• Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,175,680
• Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,488,871
• Nokia Of America Corporation / Ericsson Inc. et al. v. General Access Solutions, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2025 · IPR2023-01416 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–15 and 18 not unpatentable; the petition failed to prove the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds, including failure to establish WiMAX as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “filed with the Office a statutory disclaimer disclaiming method claims 16, 17, 19, and 20. See Ex. 2007; see also Tr. 33, 21:1–12 (Patent Owner’s counsel informing the Board that the disclaimer had been filed in the USPTO Patent Center, and Petitioner’s counsel having no objection to the filing of the disclaimer as an exhibit in this inter partes review); Tr. 34:19 1 Petitioner identifies Nokia of America Corporation, Ericsson Inc., and T-Mobile USA, Inc. as real parties in interest. Pet. 72. 2 Patent Owner identifies General Access Solutions, Ltd. as the real party in interest. Paper 6, 1. (Patent Owner’s counsel stating, “General Access has disclaimed method Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20.”). We treat disclaimed claims as if they never existed. See Facebook, Inc. v. SKKY, LLC, CBM2016-00091, Paper 12 at 8 (PTAB Sept. 28, 2017) (expanded panel) (precedential) (“The Federal Circuit has held consistently that claims disclaimed under § 253(a) should be treated as though they never existed.”) (citing, inter alia, Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TWNK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in section 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”); Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.”)). Accordingly, the remaining claims challenged in this proceeding are apparatus claims 1–15 and method claim 18.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “of both types of parameters to be stored in the same “device” is consistent with the claim language. The claim recites “a profile parameter storage device,” “said profile parameter storage device for storing [two parameter] values,” and refers to “the values stored at said profile parameter storage device.” Ex. 1001, 13:10–16. Accordingly, the claim language speaks of a single device for storing both types of parameters.12 And, Petitioner does” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “of both types of parameters to be stored in the same “device” is consistent with the claim language. The claim recites “a profile parameter storage device,” “said profile parameter storage device for storing [two parameter] values,” and refers to “the values stored at said profile parameter storage device.” Ex. 1001, 13:10–16. Accordingly, the claim language speaks of a single device for storing both types of parameters.12 And, Petitioner does” slip op. at 32

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “Id. “[A] work is not publicly accessible if the only people who know how to find it are the ones who created it.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., 929 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008) Application of Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1978)). Accordingly, in this case, Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the WiMAX exhibit was disseminated or otherwise made available to interested ordinary artisans outside of the group that created the document. Petitioner has failed to satisfy that burden.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 6,947,477 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,947,477
• Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless v. General Access Solutions, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01147 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not establish that the claimed second transceiver routes information based on monitored signal characteristics.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the purported invention would have had either: (1) a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or a related field, and at least 2 years of work or research experience in digital communications systems, such as wireless communications systems and networks, or equivalent, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or similar field. Additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa. Ex. 1002, ¶¶1-46. Pet. 10. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. Cf. Ex. 2007 ¶19 (Patent Owner’s declarant, after acknowledging Petitioner’s definition, stating: “Patent Owner has not offered a different understanding of a POSITA, and the PTAB accepted Petitioner’s submission. I accept and use Petitioner’s and the PTAB’s definition of a POSITA.”). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “During oral argument, both parties confirmed their respective positions that the claim term “route” needs no construction. See, e.g., Tr. 11:7–9 (Petitioner’s counsel: “Frankly, it doesn’t make any difference to the analysis of the prior art. And so, we don’t believe that the PTAB needs to construe the term route, and so we have not proposed a construction.”); id. at 58:25–59:2 (Patent Owner’s counsel: “You know, I don’t think that you have to define routing in order to decide the case. I think you can do it, you know, just apply whatever plain and ordinary meaning is.”); cf. Tr. 40:14–18 (Patent Owner’s counsel at oral argument: “For the routing itself, you know, there is a District Court construction and that’s a construction that the other—the Petitioner did not ask for determination whether that’s appropriate or not appropriate here. We did not address that as well, so the parties aren’t arguing that that construction should be applied here.”). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art discloses or teaches, under Petitioner’s articulated theories, that a second transceiver routes information based on monitored characteristics. This is dispositive of the inter partes review. Accordingly, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of deciding the dispositive issues.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Ex. 1004, 5:25–36 (emphasis added). Thus, Palmer discloses that the determination to roam to another cell may be done by the mobile worker’s wireless communication device 20 having a specifically-programmed processor or may be done centrally, with examples being the “network” or central host processor. We disagree that this constitutes a disclosure of the access point 40 performing the roaming determinations. Rather, we find to be persuasive and credible Dr. Chrissan’s testimony that “a POSITA recognizes that an access point does not qualify as ‘centrally, for example, by the network or a central host processor,’” and, “[i]nstead, this phrase refers to one of the centrally located devices such as network 14 or central host processor 12 (in Fig. 1), or a device in administration building 33 (in Fig. 2).” Ex. 2007 ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 1004, Figs. 1, 2). Dr. Chrissan’s opinion is consistent with Palmer’s disclosure, as we will now discuss.” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence its foundational assertion that Palmer discloses that “access point 40 determines whether roaming by a portable terminal 20 should take place and routes data packets accordingly.” Pet. 26–27; see Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Failure to prove the matter as required by the applicable standard means that the party with the burden of persuasion loses on that point—thus, if the fact trier of the issue is left uncertain, the party with the burden loses.”). As such, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that Palmer discloses, as recited in independent claim 1, a second transceiver that, “based on the first signal characteristics and the second characteristics, routes information to the first mobile station and the second mobile station, respectively,” or, as recited in independent claim 6, “based on the first signal characteristics and the second characteristics, routing, using the second transceiver, information to the first mobile station and the second mobile station, respectively.” Ex. 1001, 10:38–44, 11:19–22. The Petition does not contain a contention that this “route” aspect of the claims would have been obvious. Compare Pet. 25–26 (offering an alternative argument for the monitoring aspect; contending that, “to the extent the Board disagrees that Palmer’s access point 40 performs the monitoring, it would have nonetheless been obvious to a POSA to select the access point 40 to perform the monitoring since it directly communicates with the portable terminals 20.”), with id. at 26–27 (making the anticipationtype contention that “[t]he access point 40 routes information” without an alternative obviousness contention); see also Pet. Reply 12–13 (arguing, under the monitoring-and-routing heading, that monitoring by the access point would have been obvious, but not arguing the same for routing). Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claims 1 and 6 and dependent claims 2–4 are anticipated by or would have been obvious over Palmer.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,426,794 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,426,794
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00777 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 16–27 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “35 U.S.C. § 314(a) due to the advanced state of the parallel district-court action, which Patent Owner notes has scheduled trial date of May 19, 2025. See Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner, however, has stipulated not to pursue in the district court action “the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Paper 10, 1 (Petitioner’s Sotera Stipulation). The Office recognizes that such stipulations mitigate concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the Board and the district court. See Director Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA-Post Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 21, 2022) (“Director’s Interim Procedure”),13 at 7–8. Thus, given Petitioner’s stipulation we decline to discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a) based on parallel litigation.” slip op. at 7

  • Parallel petitionsDenied

    “institution under § 314(a) because this is the second proceeding challenging the ’815 patent and Petitioner has not justified two such challenges. Paper 8 (Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioners’ Notice Ranking Multiple Petitions). Petitioner filed a Notice Ranking Petitions, noting that this proceeding involves a second petition challenging the ’815 patent, after a petition in IPR2024-00735 challenged claims 1–15. Paper 4 (“Pet. Ranking”). Petitioner’s Ranking asserts that the two petitions challenge different claims, and that the 27 collectively challenged claims are voluminous, occupying approximately six columns of the ’815 patent. Pet. Ranking 2. We note also that the independent claims challenged in this proceeding include limitations not present in the claims challenged in the -735 IPR, such as multiple user profiles and encrypted video information. See Ex. 1001, claims 16, 21. We conclude that the ’815 patent’s claims justify two petitions based on a combination of the number of 13 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_ memo_20220621_.pdf. limitations and the number of claims. We therefore decline to discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a) based on multiple parallel petitions.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “Kaplan and Bryant were included on an Information Disclosure Statement and thus were presented, but without a substantive discussion during prosecution, we cannot understand how the Office considered the references. Based on Petitioner’s contentions as discussed below, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in considering Kaplan and Bryant. See Pet. 100. The Horn–Baumgartner–Candelore combinations were not presented during prosecution, and Patent Owner has not shown that Horn’s disclosures are cumulative to references that were considered. Patent Owner provides figures from Horn and Honkaniemi (Ex. 2012), a reference considered in a related prosecution (Prelim. Resp. 6–7), but those figures alone do not suffice to demonstrate sufficient similarity between the two references’ disclosures. Patent Owner makes a similarly unpersuasive showing for Baumgartner and Volk (Ex. 2013), a reference “considered during examination.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8. None of those assertions persuade us that art substantially the same as the Horn–Baumgartner–Candelore grounds previously were presented to the Office. As such, we do not discretionarily deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have held a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, and Computer Engineering, or a related field, and two years of practical experience in digital data management.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1009, 9; Ex. 1002 ¶ 67). While Patent Owner acknowledges there are slight differences between their definition and Petitioner’s, Patent Owner concedes there is no practical difference between the two definitions. Prelim. Resp. 23. At this stage, we see no reason to depart from Petitioner’s proposed definition, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’815 patent.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,017,815
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00735 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–15 based on the petition’s asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “1. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner requests that we discretionarily deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) due to the advanced state of the parallel district court action. See Prelim. Resp. 15. Petitioner, however, has stipulated not to pursue in the district court action “the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Paper 10, 1 (Petitioner’s Sotera Stipulation). The Office recognizes that such stipulations mitigate concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the Board and the district court. See Director Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA-Post Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 21, 2022) (“Director’s Interim Procedure”),10 at 7–8. Thus, given Petitioner’s stipulation we decline to discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a).” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “Kaplan and Bryant were included on an Information Disclosure Statement and thus were presented, but without a substantive discussion during prosecution, we cannot understand how the Office considered the references. Based on Petitioner’s contentions as discussed below, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in considering Kaplan and Bryant. See Pet. 97. The Horn–Baumgartner combination was not considered during prosecution, and Patent Owner has not shown that Horn’s disclosures are cumulative to references that were considered. Patent Owner provides figures from Horn and Honkaniemi (Ex. 2012), a reference considered in a related prosecution (Prelim. Resp. 6–7), but those figures alone do not suffice to demonstrate sufficient similarity between the two references’ disclosures. Patent Owner makes a similarly unpersuasive showing for Baumgartner and Volk (Ex. 2013), a reference “considered during examination.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8. None of those assertions persuade us that art substantially the same as the Horn–Baumgartner grounds previously were presented to the Office. As such, we do not discretionarily deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim. We have evaluated all of the parties’ submissions and determine that the record supports institution. This decision to institute trial is not a final decision as to patentability of any challenged claim, or any factual or legal issue underlying patentability. Any final decision will be based on the full record developed during trial. We expressly inform Patent Owner that any argument not asserted in a timely filed Response or another manner permitted during trial shall be deemed forfeited or waived, regardless of whether the argument was presented in the Preliminary Response. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’815 patent is instituted on the grounds set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 31

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and two years of practical experience in digital data management.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1009, 9; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). While Patent Owner acknowledges there are slight differences between their definition and Petitioner’s, Patent Owner concedes there is no practical difference between the two definitions. Prelim. Resp. 23. At this stage, we see no reason to depart from Petitioner’s proposed definition, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’815 patent.” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,017,815
• Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00745 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 45–47, 51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 68, and 69 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness over Buibas and Sinyavskiy.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Considering the subject matter of the ’474 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for the person of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least,” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’474 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, except as noted above, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states that, at this stage of the proceeding, “no formal constructions are presently necessary,” and that it “maps the prior art in this Petition in a manner consistent with Patent Owner’s allegations of infringement before the district court.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–25. Patent Owner does not propose a claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express construction of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “Petitioner further argues that one of ordinary skill “would have reasonably expected success implementing the combination, especially as Buibas and Sinyavskiy describe highly similar systems involving spiking neural networks used for training/operating robots.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Indeed, Petitioner contends, “Buibas itself confirms that its spiking neural network can be partitioned, while Sinyavskiy provides the details for doing so.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). In response, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis is flawed because “there is no articulated reasoning regarding what specific element of claim 45 Buibas . . . does not disclose.” Prelim. Resp. 19–20. In other words, according to Patent Owner, Petitioner “failed to perform a proper obviousness analysis because Petitioner has failed to identify anything in the claims that Buibas lacks disclosure of for Ground 1A.” Id. at 20. Based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has set forth sufficient reasoning to support a motivation to combine Buibas and Sinyavskiy for purposes of institution, as well as sufficient reasoning to support the conclusion that one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis is flawed because it fails to identify what is lacking in Buibas’s disclosure. To the contrary, Petitioner explains that Buibas “broadly suggests” that its spiking neural networks “can be partitioned into modules for different tasks or behaviors” but “discloses little detail about the partitioning,” and that Sinyavskiy’s more detailed disclosure of partitioning spiking neural networks would fill in these details. See Pet. 12–13, 14–15, 24. Petitioner also relies on Sinyavskiy’s more detailed disclosures concerning partitioning the network to satisfy limitations [45.1] and [45.6]. Id. at 23–27, 35. Thus, Petitioner has sufficiently identified what is missing in Buibas (a detailed disclosure of partitioning spiking neural networks) and how that missing information is provided by Sinyavskiy (by disclosure of specific techniques for partitioning spiking networks).” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,663,474
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd et al. v. Polaris Powerled Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00771 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 7 are unpatentable over Kim and Steer; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have [had] a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or equivalent field, with 3–5 years of academic or industry experience in OLED display engineering or comparable industry.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44–45). Petitioner further asserts that “[a]dditional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, and “applies Petitioner’s definition.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 12; Ex. 1002 ¶ 44). Because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision (Dec. 13) adopting Petitioner’s proposal was incorrect, and because the parties apply the same definition at trial, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. Analysis Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Both parties have presented their understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “referenced to” and “independent of.” In the Institution Decision, we requested that “[i]f there is a dispute over the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms, the parties should address those issues during trial.” Dec. 14–15 n.6. On this record, the parties do not dispute each other’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms, and, based upon the parties’ arguments, we determine that no express construction of the claim terms is necessary to resolve the controversy, but address the parties’ arguments in the context of the prior art below.6” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “(1) Whether Kim teaches a “video driver receiving the video signal and generating a video drive signal indicative of the video signal” We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown that the identified portion of Kim’s Figure 10 teaches the recited “video driver” and “generat[es] a video signal.” We find particularly persuasive Petitioner’s annotated comparison of Figure 4 of the ’521 patent as compared to Kim’s Figure 10 (both reproduced above), which illustrates the similarities between the ’521 patent and Kim. See Pet. 25–28. As set forth by Petitioner, Kim’s voltage at node A4 (video drive signal generated by the video driver identified in the dark green box) is supplied to the gate of transistor M31, driving the organic light emitting diode OLED by the video driver circuitry identified in the dark green box, similar to how voltage v(t) 322 (video drive signal) is supplied to the gate of transistor M1 driving the OLED 32 by video driver 32 in Figure 4 of the ’521 patent. Id. at 29.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “such as that it is a “simpler design,” would be “an obvious design choice,” “would simplify material needs and cost,” was “well-known,” was a “trivial design change,” would “provide immunity to power source noise,” and “would allow rejection of other power supply noise, such as drift.” Pet. 68– 70. However, several of these reasons focus on what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to do, rather than what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do at the time of the invention. See Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1068– 69 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding problematic that “the Board focused on what a skilled artisan would have been able to do, rather than what a skilled artisan would have been motivated to do at the time of the invention”); InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive because they amount to little more than an assertion that the recited limitations could have been easily achieved. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s proposed modification of Hayafuji is a redesign that appears to be the result of hindsight rather than based upon a persuasive reason for the modification. See Sur-reply 15–18. Petitioner’s argument that the modification involves adding to the functionality of Hayafuji by using an obvious variation of the circuitry Hayafuji already discloses that eliminates both the ripple component and the non-ripple component (see Reply 20–21) supports the conclusion that the proposed modifications were improperly informed by the requirements of the claim. For example, Dr. Kattamis’s testimony describes the proposed modifications, which include removing the ripple component extraction circuit and rewiring the existing circuit. Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 270–273, 321–331. We find that the extent of the proposed modifications is more suggestive of hindsight than obviousness. See Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”); InTouch, 751 F.3d at 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (criticizing use of the challenged patent as a “roadmap” for putting what the expert referred to as “pieces of a ‘jigsaw puzzle’” together).” slip op. at 57

  Patent outcomesUS 7,259,521 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,259,521
• Microchip Technology Inc. v. Aptiv Technologies AGInstituted
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · PGR2024-00011 · APJ Jean R Homere · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Chang, Chang II, and POSITA knowledge.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all” slip op. at 2

  • Other 314aDenied

    “Petitioner hereby stipulates that, if the PTAB institutes this post-grant review, Petitioner will not pursue invalidity of the Challenged Claims in a parallel district court proceeding on the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this Petition. Pet. 106. Petitioner cites the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, issued June 21, 2022 (“Guidance Memo”)3 in support of its contentions. Pet. 106.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “§ 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which petitioner relies on the prior art or patent owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of that art or arguments. Id. Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we consider whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “At the time of the invention, a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience working with computer network protocols such as USB. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Id. (citations omitted). At this stage, we find Patent Owner’s proposed level of a POSITA to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’643 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We nonetheless invite the parties to further address this issue, if they deem it necessary and appropriate. The parties should also specifically explain how different definitions for one of ordinary skill in the art relate to specific arguments and issues of unpatentability or claim construction, to the extent that a dispute remains as to who constitutes a POSITA.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,681,643
• Foil Boarding Company, Inc. v. MHL Custom, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,586,659

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.