• Apple, Inc. v. Virnetx, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 30, 2018 · IPR2017-00337 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12–18, 21–31, 33–39, and 42 are unpatentable as obvious over Beser, RFC 2401, and RFC 2543.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991).” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Beser recognizes that encryption ordinarily should be used when the contents of a communication need to be protected. See Ex. 1007, 1:54–56. Beser also teaches using encryption when user-identifiable data are sent over a network, such as during establishment of an IP tunnel. Id. at 11:22–25. Beser also criticizes prior art IP tunneling methods that sometimes prevent use of encryption, (id. at 2:1–8, 2:22–24), and states that its tunneling method is intended to overcome such problems (id. at 2:43–45). Although Beser expresses concern that some prior art encryption and IP tunneling techniques may be computationally expensive, Beser’s design provides an improved method for ensuring user privacy by allowing communications over the Internet to be anonymous. See Ex. 1007, 2:36–40, 3:4–9. Beser explains that while encrypting data can protect the contents of communications, prior art encryption did not always provide privacy because it did not hide the identities of the devices that were communicating. Id. at 2:1–5, 1:56–58. Beser’s IP tunneling technique was designed to overcome these problems with the prior art. Id. at 2:43–45. Beser notes that its IP tunnel can improve the security of encryption by helping to “prevent a hacker from intercepting all media flow between the ends” (id. at 2:36–40), and from “accumulating . . . sufficient information to decrypt the message” (id. at 1:56–58). Beser’s tunneling method is not technically incompatible with encryption, and a skilled person would be able to adjust a system’s configuration to accommodate the use of encryption with Beser’s IP tunnels. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 227–228; Ex. 1077, 79:3–11, 80:20–81:8, 82:7–17. Because Beser’s IP tunnel has a low computational burden, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Beser’s method is flexible and could be integrated into existing communications systems and combined with other security techniques. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 138; Ex. 1007, 3:4–9, 4:55–5:2. A person of ordinary skill in the art reading Beser would have” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that Beser’s statement that “IP tunnels are and should ordinarily be encrypted” does not support Petitioner’s position because this is limited to encryption being used to hide the identity of network devices, and is not directed to encryption of traffic in one of Beser’s tunnels. Id. at 16 (quoting Ex. 1007, 18:2–5). Beser, Patent Owner argues, “does not use encryption in transmitting data over the established tunnel and, in fact, teaches away from using encryption in transmitting data.” Id. at 16– 17. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Beser recognizes that encryption ordinarily should be used when the contents of a communication need to be protected. See Ex. 1007, 1:54–56. Beser also teaches using encryption when user-identifiable data are sent over a network, such as during establishment of an IP tunnel. Id. at 11:22–25. Beser also criticizes prior art IP tunneling methods that sometimes prevent use of encryption, (id. at 2:1–8, 2:22–24), and states that its tunneling method is intended to overcome such problems (id. at 2:43–45). Although Beser expresses concern that some prior art encryption and IP tunneling techniques may be computationally expensive, Beser’s design provides an improved method for ensuring user privacy by allowing communications over the Internet to be anonymous. See Ex. 1007, 2:36–40, 3:4–9. Beser explains that while encrypting data can protect the contents of communications, prior art encryption did not always provide privacy because it did not hide the identities of the devices that were communicating. Id. at 2:1–5, 1:56–58. Beser’s IP tunneling technique was designed to overcome these problems with the prior art. Id. at 2:43–45. Beser notes that its IP tunnel can improve the security of encryption” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Here, the evidence supports a finding that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 could have located them. RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 each include dates on each page, and the cover sheets bear the designations “Request for Comments” from the “Network Working Group,” discussing particular standardized protocols for the Internet. Ex. 1008, 1; Ex. 1013, 1. Each document describes itself as a “document [that] specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements . . . . Distribution of this memo is unlimited.” See Ex. 1008, 1; Ex. 1013, 1. Ms. Ginoza, a representative of IETF, states in her declaration that “RFC 2401 has been publicly available through the RFC Editor’s web site or through other means since its publication in November 1998.” Ex. 1060 ¶ 107. Ms. Ginoza also states that “RFC 2543 has been publicly available through the RFC Editor’s web site or through other means since its publication in March 1999.” Ex. 1060 ¶ 170. Patent Owner’s criticism of Ms. Ginoza’s testimony as lacking personal knowledge is not persuasive. Ms. Ginoza testified as an IETF corporate representative. See Ex. 1060 (“Declaration of the RFC Publisher for the Internet Engineering Task Force, an Organized Activity of the Internet Society”). It is well established that corporate representatives “need not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question” so long as they are “adequately prepared” to answer on behalf of the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996), aff’d, 166 F.R.D. 367 (M.D.N.C. 1996). Patent Owner’s criticism that Ms. Ginoza did not provide the basis for her “opinion” is also misplaced. Ms. Ginoza was not providing an expert opinion; she was a corporate representative of IETF testifying as to certain facts concerning the RFC Series of documents. Id. ¶¶ 1–5. Dr. Tamassia testifies that RFCs are “prepared and distributed under a formalized publication process overseen by one of several Internet standards or governing bodies,” such as the IETF. Ex. 1003 ¶ 117. Dr. Tamassia also relies on an RFC publication that discusses the RFC development and publication process itself—RFC 2026, dated October 1996. Id. ¶¶ 118–124. Dr. Tamassia states that “[t]he publication date of each RFC is contained in the RFC, typically in the top right corner of the first page of the document” and “[t]his is the date it was released for public distribution on the Internet.” Id. ¶ 121 (citing Ex. 1036, 20). Dr. Tamassia quotes RFC 2026, which explains that anyone can obtain RFCs from “a number of Internet hosts,” making the “working document readily available to a wide audience, facilitating the process of review and revision.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 120 (quoting Ex. 1036, 8). We find Ms. Ginoza’s and Dr. Tamassia’s testimony as to public slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 9,038,163 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,038,163
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Harry Heslop And Sportbrain Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2018 · IPR2016-01464 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over the combinations of Vock, Smith, and Onari; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Root; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Browne; or Shum, Nikolic, and Root.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” should be interpreted to mean data related to a number of steps, which can include data gathered by a pedometer. Pet. 21. Petitioner highlights that during prosecution, Applicants argued that the scope of this claim term encompasses pedometer step data. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1017, 8). Petitioner also highlights that the Examiner in the reissue application interpreted this claim term to encompass any data developed from the number of steps of the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1022, 35). The Specification of the ’002 patent discloses examples of personal data as the number of steps counted during the user’s fitness activity or during the day, the distance walked by the user during the day, and the amount of calories burned by the user during the day. See Ex. 1001, 7:34, 8:53–55, 10:27–30. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also does not provide its own proposed construction of this claim term. We agree with Petitioner’s reasoning and construe the term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” as encompassing at least data gathered by a pedometer, including a number of steps, or data developed from a number of steps, including a distance walked or an amount of calories burned.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Supported by testimony of Dr. Eldering, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least two years of work towards a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related subject or equivalent, or at least one year of experience working with computer networks and web sites.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We determine that Patent Owner’s contention that Vock teaches away from using the pedometer of system 620 shown in Figure 21 with the system shown in Figure 1 is inconsistent with Vock’s disclosure that “system 620 [shown in Figure 21] is useful to joggers who can gate it to serve as a pedometer” and that “[d]ata may also be acquired by the accelerometer and telemetered to the electronics 626 via an RF link 631 back to a remote base 632 for storage and processing (e.g., such as the base station 70, FIG. 1).” Ex. 1006, 50:5, 49:21–23, and Fig. 21. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify the sensing unit of Vock to measure and transmit the number of steps taken by a user, and to modify the base station of Vock to provide feedback based on the number of steps, in light of the teachings of Smith, for the benefit of providing a user with additional information with which to quantitatively assess performance during a physical activity, and that such modifications would have been accomplished with a high chance of success. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 50–52. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the sensing unit of Vock to periodically transmit data gathered by the sensing unit to a base station, in light of the teachings of Onari, for the benefit of providing other users with updates on the performance of a user as new data is collected. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 55–62.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “SportBrain iSTEP product is evidence that the claims are not obvious. PO Resp. 32–36. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner has not established a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. Reply 22–23. In particular, Petitioner contends that the evidence suggests that data was sent from the activity tracker over a telephone line when the device was docked, rather than “over a wireless network” from “wireless communication devices” as claimed. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1024, 11). Accordingly, Petitioner shows that the challenged claims do not encompass the docked/telephone product for conveying data, and no nexus presumption exists. See Reply Br. 22–23; WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (error to reach obviousness conclusion without first weighing all the factors, and relied upon product must be “the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent” to obtain a presumption of nexus) (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Even if a nexus presumption were to apply, Patent Owner’s alleged commercial success does not provide any analysis with respect to market share, so it is not clear how 10,000 subscribers or units with accessories sold shows success that alters the obviousness calculus appreciably. See PO Resp. 35–36 (alleging 10,000 subscribers and 35,000 related units and accessories); Pet. Reply 23 (citing Ex. 1024, 7–8 (showing any success probably was due to the growing popularity of exercise trackers in general)). We determine that Patent Owner has not established commercial success or a nexus, such that the product identified by Patent Owner sent data over a wireless network from wireless communication devices, as required by the claims.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,454,002 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,454,002
• Apple Inc. v. Personalized Media Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 19, 2017 · IPR2016-00755 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 13–15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, and 30 are unpatentable; the contingent motion to amend is denied because the substitute claims are unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “B. Priority The prior art status of all the asserted references in this trial hinges on the effective filing date for the ’091 patent with respect to support for the challenged claims. Petitioner contends that the earliest effective filing date for challenged claims of the ’091 patent is September 11, 1987 (through a series of continuation patents). See Pet. 2–3. The ’091 patent effectively claims CIP status from September 11, 1987 to a chain of continuing applications purportedly having an effective filing date of November 3, 1981––the filing date of the earliest-filed ancestor patent in the chain, the ’490 patent. See Ex. 1003, [63]. Patent Owner contends that the effective filing date of the ’091 patent is November 3, 1981, the filing date of the ’490 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8; PO Resp. 25. After a teleconference requested by Petitioner prior to institution, the panel authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing on this issue. See Ex. 1041 (Teleconference Transcript); Pet. Prelim. Reply; PO Sur-Reply. Citing Bradford Co. v. Conteyor N. Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2010), Petitioner relies on estoppel, contending that Patent Owner disclaimed priority to the filing date of the ’490 patent during prosecution after a double patenting rejection by the Examiner.10 See Pet. Prelim. Reply 6–7. Petitioner also relies on PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008), contending that Patent Owner broadened the scope of the claim term “programming” in the 1987 application that led to the ’091 patent, relative to the scope of the term as disclosed in the ancestor 1981 ’490 patent specification.11 Id. In addition, Petitioner contends that the 1981 ’490 patent specification does not provide sufficient disclosure to support specific claim elements as recited in challenged claims of the ’091 patent. Id. at 7. Patent Owner disagrees with each of these theories, as discussed further below. As an initial matter, Patent Owner initially argues (in its PO Sur- Reply) that the Petition fails to make “a prima facie case” that the ’490 patent does not support the challenged claims that issued in the CIP ’091 patent. PO Sur-Reply 1 (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not make this argument in its Response. Rather, in its Response, Patent Owner only argues that “[a]t least claims 13–16, and 18 (‘the 1981 Claims’) are entitled to the priority date of November 3, 1981.” PO Resp. 25. Accordingly, Patent Owner waives any argument 1) that the Petition fails to shift the burden of production to Patent Owner on the issue of priority with respect to “the 1981 Claims” (i.e., claims 13–16 and 18; PO Resp. 25) and 2) that” slip op. at 49

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “equitable tool for determining the permissible scope of patent claims.” Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 258 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Because the prosecution history does not reveal a clear disavowal of claim scope in context of the disputed phrases in the challenged claims as a whole, under a broadest reasonable construction, the public should not be bound via a doctrine of equity to a construction that would render the claims superfluous and contradict the meaning of decrypting and programming as described in the patents by stripping their breadth to all-digital applications. See Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (The court “observes that the PTO is under no obligation to accept a claim construction proffered as a prosecution history disclaimer.” (Emphasis added)). Accordingly, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, no disclaimer attaches to support Patent Owner’s claim” slip op. at 41

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “claims 14, 15, 18, and 24. See PO Resp. 55 (relying on arguments with respect to “several elements of claims 13 and 20”), 44–55 (presenting arguments for claims 13, 20, 15, and 23). The burden, however, remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As discussed above, after reviewing the Petition, supporting evidence, and the other briefs, and based on the record, we find that Gilhousen discloses each limitation of the challenged claims. See Pet. 16–29 (citing Ex. 1001; Ex. 1004). Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, we determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that Gilhousen anticipates claims 13– 15, 18, 20, 23, and 24.” slip op. at 95

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “2. Secondary Considerations As Petitioner argues, Patent Owner fails to show a nexus to its alleged” slip op. at 114

  Patent outcomesUS 8,191,091 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,191,091
• General Electric Co. v. University Of Virginia Patent FoundationRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 19, 2017 · IPR2016-00357 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the final written decision holding all challenged claims unpatentable under § 102(b) and/or § 103(a).

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDecided for petitioner

    “The Final Written Decision acknowledged the disclosure in the ’182 Application of the objective of lengthening usable echo train durations while achieving desired image contrast characteristics. Final Dec. 22 (citing Ex. 1014, 4). We concluded this disclosure was similar to the disclosure of the key feature in Purdue Pharma. Id. (citing Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1327). UVAPF disputes that conclusion, arguing that the comparison with Purdue Pharma is not “meaningful,” because we purportedly overlooked the importance of lengthening the usable echo train duration while achieving comparable image contrast, and the relationship between this “primary objective” and the echo time ratio. Req. Reh’g 8–9. The Final Written Decision, however, specifically considered this “primary objective” described in the ’182 Application—including both the echo train duration and image contrast aspects. Final Dec. 22. We further concluded the alleged relationship between that key feature and the echo time ratio, which is not described in the ’182 Application, was insufficient to direct a skilled artisan to the recited echo time ratio limitations. Id. As we explained, the patent in Purdue Pharma similarly described a key feature and claimed a particular ratio related to that feature, but the court held the written description was inadequate because it failed to describe that ratio or ascribe any particular importance to that ratio. Id. at 20–22 (citing Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1326–28). The same is true of the claimed echo time ratio and the disclosure of the ’182 Application, which does not identify any such ratio much less describe its significance. Id. UVAPF has not identified any argument or evidence we have overlooked, nor has UVAPF shown our application of Purdue Pharma was erroneous.” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “not have been considered because they were untimely. Req. Reh’g 9–11. GE did not cite the Purdue Pharma case until the Petitioner Reply. See Paper 27, 13–14. We disagree that GE’s arguments were untimely, however, because Purdue Pharma was cited to rebut arguments made by UVAPF in its Patent Owner Response. In the Patent Owner Response, UVAPF argued that a person of ordinary skill would have been able to derive the full range recited for the echo time ratio limitations based on an example provided in the ’182 Application. Paper 21, 55–58. GE argued in the Petitioner Reply that UVAPF’s position is precluded by Purdue Pharma, which held that whether a claimed ratio can be derived from the written description is immaterial if the disclosure does not describe the ratio or direct a person of ordinary skill to the ratio as a part of the invention. Paper 27, 13–14 (citing Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1328). Thus, Purdue Pharma was cited to respond directly to arguments made by UVAPF in its Patent Owner Response, and GE’s arguments based on Purdue Pharma were not untimely. In addition, UVAPF also contends GE untimely raised its arguments that the ’182 Application does not provide sufficient support for the “at least twice” aspect of the echo time ratio limitations. Req. Reh’g 11–13. To the contrary, GE argued in the Petition that the ’182 Application failed to adequately support the “at least twice” limitation. Pet. 11–12 (“[N]owhere does the ’182 application make a comparison of the [effective echo time] of a pulse sequence derived according to the disclosed method, much less delineate a range with a boundary of ‘at least twice’ that of any other echo time.”). Thus, GE’s arguments regarding the “at least twice” limitation were not untimely.” slip op. at 6

  § 112 disclosure
• Apple Inc. v. Masa LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 11, 2017 · IPR2016-00748 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6–14 are unpatentable: Acharya anticipates them, and Sweeney combined with Acharya renders them obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “Selector Option Switch” Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would construe the claim term “selector option switch” as excluding touch screen input devices, because the Specification of the ’834 patent describes a touch screen selector as a substitute for the selector option switch. Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner does not propose further construction of this term. PO Resp. 16. We agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable construction of the “selector option switch,” when read in light of the Specification of the ’834 patent, excludes touch screen input devices, because the Specification describes the touch screen selector as a substitute, not as an alternative, for the selector option switch. Ex. 1001, 4:7–9 (“Alternatively, the selector option switch 56 and confirming option switch 62 may be substituted with touch screen selector and confirming options respectively.”). We construe “selector option switch” to exclude touch screen input devices.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “2. “Coupled” Patent Owner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would construe the claim term “coupled” as “connected, directly or indirectly.” PO Resp. 18. Petitioner agrees. Reply 2. Accordingly, we construe the claim term “coupled” to encompass at least a direct connection or an indirect connection.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “until the called party is available does not constitute storing an incoming call or text is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Claim 6 does not limit the first electronic signal to an incoming call or text message. Rather, claim 6 recites a “memory unit further configured to store said first electronic signal.” Column 2 of Acharya discloses that “the portable control device processes the invitation . . . [by] holding the invitation for a specified period of time” (Ex. 1007, 2:48–59), which describes a “memory unit further configured to store said first electronic signal” as recited in claim 6.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner contends Petitioner or its expert did not provide any reason why a person of ordinary skill would have sought to combine particular available elements to reach the claimed invention. PO Resp. 52– 54. According to Patent Owner, Acharya does not suggest a need for transmitting date and time information, or for transmitting, inter alia, a current local weather signal or a current stock ticker signal. PO Resp. 54– 55. Petitioner contends that Acharya discusses the feasibility and motivation to personalize a device to receive different kinds of signals and informational content. Reply 23 (citing Pet. 25–27). Specifically, Petitioner contends that Acharya teaches providing personalized information such as weather conditions or updates on stock prices. Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1007, 15:51–57, 17:39–58, 18:65–19:38). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would include information such as weather conditions or updates on stock prices as taught by Acharya in the electronic signals received and displayed by the portable device to achieve the predictable benefit of allowing users to receive personalized information as taught by Acharya. Pet. 27. Petitioner’s showing is persuasive. Petitioner provides several reasons, as outlined above, for modifying Acharya. For example, providing different types of information obviously would have appealed to different users, and would have allowed users to personalize their device. See Pet. 26–27. Based on the foregoing discussion and the record, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Acharya render claims 9 and 13 obvious. For independent claims 10 and 14, Petitioner contends persuasively that adding a strap with a buckle fastener to the portable wrist watch device of Acharya would have been obvious because wrist watches commonly have a strap secured to a wearer’s wrist by a buckle in order to secure the device to the wrist. See Pet. 28–29 (citing Ex. 1007, 4:7–13). Based on the foregoing discussion and the record, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Acharya render claims 10 and 14 obvious.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,519,834 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,519,834
• Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00331 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Beser and RFC 2401.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s contentions are not persuasive. Patent Owner fails to explain sufficiently why the notion of “performing an additional evaluation” constitutes an implicit part of the claimed intercept clause. Addressing similar arguments by Patent Owner, a Board panel made a similar determination in the ’237 FWD relied upon by Petitioner. ’237 FWD 11 (“the record show[s] that the additional functionality urged by Patent Owner should not be imported into the intercepting phrase”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Under this standard, absent any special definitions, claim terms or phrases are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For the purposes of this Decision, only the claim terms or clauses below need express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Dr. Tamassia’s testimony as to public accessibility of RFCs in general to be credible, especially given the independent support of RFC 2026 (Ex. 1036), the contents of which Patent Owner does not challenge.7 As part of routine discovery, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii), Patent Owner had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Tamassia, but does not point us to any discussion of this issue. Moreover, RFC 2401’s contents are consistent with the publication process described by RFC 2026 and Dr. Tamassia, including the inclusion of a date “November 1998” on the top right corner of the first page of the document. Ex. 1008, 1. In addition, this document—a request for suggestions and improvements for an Internet standards protocol, 7 As addressed below, Patent Owner objects and moves to dismiss a number of Exhibits based on hearsay and relevancy. See Paper 20 (Motion to Exclude). having no indication of being a mere draft or internal paper—is precisely the type of document whose very purpose is public disclosure, including on the Internet. Both of the magazine articles, Exhibits 1064 and 1065, further corroborate the indicia of availability on the face of RFC 2401, although they are not necessary to our finding of public accessibility. We do not rely on the testimony of Sandy Ginoza, Exhibits 1060 and 1063, which Patent Owner seeks to exclude as discussed further below.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not articulate a persuasive reason for giving Dr. Tamassia’s declaration, as a whole, little or no weight in our analysis. We agree with Petitioner that experts are not required to opine on every relevant factual and legal issue in order to be accorded substantial weight. The cases upon which Patent Owner relies do not show otherwise. For example, Patent Owner cites Schumer v. Laboratory Computer Systems, Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “[expert] testimony . . . ‘must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.’” PO Resp. 52–53. Patent Owner’s quotation, however, mischaracterizes Schumer by omitting introductory words necessary to the meaning of the quoted sentence. In its entirety, the quoted portion of Schumer states the following: Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference. The testimony is insufficient if it is merely conclusory. Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315–16. The Federal Circuit then adds that it is not the task of the courts to “attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a case of invalidity has been made out” and “if the testimony relates to prior invention and is from an interested party, as here, it must be corroborated.” Id. at 1316. So, instead of laying out a specific, required format for the content of all testimony regarding invalidity, as asserted by Patent Owner, this portion of Schumer confirms the unremarkable proposition that conclusory, overly general, confusing, and self-interested testimony should not be relied upon. Id.; see also Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“General and conclusory testimony, such as that provided by Dr. Kazmer in this case, does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity.”). Patent Owner does not show that the whole of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony suffers from any of these failings. Under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), the preponderance of the evidence standard governs in determining whether Petitioner establishes unpatentability. We exercise discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord the evidence presented, including expert opinions, based on the underlying facts supporting the opinion. We accord relevant portions of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony the appropriate weight based on that particular testimony and supporting evidence.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 8,504,696 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,504,696
• General Electric Co. v. University Of Virginia Patent FoundationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2017 · IPR2016-00359 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 153–156, 161, 162, 252, and 253 are unpatentable as anticipated by Mugler 2000 and obvious over each of three stated reference combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “claims. Pet. 21–37. To anticipate a claim, a single prior art reference must disclose each and every limitation of the claim, either expressly or inherently. Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A feature is disclosed inherently if it is necessarily present in the single anticipating reference. Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Petition sets forth detailed contentions and supporting evidence demonstrating that Mugler 2000 discloses each limitation of the challenged claims either expressly or inherently. Pet. 21–37. GE’s analysis is persuasive and unrebutted. In its Patent Owner Response, UVAPF does not dispute that Mugler 2000 discloses each limitation of these claims and, thus, UVAPF has waived any such argument.17 Based on the full record after trial, GE has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are anticipated by Mugler 2000.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill According to GE’s expert8 witness, Dr. Norbert J. Pelc, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “significant working knowledge of MR spin-echo imaging, especially fast-spin-echo imaging,” as well as “a Ph.D. in a physical science (e.g., electrical or biomedical engineering or medical physics) with experience in the development of MR imaging techniques, or an M.D. degree or an M.S. degree in a physical science with significant (3–5 years) of work experience in the development of MR imaging techniques.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 105. The expert9 witness proffered by” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on Dr. Pelc’s credible testimony, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have met Dr. Pelc’s description. We further find that Dr. Hennig’s testimony on this issue does not differ materially from that of Dr. Pelc, and, in any event, our analysis in this Decision would be unchanged were we to apply Dr. Hennig’s description. C.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Claim Construction In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). No claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision.7 See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). B.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS RE44,644 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
• General Electric Co. v. University Of Virginia Patent FoundationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2017 · IPR2016-00358 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 141–146, 148, 151, 152, 159, 160, 242–246, 248, and 251 are unpatentable as anticipated; claims 141–152, 159, 160, and 242–251 are also unpatentable as obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “address the applicable burdens of proof on the parties. As an initial matter, the overall burden of persuasion of proving unpatentability on the asserted grounds based on Mugler 2000 lies with GE, and that burden never shifts. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Therefore, GE bears the burden to establish that Mugler 2000 qualifies as prior art. The burden of production, however, may shift between the parties. See Magnum Oil Tools, 829 F.3d at 1375–76; Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–80. Here, GE satisfied the initial burden of production by asserting that Mugler 2000 is § 102(a) prior art, and presenting evidence that it was published and publicly available before the priority date of the ’644 Patent.9 See Pet. 11. The burden of production then shifted to UVAPF, and UVAPF met that burden by producing evidence to demonstrate that the relevant content of Mugler 2000 was solely the work of the inventors of the ’644 Patent, i.e., the declarations of Dr. Mugler and Dr. Kiefer.10 See PO Resp. 18–20; Magnum Oil Tools, 829 F.3d at 1376 (“[T]he shifting of the burden of production is warranted [when] the patentee affirmatively seeks to establish a proposition not relied on by the patent challenger and not a necessary predicate for the unpatentability claim asserted.”). Consequently, the burden returned to GE to prove that the evidence of record does not establish that Mugler 2000 was solely the work of the named inventors. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380. GE did not carry this burden.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “An inventor’s own work is not prior art under § 102(a). See Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Katz, 687 F.2d at 454. In determining whether a reference is the work of the named inventor(s), the relevant inquiry is whether the relevant content of the reference—such as “the methods, detailed results, statistical analysis and discussion,” or “the design, trial, and analysis of results”—was solely the work of the inventor(s). See Allergan, 754 F.3d at 969. For example, an article may be solely the work of an inventor if the remaining co-authors were merely students performing tasks under the inventor’s direction and supervision. See Katz, 687 F.2d at 455–56. Before turning to the evidence to apply these precepts, we first address the applicable burdens of proof on the parties. As an initial matter, the overall burden of persuasion of proving unpatentability on the asserted grounds based on Mugler 2000 lies with GE, and that burden never shifts. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Therefore, GE bears the burden to establish that Mugler 2000 qualifies as prior art. The burden of production, however, may shift between the parties. See Magnum Oil Tools, 829 F.3d at 1375–76; Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–80.” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “For a patent to claim priority to the filing date of its provisional application, the written description of the provisional application must be sufficient to support the relevant claims of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Sufficient written description support requires providing enough information in the application to indicate to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the full scope of the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262–64 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The disclosure need not recite the claimed invention in haec verba, but a disclosure that “merely renders the invention obvious” is insufficient. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Resp. 21–59. More specifically, UVAPF argues the ’182 Application provides sufficient written description support for the challenged claims such that they are entitled to the priority date of the ’182 Application, i.e., December 21, 2000. Id. Based on the full record, however, the challenged claims have not been shown to have sufficient support in the written description of the ’182 Application and, thus, priority has not been established earlier than December 21, 2001. As with § 102(a), GE bears the burden to prove that Mugler is prior art under § 102(b) as part of its overall burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. GE also bears the initial burden of production, but satisfied that burden by asserting that Mugler 2000 is prior art under § 102(b). See id. at 1379. The burden then shifted to UVAPF to produce evidence that the challenged claims of the ’644 Patent are entitled to an earlier priority date. See id. at 1380. UVAPF met that burden by producing arguments and evidence to attempt to prove that the disclosure of the ’182 Application provides sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. See PO Resp. 22–59. Thus, the burden shifted back to GE to prove that the ’182 Application does not support the claims. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380. GE met that burden successfully, as explained below. For a patent to claim priority to the filing date of its provisional application, the written description of the provisional application must be sufficient to support the relevant claims of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Sufficient written description support requires providing enough information in the application to indicate to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the full scope of the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262–64 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The disclosure need not recite the claimed invention in haec verba, but a disclosure that “merely renders the invention obvious” is insufficient. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS RE44,644 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
• General Electric Co. v. University Of Virginia Patent FoundationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2017 · IPR2016-00357 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 75, 76, 78–82, 84–92, 94–96, 107, 111, 139, 140, 157, 158, 169–178, 180–184, 186–194, 196–198, 209, 213, 241, and 254–260 are unpatentable under § 102(b); the remaining challenged claims are unpatentable under § 103(a).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “An inventor’s own work is not prior art under § 102(a). See Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Katz, 687 F.2d at 454. In determining whether a reference is the work of the named inventor(s), the relevant inquiry is whether the relevant content of the reference—such as “the methods, detailed results, statistical analysis and discussion,” or “the design, trial, and analysis of results”—was solely the work of the inventor(s). See Allergan, 754 F.3d at 969. For example, an article may be solely the work of an inventor if the remaining co-authors were merely students performing tasks under the inventor’s direction and supervision. See Katz, 687 F.2d at 455–56.” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “For a patent to claim priority to the filing date of its provisional application, the written description of the provisional application must be sufficient to support the relevant claims of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Sufficient written description support requires providing enough information in the application to indicate to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the full scope of the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262–64 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The disclosure need not recite the claimed invention in haec verba, but a disclosure that “merely renders the invention obvious” is insufficient. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “For a patent to claim priority to the filing date of its provisional application, the written description of the provisional application must be sufficient to support the relevant claims of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Sufficient written description support requires providing enough information in the application to indicate to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the full scope of the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262–64 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The disclosure need not recite the claimed invention in haec verba, but a disclosure that “merely renders the invention obvious” is insufficient. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “For a patent to claim priority to the filing date of its provisional application, the written description of the provisional application must be sufficient to support the relevant claims of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Sufficient written description support requires providing enough information in the application to indicate to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the full scope of the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262–64 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The disclosure need not recite the claimed invention in haec verba, but a disclosure that “merely renders the invention obvious” is insufficient. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS RE44,644 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
• Black Swamp IP, LLC v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2017 · IPR2016-00693 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, 27, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 51, 57, and 60 are unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi under § 102.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “configured to “comprise an indication that the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link.” Patent Owner argues that “it is improper to equate establishing a secure communication link with indicating whether the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link” because claim 1 “separately recit[es] ‘establishing a secure communication link,’ . . . and ‘an indication that the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link.’” PO Resp. 22, 30 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 34, 46). Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently how a system that establishes a secure link somehow does not “indicate” that it supports doing so if the system establishes the secure link. One of skill in the art would have understood a system that establishes a secure link would support doing so at least as a matter of common sense. If the system did not support establishing a secure link, one of skill in the art would have expected such a system not to actually establish a secure link (the system not supporting such an action). This is contrary to Kiuchi’s system, for example, in which a secure link is established (thereby “indicating” that it supports doing so). For example, the “domain name service system” is recited in claim 1 as “establishing a secure communication link,” and comprising “an indication that the . . . system” may support the recited function of “establishing a secure communication link.” We do not observe, nor does Patent Owner point out in a meaningful way, any conflicts between a recited system comprising an “indication” that the system supports a recited function by performing the function that it supports and a recitation that the system is designed to perform that function.” slip op. at 6

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “(“New Issue #1” and “New Issue #2”) in Petitioner’s Reply Brief. PO Identification 1–5. After careful consideration of Patent Owner’s arguments and for reasons set forth below, we determine that Patent Owner’s arguments regarding alleged New Issue #1 are moot because we do not rely upon Petitioner’s arguments regarding that issue in this opinion. We also determine that alleged New Issue #2 was responsive to arguments raised by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 7,418,504 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,418,504

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.