. Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive, not sufficiently taking into account that the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Instead, the relevant issue is “what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). Moreover, as Petitioner points out, the fact that an asserted combination introduces “simultaneous advantages and disadvantages [] does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006).” slip op. at 42

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “From our review of the record, including the testimony of Petitioner’s expert Dr. Paradiso, we are persuaded that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the reliance on the combinations of Jacobsen with Quy for Ground 4, Geva for Ground 5, and Reber for Ground 6. For each ground, Petitioner’s reliance on the tertiary references demonstrates that the particular features disclosed (Bluetooth, GPS, and a power button) were well known and readily incorporated into a Jacobson-type system, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so with a reasonable expectation of success. Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive, not sufficiently taking into account that the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Instead, the relevant issue is “what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). Moreover, as Petitioner points out, the fact that an asserted combination introduces “simultaneous advantages and disadvantages [] does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 13 would have been obvious over Jacobsen and Quy, that claims 24 and 25 would have been obvious over Jacobsen and Geva, and that claim 26 would have been obvious over Jacobsen and Reber.” slip op. at 42

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Like for Grounds 4–6, we are persuaded that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the reliance on the combination of Say and Gabai. Although Gabai is directed to an interactive toy, its disclosure relating to bi-directional wireless communications with a base communication unit is pertinent art— satisfying the criterion that “[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 15, 16, and 22 would have been obvious over Say and Gabai.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 7,088,233 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,088,233
• Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2021 · IPR2019-01350 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3 and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Shellhammer; claim 8 was not reached on the merits.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteDecided for patent owner

    “Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (footnote omitted). This is such a situation. We cannot reach a decision on the merits with respect to whether Petitioner has established the unpatentability of claim 8 under any ground of unpatentability asserted by Petitioner, i.e., (1) obvious over Sherman and Trompower, (2) obvious over Shellhammer and Trompower, and (3) obvious over Shellhammer and Panasik.” slip op. at 77

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “challenged claims indeed do satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 119 with respect to the foreign application the priority of which it claims.5 Cf. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379– 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Dynamic Drinkware stated that because the USPTO does not examine priority claims unless necessary, the Board has no basis to presume that a patent is necessarily entitled to the filing date of its provisional application. Id. at 1380. Under the reasoning of Dynamic Drinkware, the same would be true for a foreign application the priority of which has been claimed. Patent Owner has made no substantive showing in this proceeding of actual entitlement to the filing date of the German Application, by satisfaction of all pertinent requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 119. Accordingly, the effective filing date of the ’676 patent is August 8, 2001, not the earlier filing date of German Application No. 100 39 532.5.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “supported by the underlying disclosure of Sherman. Dr. Roy in paragraph 175 of his Declaration (Ex. 1003) cites to column 4, lines 1–8, of Sherman, which states: “The CFP occurs with a regular period, and all 802.11 terminals set their NAV’s during the CFP. To realize such a super frame the following sequence of frames/phases can be used as shown in the graph of FIG. 5.” Ex. 1004, 4:1–5. This disclosure does not indicate, as Dr. Roy concludes, that the control station “relinquish[es]” time to 802.11 CP access if no HIPERLAN/2 transmission requests are pending. Ex. 1003 ¶ 175. We also find unpersuasive Dr. Roy’s testimony that if there is sufficient HIPERLAN/2 traffic, Sherman teaches that the HIPERLAN/2 phase may be extended to very close to the entire superframe. Id. As discussed above, in Sherman, the CFP already is preset, without regard to whether or how many HIPERLAN/2 requests are pending. Ex. 1004, 6:5–6. Dr. Roy’s conclusion is not supported by the disclosure of Sherman and also is not adequately explained.” slip op. at 34

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “III. CONSTITUTIONAL APPOINTMENT Patent Owner argues that Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”) “are principal officers under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution” “but undisputably are not appointed through the constitutionally-mandated mechanism of appointment for principal officers.” PO Resp. 60. The Federal Circuit, however, addressed this issue and devised a remedy in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2019) cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 2020 WL 6037206 (Oct. 13, 2020). Patent Owner argues that the remedy devised by the Federal Circuit “impermissibly rewrites the statutes governing APJs.” Id. at 61. We decline to consider the argument because the Arthrex decision states otherwise. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337 (“This as-applied severance . . . cures the constitutional violation.”).” slip op. at 77

  Patent outcomesUS 7,016,676 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,016,676
• Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 12, 2021 · IPR2019-01195 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 13 and 14 are unpatentable as anticipated by Kim; claims 17, 18, and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Kim and Lee because the proposed combination was inadequately explained.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “’026 patent would have had a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering, plus at least two years of experience in integrated circuit design, or alternatively a Bachelor’s degree in one of those fields plus at least four years of experience in integrated circuit design. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 49). In our Institution Decision, we found Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 15. Neither Patent Owner, in its Response, nor Dr. Annavaram, in his declaration, proposes a level of ordinary skill in the art. Instead, Patent Owner states that “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s stated skill level for this response” (PO Resp. 26), and Dr. Annavaram similarly states that “[f]or the purpose of this declaration, I adopt Dr. Harris’ definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” (Ex. 2009 ¶ 24). Nothing in the full record persuades us that our preliminary finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art was incorrect. Based on the complete record, because our preliminary finding is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering, plus at least two years of experience in integrated circuit design, or alternatively a Bachelor’s degree in one of those fields plus at least four years of experience in integrated circuit design. Inst. Dec. 15; see Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 49).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “To the extent Patent Owner argues that these particularized selection clauses recited in different claims must have the same or similar meaning because they all use the word “selecting” (see PO Resp. 28–29), we disagree with Patent Owner. See IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc., 659 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We caution that claim language must be construed in the context of the claim in which it appears. Extracting a single word from a claim divorced from the surrounding limitations can lead construction astray. Claim language must be construed in the claim in which it appears.” (emphasis added)). The selection clauses recited in these claims are plainly different on the face of the claims when considering the material differences in the claim language set forth above. According the same meaning to the limitations that recite “select . . . based on” indicators, “select . . . when” certain conditions are met, and “select . . . out of a group” of values would be improper because it would blur the material differences in the claim language recited expressly in the claims. Instead, we interpret the selection clauses recited in the challenged claims “in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears” and “in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. In other words, we do not construe the single word “selecting” in isolation, but, rather, interpret the full selection clauses recited in the challenged claims in the context of the entire patent. Claim 13 recites “selecting, by the control circuit, a value of a control signal based on the mode indicator and on the leakage indicator.” In our view, the plain meaning of this limitation is clear on the face of the claim—a value of a control signal is selected based on two indicators, the mode indicator and the leakage indicator.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Tr. 47:7–23. Because the output of Kim’s NAND gates will be different depending on the value of Kim’s memory cells C1–CN allowed to “pass through,” we agree with Petitioner that the value of Kim’s memory cells C1– CN (the claimed “leakage indicator”) “plays a role” in deciding what the output of Kim’s NAND gates (the claimed “value of the control signal”) will be. Moreover, Patent Owner acknowledged that the output of Kim’s NAND gate is determined based on the inputs to the NAND gates (i.e., the sleep signal input and the memory cell signal input). JUDGE CHUNG: But, knowing a little bit about how a NAND gate works, isn’t it the case that the input to the NAND gates, G1 through GN, with the input of the sleep signal and the C1 through CN signal, isn’t it the case that input to the NAND gate determines what the output is? MS. ZHONG: Okay. So any logic gate, the output will depend on the input. That’s for sure. Tr. 44:18–25; but see id. at 45:3–10 (stating that even if the “output is in control of the input, . . . that does not mean the selection is based on that input”). Thus, we find that Kim’s NAND gate (the claimed “control circuit”) operates to determine its output (the claimed “value of the control signal”) based on its input of the sleep signal (the claimed “mode indicator”) and the memory cell value input (the claimed “leakage indicator”). As discussed in Section III.B, the Specification indicates that “select[ing] the value of the control signal based on the mode indicator and on the leakage indicator” recited in claim 13 is synonymous to determining the value based on the recited indicators. See Ex. 1101, 4:4–11. Thus, the evidence of record shows that Kim teaches “selecting, by the control circuit, a value of a control signal based on the mode indicator and on the leakage indicator,” as recited in claim 13.” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence. First, although Petitioner proposes “[s]ubstituting Lee’s inputs of leakage current and temperature for generating a power gate control signal” (i.e., Lee’s “control signal (BIAS)”) for “Kim’s inputs of leakage current and other ‘stimuli’ for generating a power gate control signal” (Pet. 64 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 115)), neither Petitioner nor Dr. Harris explains adequately how they are proposing to “substitute” Kim’s control signal with Lee’s “control signal (BIAS).” For example, Figure A reproduced above does not show how Petitioner or Dr. Harris proposes to use Lee’s “control signal (BIAS)” in the proposed combination. Petitioner asserts that “[a]lthough Lee’s control signal is analog and Kim’s control signal is digital, it was well known to apply teachings in an analog domain to a digital domain, and conversions between analog and digital domains were easy to implement.” Pet. 66 (emphases added) (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 121; Ex. 1115). Dr. Harris similarly states that Figures A and B show examples of obvious ways to use in Kim’s system Lee’s teaching of setting conductance of the array based on temperature. A POSA would have found both of these ways obvious. That Lee uses an analog control signal and Kim uses a digital control signal would have presented no obstacle to a POSA. . . . That is, converting analog circuit elements and signals to digital was well known long before the ’026 patent. Ex. 1102 ¶ 121 (emphases added) (citing (Ex. 1115) (“Analog-to-digital converters (ADC’s) are ubiquitous, critical components of software radio and other signal processing systems.”)). But Dr. Harris does not explain adequately how “to use in Kim’s system” the digitized BIAS signal of Lee. See id. The only additional input signal shown in Figure A compared to Figure 4 of Kim is the temperature line that has the value of 0 when the temperature is cold and the value of 1 when the temperature is hot. See Ex. 1102 ¶ 116 (Fig. A). There is no explanation of how the modified teaching of the BIAS signal of Lee (i.e., modified or converted to a digital signal) would have worked in the proposed combination of Figure A.” slip op. at 69

  Patent outcomesUS 8,081,026 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,081,026
• Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm IncorporatedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2020 · IPR2018-01282 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6–10, 12–22, 25–30, 46, 47, and 49–53 are unpatentable over the stated grounds; claims 4, 5, 23, 24, and 48 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no significant distinction between Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill and that of Patent Owner. In view of Patent Owner’s admission that any differences are not material to the issues we decide here, we discern no reason to depart from our definition of the level 5 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of such secondary considerations in its briefs. Therefore, secondary considerations do not enter into our analysis. Inst. 10. Accordingly, we adopt Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’865 patent would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in either computer science or electrical engineering, together with at least two years of study in an advanced degree program in artificial intelligence, machine learning, or pattern recognition, or comparable work experience.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Second, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proffered interpretation, requiring a “pattern” to include relationships between two or more such pairs, incorrectly excludes embodiments where a “pattern” may be identified by the value of only a single parameter. We find nothing in the intrinsic evidence that supports Patent Owner’s narrow interpretation. By contrast, Petitioner identifies support in the ’865 patent Specification referring to a “pattern” being represented by “one or more” values of parameters in support of its interpretation that encompasses a single parameter value representing a “pattern.” See Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:49–55, 9:63–67). Furthermore, Petitioner points to deposition testimony of Patent Owner’s expert (Dr. Villasenor) as extrinsic evidence to support the contention that a “pattern” encompasses the value of even a single parameter.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “monitoring and detecting steps in the teachings of Louch. Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence in the complete trial record, we are persuaded Louch teaches the monitoring and detecting steps of claim 1 (as well as related recitations of claims 21 and 46). See Ex. 1011, 8:24–26 (“In some implementations, the process 400 can begin when input from one or more sensors on the mobile device are used to determine a current state of the mobile device ( 410).”), 8:33–35 (“the determining can include detecting and determining two or more different states based on inputs from two or more different sensors”), 8:55–57 (“[t]he states can be determined based on sensor inputs, as described in reference to FIGS. 1-4”); see also Ex. 1021 ¶ 119.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues Louch and Nadkarni are in the same field of endeavor, argues both Louch and Nadkarni are pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’865 patent, and articulates reasons for the proposed combination of Louch and Nadkarni. Pet. 41–45. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s reasons for combining the references. Having reviewed Petitioner’s arguments (Pet. 41–45), we are persuaded Petitioner has articulated a reason for combining Louch and Nadkarni based on rational underpinnings.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,768,865 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,768,865
• Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm IncorporatedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2020 · IPR2018-01281 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–22, 24, 25, 27–30, 46–49, and 51–53 are unpatentable; claims 4 and 23 are not shown unpatentable because Wang does not teach the claimed response between fixing and reduced parameters.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Second, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proffered interpretation, requiring a “pattern” to include relationships between two or more such pairs, incorrectly excludes embodiments where a “pattern” may be identified by the value of only a single parameter. We find nothing in the intrinsic evidence that supports Patent Owner’s narrow interpretation. By contrast, Petitioner identifies support in the ’865 patent Specification referring to a “pattern” being represented by “one or more” values of parameter value representing a “pattern.” See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:49–55, 9:63–67). Furthermore, Petitioner points to deposition testimony of Patent Owner’s expert (Dr. Villasenor) as extrinsic evidence to support the contention that a “pattern” encompasses the value of even a single parameter.” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no significant distinction between Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill and that of Patent Owner. In view of Patent Owner’s admission that any differences are not material to the issues we decide here, we discern no reason to depart from our definition of the level 5 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of such secondary considerations in its briefs. Therefore, secondary considerations do not enter into our analysis. Inst. 10. Accordingly, we adopt Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’865 patent would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in either computer science or electrical engineering, together with at least two years of study in an advanced degree program in artificial intelligence, machine learning, or pattern recognition, or comparable work experience.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “illustrated in Wang’s Table 1. In view of these numerous references to the exemplary user states and associated features illustrated in Wang’s Table 1, Patent Owner’s assertion, supported by Dr. Villasenor, that Wang does not use Table 1 to identify states is not credible. Based on Wang’s frequent by Petitioner (Pet. 17, 22–24), we determine that Wang’s implementation uses the states and features illustrated in Table 1 to recognize/identify a pattern as claimed (a particular set of feature values illustrated in Table 1), based on a condition (the corresponding present user state represented in Table 1).” slip op. at 39

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “illustrated in Wang’s Table 1. In view of these numerous references to the exemplary user states and associated features illustrated in Wang’s Table 1, Patent Owner’s assertion, supported by Dr. Villasenor, that Wang does not use Table 1 to identify states is not credible. Based on Wang’s frequent by Petitioner (Pet. 17, 22–24), we determine that Wang’s implementation uses the states and features illustrated in Table 1 to recognize/identify a pattern as claimed (a particular set of feature values illustrated in Table 1), based on a condition (the corresponding present user state represented in Table 1). It is true that there is no particular algorithm, program code, or data structure that discloses precisely how Table 1 is used. However, the claims do not require any particular data structure, algorithm, or programmed instructions. Claim 1 merely requires that the first pattern be identified “based, at least in part, on said at least one detected condition.” Wang’s frequent reference to the information illustrated in Table 1 and use of that information (feature values) to determine a user state sufficiently teaches the ordinarily skilled artisan the claimed identifying step, as discussed by Dr. Allen. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105–107. Accordingly, we find that Wang teaches the identifying step because Table 1 illustrates the exemplary states recognized (identified) by EEMSS along with the patterns (State Features) used to identify the states.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 8,768,865 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,768,865
• Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2020 · IPR2018-01033 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 17 is anticipated by Bednar, and claims 1 and 17 are obvious over Bednar and Gunther; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “requesting institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 4–6, and 17–19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,004,922 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’922 patent”). VLSI Technology LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 12). Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review of all challenged claims. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “to the level of ordinary skill in the art was incorrect. Accordingly, because our preliminary finding is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering (or an equivalent subject), together with three years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent subject) together with two years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits.” Inst. Dec. 8–9; see Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–27).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “construction of “memory device,” specifically whether it encompasses a latch. Neither party argues that “memory device” is expressly defined in the ’922 patent. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term controls. And, the standard under which we construe the term is the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification.” slip op. at 45

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claim 17 is anticipated by Bednar, and (2) claims 1 and 17 would have been obvious over the combination of Bednar and Gunther. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claim 1 is anticipated by Bednar or (2) claims 4–6, 18, and 19 would have been obvious over the combination of Bednar, Gunther, and Willingham. The chart below summarizes our conclusions.” slip op. at 91

  Patent outcomesUS 8,004,922 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,004,922

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.