- Therabody, Inc. v. Hyperice IP Subco, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 11, 2026 · PGR2025-00013 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted prior art did not establish the claimed quick-connect system during reciprocation, and Clark was not analogous art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The prior art may reflect the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“During oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it would not object to the Board adopting the construction that Petitioner proposes in the district court litigation. JUDGE MARSCHALL: I think the Petitioner wouldn’t object if we adopted the construction that Petitioner proposed in the district court, especially the “designed to” construction, correct? MR. BERG: No. We wouldn’t object to that. And we think that our Petition is on all fours with that construction. Tr. 81:12–16. As Petitioner does not object to adopting its construction from the district court litigation, we construe claim element 1[e] in accordance with Petitioner’s construction from the district court litigation.” slip op. at 11
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable
“The invention, a reciprocating massage device, is in a predictable field, namely the electro-mechanical arts. Also, there is no evidence that the recited quick-connect system is complex, even considering Patent Owner’s alleged understanding of it. Rather, Dr. Pratt testifies that many different types of connectors, whether they require alignment or not, were known. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54–58. Given the predictability of the electro-mechanical arts and lack of complexity of the recited quick-connect system, a low level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement. See RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Given the predictability of electro-mechanical inventions such as the one at issue here, and the lack of complexity of the particular claim limitation at issue—i.e., reciting the length of a heating member—‘a lower level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement than for unpredictable arts.’” (quoting Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). In view of the low level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the Specification’s example of a quick-connect system configured to secure the massaging head as the piston reciprocates fails to provide sufficient written description support for the “quick-connect system” recited in independent claims 1 and 18.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Specification provides guidance as to what amount of deviation from a perfect cylinder is still “substantially cylindrical.” The Specification describes: Quick-connect system 600 includes a piston 602 that has a hollow-end bore 608 for receiving the shaft 621 of a massaging head 620. Located within the bore 608 of piston 602 is a cylindrical seat 604. Cylindrical seat 604 retains a magnet 606. Magnet 606 is illustrated with its north pole located flush with the seat and facing toward the opening in bore 608. Massaging head 620 includes a shaft 621 having a cylindrical pocket 622 at the distal end. Located within the cylindrical pocket 622 is a magnet 624. Magnet 624 is positioned so that its south pole is located at the distal end of shaft 621. Accordingly, when the shaft 621 of massaging head 620 is slid into opening in bore 608, the magnets 606 and 624 are attracted to one another and magnetically hold massaging head 620 firmly in place. Ex. 1001, 6:57–7:3. In view of the description of quick-connect system 600, the Specification sets forth a standard for ascertaining whether the bore and the seat located within the bore are “substantially cylindrical.” To wit, the bore and the seat within the bore are “substantially cylindrical” when the massaging head and magnet are respectively received therein so that the magnet in the seat and the magnet in the pocket of the massaging head can magnetically hold the massaging head firmly in place. Furthermore, Dr. Pratt testifies that “[m]agnetic connectors comprise a magnet on at least one of the two objects to be joined. These types of connectors are ubiquitous even today for driving threaded fasteners.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 56. Dr. Pratt also testifies that a POSITA would understand how to take into account certain variances, like runout. Ex. 2033, 25:3–17. Dr. Pratt’s testimony shows that magnetic connectors are well known and that a POSITA would be able to determine whether the bore and the seat within the bore were “substantially cylindrical” for a secure connection of the massaging head. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the claim term “substantially cylindrical” recited in claims 13–16 fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, the shapes of the bore and the structure within the bore. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of claims 13–16 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 11,938,082 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,938,082 - Therabody, Inc. v. Hyperice IP Subco, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 20, 2026 · PGR2024-00053 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · PGR · Final written decision
Petitioner did not prove claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 unpatentable under § 112(a), § 112(b), or any asserted § 103 ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proffered definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art differ in the details of the experience a POSITA would possess. Petitioner’s definition requires experience with rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, whereas Patent Owner’s definition requires experience with devices for human use and interaction. These differences, however, do not affect our analysis of the issues in this case. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“During oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it would not object to the Board adopting the construction that Petitioner proposes in the district court litigation. JUDGE MARSCHALL: I think the Petitioner wouldn’t object if we adopted the construction that Petitioner proposed in the district court, especially the “designed to” construction, correct? MR. BERG: No. We wouldn’t object to that. And we think that our Petition is on all fours with that construction. Tr. 81:12–16. As Petitioner does not object to adopting its construction from the district court litigation, we construe claim element 34[e] in accordance with Petitioner’s construction from the district court litigation.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable
“The invention, a reciprocating massage device, is in a predictable field, namely the electro-mechanical arts. Also, there is no evidence that the recited quick release connector is complex, even considering Patent Owner’s alleged understanding of it. Rather, Dr. Pratt testifies that a POSITA would be able to recognize a quick release connector for a particular application. According to Dr. Pratt, A person of ordinary skill in the art would consider a number of factors, depending on the context and specific application of the connector, to determine whether a connector provides a “quick release.” Such factors could include whether the connector is designed to manually and easily connect and disconnect two objects, and whether tools are necessary to do so. Other factors to be considered may be based on the specific application or operating environment. Ex. 1002 ¶ 58. Given the predictability of the electro-mechanical arts and lack of complexity of the recited quick release connector, a low level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement. See RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Given the predictability of electro-mechanical inventions such as the one at issue here, and the lack of complexity of the particular claim limitation at issue—i.e., reciting the length of a heating member—‘a lower level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement than for unpredictable arts.’” (quoting Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). In view of the low level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the Specification’s example of a quick release connector configured to secure the massaging head as the piston reciprocates fails to provide sufficient written description support for the “quick release connector . . . configured to secure a first massaging head while the piston reciprocates a predetermined stroke length at the first speed” recited in claim element 34[e]. 4. Conclusion for Written Description For the reasons set forth above in sections II.C.1–3, Petitioner has not persuaded us that any aspect of claim element 34[e] lacks written description support. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 34, as well as any of claims 35–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 18
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Specification provides guidance as to what amount of deviation from a perfect cylinder is still “substantially cylindrical.” The Specification describes that quick-connect system 600 includes two magnets with opposite poles facing each other: magnet 606 in the distal end of piston 602 and magnet 624 located in cylindrical pocket 622 of massaging head 620. Ex. 1001, 6:57–67, Figs. 6, 6A. The Specification further describes that “when the shaft 621 of massaging head 620 is slid into opening in bore 608, the magnets 606 and 624 are attracted to one another and magnetically hold massaging head 620 firmly in place.” Id. at 6:67–7:3. In view of the description of quick-connect system 600, the Specification sets forth a standard for ascertaining whether the pocket is “substantially cylindrical.” To wit, the pocket is “substantially cylindrical” when the pocket receives a magnet therein so that the magnets can magnetically hold the massaging head firmly in place. Furthermore, Dr. Pratt testifies that “[m]agnetic connectors comprise a magnet on at least one of the two objects to be joined. These types of connectors are ubiquitous even today for driving threaded fasteners.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 55. Dr. Pratt also testifies that a POSITA would understand how to take into account certain variances, like runout. Ex. 2033, 25:3–17. Dr. Pratt’s testimony shows that magnetic connectors are well known and that a POSITA would be able to determine whether the pocket was “substantially cylindrical” for a secure connection of the massaging head. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the claim term “substantially cylindrical” recited in independent claim 34 fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, the shape of the pocket. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 34, as well as claims 35–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,857,482 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,857,482 - Recor Medical, Inc. / Otsuka Medical Devices Co., Ltd. v. Medtronic Ireland Manufacturing Unlimited Co.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2022-00431 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1–3 and 8–12 are unpatentable over the instituted grounds; claim 4 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Federal Circuit (Paper 33), which vacated the original Final Written Decision and remanded the proceeding to the Board. See ReCor Med., Inc. v. Medtronic Ir. Mfg. Unlimited Co., No. 2023-2251, 2025 WL 944511 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (“the Appeal Decision” or “Appeal Dec.”); see also Paper 41 (copy of the Appeal Decision). The Federal Circuit’s mandate issued on May 5, 2025. See Paper 40. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6, and we issue this Final Written Decision on Remand under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons below, on the complete record, we conclude that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 8–12 of the challenged patent, and we conclude that Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unpatentability of claim 4.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentable
“and Petitioner’s rebuttal evidence. Objective evidence of nonobviousness, when present, must be considered as part of an obviousness inquiry. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art, the totality of the evidence submitted, including objective evidence of nonobviousness, may lead to a conclusion that one or more of the challenged claims would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984).” slip op. at 50
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“1. Claims 1–3 and 8–11 Because the obviousness ground based on Levin and Acker is dispositive as to challenged claims 1–3 and 8–11, we need not reach this additional ground as to those claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018) (holding that a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Boston Sci. Scimed, analysis in the appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Appeal Dec. *1–*2 (summarizing grounds at issue on appeal and not discussing anticipation based on Acker). Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (stating that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding,” such as “alternative arguments with respect to claims [the Board] found unpatentable on other grounds”); SK Hynix Inc. v. Netlist, Inc., IPR2017-00692, Paper 25 at 40 (PTAB July 5, 2018) (determining all challenged claims to be unpatentable and not addressing additional grounds). 2. Dependent Claim 4 As to dependent claim 4, in the context of this ground, Petitioner relies on Acker as to the additional limitations in claim 4 in the same manner as relied on in the context of the ground based on Levin and Acker. See Pet. 73 (“The combination teaches this element for the same reasons described in [the obviousness ground based on Levin and Acker], claim 4, with the exception that [one of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated based on his or her knowledge of prior renal denervation work, as noted above.”). Thus, for the same reasons discussed above (see § II.C.3.c), we determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 would have been obvious based on Acker and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. G. Asserted Obviousness of Claim 12 Based on Acker, the Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art, and Yock Petitioner asserts that claim 12, which depends from independent claim 1, would have been obvious based on Acker, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and Yock. Pet. 12, 75; Pet. Reply 35–36. Patent Owner provides arguments addressing this ground. PO Resp. 57–60; PO” slip op. at 75
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Independent Claim 1 Petitioner contends that Acker discloses each limitation of claim 1. Pet. 61–63; Pet. Reply 35. In the “Overview of the Ground” section, Petitioner references its proposed construction of the phrase “configured to” and states that “it is proper to consider whether the prior art is ‘capable of’ performing the recited functions, as opposed to requiring that a designer of a prior art device have actually conceived of the recited functional language.” Pet. 61. Petitioner continues: “If the PTAB agrees that this is the proper approach to claim construction, then Acker also anticipates the claims challenged in this ground.” Id. For the reasons below, we determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Acker. As to element 1d, which includes the phrase “configured to,”16 Petitioner states that Acker is capable of being used to target renal neural fibers outside of the blood vessel to thermally induce modulation of target neural fibers while protecting non-target tissue in the blood vessel wall from thermal injury for the reasons discussed under claim 1, limitation [1d] and in the section entitled “Reasonable Expectation of Success”, beginning on page 37 [of the Petition]. Pet. 62–63 (citing Daft Pet. Decl. ¶ 179) (first bracketed text added by Petitioner). Patent Owner argues that, in the context of this asserted ground based” slip op. at 71
Patent outcomesUS 8,845,629 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,845,629 - The Boeing Company v. The Regents Of The University Of CaliforniaNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00761 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–24 not unpatentable because the asserted references did not show the glass element propagating a modified stress wave to generate tensile stress at the interface.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’684 patent “would have had an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering or a related field, and at least five years of experience using laser systems to characterize and test mechanical behavior in materials” and that “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“Both parties maintain that no claim term needs to be construed. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40); PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner, however, provides an express construction for limitation [1.d] of independent claim 1 and the similar limitation of independent claim 13, namely limitation [13.c]. PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 25). To resolve the controversy before us, we determine that these limitations require express construction. 1. “the glass element is configured to propagate and modify a stress wave to the coating/substrate interface to generate a tensile stress between the substrate and the coating” (limitation [1.d]) and “propagating and modifying a stress wave through the glass element to the coating/substrate interface to generate a tensile force between the substrate and the coating” (limitation [13.c]) Patent Owner argues these limitations mean “changing the profile of the laser generated compressive wave and propagating the wave profile as modified to the free surface of the coating, which upon reflection from the free surface as a tension wave generates a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 25). Petitioner does not refute this proposed construction and, during the oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it agrees with the proposed construction. Tr. 8:16–9:12. We so no reason to depart from the parties agreed-upon construction of limitations [1.d] and [13.c]. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt the parties’ construction of limitations [1.d] and [13.c].” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“a shock in the compression wave in the fused silica substrate. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Wang-Dissertation’s fused silica substrate modifies the compression waveform, we would not be persuaded that the fused silica substrate propagates the modified wave to the free surface of the coating, which upon reflection from the free surface as a tension wave generates a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface, as limitation [1.d] requires. In view of the presence of tension-wave-1 in Wang-Dissertation’s experiments, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated persuasively that the fused silica substrate propagates a modified stress wave to the free surface of the coating to generate a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface. Also, we find credible Dr. Gupta’s unrebutted testimony that any modified compression wave would attenuate in the substrate and not propagate to the free surface coating or generate a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface. Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 93–98. Petitioner does not dispute that the experiments in Wang-Dissertation include tension-wave-1. See Ex. 1005, 65 (“The experimental picture is complicated somewhat by the presence of a tensile wave, reflected from the back of the confining layer.”). Nor does Petitioner dispute that Wang-Dissertation discloses that the tension-wave-1 propagates faster than the compression-wave-1 and eventually overtakes compression-wave-1. See id. at 65–66 (“Being tensile, it propagates faster that the peak compressive stress, and faster than the low stress tail of the main pulse. It eventually overtakes the compressive pulse and linear dissipative mechanisms govern the final thickness of the shock.”). Rather, Petitioner relies on Dr. Wang’s testimony regarding the timing of the waves through the sample and argues that tension-wave-1 does not overtake compression-wave-1 in the fused silica substrate. Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1038 ¶ 5). Dr. Wang testifies that the peak stress from tension-wave-1 is about 2 ns behind the peak of compression-wave-1 and will not reach the interface before the reflected tensile peak of compression-wave-1 reaches the interface in 0.3 ns. Ex. 1038 ¶ 5. However, as Dr. Gupta persuasively explains, the delay between tension-wave-1 and compression-wave-1 depends on the properties of the confining layer, and Wang-Dissertation acknowledges that these properties are not well controlled. Ex. 2011 ¶ 54; see also Ex. 1005, 65 (“The surface properties of that confining layer are not well controlled.”).” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“claimed subject matter. Pet. 35–38; Pet. Reply 23–24. In doing so, Petitioner continues to rely on Wang-Dissertation to disclose limitation [1.d] of independent claim 1 and limitation [13.c] of independent claim 13. Pet. 35–38; Pet. Reply 23–24. Petitioner does not put forth any further obviousness rationale in this ground based on Wang-Dissertation for teaching these limitations. For the same reasons discussed in sections II.C.2–3, Petitioner has not persuaded us that Wang-Dissertation teaches or suggests limitations [1.d] and [13.c]. Thus, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Wang-Dissertation renders obvious the subject matter set forth in claims 4, 6, 9, 15, 17, 20, 23, and 24, which depend from independent claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 7,487,684 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,487,684 - Air Products And Chemicals, Inc. v. Evonik Operations GmbH And Evonik CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00611 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–23 were not shown unpatentable: the Ungerank Patent was not established as prior art, and Scholz did not establish the claimed recycle range or motivation to modify its systems.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ . . . and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)). Here, Petitioner asserts that (1) the combined teachings of the Ungerank Patent and Scholz disclose or suggest all of the limitations of claims 1–5, 7, 9, and 11–23 of the ’380 patent, and (2) the Ungerank Patent qualifies as prior art because the portions cited in the Corrected Petition and the Baker Declaration were published in the Ungerank Application.7 slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner ultimately has the burden of persuasion, based on all the evidence, on both these assertions. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the portions of the Ungerank Patent relied on in the Corrected Petition and the Baker Declaration qualify as prior art. There is nothing in the Initial Petition or the exhibits filed in support thereof that indicates Petitioner’s intention to rely on the Ungerank Application as prior art in this proceeding. The Initial Petition defines “Ungerank” as the Ungerank Patent, and all citations to “Ungerank” in support of Petitioner’s allegations are to the Ungerank Patent. Initial Pet. 3, 12–14, 17–42. The Initial Petition does not refer to the Ungerank Application, and the Ungerank Application was not submitted as an exhibit with the Initial Petition. Id. at iii–v (Exhibit List). And Petitioner’s expert declarant, Dr. Baker, did not consider the Ungerank Application when formulating his opinions in support of the Initial Petition. Ex. 1003 ¶ 51 (identifying materials considered). Although the Corrected Petition redefines “Ungerank” as the Ungerank Application, the Corrected Petition retains its citations to the Ungerank Patent.8 Corrected Pet. 3, 12–15, 18–43. In that regard, Petitioner generally asserts that the Ungerank Application’s “specification and figures 8 At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel stated that they left the citations to the Ungerank Patent in the Corrected Petition because they “didn’t want to make tons and tons of changes,” and the Ungerank Patent citations “are much more specific.” Tr. 12:10–13; see also Pet. Reply 10 (“Moreover, by citing AP-1006’s column and line numbers instead of AP-1038’s paragraph numbers, Petitioner provided more specific citations in support of its arguments.”). are identical to the” Ungerank Patent, but does not direct us to where the specific portions of the Ungerank Patent that it asserts to be prior art can be found in the Ungerank Application. See id. at 3. We are also not directed to any evidence in the record that indicates that Dr. Baker compared the portions of the Ungerank Patent on which he relies to the disclosures in the Ungerank Application, or even considered the Ungerank Application at all. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 51; Ex. 1041 ¶ 4; Ex. 2009, 44:10–45:18; Ex. 2018, 12:18– 23. We decline to perform an analysis that is missing from the Corrected Petition and Dr. Baker’s testimony. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”). Accordingly, Petitioner does not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cited portions of the Ungerank Patent were published in the Ungerank Application.” slip op. at 17
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Our rules provide that a petitioner must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing laws, rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a). Our rules also state that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” Id. § 42.23(b). “‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” CTPG 74. Our Trial Practice Guide explains that “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. at 73; see also id. at 74 (“Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the patentability or unpatentability of an original or proposed substitute claim, such as newly raised rationale to combine the prior art references that was not expressed in the petition.”). In the Reply, Petitioner argues that “POSITAs ‘might have already figured out’” that, in Comparative Example 1, the surface area of the membrane in stage 2 was larger than that of the membrane is stage 1, and Scholz’s Figure 7 systems with larger stage 2 membrane areas than stage 1 were “consistent with POSITAs’ likely intuition about [Comparative Example 1’s] stage 2 and stage 1 areas.” Pet. Reply 19. As Petitioner concedes, this “an additional reason POSITAs would have found it appropriate to look to Scholz’s Figure 7 to better understand [Comparative Example 1’s] relative surface areas.” Id. (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 31–32) (emphasis added). The case presented in the Corrected Petition is that a POSITA would have looked to Scholz because Comparative Example 1 does not provide details on the area of the membranes or their ratios. Corrected Pet. 18–19. Petitioner’s admitted “additional reason” to combine the Ungerank Patent and Scholz in the Reply is a newly raised rationale to combine the prior art references necessary to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. See CTPG 74. Accordingly, Petitioner’s untimely new argument is waived, and we do not consider it here.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner fails to sufficiently demonstrate that the combination of the Ungerank Patent and Scholz teaches limitation [1.f.ii] because Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to look to the relative sizes of the membranes in the stages of Scholz’s Figure 7 to determine the relative sizes of the membranes in the stages of Comparative Example 1.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 10,471,380 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,471,380 - PTAB · Jul 2, 2025 · PGR2025-00013 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 and 18, finding a sufficient preliminary showing of unpatentability for claims 1–4, 7, 9–11, 13, and 18 under the Mabuchi-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one of claims 1–16 and 18, which are the challenged claims of the ’082 patent that remain after Patent Owner’s disclaimer.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aOther
“II. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL In view of the Acting Director’s memo bifurcating discretionary considerations and merits considerations,8 we note that Patent Owner had the opportunity to file a brief requesting discretionary denial of institution but did not file such a brief. Paper 7, 1. Accordingly, any discretionary issues were mooted, and the case was referred to this Board panel to consider the merits and other non-discretionary considerations. Id. at 1–2.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a related field, and two-to-three years of experience in the research, design, development, or testing of rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as of the effective filing date of the Challenged Claims would have a working knowledge of product development and would likely have a degree in engineering and/or industrial design and/or at 5 Harris et al., US 6,432,072 B1, issued Aug. 13, 2002. Ex. 1006. 6 Pivaroff, US 6,682,496 B1, issued Jan. 27, 2004. Ex. 1007. 7 Clark, US 3,007,504, issued Nov. 7, 1961. Ex. 1014. 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ InterimProcesses-PTABWorkloadMgmt-20250326.pdf. least three to five years of experience in conceiving, designing, engineering, and/or modifying such products and devices. Prelim. Resp. 16. While we appreciate that the parties differ slightly on the details of experience that an ordinary artisan would possess, we do not find a difference that affects our Decision. For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. The parties may provide briefing at trial, if appropriate, to explain why adoption of one definition over the other changes the remaining analysis.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION In a post-grant review, we interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Neither party identifies any term that requires construction. Pet. 13‒ 15; Prelim. Resp. 16‒17. Accordingly, we need not construe any term at the present time.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,938,082 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00294 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable; proposed substitute claims 21–24 are also unpatentable, so the contingent motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“appear to be that Patent Owner specifies that the POSA’s knowledge and experience may include optical sensors and that the POSA may have a degree emphasizing software. We do not deem these differences material, particularly because the optical sensors and technologies at issue are those used in physiological monitoring technologies and both parties agree that the POSA would have a working knowledge of physiological monitoring technologies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; PO Resp. 11. We find the additional specificity of Patent Owner’s definition to be helpful. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’507 patent. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art. (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). We note that we would reach the same outcome under either definition of the POSA. Cf., PO Resp. 12 (asserting that Petitioner’s proposed definition is “flawed” but also asserting that “patentability is confirmed” “[r]egardless of the level of skill”).” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1007, 1528. The dispute between the parties focuses on whether D’Angelo was made available to attendees of the IEEE EMBS conference identified in this header and, if so, what effect that has.16 Accordingly, we begin our analysis by considering the conference.” slip op. at 42
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“understood Mendelson to disclose averaging signals. We do not find in Mendelson any discussion of summing or averaging signals. See generally Ex. 1011, 912–915. Our inability to find a teaching of averaging in Mendelson is consistent with the testimony of Drs. Kenny and Duckworth. Dr. Kenny testifies that “there is simply no disclosure in Mendelson itself of any summing or averaging of collected signals.” Ex. 1083 ¶ 23. And in his deposition, Dr. Duckworth was unable to identify any express disclosure of averaging in Mendelson. See Ex. 1087, 103:9–114:11 (confirming that certain aspects of his declaration testimony relating to averaging of signals are not discussed in Mendelson). Accordingly, Mendelson, standing alone, does not support that the POSA would have understood Mendelson’s Sensor Module to have output averaged signals” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“the PDA to read out ‘data that’s been stored’ (i.e., previously measured physiological data) even after the Receiver Module’s battery had died” because Mendelson’s Receiver Module lacks “a microSD card or other nonvolatile storage from which measured data could be ‘read out’ after its battery has died.” PO Resp. 37; see also Ex. 2037 ¶ 147 (testimony of Dr. Duckworth confirming that Mendelson’s system could not store data that could be read out after its battery died). Accordingly, Patent Owner argues the POSA “would not have been motivated to modify Mendelson’s Receiver Module to draw power from the PDA as proposed because doing so would not allow the PDA to ‘read out’ the previously ‘measured physiological data’ after the Receiver Module’s battery died.” PO Resp. 39.” slip op. at 60
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,736,507 - PTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · PGR2024-00053 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness over the asserted Mabuchi-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“post-grant review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“likely occur very close in time to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision. . . . the claim construction hearing will occur on April 16, 2025” Prelim. Resp. 63. Neither party identifies a date for trial in the Parallel Litigation. On review of the Pacer record, it appears that the claim construction hearing was continued to April 23, 2025. There is no indication that the trial will be completed prior to a PTAB Final Written Decision, much less a court decision. Accordingly, this factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one of claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 of the ’482 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a related field, and two-to-three years of experience in the research, design, development, or testing of rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention would have a working knowledge of product development, and would likely have a degree in engineering and/or industrial design, and/or at least three to five years of experience in conceiving, designing, engineering, and/or modifying such products and devices.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,857,482 - Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationInstitutedPTAB · Jun 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00294 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 on all grounds asserted in the Petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. We decline to deny the Petition on a discretionary basis as requested by Patent Owner. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’507 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 11–12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”).11 Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo, 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like that in Sotera, i.e., a stipulation to “not pursue for the instituted claims, in [the Delaware Litigation], the same grounds as in the IPR2024-00293 petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in that Petition” (Ex. 1078, 1), we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 10
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Discretionary Denial in View of Parallel Petitions Petitioner filed two petitions for inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’507 patent, this Petition and the petition filed in IPR2024-00293. See Apple Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2024-00293, Paper 3 (PTAB, filed December 12, 2023). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “fails to establish that two petitions on the ’507 Patent are necessary” and that “if the Board institutes one of the Petitions, it should deny the other.” Paper 8, 1. This argument is moot because, concurrently herewith, we deny institution of inter partes review in IPR2024-00293 on the merits. III.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The main differences between the parties’ definitions of the POSA appear to be that Patent Owner specifies that the POSA’s knowledge and experience may include optical sensors and that the POSA may have a degree emphasizing software. On the present record, we do not deem these differences material, particularly because the optical sensors and technologies at issue are those used in physiological monitoring technologies and both parties agree that the POSA would have a working knowledge of physiological monitoring technologies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Prelim. Resp. 6. We find the additional specificity of Patent Owner’s definition to be helpful. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’507 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We note that we would reach the same outcome under either definition of the POSA.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,736,507 - Pioneer Pet Products, LLC v. Oil-Dri Corporation Of AmericaSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 19, 2023 · IPR2022-01138 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–8, 10–16, and 18 are unpatentable over Goss; claims 2, 9, 17, and 19 were not shown unpatentable. The revised motion to amend is denied for lack of written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd mixedMixed
“To prevail in its challenges, Petitioner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burdens of proof in an inter partes review).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“PHOSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor of science degree in chemistry, mineralogy, geological science, material science, chemical engineering, or mining engineering with at least two to five years of work experience relating to designing specific chemical mixtures including clay or other minerals, particularly absorbents.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 23. We adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner because it appears consistent with the record, including the prior art. See GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We generally agree with Petitioner that the assumptions and approximations made in the calculations described in the ’397 patent to determine the external surface area of the components of the litter render the computations only a general approximation of the respective surface areas. See Pet. Reply 9–12. We need not, however, reach the issue of whether the 47% surface area limitation requires the use of the multi-step method disclosed in the ’397 patent because Petitioner followed that methodology in its arguments and evidence in its Reply. See Pet. Reply 13. Importantly, Patent Owner agrees that Petitioner followed the approach set forth in the ’397 patent, and argues that we need not construe “external surface area” to resolve any dispute between the parties. See PO Sur-reply 23–24 (arguing that we need not “determine whether ‘total external surface area’ must be determined using the same multi-step approach” in the ’397 patent to resolve the controversy because “the only calculation of external surface area relied on by Petitioner was presented in the Reply and it followed the methodology of the [’]397 Patent”); PO Supp. Sur-reply 2 (same). Based on our review of the current record, we need not and do not formally construe any claim terms to resolve the patentability issues in this inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent some implicit claim construction disputes remain, we address those issues in the context of the challenges below.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“review of the record, we find that Petitioner fails to articulate an adequate rationale for the combination of Goss and House. The Petition contains only a single sentence addressing the issue, without any citation to record evidence or declaration support. See Pet. 46. In addition, the assertion merely states the conclusion that a “PHOSITA would understand that there is a rational underpinning to combine the teachings of Goss and House as required under patent law because both are related to cat litter having similar characteristics.” Id. This assertion, at most, addresses the fact that Goss and House are in the same field or that they are analogous art, but does not explain why a PHOSITA would have been motivated to combine Goss and House. See id. In addition, the Petition lacks sufficient explanation of how Petitioner proposes to combine Goss and House. See Pet. 46–53. Instead, when Petitioner relies on House in this challenge, it appears to be a back-up argument in the event that we find Goss fails to disclose the limitation. Merely stating that Goss and House both disclose a limitation does not explain which aspects of House Petitioner proposes adding to Goss or what the resulting litter composition would look like. See id. The details of the resulting litter based on the combination of Goss and House matter here because it could impact whether all limitations of a given claim are satisfied by the combination. For example, Petitioner relies exclusively on specific examples from Goss for the 47% surface area limitation, but adding some aspects of House’s litter components to meet other limitations could undermine Petitioner’s reliance on Goss’s specific examples. The failure of the Petition to set forth a specific combination elides these issues. See Pet. 46–51. Petitioner’s Reply arguably addresses some of these concerns by providing a more fulsome motivation section, backed by new expert testimony, and specific litter examples based on Goss and various cellulose filler materials allegedly disclosed by House. See Pet. Reply 24–25 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 7); see also PO Sur-reply 18–22 (arguing that Petitioner’s Reply still fails to articulate an adequate motivation to combine). This analysis goes far beyond the limited analysis in the Petition, and Petitioner provides no reason why it could not have been included in the Petition. See Pet. Reply 24–25. As noted below, in some situations petitioners should be afforded the opportunity to go beyond the arguments in a petition when addressing a new claim construction or other new argument raised by a patent owner or an” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,026,397 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,026,397
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.