• Clearwater Paper Corporation v. Graphic Packaging International LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland and obvious over Nakagawa and over Nakagawa combined with Tanner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering, materials science, polymer science, or equivalent coursework, at least a year of experience developing paper-based laminates involving the application of polymer coatings to a substrate, and the appropriate industry familiarity with biodegradability standards and degradability techniques [and] . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 50). Clearwater’s definition is uncontested, and we apply that definition here, as it accords with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the problems addressed in the specification of the ’126 patent. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We have reviewed the cited testimony of Clearwater’s expert, including their calculations for arriving at a coat weight in Nakagawa that falls within the claimed range. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–33. We find that testimony, which is unrebutted, both credible and supported by the evidence of record. Thus, in light of Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the unrebutted testimony of Clearwater’s expert, we are persuaded that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each and every element of claim 1. See Pet. 45–54, 60–64. Clearwater also persuades us that Cleveland discloses the additional subject matter of dependent claims 2, 3, and 11. See Pet. 64–66. Thus, we determine that Clearwater demonstrates that claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. F. Ground 3—Obviousness Over Nakagawa and Tanner” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Inst. Dec. 4 n.5. We were persuaded by Clearwater’s proof that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (Ex. 1005) and that the provisional provides written description support for at least claim 1 of Cleveland. See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1006, 2–6, 9). We were also persuaded by Clearwater’s showing that the provisional provides written support for the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland. Id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–9). We are still persuaded by Clearwater’s showing. Thus, we see no reason to disturb our earlier finding that Cleveland is prior art to the ’126 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “protectant layers has “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2.” As noted by Clearwater, Cleveland discloses a total coat weight for layers 14 and 16 as falling within the claimed range. Pet. 32–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 32). In particular, Cleveland discloses that “the coextruded layer of copolyester (irrespective of which side of the substrate the layer is disposed) is of a total coat weight of between about 10 and about 40 lb/3000 ft2 in any combination of between about 80/20 to 20/80 parts by weight of Ecoflex to Biomax,” of which “a total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 is preferred.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 32. As disclosed, Cleveland’s total coat weight range of 10–40 lb/3000 ft2 falls almost entirely within the claimed range, and the preferred total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 falls squarely within the claimed range. Thus, Cleveland satisfies claim elements [1.3.2] and [1.5.2]. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art.”) (citation omitted). As such, we find that Clearwater adequately demonstrates that Cleveland discloses all the elements of claim 1. 4. Dependent Claims” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,637,126 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,637,126
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, and 30 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “We decline Patent Owner’s invitation to construe “during a frame” of “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame” by importing the extraneous limitations “at some point between the beginning and the end of the exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” As pointed out by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unsupported by the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Specification because Specification does not disclose an exposure interval nor suggest “during a frame” is limited to an exposure interval. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Saber cite only extrinsic evidence (Exs. 2006, 2009) to support its argument that claim 22 should be limited to an “exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” See PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2020 ¶ 64. Similarly, Patent Owner relies only on extrinsic evidence (e.g., Ex. 2011, 1; Ex. 2022, 1; Ex. 2020 ¶ 66) to limit “during” to “at some point between the beginning and the end.” See id. at 18. When considered in the context of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification which do not limit “during a frame” to an exposure interval, we find that we cannot rely on Patent Owner’s citations to extrinsic evidence to yield a reliable construction for “during a frame.” As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit construction for “during a frame” to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the merits of the patentability challenges. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. We apply the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame.” To the extent that an explicit identification of the ordinary and customary meaning may aid the understanding of our analysis, consistent with the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification, we find that the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame” is “during the period of time that data for an image frame is acquired.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 20:6–24, 25:23–35.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing deficiencies of written description support the ’854 Provisional Application provides written description support for all of the limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Specifically, Patent Owner does not address written description support in the ’854 Provisional Application for “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame”––limitation [22.3]––the heart of the parties’ claim construction disputes addressed above in Section II.A. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–27. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in the ’854 Provisional Application. As a result, the burden of production does not shift back to Petitioner, and, therefore, the ’180 Patent is not entitled to the benefit of the August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not present arguments that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Matsushima to acquire data for images 62A and 62B at the argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).10 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, 30, and 33 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu under § 103; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, and 32 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments based on retrieval of data from CCD 18A and CCD 18B. Although Matsushima’s CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28 (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 27), Matsushima discloses that “accumulated signal charges are retrieved by CCD drive pulses applied by CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B, and are sequentially output from CCD 18A and CCD 18B as voltage signals (analog image signals) corresponding to each signal charge” (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 23) (emphasis added). In other words, regardless of whether CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28, Matsushima discloses that voltage signals corresponding to the accumulated 8 Petitioner’s citation erroneously includes ¶¶ 34–36 of Exhibit 1069. CCD 18A and CCD 18B sequentially––not output at the same time or simultaneously.” slip op. at 30

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).9 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. Petitioner clarifies that the Petition does not argue inherency. See Pet.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish that Usui’s interconnect structure or Yu’s metal gate stacks satisfy the construed “electrode stack” limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 6–7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’562 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “comprises the recited metals and has the recited thickness, which forms an electrical contact for use on a semiconductor device generally or a group III- V semiconductor in particular. This is consistent with our determination that “electrode stack” is a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device We disagree with Patent Owner that “electrode stack” as used in the challenged claims should be limited to the specific electrodes shown in the embodiments described in the Specification. See PO Resp. 4–9. Although the Specification describes embodiments using source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes as electrical contacts, we see no reason to construe the term “electrode stack” itself to be limited to these components as Patent Owner proposes. Claims 1 and 13 expressly recite that electrode stacks comprise the claimed “electrical contact,” without expressly including or precluding any specific type of electrode. Ex. 1001, 5:54–63, 6:37–47. The Federal Circuit advises that the Specification “is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language. ‘Specifications teach. Claims claim.’” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). The Specification does teach electrical contacts that include source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes, but claims 1 and 13 are directed to electrical contacts that are not expressly so limited. Patent Owner’s proposed construction would effectively rewrite the claim by adding limitations, which we decline to do under the guise of claim construction. See id. (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the claim term “electrode stack” to mean “a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.”” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Piner testifies, with evidentiary support, that interconnects (such as Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure) and electrical contacts (such as that claimed in the ’562 patent) are not the same thing. See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 63–70. For example, Dr. Piner explains: In other words, not all metals in a semiconductor device have the same purpose and could not be said to be interchangeable. By August 2009 it was well known to a POSA how to discern if a metal component in a transistor is an interconnect or serves as an electrical contact such as a gate contact or ohmic contact, based on the structure and functionality of the metal component. For example, interconnects are made up of metal strips and are deposited on insulators. EX-1011 (Mishra) at 216. Interconnects are low resistance conductors that can carry very high current densities. Id., 216, 217. Unlike Schottky contacts and ohmic contacts, interconnects do not provide non-linear IV response like Schottky contacts nor inject electrons and holes into semiconductors like ohmic contacts. Id., 218. As many of the references cited by Dr. Zhao illustrate, electrical contacts had their own highly complex design challenges. EX-1008 (Pearton), 41-59 (Pages 53-71 of 383) (discussing electrical contacts); EX-1017 (Kramer), 11-126 (Pages 18-130 of 151) (same). And while Dr. Zhao cites these as supporting a POSA’s knowledge of an electrical contact, none of these references describe electrical contacts as interconnects. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Piner further testifies that Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure is an interconnect, and not an electrical contact, because “Usui states that ‘[t]he structures fabricated by the process of the present invention are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.’” Id. ¶ 148 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:11–14) (alteration in original); see also id. ¶¶ 150– 151 (Dr. Piner testifying that Usui’s interconnect metallization structure is not an “electrode stack” under a broad definition of electrode). Dr. Piner’s testimony in this regard rebuts Petitioner’s and Dr. Zhao’s conclusory assertions to the contrary.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.” Thus, Petitioner must show that Usui’s layers 13–15, 18, and 19 provide a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. After reviewing the complete trial record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has done so. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Zhao to support its contention that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,686,562 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,686,562
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wallen and Berggren because the combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is wholly unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the language of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and the aims of the ’670 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 2:3– 25, 9:32–10:5, 12:51–67, 18:54–19:6, 19:26–42, 20:12–26. Moreover, the cited extrinsic evidence––testimony by Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lomp–– does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is internally inconsistent and also undermined by Dr. Lomp’s inconsistent deposition testimony. See Ex. 1036, 11:6–17, 12:9–12; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 40, 48. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence cited by Petitioner (e.g., Exs. 1037, 1038, 2009) undermines Patent Owner’s position emphasizing the intended recipient devices of SIB1. In summary, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because it is unsupported by the claim language, the ’670 Patent Specification, and the cited extrinsic evidence. with the ordinary and customary meaning which does not include limiting SIB1 to an ordinary legacy SIB and excluding MTC specific SIBs or SIBs intended for MTC devices. In addition, we need not construe explicitly any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017 (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the prior art of record. slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “filing date. As explained above, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that Wallen is not prior art because the ’670 Patent is entitled to the earlier January 20, 2012, filing date of foreign priority application GB1201000. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing a system information block 1, Patent Owner’s arguments do not substantively address how GB1201000 provides written description support for any other limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 43, 57. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in foreign priority application GB1201000, the burden of production did not shift back to Petitioner, and,” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel (PBCH) including a master information block (MIB).” See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 77, 83–84). Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that Wallen does not expressly disclose a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), but relies on Berggren for confirming that the LTE standard specifies that a PBCH carries the MIB. See Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 73–75). According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit Wallen’s MIB using a PBCH as taught by Berggren.” Pet. 43 (citing Pet. 33–38). In particular, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated for Wallen’s LTE system to utilize the LTE standard implementation details taught by Berggren,” and “it would have been predictable and beneficial for Wallen’s user equipment to receive the MIB in the [PBCH], as was standard in LTE.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58), 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, “the combination is nothing more than ‘the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’” Pet. 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Wallen’s broadcast MIB with Berggren’s teachings of using a PBCH for transmitting broadcast MIBs. See Pet. 33–38; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,206,670 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,206,670
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 27, 2026 · IPR2024-00906 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, and 8–27 are unpatentable as obvious; Judge Hudalla dissented as to claim 15.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedDecided for patent owner

    “reachable through intuitive navigation from the homepage using the descriptive titles to the reference, is sufficient to demonstrate the BT-Spec was publicly accessible. See M&K Holdings, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 985 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The law regarding public accessibility is not as restrictive as M&K suggests—a website’s landing page is not required to have search functionality. Instead, given the prominence of JCT-VC, the dispositive question is whether interested users of the JCT-VC website could have located Park and Zhou through reasonable diligence.”). The Bluetooth SIG website itself functioned as a well-known, organized repository that a skilled artisan would naturally consult when researching Bluetooth technology. See id. at 1382 (“The Board found that the documents in question on the meeting pages of the JCT-VC website were effectively indexed by subject matter in light of the title-search functionality and the fact that Park and Zhou featured descriptive titles. That finding supports the Board’s conclusion that Park and Zhou were publicly accessible.”).” slip op. at 39

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proof to” slip op. at 139

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “12. Conclusion Based on the complete record, we find a preponderance of the” slip op. at 115

  Patent outcomesUS 11,445,241 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,445,241
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 27, 2026 · IPR2024-00907 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 5, 8–12, and 14–25 are unpatentable as obvious; the majority finds the asserted combinations persuasive despite 3GPP-Spec not qualifying as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “accessibility. A document hosted on the official standards body website, reachable through intuitive navigation from the homepage using the descriptive titles to the reference, is sufficient to demonstrate the BT-Spec was publicly accessible. See M&K Holdings, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 985 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The law regarding public accessibility is not as restrictive as M&K suggests—a website’s landing page is not required to have search functionality. Instead, given the prominence of JCT-VC, the dispositive question is whether interested users of the JCT-VC website could have located Park and Zhou through reasonable diligence.”). The Bluetooth SIG website itself functioned as a well-known, organized repository that a skilled artisan would naturally consult when researching Bluetooth technology. See id. at 1382 (“The Board found that the documents in question on the meeting pages of the JCT-VC website were effectively indexed by subject matter in light of the title-search functionality and the fact that Park and Zhou featured descriptive titles. That finding supports the Board’s conclusion that Park and Zhou were publicly accessible.”).” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” (alteration in original)). This search for answers about whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention applies “an expansive and flexible approach.” Id. at 415. Whether a patent claiming the combination of prior art elements would have been obvious is determined by whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Reaching this conclusion, however, requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention. Id.” slip op. at 14

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proof to” slip op. at 158

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,590 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,590
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 because the prior-art combinations teach the claimed features and have adequate motivation and reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “1. Whether Ma Qualifies as a Prior Art Printed Publication First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Ma was publicly accessible in August 2008 so as to qualify as prior art. PO 11 As Petitioner notes, the district court adopted a claim construction requiring only “one or more wavelengths” in the infrared-to-UV spectrum. PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 2031, 47–48). Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,828,425

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.