- PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00525 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claim 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood it is obvious over Beard.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 21, the sole challenged claim. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claim 21 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[E]ither (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the aerospace, avionics, telecommunications, or electronic device manufacturing industry, or (2) at least four years of industry experience in any of the above industries. Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 47). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s proposed formulation. See generally Prelim. Resp. For 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2016/0253907 A1, published Sept. 1, 2016 (Ex. 1010). 4 PCT Pub. No. WO 2016/078093 A1, published May 26, 2016 (Ex. 1011). 5 PCT Pub. No. WO 2016/154949 A1, published Oct. 6, 2016 (Ex. 1012). 6 U.S. Pat. App. Pub. No. US 2016/0127890 A1, published May 5, 2016 (Ex. 1013). 7 PCT Pub. No. WO 2015/043123 A1, published Apr. 2, 2015 (Ex. 1014). purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is (1) consistent with the ’959 Patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Chowdhary. B.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“But before describing the embodiments cited by Patent Owner, the Specification plainly states: “Any terms not expressly defined herein have their conventional meaning as commonly understood by those having skill in the relevant art(s).” Ex. 1001, 4:64–67. Thus, the Specification itself cautions against construing the claim terms such as “secure identifier” as limited to the scope of the disclosed embodiments. Here, Patent Owner has not cited any express definition of “secure identifier,” or identified any explicit disclaimer of claim scope that might justify narrowing the scope of this claim term to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. In the absence of such a definition or disclaimer, we are not persuaded that the scope of the claim term “secure identifier” should be limited to specific aspects of the preferred embodiments cited by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 7–14. On this record, and at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction and preliminarily construe “secure identifier” as “a credential that can be used to securely verify the identity of a device, such as an airborne object or ground-based transmitter.”8” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“’071 Application lack adequate written description support for the “secure identifier” claim limitation. For a patent claim to be entitled to the priority date of an earlier-filed application, the earlier application must provide complete written description support for the claim as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). L.A. Biomedical Rsch. Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“L.A. Biomed”). To satisfy this requirement, the written description must “reasonably convey” to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession on the claimed priority date of each limitation of the later-claimed subject matter. L.A. Biomed, 849 F.3d at 1057. It is not enough that an earlier application’s disclosure “renders the later-claimed invention obvious;” as “the disclosure must describe the claimed invention with all its limitations.” L.A. Biomed, 849 F.3d at 1057. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application lack adequate written description support for the “secure identifier” limitation of claim 21. We have preliminarily construed “secure identifier” as “a credential that can be used to securely verify the identity of a device, such as an airborne object or ground-based transmitter.” See supra § II.B. As discussed above, the Specification of the ’959 Patent does not use the term “secure identifier,” but the Specification contains extensive discussion of the need for an identification credential that is secure (e.g., difficult for a bad actor to clone or impersonate). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:56– 65 (discussing the need for a system that is difficult to “clone”), 10:20–49 (discussing the need “trust” between a drone and ground-based equipment, and the need for a way to verifying the drone’s credentials), 11:5–12:62 (disclosing the use of encryption and a rotating SSID to generate a secure identifier for a drone). None of the portions of the Specification cited above is present in the ’153 Provisional or the ’071 Application. See generally Ex. 1006, 1007. The ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application discuss the need for identifiers for low-altitude aircraft (see, e.g., Ex. 1006, 2; Ex. 1007, 9), but there is no discussion of any need for an identification credential to be secure or resistant to cloning or impersonation. See generally Ex. 1006, 1007. The ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application do not disclose the use of encryption, SSIDs (much less rotating SSIDs), or any other technologies for the purpose of verifying the authenticity of an identification credential. See generally id. Based on our review of the ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application, we preliminarily conclude that neither of these applications would have reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor then had possession of the concept of the “secure identifier” that was later claimed in the ’959 Patent.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,713,959 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00261 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Haley anticipates claims 1, 7, 8, 17, and 20 and Haley with Lai renders the remaining claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Patent Owner argues that we should discretionarily deny the Petition based on alleged deficiencies in the Petition. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that “even if arguments as to a few claims might have been properly presented in the Petition, a decision to institute here would require the Board to address—for the first time and with no Petitioner input—critical claim construction issues affecting nearly every claim” in contravention of the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Prelim. Resp. 33–35. For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded on the current record that Petitioner has violated 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), or that critical and unresolved claim interpretation issues justifying discretionarily denying the Petition exist. We, therefore, decline to deny institution on this basis. E. Claims 1, 7, 8, 17, and 20: Anticipation by Haley” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“1. Lifter The Petition contends that the “lifter” limitation is a means-plus- function limitation, Pet. 7, which Patent Owner does not dispute, Prelim. Resp. 10–14. Patent Owner argues, however, that Petitioner has “fail[ed] to identify any structure in the ’007 Patent to perform the claimed function.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We disagree. Petitioner identifies the structures in the Specification corresponding to the “lifter” as follows: The “lifter” (“lifter member”) of the ’007 patent includes a rotatable cam lifter 100 (yellow below left), with pin 104, 106, and 108 (green) on its face surface that engage protrusions 92 (blue) on the driver member 90 (orange). ’007 patent, 9:36–52, 16:39–53, Fig. 12. The ’007 patent also discloses two-pin variants: lifter members 465 and 480 in Figs. 31, 33. ’007 patent, 32:23–38, 32:56–33:4. Pet. 17. This identification of corresponding structure is sufficient to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). We also note that at this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that Petitioner has correctly identified the corresponding structure. The parties may further address the proper interpretation of “lifter” at trial.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“gas pressure system” recited in the preamble of independent claims 1 and 17. Prelim. Resp. 21–22. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner, through its comparison of claims 1 and 17 to Haley, improperly implies that the “gas pressure system” can be “limited to a distinct portion of a power tool.” Id. at 23. Patent Owner contends that such an interpretation is improper because the “gas pressure system” must refer to “the entire system,” because the “structure of the claims themselves . . . include[s] . . . every component of the tool.” Id. We disagree. The “gas pressure system” recited in the preambles of claims 1 and 17 expressly refers to a system that is “for a power tool” and thus does not necessarily refer to “the entire” tool or “every component of the tool.” Ex. 1001, 39:6 (claim 1), 40:51 (claim 17). Neither claim 1 nor claim 17 recites, for example, the lifter or driver, which are required elements of an “entire” tool. Id. at 39:6–22 (claim 1), 40:51–67 (claim 17). The lifter and driver are introduced in dependent claims 2 and 18. Id. at 39:23–30 (claim 2), 41:1–9 (claim 18). Still other necessary components of a tool, e.g., a motor and power source, are introduced in dependent claims 5 and 19. Id. at 39:40–42 (claim 5), 41:10–13 (claim 19). By contrast to claims 1 and 17, independent claims 9 and 14 recite a “portable fastener driving tool” and expressly recite many necessary components of such a tool including the driver, lifter, prime mover, and power source. Id. at 39:54 (claim 9), 40:20 (claim 14). Accordingly, we find that the “gas pressure system” of claims 1 and 17 broadly refers to a portion of a power tool rather than the “entire system” or “every component of the tool.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,034,007 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Fendgo, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00114 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 were not shown unpatentable because DiPerna964 and Strack do not teach or suggest the panic button readying itself to perform the claimed functions.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“After review of the ’404 patent’s description, we find no disclosure that pressing the panic button together with another button causes the panic button to ready itself to perform functions (1) and (2) as recited in limitation 1[d]. The closest descriptions we find to limitation 1[d] are that the safety switch readies the panic button to contact 911 (Ex. 1001, 6:59–62), that the panic button may be activated by pressing the panic button with another button (id., 3:59–67, and that the panic button may start a speech recognition process that can trigger the device (id., 7:61–62). Consequently, claim 1 is itself the best source for determining what the claim language means. We determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of the “ready itself” feature of claim 1 is that the panic button “prepares itself to be triggered to perform the panic button functions (1) and (2).” Since the intrinsic evidence is sufficiently clear to discern the meaning of the “ready itself” limitation, we do not resort to extrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (explaining that extrinsic evidence is less significant than intrinsic evidence); Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (Court of Appeals gives primacy to intrinsic evidence and resorts to extrinsic evidence only if consistent with intrinsic evidence); Sequoia Tech., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 66 F.4th 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (Court of Appeals stating that its “decision rests solely on the intrinsic evidence”).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“Thus, the ’353 application describes that moving the safety switch into position readies the panic button to contact 911, which is not the same as the panic button being activated to ready itself to perform functions (1) and (2) required by claim 1 of the ’404 patent. Patent Owner’s reliance on disclosures elsewhere in the ’353 application is unavailing. PO Resp. 5–8 (citing Ex. 1006, 15, 17, 19–21, 23, 25); PO Sur-Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1006, 15, 17, 19–20, 24–25)). For example, while the ’353 application does mention voice activation with a codeword and activation by depressing of the panic button together with another button (see, e.g., Ex. 1006, 17, 21, 24–25), it does not mention that depressing the panic button together with another button causes the panic button to ready itself to perform recited functions (1) and (2). The application explains that “[t]he [panic] button can send a signal to a controller inside the device to activate [the code word activation] process” and “[t]he [panic] button can start the speech recognition process in one embodiment, to trigger the device.” Ex. 1006, 25. But that describes readying the device for activation by the code word, not readying the button to perform the recited functions. The ’353 application also mentions the word “ready” in relation to using a self-defense mechanism such as pepper spray, which does not appear to be related the readying of the panic button recited in claim 1. Ex. 1006, 15, 19–20. Petitioner has thus met its burden to demonstrate that claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent lack written description support for a panic button adapted to “ready itself” to perform the recited functions because the limitation is not present in the ’353 application to which the ’404 patent claims priority.3 Pet. 8–10. The burden of production thus shifted to Patent Owner to demonstrate that the ’353 application has written description support for limitation 1[d], which it has not done on this record. PO Resp. 5–8; PO Sur-Reply 2–3.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“DiPerna964 discloses a separate “safety” switch that readies the panic button to contact 911 upon being pressed (Ex. 1028 ¶ 41), but there is no mention of pressing the panic button together with another button to cause the panic button to “ready itself” to perform panic button functions (1) dialing a public or private network for an emergency purpose and (2) activating the transmitting unit, as limitations 1[d] and 1[e] require. DiPerna964 mentions pressing two buttons together to activate the panic button (see, e.g., Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 17, 23–25, 27), but not to “ready itself” to perform recited functions (1) and (2). Petitioner relies on Strack’s triggering the collection of audio, video, and location data for transmission to a remote location as equivalent to a panic button readying itself to, when activated, perform the panic button functions (1) dialing a public or private network for an emergency purpose and (2) activating the transmitting unit. Pet. 15–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–88). We do not agree with Petitioner’s contention because Petitioner fails to explain how Strack’s button press that collects and then transmits audio, video, and location data would ready the panic button to perform recited functions (1) and (2). It appears that Strack’s button press readies the device, not the button, to perform the functions. As neither DiPerna964 nor Strack nor their combination teach or suggest limitations 1[d] and 1[e], we determine it is unnecessary to proceed further with the obviousness analysis. PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1164 (Fed.Cir.2006) (stating that we consider motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success only “if all the elements of an invention are found in a combination of prior art references”)).” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which appears consistent with the educational level, technology, problems and solutions identified in the ’404 patent and prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level in this Decision.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 11,265,404 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,265,404 - Siemens Industry Software Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2023 · IPR2021-01215 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 11–15, 17, 18, and 21–24 are unpatentable over Yoshimura-based grounds; claims 6, 9, 10, 16, 19, and 20 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner offers an assessment as to the level of skill in the art as of the time the ’655 patent was filed. Pet. 9. For purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner and Petitioner’s declarant “adopt the [following] definition for the person of ordinary skill in the art”: “a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering, and has either received academic credits for an ASIC design course or completed at least one year of work experience in the VLSI design, electronic design automation for VLSI, or ASIC design fields.” Id. at 9–10; Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (Robins Declaration). Patent Owner applies the same definition. Resp. 5. To the extent necessary, we accept this definition because it is supported by the Robins Declaration and consistent with the ’655 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Although the phrase “separate from,” is not found in the claims, we look to the language of the claims, the description in the patent disclosure, and the prosecution history to determine what type of separateness is required by the claims. We start with the relied-upon Figure 4 of the ’655 patent, which illustrates a box labeled “Multi-Scenario ECO Database 426” that is near, but not overlapping with or surrounding, boxes labeled “Image 424” through “Image 422” and “Image 420.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 4. The ’655 patent also describes a storage device 408 as “storing scenario images 420– 424 that correspond to different scenarios,” and “can additionally store multi-scenario ECO database 426,” which “can include circuit information for multiple scenarios that can be used to estimate the impact of ECOs in multiple scenarios.” Ex. 1001, 5:9–11, 5:18–21.” slip op. at 9
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“determin[e/ing . . . ] an ECO to fix one or more design requirement violations, wherein said determining includes identifying an ECO to fix a design requirement violation in the scenario and checking that ECO against at least some of the multiple scenarios by estimating parameter values based on parameter values stored in the scenario image and the multi-scenario ECO database. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001, 21-24). In reviewing the term, the District Court explained that the multi- scenario ECO database “stores parameters and allows for a quick estimation of an ECO’s impact across multiple scenarios.” Ex. 2001, 19. The District Court further summarized the ’655 patent as describing that a scenario image is “[f]irst” loaded, and if there is a design requirement violation, an ECO is determined for that scenario, and then subsequent scenarios are loaded to check whether the ECO from the first scenario will create new, or exacerbate existing, design violations. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 4:21–33). However, as recognized by the Court, the process at the cited section is described in the ’655 patent as an “approach [that] may take an impracticably long time to fix design requirement violations in multiple scenarios” due to the long time that is required to load a scenario image. Id. at 24; Ex. 1001, 4:43–47. The Court reasoned that in order to determine an ECO to fix a violation, “determine” must involve “identifying” a possible fix and “checking” whether that fix is suitable. Id. at 23. Thus, the District Court’s construction requires both identifying and checking as part of the claimed determining step. Id. at 23–24. We agree with the District Court’s reasoning, and apply their construction in this proceeding.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner assertion that Yoshimura’s estimation in step S5 is performed to check an identified ECO is supported by the record. In determining the change to be made (the ECO), Yoshimura uses estimated parameters for the third and fourth corner conditions, calculated in step S5 through the “Hold Margin” equation. Ex. 1007, 6:63–67. Those third and fourth corner conditions are then used to check potential layouts identified in step S6. Id. at 7:18–20 (“In step S6, the automatic EC device 16 searches for a layout that does not cause a timing error under any one of the first to fourth comer conditions from the analysis results of step S4 and step S5.”). In this manner, step S5 sets an initial third corner condition having estimated parameter values that is included, as the initial step, in checking an identified ECO at steps S6–S8. Thus, Yoshimura’s determination of a change to satisfy the corner conditions is, to use Dr. Edward’s phrase, “based on” its third and fourth corner conditions having parameters estimated in step S5. For this reason, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Yoshimura discloses the claimed limitation.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,407,655 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,407,655 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2022 · IPR2022-00411 · APJ Paul J Korniczky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, or 13 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and other evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, and 13 of the ’690 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“2 The substantive discussion in Petitioner’s three declarations are essentially identical to each other and to the Petition. For example, pages 40–74 of the Petition are essentially identical to a single paragraph in each of the declarations –– Hopkins Decl. ¶ 88 on pages 54–92, Keough Decl. ¶ 88 on pages 63–97, and Denton Decl. ¶ 65 on pages 46–81. Thus, we question whether the declarations provide independent analysis and we give the declarations little, if any, weight. See Intex Recreation Corp. et al. v. Team Worldwide Corp., IPR2018-00875, Paper 129 at 40, n. 15 (PTAB Sept. 11, 2019) (“We further note that Dr. Stevick’s testimony is nearly identical to the language appearing in the Patent Owner Response, down to the case citation. This identity in language causes us to attribute less weight to a declarant’s testimony.” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s definition is unclear. Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition includes unclear and subjective requirements such as that the person of ordinary skill in the art have (a) worked “long enough to be aware of” certain items, including unexplained “primary existing RV features,” (b) familiarity with unexplained “common terminology,” (c) “good mechanical aptitude,” (d) “good spatial perception,” (e) “significant experience” with a wide variety of roles, and (f) “sufficient awareness of the various governmental regulations applicable to RVs.” Id. (citing Pet. 18–20). Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’690 patent. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“While we generally agree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a truss and beam, as used in the ’690 patent, are two different structures, serve different purposes, and provide different benefits to the overall design of a chassis, Patent Owner identifies the function, but not the structure, of a truss and beam. After considering the extrinsic and intrinsic evidence, we construe: (1) a beam to be a “body, with one dimension large compared with the other dimensions, configured to carry lateral loads (perpendicular to the large and bending dimension) and bending movements;” and (2) a truss to be a “frame built from members in tension and compression.” These definitions are consistent with the support structures shown in Figures 7 and 9 and discussed in column 3, lines 21–48 of the Specification. Referring to Figures 7 and 9, for example, truss 93C is a frame built from members in tension and compression and beam 93D has one large dimension and supports loads applied to its perpendicular axis. In addition, third section 93 of chassis 90 has beams, not trusses. Ex. 1001, 3:26–28.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,046,690 - Helen Of Troy Limited v. Tomy International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 7, 2022 · IPR2021-01208 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–21 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on anticipation by Song or obviousness over Song alone, with Kilion, or with Kassai.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we determine the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’176 patent “would be someone with a Bachelor’s degree in industrial design or furniture design with a focus on designing adjustable or reconfigurable furniture, or with one to two years of experience designing adjustable furniture or other products for infants or children.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 10). Patent Owner indicates that it “does not submit a different level of ordinary skill than the Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that it “does not believe any special claim constructions are required for the Board to conclude that the asserted prior art renders the challenged claims unpatentable.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner generally agrees, stating that “the Board does not need to construe the claims to deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 11. We determine that for the purposes of this Decision, it is unnecessary to expressly construe these claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms in controversy must be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that Patent Owner has the better position. With respect to Petitioner’s annotated versions of Song’s Figures 2 and 3, we agree that Petitioner’s arguments are not supported. To be sure, drawings may be relied upon for the purposes of anticipation. In re Bager, 47 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1931) (“Description for the purposes of anticipation can be by drawings alone as well as by words.” (citation omitted)). Nonetheless, an ambiguous reference cannot anticipate a claim. Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017). With respect to Figure 3, Song does not expressly teach that the bottom portion of water tank 3 is rigid. Rather, Song teaches that water tank 3 is made with foldable wall 2 that can be folded inward. Ex. 1005, 3. The support legs are also foldable to the inside of support levers 4 and each part can be joined and affixed in a small volume. Id. In other words, the walls, legs, and levers are folded together into a small volume to make the bathtub “convenient to carry.” Id. As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Figure 3 may very well depict the folded bathtub with a taut or folded wall (including the tank bottom) rather than a rigid material. The point, here, though is that we cannot tell from Figure 3 why the tank bottom is depicted as it is shown. Moreover, Song’s express description of the folded bathtub shown in Figure 3 does not support Petitioner’s position that the straight tank bottom must be rigid. Similarly, it is ambiguous as to whether Figure 2 uses cross-hatching to depict a rigid material for any illustrated structural components. Indeed, the left-side leg attachment of Figure 2 shows white dots against black. Id. at Fig. 2. But at the opposite side, the companion leg attachment near “6” does not show the same pattern. Id. Moreover, lid body 9, which is made from a synthetic resin, has no cross-hatching. Id. Further, the pattern presented in the magnified version (provided by Patent Owner) of Figure 2 shows uneven and inconsistent markings at the bottom of water tank 3. Thus, it is unclear whether the identified portion at the tank bottom contains any cross-hatching or intentional markings. Likewise, even if we were to apply purported drafting conventions (e.g., MPEP § 608.02) to a Japanese patent application, the relied upon markings shown in Figure 2 still do not show cross-hatching “with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.” Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,545,176 - PTAB · Jan 13, 2022 · IPR2021-01215 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including over Yoshimura and Srinivas.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherDenied
“pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. On the record before us, Petitioner has not produced evidence that a stay for the results of the instant inter partes review has been requested. The district court stay currently in force is for a limited time, until February 2022. Thus, the stay will expire approximately one month after issuance of this decision on institution. The effect of the current stay on the pending inter partes review proceeding would be extremely minimal, and would not appear to meaningfully allay any concerns of inefficiency or duplication of efforts. Furthermore, the parties’ reliance on other cases in which the district court judge considered requests for stay is misplaced. As the Board has explained, “[a] judge determines whether to grant a stay based on the facts of each specific case as presented in the briefs by the parties.” See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15, 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”). “We decline to infer, based on actions taken in a different case with different facts, how the District Court would rule should a stay be requested by the parties in the parallel case here.” Id. Accordingly, we find that this factor is neutral; i.e., it does not weigh for or against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1–24 of U.S. Patent No. 8,407,655 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’655 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Synopsys, Inc., (“Patent Owner”), filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). An inter partes review may not be instituted on fewer than all claims challenged in the Petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Having considered the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–24 of the ’655 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103(a). Pursuant to § 314, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–24 of the ’655 patent on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation, supported by evidence, of how each limitation of these claims is disclosed by Yoshimura. In view of the foregoing, we are persuaded that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on its assertion that claims 1–3, 8, 11–13, 18, 21, and 22 would have been anticipated by Yoshimura.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner alleges that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have been motivated to use capacitive load values as a parameter value in Yoshimura, because the capacitive load values at the pins affect the rate at which the pins’ voltage can change, and would be needed to determine whether a timing or power requirement has been violated. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180–181). Petitioner further alleges that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of succeeding in including capacitive load values in Yoshimura’s scenario image and/or multi-scenario ECO database, because Yoshimura’s database already includes similar types of parameter values. Id. at 40–41 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181).” slip op. at 26
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,407,655 - Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd. / Seoul Semiconductor, Inc. v. Document Security Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2021 · IPR2020-00938 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 7 are unpatentable as anticipated by Nichia-614; claims 5 and 6 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“PO Resp. 9 (quoting Ex. 1007 ¶ 29) (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not, however, explain how this difference in experience level would affect our analysis. Indeed, we see nothing in the record that indicates that viewing the ordinarily skilled artisan as having two more years of experience would change the outcome here. To the extent necessary, we apply Patent Owner’s adopted definition above because it is consistent with the ’119 patent and the asserted prior art and is supported by the Doolittle Declaration submitted by Petitioner. But our analysis would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“16. In particular, the patentee has not defined “conformal” or “substantially uniform” in the patent’s written description. See id. In fact, the terms do not appear in the Specification as originally filed. Id. at 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002, 152–162). And we see no other evidence of lexicography or disavowal with respect to these terms. See Ex. 1001. So, consistent with Petitioner’s articulation of the case law, the terms “conformal” and “substantially uniform” should be given “their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” See Thorner v. Sony Comp. Ent. Amer., 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cited in Pet. Reply 3. As evidence of the “ordinary usage,” Petitioner cites the patent’s” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“To be sure, a patent “specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Or it may reveal “an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope.” Id. “The patentee’s lexicography must, of course, appear ‘with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision’ before it can affect the claim.’” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The patentee can disavow claim scope with language in the specification or the prosecution history. Poly-Am., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “In either case, the standard for disavowal is exacting, requiring clear and unequivocal evidence that the claimed invention includes or does not include a particular feature.” Id. For the phrase “layer of phosphor particles” recited in the claims here, we see no reasonably clear, deliberate, and precise lexicography in the ’119 patent’s written description. When read in context, the sentence that Patent Owner characterizes as definitional simply explains that the drawings are not to scale: To simplify the drawings and better explain the present invention, the above figures show layers of relatively large phosphor particles that are only a few particles thick. However, it is to be understood that the phosphor layers are actually uniform layers constructed from much smaller particles, and the layers are many particles thick.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also quotes the sentence that reads in full: “In the proposed invention, a wavelength converting material such as phosphor is laid over the LED chip in a manner such that substantially all the phosphor particles are in contact with the LED chip and the walls of the cavity where the LED is mounted.” Ex. 1001, 3:16–19, quoted in PO Resp. 11 (emphasis added). The written description also discloses that “the phosphor particles all settle down and are deposited around the LED chip and at least some portions of the cavity walls.” Id. at 4:24–26, quoted in PO Resp. 12. Yet these sentences do not define the term “layer of phosphor” with the reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision required to limit the claim as Patent Owner proposes. In fact, the cited passages do not even explicitly use the term “layer of phosphor.” Id. Instead, these sentences describe a single, exemplary embodiment, which is not definitional. See id. Lastly, Patent Owner points to the drawings to support its position. PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 1001, Figs. 2–4, 6). But the drawings are merely exemplary, non-limiting embodiments. See Ex. 1001, 5:20–24; supra § II.C.1.b(1). In sum, we see no reason to interpret the claimed “layer of phosphor particles” as limited to the phosphor particles themselves. And we see no requirement in the claims that a “conformal layer of phosphor particles covering said die and in direct contact therewith” requires that the bottom layer of phosphor particles directly contact the LED, as Patent Owner has proposed. PO Resp. 11–13. Rather, consistent with the patent’s written description and the evidence of record, we determine that the recited “layer of phosphor particles” simply requires a layer that includes phosphor particles, without limitation to the position of the bottom phosphor particles relative to the LED.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 7,315,119 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,315,119 - Nichia Corporation v. Document Security Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 16, 2021 · IPR2020-00908 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 8, and 11 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner’s planar construction of “mounting surface” was unsupported and the references did not disclose the claimed surface.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSA’) would have had at least a B.S. in mechanical or electrical engineering or a related field, and four [years of] experience designing or developing semiconductor—including LED—packages.” Pet. 13 (citing Shealy Decl. ¶ 31). Petitioner adds that “a higher education or skill level might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. at 13–14. Patent Owner does not propose an alternative assessment but states: “For the purposes of this IPR proceeding, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Baker Decl. ¶ 26). We apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, which appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself can reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“For purposes of this decision, we need only address the proper construction of “mounting surface,” which is disputed by the parties. Here, Patent Owner’s argument and evidence produced during trial show that Petitioner’s construction of “mounting surface” is not in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that “the mounting surface having a plurality of recesses,” as recited in claim 1, means that the recesses are in the mounting surface itself. PO Resp. 10–11. As we discuss further here, this requirement cannot be satisfied by a single planar surface, as used in Petitioner’s analysis. See, e.g., Pet. 18. Both parties acknowledge the argument that the claimed recesses could be interpreted in at least two ways: The recesses could be (1) only in the packaged body, excluding the contacts; or (2) in the device as a whole. PO Resp. 12 n.6; see also Pet. 18–19 (reviewing the second interpretation). Under both interpretations, Petitioner asks the Board to construe the mounting surface as a plane. See Pet. 18–19. We need not resolve which” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For the reasons discussed in the Claim Construction Section, we disagree that the recited mounting surface can be a plane and still satisfy all the claim limitations. Supra § II.B. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s planar mounting surface does not include “recesses” at the side edges of the body as the claim requires. PO Resp. 15. Rather, the planar surface identified by Petitioner sits below the recesses in Kim’s device—i.e., “the depressions or indentations in molded resin package body 37” or the device as a whole. Pet. 41–42; Ex. 1004, Figs. 1, 3. Petitioner argues that, even under Dr. Baker’s analysis, Kim discloses the claimed mounting surface. Pet. Reply 10–11 (citing Ex. 1027). Dr. Baker’s analysis, however, is not consistent with the written description or the claims. Supra § II.B. In its challenge, Petitioner compares Kim’s device to the embodiment shown in Figure 4A of the ’040 patent. See Pet. 38–53. As discussed in the Claim Construction Section, however, of the challenged claim. Supra § II.B. Contrary to the claim’s requirement that the device itself comprise a mounting surface with “recesses and electrical contacts [that] are sized to provide offsets between said mounting surface and said electrical contacts,” both Kim’s device and the Figure 4A embodiment show recesses between the device and a flat surface on which the device is mounted. Compare Ex. 1004, Figs. 1, 3, with Ex. 1001, Fig. 4A, 5:11–14. Thus, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Kim. Claims 2, 3, and 11 also require a “mounting surface” because those” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“D. Obviousness over Kim and Shirahata Petitioner asserts that claim 8 is unpatentable as obvious over Kim and Shirahata. Pet. 54–59. Claim 8 depends from claim 1. Ex. 1001, 12:3–5. This ground relies on Kim for the limitations of claim 1, including the recited “mounting surface.” Pet. 54–59. Petitioner has not shown that Kim teaches the mounting surface in claim 1. Supra § II.C. Thus, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 is unpatentable as obvious over Kim and Shirahata.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 6,879,040 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,879,040 - Asetek Danmark A/S v. Coolit Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 12, 2021 · IPR2020-00825 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 are unpatentable over Bezama or Bezama and Chiang; claims 13–15 were not shown unpatentable over Kang or Anderson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“the 2007 Provisional describes the material of which plate 240 is made, much less indicates that the inventor had possession of an invention including a manifold body (i.e., plate 240) defining a pair of compliant surfaces. See generally Ex. 1005.” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Bezama discloses all limitations of claims 1 and 9. See Pet. 23–39; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–86. Patent Owner’s attempt to disqualify Bezama as prior art fails because claims 1 and 9 are not entitled to a priority date earlier than July 27, 2011. See supra § II.E. On this record, and considering all of the evidence and arguments put forth by the parties, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 9 are unpatentable as anticipated by Bezama. G.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“teach or suggest each limitation recited in claims 2, 4, and 5, and these contentions are supported by testimony from Dr. Tilton. See Pet. 54–66; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–137. Petitioner additionally identifies rationales for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Bezama and Chiang to arrive at the inventions recited in those claims. See id.” slip op. at 31
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“bifurcated flow limitation of claim 13. Resp. 46–52. In particular, Patent Owner asserts, with support from Dr. Pokharna, that the fluid entering any of Kang’s inlet channels 44 would mix with fluid from adjacent inlet channels, and that the bulk of the fluid from any inlet channel would exit through adjacent outlet channels, rather than traveling to the outer-most outlet channels as Petitioner suggests. Id. at 47–48; Ex. 2038 ¶¶ 105–114. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive and supported by well-reasoned testimony from Dr. Pokharna. For example, Dr. Pokharna correctly points out that Dr. Tilton has admitted that microchannels have high flow resistance. Ex. 2038 ¶ 112 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). We agree with Dr. Pokharna that because of this high flow resistance, fluid entering a microchannel through any inlet channel 44 would tend to exit through the path of least resistance (i.e., the nearest outlet channel 47) rather than traveling to each end of the microchannel and exiting through the most distant outlets. See id. ¶ 112. contention that in Kang that the bulk of any fluid entering a microchannel would exit through the closest outlet channel 47. See Reply 17–18. Instead, Petitioner contends that at least some portion of the fluid will reach each end of the microchannel. See id. This argument is not persuasive because claim 13 recites that the flow that enters each channel through the one aperture “bifurcates into two sub flows,” and requires that each of the recited outlet regions receives “one of the two sub flows” or “the other of the two sub flows.” This claim language is not satisfied by an outlet region that receives only a portion of one of the two recited sub flows. Claim 13 requires that each outlet region receive one of the same two sub flows that originally entered the microchannel. See also Ex. 2038 ¶ 108. Petitioner neither proposes a claim construction that would encompass such an embodiment, nor offers any persuasive evidence that a POSITA would read claim 13 to encompass such an embodiment. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Kang teaches or suggests a flow of heat exchange fluid that is bifurcated into two sub flows within each of the microchannels, wherein each of these two sub flows is received by one of the two outlet regions adjacent to the opposing ends of the microchannels, in the manner required by claim 13.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 10,274,266 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,274,266
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.